Muhammad v. Bethel-Muhammad et al

Filing 255

ORDER denying 211 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff. All claims against Bethel are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge William H. Steele on 10/17/2013. Copy mailed to Plaintiff & Brenda Bethel-Muhammad on 10/17/13. (tgw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
KALIM A.R. MUHAMMAD, etc.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) CIVIL ACTION 11-0690-WS-B
)
BRENDA BETHEL-MUHAMMAD, et al.,)
)
Defendants.
)
ORDER
Of the eight defendants in this action, two have been dismissed on motion
to dismiss and five have been dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Only
Brenda Bethel-Muhammad (“Bethel”) remains. After reviewing the motions for
summary judgment, it appeared to the Court that Bethel likely would be entitled to
summary judgment as well and for similar reasons. Accordingly, and pursuant to
Rule 56(f), the Court notified the plaintiff that it would consider granting summary
judgment in favor of Bethel sua sponte and provided the plaintiff two weeks to
submit any brief and/or evidentiary materials in opposition to such relief. (Doc.
240).
No sooner had that order issued than Bethel filed a notice advising that she
had received a discharge in bankruptcy, which discharge included the plaintiff’s
claim against her. (Doc. 241). Accordingly, the Court ordered the plaintiff to
show cause why his action as to Bethel should not be dismissed on this basis.
(Doc. 242).

The plaintiff has filed an untitled document in response to these orders.
(Doc. 253).1 His filing is unaccompanied by exhibits, but the Court is aware that
he filed a number of exhibits in opposition to the motions for summary judgment
filed by five defendants. (Doc. 229). Now ripe for resolution is the Court’s sua
sponte determination whether Bethel should receive dismissal and/or summary
judgment. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Bethel is entitled
to dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted against her.
BACKGROUND
This is the pro se plaintiff’s second lawsuit covering essentially the same
subject matter.2 The defendants are: (1) Bethel; (2) LaJenna Hatcher; (3) Dallas
County Department of Human Resources (“Dallas DHR”); (4) Alabama
Department of Human Resources (“State DHR”);3 (5) Judge Robert Armstrong;
(6) Paul Vaughan Russell; (7) Equifax Credit Reporting Agency (“Equifax”); and
(8) Experian Credit Reporting Agency (“Experian”). In general, the amended
complaint, (Doc. 37), alleges that the plaintiff and Bethel entered an agreement
purporting to require that any disputes regarding their minor daughter be resolved
by a religious tribunal. Bethel, represented by Russell, nevertheless filed custody
and child support actions in state court, presided over by Judge Armstrong.
Hatcher, a DHR employee, assisted Bethel. Experian and Equifax (collectively,

1

The plaintiff also has filed a “notice to the Honorable Court of possible
misunderstanding,” (Doc. 254), which apologizes for any offense given by his erroneous
denials that Bethel had filed Document 241. No offense was taken.
2

The first was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiff’s prolonged
failure to present a comprehensible complaint compliant with basic pleading
requirements, a ruling upheld on appeal. (Docs. 20, 35 and attachments). Muhammad v.
Bethel, Civil Action No.10-0086-WS-B (“Muhammad I”).
3

The State and Dallas County DHR are referred to herein collectively as the
“DHR defendants.”
2

“the Credit defendants”) disseminated negative information from the DHR
defendants and/or the court file.
The counts, and the defendants under each, are as follows:
1

Section 1981 and First Amendment

Bethel, Russell, Hatcher

2

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

All

3

Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy

All non-Credit defendants

4

Fifth Amendment Due Process/

All non-Credit defendants

Federal Arbitration Act
5

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2

All non-Credit defendants

6

18 U.S.C. § 241

All

7

18 U.S.C. § 242

All non-Credit defendants

8

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1

All non-Credit defendants

9

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3)

All individual defendants

10

18 U.S.C. § 1341

All

11

42 U.S.C. § 1986

All but State, Dallas DHR

12

Article 1, Section 10, 14th Amendment

All non-Credit defendants

13

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1), (2)

All

14

42 U.S.C. § 2000a

All non-Credit defendants

15

40 U.S.C. § 122

Armstrong

16

42 U.S.C. § 1994

Armstrong

17

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), (3), 1986,

All but Russell, Armstrong

5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
18

Ninth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

All non-Credit defendants

19

Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,

All

42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983
20

Article 1, Section 10, 18 U.S.C. § 1001

21

18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(d), 1514,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986

All
All

3

22

Ala. Code § 12-16-217,

All non-Credit defendants

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986
23

Canon 1, Canons of Judicial Ethics

All non-Credit defendants

24

Canon 2, Canons of Judicial Ethics

All non-Credit defendants

25

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)

All

Bethel is thus a defendant under all counts except Counts Fifteen and
Sixteen.
DISCUSSION
The Court considers first Bethel’s discharge in bankruptcy, then turns to her
entitlement vel non to summary judgment.
I. Discharge in Bankruptcy.
Bethel filed a bankruptcy petition in March 2013.4 In May, she filed an
amended Schedule F adding the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor based on this
lawsuit and providing as his address the same address he has consistently used in
this litigation. On June 17, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court entered the following
order:
It appearing that the debtor is entitled to a discharge,
IT IS ORDERED:
The debtor is granted a discharge under section 727 of title 11,
United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code).
“A discharge in a case under this title ... voids any judgment … to the
extent such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with
respect to any debt discharged under section 727 … of this title, whether or not
discharge of such debt is waived ….” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). Moreover, “[a]
discharge under this title … operates as an injunction against the commencement
4

Relevant portions of the bankruptcy file are attached to this order.

