Leblanc v. MIS Inc. et al

Filing 49

ORDER denying 42 Motion for TRO, as set out. Signed by District Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 11/26/2024. (meh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALLISON-KATHLEEN OF HOUSE
LeBLANC, YOUR ORATOR, et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIS, INC., REGIONS BANK, FREDDIE
MAC, MO’S TOWING LLC, DEPUTY
SHERIFF CLARENCE HERRING, and
BALDWIN COUNTY SHERIFF HUEY
HOSS MACK,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 24-00209-KD-MU

ORDER
This action is before the Court on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed by
Plaintiff Allison-Kathleen of House LeBlanc, Your Orator (doc. 42), Defendants MIS Inc., Sheriff
Huey Mack and Deputy Clarence Herring’s opposition (doc. 45), Plaintiff’s supplement to her
Motion (doc. 47), and Defendant MIS, Inc.’s opposition to the supplement (doc. 48). Upon
consideration and for the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is DENIED.
I. Motion for temporary restraining order
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order against “William Tyndall and Dewey
McGowan, officers and associates of MIS, Inc., a foreign corporation; and ‘Officers’ and ‘Deputies’
of the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office” to
1. Prohibit the disposing of, damaging, or destroying our property.
2. Prohibit them from imposing any conditions, such as settlement of this case, for
the retrieval of Plaintiffs' property.
3. Allow Plaintiffs immediate and unfettered access to their property to retrieve
their tools, trucks, movable buildings and sheds, and other belongings necessary
for their work and daily life, which are unrelated to the foreclosure.

4. Restrict any party, including Plaintiffs, Defendants, “officers” of the BCSO, and
all associates from accessing the property until the resolution of the ongoing
federal case, except as permitted for the purposes of retrieving the specified
essential belongings.
(Doc. 42).
A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the
injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest.” FF Cosmetics FL, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 866 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir.
2017) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Gissendaner v.
Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2015) (same standard for granting
a temporary restraining order). Injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’ and should
not be granted unless ‘the movant clearly establishe[s] the “burden of persuasion” as to each of the
four prerequisites.’” FF Cosmetics FL, Inc., 866 F.3d at 1298 (quoting McDonald's Corporation v.
Robertson, 147 F. 3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998)). Also, the “court may issue a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the
court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Relevant here, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that irreparable injury
is “the sine qua non of injunctive relief.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that an “injury is ‘irreparable’ only if it cannot
be undone through monetary remedies.” Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1449
(11th Cir. 1991).
Review of the supplement to the Motion indicates that Plaintiff asserts that past harms
already inflicted resulted in irreparable injury which cannot be undone through monetary relief.
Plaintiff alleges that “constitutional violations” occurred during the eviction in June 2024 (doc. 47,
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p. 1-2). She argues that the “trauma” of the eviction “caused significant emotional and
psychological harm” and that “emotional distress and psychological harm constitute irreparable
harm, particularly where the plaintiff’s emotional stability and personal safety were at risk.” (Id.).
However, the record indicates that the eviction concluded in June 2024. Plaintiff waited almost five
months to move for a temporary restraining order. And she waited until after filing an amended
complaint seeking “$ 9 million for the losses suffered” (doc. 6). The delay and claim for monetary
relief weigh against a finding of irreparable harm. See Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d
1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[a] delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only
a few months -- though not necessarily fatal -- militates against a finding of irreparable harm”
because “the very idea of a preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent
action to protect a plaintiff's rights before a case can be resolved on its merits.”) (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiff argues that “unique and essential property” among them “irreplaceable antiques”
and “priceless sonograms and baby photos” were “destroyed” during the eviction (doc. 47, p. 2).
She argues that other property, including medical records, were “discarded” (Id.). Since these items
were destroyed or discarded in June 2024, Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm if she is not
allowed to enter the foreclosed property to recover personal property that no longer is there.
Plaintiff also argues that “[i]ncreased housing costs have arisen from having to rent furnished
housing” (Id.). However, monetary relief can compensate for increased housing costs. Plaintiff also
argues that her mother’s medical bed was destroyed, and her backup bed was damaged, which
negatively affected her mother’s health. She argues that “threats to health and safety” cannot be
“undone by financial compensation” (Id.). Again, Plaintiff waited almost five months before filing
her motion for a temporary restraining order. Thus, there does not appear to be any “need for
speedy and urgent action” Wreal, 840 F.3d at 1248, with respect to her mother’s medical beds or
any threat to health and safety.
Plaintiff also alleges irreparable harm from “disrupted livelihood” (Id., p. 2). She argues
that Defendant Mo’s Towing, Inc. towed and stored her husband’s trucks and trailers during and
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after the eviction, which prevented him from working. Plaintiff states that Mo’s Towing agreed to
return the property, but her wrongful arrest for trespassing has “made it impossible to secure a place
for their return” (Id.). Plaintiff also argues that the “false allegations by Mr. Tyndall of MIS, Inc.,
have the potential to damage [her] nursing career and professional registration” and “prevented
[her] from working extensively” (Id.).1 These arguments are not relevant to the injunctive relief she
seeks (doc. 42, p. 2) (see supra, p. 1-2). Plaintiff argues that “[t]hey have failed to secure the land
leading to the theft of [her] husband’s tools, 22 ft. trailer, and wench” (Id.). “They” appears to mean
Defendant MIS, Inc., the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Again, Plaintiff will not suffer
irreparable harm if she is not allowed to enter the foreclosed property to recover personal property
that no longer is there.
Plaintiff alleges irreparable harm caused by “animal endangerment and property
destruction” (Id., p. 3). She alleges that her dog escaped because her arrest for the false trespassing
charge prevented her from completing a “dog enclosure” on the adjacent property which she rents.
She reports that the dog was found but had lost weight. The Court finds no merit to the allegation
the Plaintiff would be irreparably harmed if no temporary restraining order is entered because the
dog escaped months ago and has since been found.
Plaintiff also alleges that McGowan “began feeding my cats and chickens, luring them
away” from the coop on the adjacent property. She argues that this “interference with feeding my
animals disrupted their care, reducing our ability to provide for our family’s sustenance” which
cannot “be compensated for through monetary damages” (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff appears to allege that
she has been deprived of food, i.e., chickens. However, the loss of chickens could be compensated
with monetary relief. Again, the approximately five months delay in seeking a temporary
restraining order weighs against a finding of irreparable harm which cannot be remedied with
monetary relief.

