Coleman v. Berryhill

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the Commissioners final decision denying Colemans applications for SSI under Title XVI of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, made final by the Appeals Councils denial of review on May 1, 2017, is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson on 7/9/19. (srr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAREN DENISE COLEMAN
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00195-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Karen Denise Coleman brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 14, 17)
and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as “(R.
[page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the issues
raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held November 27, 2018, the Court
finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED under §
1383(c)(3) and sentence four of § 405(g).1

With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned
Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in
this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Doc. 21).

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I.

Background

On March 20, 2015, Coleman filed a Title XVI application for supplemental
security income, alleging disability beginning November 27, 2013. 2 After her
application was initially denied on August 11, 2015, Coleman requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review. A hearing was held with an ALJ on February 13, 2017.
On May 1, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Coleman’s
applications, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not
entitled to benefits. (See R. 15).
The Commissioner’s decision on Coleman’s application became final when
the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied
her request for review of the ALJ’s decision on March 5, 2018. Coleman
subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review
of the Commissioner’s final decision.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final

determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI
benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this
title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section
405 of this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of

“For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates
disability on or before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. §
423(a)(1)(A) (2005). For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month
where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202–
03 (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

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the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by
a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of
such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security
may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under
sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).
II.

Standards of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on
proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” ’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233,
1239 (11th Cir. 1983))).

“‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the

[Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached
is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin
3

v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
“Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as
automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if
the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens
v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to
conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions
that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based
on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered
in light of all the relevant facts.”).3 “In determining whether substantial evidence

Nevertheless, “[m]aking district courts dig through volumes of documents and
transcripts would shift the burden of sifting from petitioners to the courts. With
a typically heavy caseload and always limited resources, a district court cannot be
expected to do a petitioner’s work for him.” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings).
“[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a
massive record,” id., and “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill
every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it…’ ”
Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added).
Generally, claims of error not raised in the district court are deemed waived. See
Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that
has not been raised in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of
his assertions in the district court, we decline to consider them on appeal.”
(applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3));
Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (same); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App'x
958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 671 F. App'x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As
a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented
to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211,

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exists, [a court] must…tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as
unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,
131 (11th Cir. 1986).
However, the “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to
findings of fact.

No similar presumption of validity attaches to the

[Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper
standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050,
1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679
F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the
administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of
the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive ....’ 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the statutory language,
this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by
the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity
attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of the
proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks

1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating as waived a challenge to the administrative law
judge’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . .
before the administrative agency or the district court’).”); In re Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program
Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim,
argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the
district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity
to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)
(applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal).
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omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.”
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin
v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “‘The [Commissioner]’s failure
to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning
for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates
reversal.’” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference
and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo
the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting
decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”).
Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App’x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per

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curiam) (unpublished).4
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential
evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5
“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to
demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant
work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093
(11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial
burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or
clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain;
and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d
1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251,

In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,
but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).
5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing
individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.
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1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly
and in combination.

Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself,

conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves
that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant
work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the
claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of
engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the
national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v.
Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears
the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant
work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and
fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison
v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is wellestablished that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record.
Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and,
consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.”
(citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and
conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts.

In

determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence
as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
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When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of
that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final
decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But “when a claimant properly presents
new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether
that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at
1262. Nevertheless, “when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court]
will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining
whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel,
150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).
III.

Summary of the ALJ’s Decision

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Coleman’s earnings did not equate
to the level of substantial gainful activity as defined in 20 CFR 416.974 and that
she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date,
March 20, 20156. (R. 17). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Coleman had the
following severe impairments: hepatitis C, narcolepsy, personality disorder, and
a history of substance abuse.

(R. 17). The ALJ concluded that Coleman’s

impairments did not “have more than a de minimis effect on the claimant’s ability
to perform basic work activities, and, therefore, are not ‘severe’ disabling
impairments.” (R. 17) At Step Three, the ALJ found that Coleman did not have

“The record reveals that the claimant earned $339 in the fourth quarter of 2015, $64 in
the first quarter of 2016, and $64 in the second quarter of 2016. (Exhibits C4D and
C8D).”(R. 17).