4

or continuation of an action … to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived
….” Id. § 524(a)(2). The plaintiff’s suit against Bethel plainly falls within this
provision. While there are certain exceptions to discharge, see id. § 523, the
plaintiff invokes none of them, and it is plain that none applies.5
The plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Bethel’s notice of
discharge due to “the herein prejudices and those to be inferred, discovered and
announced in later briefs or on appeal.” (Doc. 253 at 25). These prejudices are
difficult to discern in the plaintiff’s rambling, unfocused brief, but they appear to
center on his belief that Bethel has not properly placed her discharge in issue.
Formerly, discharge in bankruptcy was an affirmative defense, required to be
asserted or waived, but the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure deleted it from the list of affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).
Thus, Bethel was not required to file an amended answer asserting discharge in
bankruptcy. Even if she were so required, the Court would construe her notice as
a motion for leave to amend her answer and would grant such motion under Rules
15(a)(2) and 16(b).6
Because the plaintiff’s claims against Bethel have been discharged in
bankruptcy, they are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

5

The plaintiff complains that Bethel did not “serve” him the “complaint or
summons” in the bankruptcy case. (Doc. 253 at 18, 27). There is no complaint and
summons in a bankruptcy case, and the debtor does not serve her petition on creditors.
The debtor is responsible for listing her creditors and providing their addresses; the
bankruptcy clerk’s office is responsible for giving the listed creditors notice. See
Bankruptcy Rules 1007, 2002(a). The plaintiff does not assert that he failed to receive
such notice. Nor does he provide evidence that he received no notice.
6

Amendments to the pleadings were required by February 22, 2013. (Doc. 167 at
2). Good cause is required to modify this deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Because
Bethel did not obtain her discharge until long after February 2013, she could not have
asserted discharge by that date, and that impossibility furnishes good cause for her later
invocation of discharge.
5

II. Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he
evidence, and all reasonable inferences, must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant ….” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234,
1243 (11th Cir. 2003). There is no burden on the Court to identify unreferenced
evidence supporting a party’s position.7 Accordingly, the Court limits its review
to the exhibits, and to the specific portions of the exhibits, to which the plaintiff
has expressly cited.
A. Claims Resolved on Other Motions for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons set forth in Parts II, III, IV, V, VIII and IX of the Court’s
order on the DHR defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 247), Bethel
is entitled to summary judgment as to Counts Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten,
Thirteen, Fourteen, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four and is entitled to summary
judgment as to those portions of Counts Four, Seventeen, Twenty, Twenty-One
and Twenty-Two addressed therein.
B. Constitutional Claims.
As discussed in Part II of the Court’s order on Russell’s motion for
summary judgment, (Doc. 249), all of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims are
brought through the vehicle of Section 1983 and thus require conduct under color
of state law. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its
reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus
7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it
may consider other materials in the record.”); accord Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The district court has discretion to go beyond the
referenced portions of these [summary judgment] materials, but is not required to do
so.”).

6

on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotes omitted).
The amended complaint asserts that Bethel “is a private citizen,” (Doc. 37
at 2), and she is sued for her conduct in connection with the custody and child
support matters. “Use of the courts by private parties [a client and his lawyer]
does not constitute an act under color of state law.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d
1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992).
It is possible for a private party to be deemed a state actor if the state has
compelled her conduct; if her function is one traditionally performed exclusively
by the state; or if the state has insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with her to such an extent as to be a joint participant. Focus on the Family, 344
F.3d at 1277. The plaintiff, however, has asserted none of these things, much less
shown them to exist.
There is one other possibility. “[A]n otherwise private person acts ‘under
color of’ state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive
another of federal rights.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). The
amended complaint alleges that Bethel conspired with Hatcher and with Judge
Armstrong, (Doc. 37 at 6-7, 8, 17), and both are state officials for purposes of this
analysis. The plaintiff, however, has identified no evidence that Bethel in fact
conspired with Hatcher or Judge Armstrong.
With respect to Hatcher, the amended complaint alleges that Bethel and
Hatcher “are close cousins and that was the initial base of the conspiracy.” (Doc.
37 at 17). The mere fact of familial relationship would of course be irrelevant to
the existence of a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but in
any event the only evidence before the Court is that Bethel and Hatcher are not
related. (Doc. 235, Hatcher Affidavit at 2). The amended complaint also alleges
that Hatcher and Bethel agreed to attack the plaintiff by pursuing child support
against him despite his agreement with Bethel to keep such matters out of the civil
courts. (Doc. 37 at 8). But it is uncontroverted that Hatcher’s very job is to
7

participate in child support proceedings as a witness and in helping the parents fill
out income affidavits, (Doc. 235, Hatcher Affidavit at 2), so her doing so in this
case is not evidence that she reached an agreement with Bethel to violate the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
With respect to Judge Armstrong, the amended complaint relies on Bethel’s
attorney-client relationship to Russell and on Russell’s alleged ex parte
conversations with Judge Armstrong. (Doc. 37 at 6-7). As noted in the order
granting Russell summary judgment, the only evidence presented to the Court is
that no ex parte conversations occurred. (Doc. 209, Exhibit A at 2; Doc. 229 at
25). Thus, even if Bethel had agreed with Russell to violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights (and there is no evidence that she did so), Russell is as much a
private actor as is Bethel, and without evidence that Russell conspired with Judge
Armstrong, Bethel cannot be part of a conspiracy with him.
Because the plaintiff has shown no basis on which Bethel could be found to
be a state actor, all of the plaintiff’s claims brought under Section 1983 – which
means at least all of her constitutional claims – fail as a matter of law. Bethel is
entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts Two, Three and Twelve.
She is also entitled to summary judgment with respect to the only remaining
portions of Counts Four and Twenty. Finally, Bethel is entitled to summary
judgment with respect to those portions of Counts One, Eighteen, Nineteen and
Twenty-Two that assert constitutional claims or invoke Section 1983.
C. Section 1985.
“The core of a conspiracy claim is an agreement between the parties ….”
Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 181 Fed. Appx. 865, 876 (11th Cir. 2006).
Thus, the plaintiff “must show … an agreement between two or more people (at
least one of whom is a state actor) to violate his constitutional rights ….” AFLCIO v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011). As noted in Part II.B,
the plaintiff has no evidence that Bethel reached such an agreement with a state
8

actor. Thus, the plaintiff’s Section 1985 claims against Bethel fail as a matter of
law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count Nine and with
respect to those portions of Counts Seventeen, Twenty-One and Twenty-Two that
invoke Section 1985.
D. Section 1986.
A claim under Section 1986 requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant knew of a Section 1985 conspiracy, that she had the power to prevent
(or aid in preventing) the constitutional violation made the object of the
conspiracy, and that she failed to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 1986; accord Cox v. Mills,
465 Fed. Appx. 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff has identified no evidence
that Bethel knew of a Section 1985 conspiracy involving Judge Armstrong,
Hatcher and/or the DHR defendants and that she had the power to stop the
conspiracy from succeeding.
For that matter, the plaintiff has identified no evidence that an underlying
Section 1985 conspiracy existed. As noted in Part II.C, the plaintiff must show an
agreement to violate his constitutional rights. While the plaintiff is full of
conspiracy theories, he has yet to point to evidence that could support an inference
that an agreement to violate his rights existed. Since claims under Section 1986
are “derivative” of Section 1985 claims, the failure to establish a conspiracy for
purposes of a Section 1985 claim dooms the derivative Section 1986 claim. E.g.,
Cox, 465 Fed. Appx. at 888.
For both these reasons, the plaintiff’s Section 1986 claims against Bethel
fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with respect to
Count Eleven and with respect to the sole remaining portions of Counts
Seventeen, Twenty-One and Twenty-Two.

