Fick v. State Of Alabama et al

Filing 16

ORDER DENYING Plf's #15 Motion for TRO as set out. Signed by Senior Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 2/27/18. (copy mailed to Plf on 2/27/18) (tot)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DANIEL HASSAN FICK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants.

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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-08-CG-MU
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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth herein below, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing the required elements
to obtain a temporary restraining order and, therefore, the motion (Doc. 15) is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action against Mobile County Public School System and the
State of Alabama on January 9, 2018, seeking damages for the Defendants’ alleged
negligent failure to protect him from harassment/bullying he suffered at the hands
of other students during his tenure in the Mobile County Public School System.
(Doc. 1). Plaintiff was subsequently ordered to amend his Complaint to meet the
general rules of pleading. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January
18, 2018, (Doc. 4) describing a number of harassing/bullying experiences he endured

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while a student in the Mobile County School System and identified several statutes
under which he brings this cause of action including, 42 U.S.C 2000a, 20 U.S.C.
1703, and 42 U.S.C. 2000c-8. (Doc. 4).
On February 25, 2018, Plaintiff additionally filed the subject Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 15) wherein he request this Court enter an
Order restraining Defendant, State of Alabama, from incarcerating Plaintiff for the
duration of the trial in the instant action for failure of Plaintiff to pay five traffic
citations. (Doc. 15). As grounds, Plaintiff states that “[t]he Defendant having the
ability to incarcerate Plaintiff, for these traffic violations, could serve an injustice.”
(Id.) Attached to Plaintiff’s motion is a letter from the District Attorney’s Recovery
Unit stating that a warrant has been issued for Plaintiff’s arrest for his failure to
appear in court for arraignment or otherwise pay the citations in full. (Doc. 15-1).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court previously noted the applicable standard for preliminary
injunctive relief in Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Key, 93 F.Supp.2d 1222 (S.D. Ala.
2000):
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish the following
four factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
threat of irreparable injury; (3) that its own injury would outweigh
the injury to the nonmovant; and (4) that the injunction would not
disserve the public interest. Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th
Cir.1999); McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th
Cir.1998). The Court should be mindful that a preliminary injunction
is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the
movant has clearly satisfied the burden of persuasion as to the four
requisites. McDonald's, 147 F.3d at 1306; Northeastern Fl. Chapter of
the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d
1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990).

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Id. at 1226-27. The same standard applies to a request for a temporary restraining
order as to a request for a preliminary injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., v.
Frisby, 163 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d
898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s motion is silent as to all four factors that Plaintiff must establish in
order to succeed on his motion for TRO. Nevertheless, considering liberally the facts
pled in pro se Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and the information provided in the
Motion for TRO, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met even the first factor,
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. First, it is unclear what
connection, if any, Plaintiff’s request for a TRO relating to his unpaid traffic tickets
has to his lawsuit relating to being bullied/harassed in the Mobile County Public
School System, such that he could ostensibly establish a likelihood of success on the
merits. Nevertheless, assuming a viable connection could be made, Plaintiff makes
no argument that his citations are invalid or that his failure to either pay the fines
charged or appear in court were justified. As a result, Plaintiff has not established
that he will likely prevail on the merits. While Plaintiff’s failure to establish any
one factor is enough to defeat his motion for TRO, Plaintiff also fails to establish any
of the three remaining factors required. Specifically, Plaintiff’s position that his
incarceration “could be an injustice” falls far short of showing irreparable injury.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s own injury –assuming one existed – would not outweigh the
injury to the State, that is, its inability to properly collect the fines validly owed to it
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by traffic offenders and lastly, Plaintiff’s request that he be exempt from a financial
obligation or other penalty to the State of Alabama for his own failure to pay fines
due to the State by him would not serve public interest.
Because the failure to show any of the four factors is fatal to Plaintiff’s motion
for TRO, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. 15) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of February, 2018.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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