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an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity
of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 19
– 20).
At Step Four,
the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the
regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about
[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine
whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under
the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth
step…20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will
conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past
relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.
In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant
work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant
medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That
is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular
work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the
claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to
her prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).
The ALJ determined that Coleman had the RFC “to perform medium work
as defined in 20 CFR 416.967 (c) except she should avoid all exposure to heights
and hazards.” (R. 20). Based on this RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert
(VE), the ALJ determined that Coleman is limited to simple, routine, repetitive
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tasks; simple work-related decisions; occasional interaction with supervisors and
coworkers; no direct interaction with the public; and gradual change in a routine
work setting. (R. 20). Coleman does not have past relevant work. Alternatively,
the ALJ proceeded to Step Five and found that there exist a significant number of
jobs in the national economy that Coleman could perform given her RFC, age,
education, and work experience. (R. 25). Thus, the ALJ found that Coleman was
not disabled. (R. 28).
IV.

Analysis

Coleman claims that the ALJ “committed reversible error in violation of 20
C.F.R.§§404.1527(c)7 by failing to evaluate or explain the weight accorded to the
consultative examination performed by Dr. Kenneth Starkey.” (Doc. 14 at 1).
Additionally, Coleman maintains that the ALJ failed “to order a medical expert to
clarify the medical evidence of record” pursuant to HALLEX I-2-5-34. (Doc. 14 at
2).
A. The ALJ did not err in the decision to accord little weight to Dr. Starkey’s opinion.
“With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, in a
social security disability proceeding, but he must clearly articulate the reasons for
doing so.” Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F. 3d 1176, 1179(11th Cir.
2011). Furthermore, when and if "the ALJ fails to state with at least some

“Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive. Unless we
give a treating source’s medical opinion controlling weight under paragraph (c)(2) of this
section, we consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give to any
medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c).

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measure of clarity the grounds for his decision, in a social security disability
proceeding, the reviewing court will decline to affirm simply because some
rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” Social Security Act, §
205(g), 42 U.S.C.A § 405(g), Id.
On December 16, 2016, Dr. Kenneth Starkey completed Coleman’s consultative
psychological evaluation. (R. 23). The evaluation described Coleman as evasive
and that she “exhibited significant symptom exaggeration behaviors and that her
overall motivation and cooperation for completing the tasks of the assessment
appeared questionable.” (R. 23). After the evaluation, Dr. Starkey concluded that
Coleman had antisocial personality disorder and decided that a “more accurate
diagnosis and more reliable prognosis could not be established.” In addition, Dr.
Starkey noted that Coleman “clearly appeared to be malingering.” (R. 23).
Coleman maintains that the ALJ “gave little weight to Dr. Starkey’s estimates
as to functioning, but did not address any weight given to his report.” (Doc. 14 at
2). Coleman references the ALJ’s statement in the RFC, noting that, “Dr. Starkey
himself did not consider the conclusions to be reliable and his estimates as to
functioning are therefore given little weight.” (Doc. 14 at 2). The Commissioner
contends that the ALJ performed a proper evaluation and correctly gave Dr.
Starkey’s findings and conclusions “little weight”, based on statements provided.
The ALJ explained: “(1) Dr. Starkey’s conclusion that she ‘clearly appeared to be
malingering’ (Tr.23, 32) and (2) that Dr. Starkey’s limitations are contradicted by
other evidence in the record (Tr. 23-24).” (Doc. 17 at 4). Also, the ALJ noted:
12