9

E. Race Discrimination Claims.
Section 1981 addresses only intentional discrimination on the basis of race.
E.g., Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 2012). Likewise,
Section 1982 addresses “discrimination based on race.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter,
553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008). Finally, Title VI is limited to discrimination “on the
ground of race, color, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
The amended complaint, however, does not accuse Bethel of a racial
motivation. While his briefs are full of racial invective, the plaintiff identifies no
actual evidence that Bethel acted based on racial animus.8 The Court incorporates
its discussion in Part VII of its order disposing of the DHR defendants’ motion for
summary judgment concerning the standard and method of proof of racial animus.
For want of such evidence, the plaintiff’s claims under Section 1981, Section 1982
and Title VI fail as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to summary judgment with
respect to the last remaining portions of Counts One, Eighteen and Nineteen.
F. Fair Credit Reporting Act.
The plaintiff invokes Section 1681s-2, (Doc. 37 at 28), which generally
requires a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies to investigate a
consumer’s challenge to the accuracy of the information transmitted. 15 U.S.C. §
1681s-2(a)(8)(E), (b)(1)(A). The amended complaint, however, does not allege
that Bethel is a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies, and the
plaintiff has identified no evidence that Bethel was such a furnisher. Without such
evidence, his claim under FCRA fails as a matter of law. Bethel is entitled to
summary judgment with respect to Count Twenty-Five.

8

This would be a hard sell, given that Bethel and the plaintiff are both AfricanAmerican.
10

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Also pending is the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, for judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 211).9 The plaintiff asks that
judgment be entered against Bethel due to her failure to prosecute and failure to
comply with the Magistrate Judge’s orders concerning discovery.
The plaintiff invokes Rule 41(b), but that rule addresses only dismissal of a
plaintiff’s case, not entry of judgment against a defendant.10 He also invokes Rule
37, which does apply to defendants. For failing to serve answers to
interrogatories, or for failing to obey an order to provide discovery, a defendant is
subject to sanction, up to and including default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A), 37(d)(1), (3).
In September 2013, the Magistrate Judge entered an order granting the
plaintiff’s motion to compel and ordering the plaintiff to respond to the plaintiff’s
interrogatories by September 27, 2013. (Doc. 238 at 2). The plaintiff’s motion
was filed in June 2013, and the plaintiff has filed nothing asserting that Bethel has
failed to serve interrogatory responses following the Magistrate Judge’s
September order. Without such an assertion, the plaintiff can obtain no relief.
Even had the plaintiff made this threshold showing, his motion would be
denied. While Rule 37 “gives district judges broad discretion to fashion
appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery orders[,] this discretion is guided
by judicial interpretation of the rule. For example, a default judgment sanction
requires a willful or bad faith failure to obey a discovery order.” Malautea v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993). “Violation of a discovery

9

Because a motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only after the
introduction of evidence in a jury trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), the Court construes the
plaintiff’s motion exclusively as one for summary judgment.
10

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a defendant such as Bethel, who asserts no
counterclaims, could fail to “prosecute.”

11

order caused by simple negligence, misunderstanding, or inability to comply will
not justify a Rule 37 default judgment or dismissal.” Id.
Where, then, is the plaintiff’s showing of Bethel’s bad faith or willfulness?
As noted, she filed a bankruptcy petition in March 2013, and she was from that
moment protected by the automatic stay of Section 362(a). Once she received her
discharge in June, she was protected by the injunction of Section 524(a). The
plaintiff has not attempted to show how, in light of these circumstances, Bethel’s
silence could be deemed willful or in bad faith.
Moreover, the interrogatories the plaintiff submitted to Bethel bear no
relation to the issues in the case in general or to Bethel’s entitlement to summary
judgment in particular. (Doc. 229 at 47-56). It would be wildly inappropriate to
enter default judgment against a defendant, who is entitled to summary judgment,
merely for failing to respond to irrelevant questions. See Dunbar v. United States,
502 F.2d 506, 509 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974) (“It is perhaps worthy of note that even
though a given piece of information may be ‘relevant’ for purposes of Rule 26(b),
the less relevant that information becomes, the less appropriate a Rule 37 sanction
is, where there is a failure or refusal to produce the information.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court exercises its broad discretion against
the extreme sanction of default judgment. The plaintiff’s motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, all claims against Bethel are dismissed
with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly by separate order.
DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of October, 2013.
s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

BI

Counr

UNTTED STATES BANTRUPTCy

Southern District of Alabama

tt*'3;rn",.

Nano of Debtor (if individrul, cntcr Last First

All Odwr Namc uscd by thc Dcbtor in thc last
(include manicd, rnaiden, and trade namcs):

E

Name of Joint Debtor (Spotso) (l"sst, Firsl, Middtc):

Brenda Lea

I

thc Joint Dcbtor in thc last
Ottrcr Namrs uscd
(include rnanied, maidcn, urd tradc names):

Tn

yrrN

8

ycan

Last four digits ofSoc. Sec. or lndividual'Taxpayer l.D. (lTlNycunplcle tslN
(ifmore than onc, statc all):

Last ficw digits of Soc, Scc. or Indivi{tual-Taxpaycr l.D. (lTlNyL'omplcte tilN
than orr, statc 8tl):

(if morc

3538
Strca eCCrcis ofJoint Debtor (No. and Strcet, City, and Statc):

Strcct Addrcss of Dobtor (No. 8nd Sbect City, and Statc):

1208 ilemorial Ave.
Selma, ALa

ztPcoDE36703
County of Rs3idcrce or of thc hincipEl Placc of

Busi**,

EiPcoEE

|

County ofRcsidcncc or ofthe Principel Placo ofBusincss:

O"ll", Coun'
Mailing Addrcss ofJoint Debtor (ifdiffcrcnt from srcat sddtcss):

Mailing Addres of Dchor(if diffcrcnt from strcct addrcss):

VIPC(
Location of Principal Asscu ofBusincss Deb{or (ifdiffereflt from $rert addtos abovc):

tr
tr
tr

lhc Potlllon ir Fllcd (Check onc box.)

