Williams v. Nexstar Media Group et al

Filing 10

ORDER denying 8 Motion for Recusal of Magistrate Judge, as set out. Copy to Plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 3/28/2024. (meh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WENDY M. WILLIAMS,

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*
*
*
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-00456-KD-B
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*
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Plaintiff,
vs.
NEXSTAR MEDIA GROUP, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This

action

is

before

the

Court

Williams’ Request for Recusal (Doc. 8).

on

Plaintiff

Wendy

M.

Upon consideration, the

motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff Williams, who is proceeding pro se, asserts that
the undersigned should recuse from this case “due to bias” pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Id.).

According to Williams:

Mrs. Wendy Williams has dealt with this judge before and
has never won her case against several individuals who
ha[ve] violated her, and this judge and others know this
and ha[ve] done nothing to stop these individuals from
harming, Ms. Wendy M. Williams.
(Id. at 3-4).
28 U.S.C. § 455 requires a judge to remove herself in “in any
proceeding
questioned”

in
or

which
if

h[er]

“[s]he

impartiality
has

a

might

personal

bias

reasonably
or

be

prejudice

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding[.]” 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) & (b)(1).
The applicable legal standard is whether “an objective, fully

informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the
judge’s impartiality.”

Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333

(llth Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “A party introducing a motion
to recuse [under 28 U.S.C. § 455] carries a heavy burden of proof;
a

judge

is

presumed

disqualification
otherwise.”

to

bears

be
the

impartial

and

substantial

the
burden

party
of

seeking
proving

Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 985 (8th

Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see In re Clark, 289 B.R. 193, 196
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).
The undersigned has fully reviewed and considered Williams’
motion and finds that there is no legitimate reason for recusal.
The mere fact that Williams is not pleased with the undersigned’s
rulings provides no basis for recusal.

See Stringer v. Doe, 503

F. App’x 888, 890 (llth Cir. 2013) (“Judicial rulings standing
alone rarely constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.”).

Moreover, “a judge, having been assigned to a case,

should not recuse [her]self on unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation.”

United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556,

1558 (llth Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Lawal v. Winners Int’l
Rests. Co. Operations, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63695, at *4,
2006 WL 898180, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2006) (“A trial judge has
as much obligation not to recuse [her]self when there is no reason
to do so as [s]he does to recuse [her]self when the converse is
true.”); United States v. Malmsberry, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349

2

(M.D. Fla. 2002) (“[A] judge has as strong a duty to sit when there
is no legitimate reason to recuse as [s]he does to recuse when the
law and facts require.”).

Not only has Williams failed to provide

a reasonable basis for recusal, but the record evidence clearly
shows, as set forth in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 7),
that Williams has repeatedly failed to comply with orders of this
Court.1
For the reasons set forth above, Williams’ request for recusal
is DENIED.
DONE this 28th day of March 2024.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS_______
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

While Williams belatedly filed an amended complaint (Doc. 9)
after the deadline set by the undersigned, she has made no effort
to file a new motion to proceed without prepayment of fees or in
lieu thereof, pay the $405 statutory filing fee as directed by the
Court. (Doc. 6).
3