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Plaintiff appears to mean the criminal trespass action based upon Tyndall’s complaint that she
trespassed upon the foreclosed property.
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Plaintiff’s last arguments in support of irreparable harm – that she is financially depleted and
emotionally distressed, that her firearms were unlawfully seized during the eviction in violation of
the Constitution and returned in damaged condition, and that a Deputy Sheriff used coercive and
intimidating tactics during the eviction – are without merit. Should she prevail on her action, she
may pursue monetary damages as compensation for the harm alleged. Again, the approximately
five months delay in seeking a temporary restraining order weighs against a finding of irreparable
harm which cannot be remedied with monetary relief.
Also, the Plaintiff has utterly failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Rather,
she has merely made conclusory statements that her Constitutional rights were violated and the
eviction was wrongful.
Since Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm or likelihood of
success on the merits, she cannot meet all the elements necessary to obtain a temporary restraining
order. Plaintiff has failed to show that her injuries are irreparable, i.e. “cannot be undone through
monetary remedies.” Ferrero, 923 F.2d at 1449. Accordingly, her motion is due to be denied.
II. Attorney fees and costs
Defendants MIS, Inc., Sheriff Mack and Deputy Herring seek an award of costs and attorney
fees incurred in defending Plaintiff’s motion (doc. 45, doc. 48). They argue that Plaintiff’s motion
was not brought in good faith, but instead was intended to financially harm and harass the
Defendants. As a result, Defendants claim they have unnecessarily incurred attorney fees and costs.
They also argue that Plaintiff’s motion was a waste of judicial resources, and improperly prolonged
this litigation. The Court is not inclined to award attorney fees and costs at this time. However, the
Plaintiff is warned that any frivolous filings or repetitive filings in the future may result in attorney
fees and costs being awarded for the Defendants.
DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of November 2024.
s / Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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