(Chcck orc box.)

(Chcck onc box,)

g

ErPcqpE___l
Chr6or of Brnkruplcy Codc Uodcr Whicb

Nrturc.f Burlrcrr

Typc of Dcbtor
(Form ofOrganization)

tr
tr

lndividrnl (includes Joint Dobtors)
Scc Erhibtt D on pgc 2 of thisforn.

tr
tr
tr
D
|--l

Corporation(includcsLLCandLLP)
Partrrrship
Other (lfdcbtor ir notoneofficabovc cntitics,chcck
this box and stato typc ofcntity bolow.)

Hcal0r Carc Busincss
Single Asd Real Estste

il

Es

dcfird

in

u.s.c. $ r0r(5rB)

Railroad

Stockkokcr

g ChaptcrT tr
D Cfuptcr 9
tr Chapter I I
tr
tr Chaplcr 12
tr Chapter 13

ClcaringBank

f).hf
Nrturc of Dcbr
(Chcck onc box.)

Tu-Er.mpt Eldry

Cheptcr l5 Dcbton

(Chcck box, if applicrble.)

Each country in which a forcign proceoding by, regrrding, or
againsl debtor is pending:

Recognition of o Foreign
Main Procccding
Chaplcr 15 Petition for
Rocognitionofa Forcign
Nonmain hocecding

Commodity Brokcr

Country of dcbtor's entcr of main intcrcsts:

O

Chaptcr15Petitionfor

E

Dcbtorisalax-cxcmptorganization
undcr titlc 26 oftho Unitcd Statcr
Codc (thc lntcrnsl Rcvcnuc Codc).

ocbts$aprirurilyconsumer

U.S.C.
g l0l(8) as "incuned by an

debts, dcfinod

in I I

I

Dcltsare
ptimorily
busincss dcbts,

individual primarily fot a
penonal, fanily, or
houschold purposc,"

ClrPtcr tt Dcblorr
Cbccl orc bor:
Dcbtorirasmall busincssdcbtorasdeflncd in

Filiry Frc (Chcck onc box.)

tr
tr
g

tr
tr

FullFilingFecaruchod.
Filing Fcc lo bc poid in imtallmcns (applicablo to individrnls only). Must attach
signcd application for thc court's coruidcration cortiSing that th€ dlbtor is
unable to poy fco oxcGpt in installmcnr. Rulc l005(b). Soo Ofticisl Form 3A.

ll

U'S.C' $ l0l(5lD)'
Dcbtor is not a small busincs dcbtor as detlncd in I I U.S.C. $ l0l(51D).

Cbeck lf:
Dobtor's aggrcgatc noncontingcnt liqoidatcd dcbts (cxcluding dcbts ou€d to
insidcrs or afliliabs) rrc las than $2 ,143,700 (anowt tubiect to adiusrment
on 1/01/1 3 and cvery three ye$t ,herearer).

tr

Filing Fcc uaivcr requ€sed (applhablc to chopter 7 individurls only). Must

Clocl rll rppllcebl. bor$!

O
tr

A plan is bcing filcd with this pctition.
Acceptancos ofthc plan woro solicited propetition from one or nore classss
of crcditon. in accordancc with I I U.S.C. I ! 126(b).

Strtbti.ryA dnrlnblrrtivc Infortl.tloD

tr
g

THI$ SPACE IS FOR
CPURT I.'SE ONLY

Dcbior cstimrtcs that funds will bc availablc for distribution to unsccurcd grcditon.
Dcbtor ctimatcs that, aftcr any c,(Gmpt propcrty is cxcludcd urd administrativc cxpcrucs paid, thcre will bc no funds availablc for
disaibution to uns.cured crcditofr.

gtru 50-99
l-49

trtr
200-999

Estirnntcd Numbor of Cndilors

r0Gt99

Estrmatc{l Asscts

qjDDD

$0

to

$50,001

to

t100,001

to

$500,001

$50,000 $100,000 $500,000 to$l

million

nstrnnntrDntr
to
to
t0to

tr

t,0005,000

5,00110,m0

E
10,00

t-

25,000

trtrDtr

$,000,00r Jt0.000,001 $50,000,00t
to

JlO

rnillim

to

350

millim

toJlOO
million

t100,001

$50,000 $100,000 $500,000

tr

25,00r"

50,00t-

Ovcr

50,000

r00,000

t00,000

st00,@0,001
to $500

3500,000.001 Morc thm

Case 1-3-00819 Doc

1

million

million

Filed 03/11/13
Document

'

,\)

to

3l

billion fl

billion

million

to$10 to$50 to$100 toJ500

million million

'':2

trtr

t500,001 $1,000,00t t10,000,00t S50,000,001 t100,000,001 t500,000,001

totl

.a:2

fI

tr

Estimatcd Liabilities
S50,001

F

to$l

billion

. ir)
Morethan
$l billion

{'\

million

Entered 03lLLlI31-l-:55:04 Desc Main
Paqe Lof 46

B
Namc of

volunt|ry P.ullen
f*k

wo

anr

ht nannloted nnd lilil

Dcbtor(s)'

B"th"r, Brenda Lee

in

YGln 0f lnqlll lisn t'ro.

attach additioflsl

$hGGt')

Looation
Wherc Filcd:

Caso Numbcr:

Datc Filcd:

Location
Whcrc Filed:

Casc Numbcr;

-

Datc Filcd:

Pcndlns

Brrknnlw Cr|.

tr'll.d by rnv Siourr- Prrlncr. or

Amllrlr oI lbit DlDtor (lt

lnofe tnan Onc. anacn

I

ional slrccf.)

Name of Dcbtor:

Casc Numbcr:

Datc Filcd:

District:

Rclationship:

Judge:

Exhibit B

Erhibit A
(To bc conplctcd if dsbtor is rcquircd to filc pcriodic rcports (c.9., foms lOK and
lOQ) witb thc Sccuritics and Exchangc Conmission punuant to Scction 13 or l5(d)
of thc Sccuritic Exchsngc Aot of | 934 and is rcqucting rcl ief undcr chaptcr | | )

(To bc complc{cd if &btor is an individual
whosc dcbts arc

prinnrily

consumsr dcbts )

.