Dr. Starkey observed that the claimant exhibited significant
symptom exaggeration behaviors and that her overall motivation and
cooperation for completing the tasks of the assessment appeared
questionable; for example, she occasionally referenced a non-existent
person in the room talking to her, and reported the colors of the
American flag to be black, yellow, and green. (Doc. 17 at 5).
As the Commissioner correctly notes, “it is the ALJ’s duty to weigh medical
evidence…she is not bound to adopt a medical opinion when other evidence in the
record contradicts its. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a)(3). Since an RFC assessment is not a
medical assessment, the ALJ need not adopt any doctor’s opinion to assess
plaintiff’s RFC…”(Doc. 17 at 4). Coleman argues that, “Dr. Starkey clearly stated
in his medical source statement that, ‘Plaintiff may have been malingering or
experiencing delirium secondary to unspecified medical condition (possibly
untreated Hepatitis C).” (Doc.14 at 3). The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ
was unable to find information in Coleman’s record that would establish prior
treatment for mental health issues from a mental health professional or
psychiatric specialist. (Doc. 17 at 5). Thus, the ALJ deduced that the Coleman’s
treatment history “did not suggest mental health findings consistent with Dr.
Starkey’s limitations.” Id.
Additionally, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ considered Coleman’s
report of activities during her evaluation with Dr. Starkey8. (Doc. 17 at 6). With

“The claimant has described her daily activities that include watching television, reading ,
watching movies, playing cards, preparing her own meals, cleaning, doing laundry, washing
dishes, taking out trash, and taking care of her dog. She drives a car, shops in stores,
attends church, goes to sport events, uses her phone for social media such as Facebook,
visits friends, and spends time playing cards (Spades) and talking with others on the phone

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information attained from Coleman’s report, the ALJ concluded that Coleman’s
mental impairments were not supported by sufficient evidence and “are not
consistent with the severity of Dr. Starkey’s limitations.” (Doc. 17 at 7). The
undersigned finds that the ALJ articulated specific reasons why Dr. Starkey’s
opinion was accorded little weight and substantial evidence exists to support the
ALJ’s determination.
B. The ALJ did not err in its decision to not call a medical expert to clarify the
medical evidence.
Coleman next argues that under the Hearings, Appeals, and Litigations Law
Manual (“HALLEX”), the ALJ failed to call a medical expert to clarify the medical
evidence of record. Pursuant to HALLEX I-2-5-34, an ALJ may need to obtain an
ME (medical expert) opinion, either in testimony at a hearing or in response to
written interrogatories, when the ALJ determines the degree of severity of a
claimant’s physical or mental impairment. HALLEX states that the ALJs are
required to obtain a medical expert’s opinion when: (1) the Appeals Council or the
court so orders; (2) to evaluate and interpret background medical test data; or (3)
when the ALJ is considering a finding that the claimant’s impairment(s) medically
equals a medical listing. The crux of Coleman’s argument concerning HALLEX,
yields to the discretion of the ALJ, placing emphasis on the word “may.”

daily. She reported she feeds, walks and bathes her dog. The claimant indicated she can go
out alone and is able to take care of her own finances. She goes outside daily and gets along
well with family, friends, and authority figures. She noted that she can follow spoken
instructions well.” (Doc. 17 ay 6-7).

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Coleman maintains that the ALJ’s decision to not address the second part of
Dr. Starkey’s examination concerning her Hepatitis C, resulted in an RFC not
supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 14 at 5-6). Coleman asserts that the ALJ
“formulated a residual functional capacity that is based on a lack of medical
evidence,” and that “the ALJ delineated a residual functional capacity that is not
supported

by

substantial

evidence…and

essentially

substitutes

the

Administrative Law Judge’s own medical opinion.” (Doc. 14 at 5-6).
In response, the Commissioner argues that none of the circumstances that
require appointment of a medical expert are present in this case. Specifically, that
Coleman does not present facts that highlight the ALJ’s failure to act within the
HALLEX guidelines or that the described circumstance required an medical
expert’s opinion. (Doc. 17 at 8). The undersigned concurs.
The ALJ did not err in her decision to not receive the opinion of a medical
expert, and pursuant to HALLEX 1-2-5-34, was not required to do so. Accordingly,
the Court OVERRULES Coleman’s claims of reversible error and finds that the
Commissioner’s final decision denying her benefits is due to be AFFIRMED.
V.

Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s final decision denying Coleman’s applications for SSI under Title
XVI of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, made final by the Appeals Council’s
denial of review on May 1, 2017, is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
15

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
DONE and ORDERED this the 8th day of July 2019.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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