I, thc anomcy for thc potitionar namcd in thc forogoing pctition, d€clato thEt I have
informcO thspctition; dt8t fhc or shc] may pocccd undcr chaptcr 7, I l, 12' or 13
of tittc I l, U;itcd Statos Codo, rnd have oxplairrd 0lc rclief avrilabl. urdct cach
$!ch chsptcr. I furthcr carriry thrt I havc dclivared to tlrc dcbtor 0tc notice rcguirrd

byllu.s.c.$342(b).

tr

ExhibitA isattrchcdand madcapartofthispctition.
sicmrurc of Attoflicv for

Dcbtor{s)

(Datc)

Exhibit C
Docs the dcbtor own or hovc posscsion ofany propcrty that poses or is allcged to po6r s thnat ofimminent and idcntifiable harm to public hcalth or safcty?

tr
f,

Ycs, and Exhibit C ir att*hcd and madc a part of this pctition.
No.

Exhibit D
(To bc complotcd by evcry individurl dcbtor. lfa joint pctition is liled, crch spousc must complctc and attrch

Ef
lfthis

E

nxnifir
is

a scparate

Exhibit D.)

O, comphtcd and signcd by the debtor, is atlachcd and madc a part ofthis pctition,

ajoint pctition:

Exhibit D, also compteted and signed by thc joint dcbtor, is atlached and made a pan ofthis pctition.

Informrtlor Rcgrrdhg thc Dcbtor - v.nu.

fr

(Chcck rny applicablc box.)
Dcbtor has been domicilcd or has h8d a residencc, principal placc ofhsincs, or principal assets in this District for lEO days immcdiatcly
preceding the date ofthis potition or for o longer part ofswh 180 days than in any otha District

tr

Thcrc is a bankruptcy casr conccming dcbtor's alliliatc, gcncrsl panncr, or pqnncrship pcnding in this Disttict,

D

Dcbtor is E druor in a forrigrr prccccding ard has iB principll plmc of businors or prircipal ass€ts in thc Unircd Starcs in lhis District, or hss
no prirrcipal placc ofburincrr or.nscts in thc Unitcd State but is a dcfcndant in ao aotiot or procccding [in a fcdcral or sldc cowtl in this
District, or tlr intercsE oftlp psrtics will bc scrvod in rcgard to thc rclicfsought in this Disrict.

CcrllfLrtlotr by r Dcbtor Who Rcidrr rr r Tcnrnt of Rcrld.ntid Pr.pcrty
(Chcck all applicablc boxes,)

tr

Landlordhasajrdgmcntagainsthcdcbtorforpossessionofdebtor'srosidoncc.

(lfboxchccked,complctcthcfollowing.)

(Namc of landlord that obtain€d judgncnt)

(Addr6s of landlord)

tr
tr
tr

Deblor claims thEt undcr applicablc nonbankruptry lau thcre rrp circumstansw urdar which thc dcbtor urculd bc pcrmincd to curc th?
ri* to thc judgrnont for possGrsioo, rftcr the judgrrcnt for posr€gsion ws cntered, and

ontiF momtsry dofauli lhat gave

Dcbtor has includcd with this pctition thc dcpositwith thc courtofEny rcnt that would bccome due duringthe 30-day pcriod affcr thc filing

ofthc pctition,
Dcbtor oGrtifics that hc/shc has scrvcd thc lrndlord with this ccrtifigation.

Case 13-0081-9 Doc 1

Filed 03/l-L113
Document

(l I U.S.C.

$

362(l).

Entered 03lL1,l!311-:55:04 Desc Main
Paqe 2 of 46

Narnc of Dcbtor(s):
- 'Bethel.

Sllrrtur.(r)

of Dobtor(r)

Slgnrturr of r Fordgo Rcpratntrtlvr

{ladlvldrrUJolrt)

I declarc udcr pcmlty of pcrjury that tltc information providcd in this pctition

is

trrc

and concct,

JIf pctitiofEr is an individual whose dcbs are primarily consumcr dchs and has
filc urder ch.pt6 4 I am awarc that I may procecd undcr chaptcr 7, I I, 12
or l3 oftith I I, Unitcd Strtcs Codc, undentand the rclicfavailablc undcr each suoh
choscn to

choptcr, and choosc to procccd undcr chapter 7.
flfno attorncy rEprcscnts nrc and no ben]np{cy pctition preparcr rigns thc pctitionl I
havc obtain€d and rcad thc noticc roquircd by I I U.S.C. $ 342(b).

I

rgquest roliof in accordanc€ with the chaptcr
spccificd in this pctition.

:lt

'f)..ro,..1,-

x

Brenda Lee

of title I I, unitcd ststcs codc,

I declarc undcr pcnalty of pcrjury that the information providod in this ptilion is true
and concct, that I arn tlr foreign reptcscntslivc ofa debtor in a forcign procceding,
and thal I am authotizcd to filc this pctition.
(Check only onc box.)

B

I roqucst.rolicfin acoordancc with chrptor l5 oftitlc t l, Unitcd slalcs Cods.
Ccrtified copics ofthc documents rcquirod by I I U.S.C' $ l515 are attach€d

S

Pursuant to | | U.S.C. g l5 I l, I rcquest rclicf in accordance with thc
chaptcr oftitlc t t spccificd in this pctition. A cerriflcd copy ofthe
ordcr granting rccognition ofthc fortign main procccding is attoched.

ltzt
(Printcd Name of Foreigr Rcprcscntativc)

Numbc-r

(ifnot rcprcscntod

by attorncy)

Sigortrrr of Non-Attoro.y Brnkruptcy P3litio[ Prcprn:r

(l)l

rm a bankruptcy Ftition prcparcr as
I dcclarc un&r pcnalty of perjury 0rst
dcfirrcd in I I U.S.C. $ I | 0l (2) | prepared this documcnt for compensation and have
providcd thc debtor with a copy of this documcnt and the noticls and infomation
rcquired undcr
U.S.C. $$llqb), ll0(h), and 342(bI snd, (3)if rules or
guirhlincs have bccn promslgsted pursu|nl lo I I U.S.C. $ I l0(h) sctting a maximum
fce for scrviccs chage$lc by bankruptcy pctitkn prcpsters, I have givcn thc dcbtor
noricc ofthc maximum amount bcfore preparing any document fol filing for a dcbtor
or sccepting rny fec ftom trc dobtot as requircd in that scction. Ollictal Form 19 is

Sigutuc of Attomcy for Dcbto(s)

ll

Printed Namc of Attomcy for Dcbto(s)

attachcd.

Printcd Namc and titlc, ifany, ofBankruptcy Pctition Prcparet
Dalc

rln

a case in which g

Social-Socurity numbcr (lf the benkruptcy pctition preparcr is mt an individual,
thc Social-Sccurity numbcr oftlr oflicer, principal, rcsponsrblc pcrvrn or
porhcr of thc bankrupcy pctition ptcporcr.) (Rcquired by | | U.S.C, $ | 10.)

70{b[4)(D) applics, this signaturc dso constitutcs a

stratc

cartification that rhc attomcy hrs no knowlodgc afier an inquiry that thc infonnation
in tho schcdulcs is inconecl.

I declare under pcmlty of pcrjury lhat thc information providcd in this pctition is trrr
I havc bccn authorizcd to filc this pctition on bchalf of ttrc
dcblor.

ard corrccl and thst

Thc debtor rGquels thc rclicfin accordancc with the chaptcr
Code, spccificd in this pclitim.

oftitle I l, Uniled Stltes

x

Date

Signaturc of Ardhorizcd lndividual

hintcd

Signaturc ofbEnkruptcy pctition prcparcr or officer, principol, responsible pctson, or
partncr whosc Social-Sccurity numbcr is providcd abovc.

Namc of Authorizcd lndividrul

Namcs and Social-Sccwity numbcrs

in

ofrll

other individuals who prcparcd or assistcd

preparing this documcnt unlcss the brnkruptcy pctitioo prcparcr

is not

an

individual.

lf morc lhan onc porson prcparcd lhis documcnt, atlach additional shects eonforming
to lhc Eppropriatc ofticial form for cach pcrson.
A banbuptcy pttltton pr.pnr't fallut. to compv vlth ,he p,oritlont at title I I and
thc Fcderal Rulct of Banlvtgtcy Procedun may rcsult in tinct or imprlsonmcnt or

both.

Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc

1

Filed 03/1L/13
Document

ll

U.AC.6

ll0:

16

Entered O311L1L311-:55:04 Desc Main
Paqe 3 of 46

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMAi

':-f '-"
, -,,..r

l'. . ! i.i:i
1..: iri l. ^n

':

Debtor(s):

cAsENo. ,13

CU M ULATIVE

-0 oa{l'1

STATEMENT OF AMENDM ENTS

Comes nowthe debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuantto Bankruptcy Rule 1009
And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows:

Serrc-6-lev,td-

"'"*il ;i,*.f :'t "r|
clr'*Lt 6"Pl'*
;;i..,
il::* IDc...*hel t;^,n t,fivsulaarsq ;ii,
TrW og?rnA Aott.,
-*-t [O.- i|Vo..,r.oas.
u

affi :l:'" Tls*"..
gtof{trtS r.

'p
olr.7,
P olrc7

'

r{,f ten.3L ftoy;,ly,
._,, Pr,floaeL ?tofut3l,

5l"ta6tcnt bg rr.1 tileoilt.-.r.a.l' 5cr+rcf - 3.ofi *off
pAJr$rrd.- .flI.{hc,,n-+j- l - 4t il* ?o-{rJ5-'S - p.,}a,15G..r,0
t
'# lotl

&huby *ctoua/
(Ln'qrlJ ffLn*ttx t
ftLl'Foro- /4nhn^,n*& *a
r'5
&ag.r1,.*traa) *c" pi*o o nt',l a.6s &on onJ I ta'hrtt

rr-

pfo pe-t*1, lrvra5s fluao'tc-,
p.rroa.L'0
|
'
'T;*.3#*fi ilrirll.y:?fr,"r^i:ii,:,,t"i,,F".#ffifi* ?xiili\*p-e
'"1n-1r&r,17

eelsoae,L

l/We declare under pendlt! of perjury that the information b'rovided in this amendment it true jnd
oateo

trris I Y

aav

ot

.

..-il *

.zo

?

correct:-

lS

f*t"a,

/,--- Ez/rl
Debtor
Joint Debtor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by placing it in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States Bankruptcy Administrator and
Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case.

Date

1.3

Debtor
Joint Debtor

Case 13-00819 Doc

L5

Filed

05/15/13 Entered 05lL5lL31-4:02:01,
Paqe

1,

of 24

Desc Main

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

CASENo.

Debtor(s):

CUM

U

n-a0glq

LATIVE S.TATEM ENT OF AMENDMENTS

Comes now the debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1009
And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows:

Co*},,Y*J-;

$c.tre- F
?.rrtO

Ae6 ,o de fio,u

K"f ,^

-

A<-rt

r

a*1

o+ 4ttl'

{'o

r'"s

0w

aL

c.-alC r

L

k frU*L

rYl,rh,r,n

m<A-

Trt aLJ, *, o il
*o $ oh -Lo lq

4&J"L

(*dle^o

q

u.t*

t#to un bqrc

d I ,l

r r.

l/We declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this amendment
oateo

'n'

tr'is I {

dav

ot

/\ * t/

u,7 * "JJ**1-

is

true and correct;

,zo L3

fi*"^z t--- Ezr'--t
Debtor
Joint Debtor
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by placing it in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States Bankruptcy Administrator and

Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case.

oate

lrJ*,/

14, .As

-----l---1-

13

#.'*"

*" 8*l

Debtor

Joint Debtor

Case 13-0081-9 Doc

15

Filed

05/15/13 Entered
Paqe 2 of 24

051151L3 LA:OZ:OL

Desc Main

B 6F (Official F'orm 6F) ( l2l07) - Cont.

In

re

Brenda Lee Bethel--AMENDED

Case

Debtor

No.

13-00819

(if known)

SCHEDULE F - CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED NONPRIORITY CLAIMS
(Continuation Sheet)

CREDITOR'S NAME,

DATE CLAIM WAS

AMOI.INT OF

MAILING ADDRESS

INCURREDAND

CLAIM

INCLUDING ZIP CODE.
AND ACCOUNTNUMBER

CONSIDERATTON FOR

(See instructions above.)

IF CLAIM IS SUBJECT TO

CLAIM.
SETOFF. SO STATE,

Regions Bank
P.O. Box 681
B'Ham, AL 35201
Jan. 23,2013
Kalim Muhammad
1043 County Rd. 306
Selma, Ala. 36703

Sheet no. 2 of-_a- continuation sheets attached
to Schedule ofCreditors Holding Unsecured
Nonpriority Claims

Total>
(Use only on last page ofthe completed Schedule F.)
(Report also on Summary ofSchedules and, ifapplicable on the Statistical
Summary of Certain Liabilities and Related Data.)

Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc

15

Filed 05/1-5113 Entered 051L51L31,4:02:0I Desc Main
Paqe L1,of24

B7

(t2/t2)

n

c. All debtors: List all payments

made within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this case
to or for the benefit of creditors who are or were insiders. (Married debtors filing under chapter I 2 or chapter I 3 must
include payments by either or both spouses whether or not ajoint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and
a joint petition is not filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR
AND RELATIONSHIP TO DEBTOR

DATE OF
PAYMENT

AMOIJNT
PAID

AMOLINT
STILL OWINC

4. Suits and administretive proceedings, executions, garnishments and ettachments
a. List all suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor

is or was a party within one year immediately
preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case. (Manied debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter 13 must include
information concerning either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated
and a joint petition is not filed.)

CAPTION OF

SUIT

ANDCASENUMBER
Muhammad 1
2:11-690-WS-B

a
None

b.

NATURE OF

COURT OR AGENCY

PROCEEDING

AND LOCATION

Civil
filing

Southern District of
Alabama Court

STATUS OR
DISPOSITION

Dropped
Pending

Describe all property that has been attached, gamished or seized under any legal or equitable process within one

year immediately preceding the commencement of this case, (Married debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter | 3
must include infiormation concerning property of either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless
the spouses are separated and ajoint petition is not filed,)
NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE OF
SEIZURE

OF PERSON FOR WHOSE

BENEFIT PROPERTY WAS SEIZED

5.

DESCRIPTION

AND VALUE
OF PROPERTY

Repossessions, foreclosures and returns

List all property that has been repossessed by a creditol sold at a foreclosure sale, transferred through a deed in lieu
of foreclosure or returned to the seller, within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this case.
(Manied debtors filing under chapter l2 or chapter l3 must include information concerning property of either or both
spouses whether or not ajoint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and ajoint petition is not filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS
OF CREDITOR OR SELLER

Case 1-3-00819

Doc 15

DATE OF REPOSSESSION.
FORECLOSURE SALE,
TRANSFER OR RETURN

DESCRIPTION

AND VALUE
OF PROPERTY

Filed 05/1-511-3 Entered 05/15/13 1"4:O2:OI
Paqe t5 ot 24

Desc Main

B 7 (12/t2)

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have tead the answers contained in the foregoing statement of financial affairs
and any attachments thereto and that they are true and correct,

Signature

05109/0201

Date

of Debtor
Signature

of

Joint Debtor

(if any)

Date

llf ampletetl

on behalf of

a

purtnership or eorporation.l

I declare under penalty ofperjury that I have read the answers contained in the foregoing statement offinancial affairs and any attachments
thereto and that they are true and corlect to the best ofmy knowledge, information and beliefl

Signature

Print Name and

Tide
[An individual signing on behalfofa partnership or corporation must indicate position or relationship to debtor.]

_continuation

sheets attached

I'enalty.formakinga.falsestotement: I;ineofupro!i500,000orimprisonment-forupto5ywrs,orhoth. I8 ILS.(:,sr.rl52arul 3571

DECLARATION AND SIGNATURE OF NON-ATTORNEY BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER (see
ldeclareunderpenaltyofperjurythat:

(l)

Iamabankruptcyp€titionpreparerasdefinedinllU.S.C.gll0;(2)

11 U.S.c. g 110)

lpreparedthisdocumentfor

compensation and have provided the debtor with a copy ofthis document and the notices and information required under I I U.S.C. gg I I 0(b), I I 0(h), and
342(b); and, (3) ifrules or guidelines have been promulgated pursuant to I I U.S.C. g I l0(h) setting a maximum fee for services chargeable by bankruptcy
petition pr€parers, I have given lhe debtor notice ofthe maximum amounl before preparing any document for filing for a debtor or accepting any fee from
the debtor, as required by that section.

N/A
Printed or Typed Name and Title, ifany, ofBankruptcy Petition Preparer

Il lhe hankruPtcy petitbn preparer is nol an individual,

$tute the name, ttile

Social-Security No. (Required by I I U.S.C. S I10.)

(fany),

address, arul social-security'number oJ the of/icer, principa!,

respontible person, or partner who signs lhis documenf.

N/A
Address

N/A
Signature ofBankruptcy Petition

Preparer

Names and Social-Security numbers
not an individual:

Date

ofall other individuals who

prepared or assisted in preparing this document unless the bankruptcy petition preparer is

lfmore lhan one person prepared this documenl, attach additional signed

A banknuptcy petitlon preparer's tailure lo comply with
intines orinryrisonmentor both. I8 U.S.C S 155.

Case 13-00819 Doc

1-5

sheets conforming to the appropriate

the prcvisions

Official Form for

each person

oftitle I I and the Federal Rules of Banhaptcy Procedare qpy result

Filed 05/1-511-3 Entered 05/1-5/L3 L4:O2:OL Desc Main
Paqe 23 of 24

AMENDED CREDIT MATRIX
RE: Brenda Bethel Case Number 13-00819
UAB Hospital
Acct# 064220639-6073
619 19th St S.
Birmingham, AL 35249

Sunrise Credit Services

Attn:

Col

lections Department

P,O, Box 9100

Farmingdale, NY 11735

McCormick and Russell
718 Alabama Ave.
Selma, AIa.36701

Vonda K. Bonham
116 Mabry St.
5elma, A|a.36701
Regions Bank
Acct #00700533000075885
101 Church St.
Selma, Ala.36701
Kalim A. R. Muhammad
1043 County Rd. 306
Selma, AL 36703

Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc

15

Filed

Entered 05/1-5/1-3 L4:O2:OL Desc Main
Paqe 24 of 24

05/1-511-3

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

Debtor(s): Brenda

Bethel

ALABAFfA?
'- '-' "{,'r :-

rr:r ^
..'Ji. * J
',

Di

,

i". .jO

CASE NO.13-00819

..i
CUMUTATTVE STATEMENT OF AMENDMENTS

Comes now the debtor(s) in the above-referenced case and pursuant

.,.

I ','.i

't

I

to Bankruptcy Rule 1009

And Local Rule 1009-1 amends the schedules previously-filed as follows:

1) Form B, VA pension added and 2011 and20L2 Employment income added.
2) Schedule B : daughters assets removed
3) Schedule C: exemption and exemption laws changed.

4l

5)

I

schedule F: Dollar amount added for lawsuit, and attorney fees added.
Matrix: Lawsuit plaintiff added to Matrix

declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this amendment is true and correct:

Dated

this$! day of Mav, 2013.

.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'nT.

J

/^xa'B

Debtor

certifu that I have this date served a true and correct copy of the above pleading electronically, or by
placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed the United States
I

Bankruptcy Administrator and
Trustee, as well as all effected creditors and or parties in the above referenced case.

Darc

rl&7,fi!_at ts

Case 13-00819 Doc

20

Filed 06/03/1-3 Entered 06/03/13
Document
Paqe 1 of 1-0

15:48:50 Desc

Main

B 6F (Oflicial Form 6F) (12107) - Conl.

InreBre@
SCHEDULE

Crse No.

1&00819

(if known)

F. CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED NONPRIORITY CLAIMS
(Continuation Sheet)

CREDITOR'SNAME,
MAILING ADDRESS
INCLUDINC ZIP CODE,

AMOUNTOF
CLAIM

DATECLAIM WAS
CONSIDEMTION FOR
CLAIM.
IF CLAIM IS STIBJECTTO

INCI.JRREDAND

AND ACCOTJNTNUMBER
(See instnrctions above.)

SETOFF, SO STATE.

May 23,2007

'Personal Loan'

Regions Bank
P.O. Box 681
B'Ham, AL 35201

Jan.23, 2013

'Lawsuif

Kallm Muhammad
1043 Coun$ Rd. 306
Selma, A|a.36703

2 ot_?-

conrinuationshoeranach€d
shectno.
to Schedulc ofCrcditors Holding Unsccured
Nonpriority Claims

SubtotalD

Tobl>
(Usc only on Iast paBe ofthc complc&d Schcdulc F.)
(Report also on Summary ofSchedules end, ifapplicablc on thc Statistical
Summary of Certain Liabilities and Relatcd Data )

Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc

20

Filed 06/03/13 Entered 06/03/1-3
Document
Paqe 9 of 1-0

l-5:48:50 Desc

Main

AMENDED CREDIT MATRIX
RE: Brenda Bethel Case Number 13-00819
UAB HosPital
Acct# 064220639-6073
619 19th st s.

Birmingham, AL 35249
Sunrise Credit Services

Attn: Collections

DePa

rtment

P.O. Box 9100
Farmingdale, NY 11735

McCormick and Russell
718 Alabama Ave.
Selma, Ala. 36701
Vonda K. Bonham
116 Mabry St.
Selma, Ala. 36701
Regions Bank
Acct t100700533000075885
101 Church St.
Selma, Aia.36701
Kalim A. R. Muhammad
1043 CountY Rd. 306
Selma, AL 36703

Case 1-3-0081-9 Doc

20

Filed 06/03/1-3 Entered 06/03/13 fS:4g:SO Desc Main
Paqe 1-0 of 10
Document

B18 (Official Form 18) (12107)

United States Bankruptcy Court
Southern District of Alabama
Case No. 13-00819

Chapter 7

In re Debtor(s) (name(s)

used by the debtor(s) in the last 8 years, including married, maiden, trade, and address):

Brenda Lee Bethe]
1208 Memorial Ave.
Selma. AL36703

Social Security / Individual Taxpayer ID No.:

xxx-xx-3538
Employer Tax ID / Other nos.:

DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR
It appearing that the debtor is entitled to a discharge,

IT IS ORDERED:
The debtor is granted a discharge under sectionT2T of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code).

BY THE COURT
Dated: 6l17lI3

MARGARET A. MAHONEY
United States Bankruptcy Judge

SEE THE BACK OF THIS ORDER FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.

Case 1-3-00819 Doc 27 Filed 06/1711-3 Entered 06lL7lI3 05:00:1-l- Desc 7
Individual or Joint (both
Paqe Iof2

de

818 (Official Form 18) (12107)

-

Cont.

EXPLANATION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
INACHAPTERTCASE
This court order grants a discharge to the person named as the debtor. It is not a dismissal of the case and
does not determine how much money,

if

any, the trustee

it

will pay to creditors.

Collection of Discharged Debts Prohibited
The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For example, a
creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to attach wages
or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor. [In a case involving
community property: There are also special rules that protect certain community property owned by the debtor's
spouse, even if that spouse did not file a bankruptcy case.l A creditor who violates this order can be required to pay
damages and attorney's fees to the debtor.

However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against
the debtor's property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case. Also, a
debtor may voluntarily pay any debt that has been discharged.
Debts That are Discharged
The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor's legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most, but
not all, types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date the bankruptcy case was filed. (If this case was
begun under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and converted to chapter 7, the discharge applies to debts
owed when the bankruptcy case was converted.)

Debts That are Not Discharged
Some of the common types of debts which are not discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case are:
a. Debts for most taxes:

b. Debts incurred to pay nondischargeable taxes;
c. Debts that are domestic support obligations;
d. Debts for most student loans:
e. Debts for most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal restitution obligations;

f. Debts for personal injuries or death caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft
while intoxicated;
g. Some debts which were not properly listed by the debtor;

h. Debts that the bankruptcy court specifically has decided or
discharged;

will decide in this bankruptcy case are not

i. Debts for which the debtor has given up the discharge protections by signing a reaffirmation agreement in
compliance with the Bankruptcy Code requirements for reaffirmation of debts; and

j. Debts owed to certain pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, other retirement plans, or to the Thrift

Savings

Plan for federal employees for certain types of loans from these plans.

This information is only a general summary of the bankruptcy discharge. There are exceptions to these
general rules. Because the law is complicated, you may want to consult an attorney to determine the exact
effect of the discharse in this case.

Case l-3-0081-9 Doc 27 Filed 06/171L3 Entered 06f-7113 05:00:11- Desc
Paqe 2of2
Individual or Joint (both

de

7