Howard et al v. City of Demopolis, Alabama

Filing 34

ORDER granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims against the City of Demopolis, Mayor Grayson, Chief Reese, and the Demopolis Police Department; summary judgment is granted in favor of Sergeant Bryant as to Count Six for assault, Co unt Eight for outrage, and Count Nine for loss of consortium; and denied as to Sergeant Bryant as to Count One for excessive force, Count Three for false arrest, Count Five for negligence, and Count Seven for malicious prosecution.. Signed by Judge Kristi K. DuBose on 11/25/2013. (cmj)

IN
 THE
 UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 COURT

FOR
 THE
 SOUTHERN
 DISTRICT
 OF
 ALABAMA

NORTHERN
 DIVISION

LOUIS
 HOWARD
 and
 LEDORA
 HOWARD,
  )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)
  CIVIL
 ACTION
 NO.
 2:12-­‐0522-­‐KD-­‐M

)

CITY
 OF
 DEMOPOLIS,
 ALABAMA,

)

et
 al,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

This
 action
 is
 before
 the
 Court
 on
 the
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 brief
 in

support
 and
 exhibits,
 and
 suggested
 determinations
 of
 fact
 and
 conclusions
 of
 law
 filed
 by

defendants
 City
 of
 Demopolis,
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department,
 Mayor
 J.
 Michael
 Grayton,

Chief
 of
 Police
 Tommie
 J.
 Reese,
 and
 Sergeant
 Richard
 Bryant
 (docs.
 19-­‐21);
 the
 response
 in

opposition
 with
 exhibits
 and
 response
 to
 defendants’
 suggested
 determination
 of
 fact
 filed

by
 Louis
 and
 Ledora
 Howard
 (“the
 Howards”)(doc.
 23);
 and
 the
 defendants’
 reply
 (doc.
 24).

Upon
 consideration,
 and
 for
 the
 reasons
 set
 forth
 herein,
 the
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment
 is
 GRANTED
 as
 to
 all
 claims
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis,
 Mayor
 Grayson,
 Chief

Reese,
 and
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department;
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of

Sergeant
 Bryant
 as
 to
 Count
 Six
 for
 assault,
 Count
 Eight
 for
 outrage,
 and
 Count
 Nine
 for
 loss

of
 consortium;
 and
 denied
 as
 to
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 as
 to
 Count
 One
 for
 excessive
 force,
 Count

Three
 for
 false
 arrest,
 Count
 Five
 for
 negligence,
 and
 Count
 Seven
 for
 malicious

prosecution.

I.

Procedural
 history

The
 Howards
 filed
 their
 complaint
 against
 the
 defendants
 on
 August
 8,
 2012
 (doc.
 1-­‐

1).

 Plaintiff
 Louis
 Howard
 brings
 Count
 One
 pursuant
 to
 42
 U.S.C.
 §1983
 against
 all

defendants
 for
 violation
 of
 his
 constitutional
 rights
 under
 the
 Fourth,
 Fifth
 and
 Fourteenth

Amendments1;
 Count
 Two
 pursuant
 to
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 for

adopting
 policies,
 procedures,
 practices
 or
 customs
 within
 the
 Demopolis
 Police

Department
 that
 allow
 the
 use
 of
 excessive
 force;
 Count
 Three
 pursuant
 to
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983

against
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 in
 his
 individual
 and
 official
 capacity
 for
 false
 arrest;
 Count
 Four

against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 and
 Chief
 Reese
 for
 negligent
 supervision
 of
 Sergeant
 Bryant;

Count
 Five
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 for
 negligence;
 Count
 Six
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 for

assault;
 Count
 Seven
 against
 the
 defendants
 for
 malicious
 prosecution;
 and
 Count
 Eight

against
 the
 defendants
 for
 outrage.

 Ledora
 Howard
 brings
 Count
 Nine
 for
 loss
 of

consortium.

On
 August
 21,2012,
 defendants
 removed
 the
 action
 to
 this
 Court
 and
 filed
 their

answer.

 They
 admitted
 certain
 allegations
 such
 as
 the
 location
 of
 the
 incident
 alleged
 in
 the

complaint,
 the
 Howards’
 citizenship,
 that
 Ms.
 Howard
 posted
 a
 bond
 for
 Mr.
 Howard,
 that

Mr.
 Howard
 filed
 a
 notice
 of
 claim
 for
 certain
 actions
 against
 the
 City,
 and
 the
 Howards’

marital
 status,
 but
 otherwise
 denied
 all
 allegations.

1

 Howard
 alleged
 that
 defendants
 deprived
 him
 of
 “a)
 the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from

unreasonable
 searches
 and
 seizures;
 b)
 the
 right
 not
 to
 be
 deprived
 of
 liberty
 without
 due

process
 of
 law;
 c)
 the
 right
 not
 to
 be
 deprived
 of
 property
 without
 due
 process
 of
 law;
 d)

the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 excessive
 use
 of
 force
 by
 persons
 acting
 under
 color
 of
 state
 law;
 e)

the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 false
 arrest;
 and
 the
 right
 to
 just
 compensation
 for
 taking
 of

property”.
 (Doc.
 1-­‐1,
 Count
 One,
 p.
 5)

2

II.

Findings
 of
 fact2

Louis
 Howard
 was
 diagnosed
 with
 paranoid
 schizophrenia
 in
 1982.
 He
 takes

Thorazine
 and
 Risperidone
 to
 control
 his
 illness.
 On
 May
 25,
 2011,
 he
 and
 his
 wife
 Ledora

were
 traveling
 home
 to
 Vicksburg,
 Mississippi
 after
 visiting
 family
 in
 Michigan.

 Ms.

Howard
 was
 driving
 and
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 in
 the
 front
 passenger
 seat
 of
 their
 van.

 After

they
 left
 Michigan,
 Mr.
 Howard
 had
 a
 mental
 episode
 because
 he
 had
 not
 been
 taking
 his

medication.

 Ms.
 Howard
 called
 911
 for
 help.
 The
 police
 and
 paramedics
 arrived
 and

convinced
 Mr.
 Howard
 to
 take
 his
 medication.
 After
 about
 thirty
 minutes,
 they
 were
 on

their
 way
 to
 Vicksburg.

 They
 stopped
 to
 rest
 in
 Indiana
 and
 Ms.
 Howard
 had
 difficulty

convincing
 Mr.
 Howard
 to
 get
 back
 in
 the
 van.

 After
 he
 did,
 she
 continued
 driving.

When
 they
 neared
 Demopolis,
 Alabama,
 they
 were
 detoured
 because
 of
 floodwater.

Mr.
 Howard
 was
 afraid
 of
 the
 rising
 water
 and
 his
 mental
 state
 deteriorated.

 While
 Ms.

Howard
 was
 driving,
 Mr.
 Howard
 took
 off
 his
 clothes
 and
 threw
 them
 and
 other
 personal

items
 out
 the
 van
 window.

 At
 about
 2:30
 a.m.,
 Ms.
 Howard
 called
 911
 for
 help
 and
 was

told
 to
 pull
 over
 until
 help
 arrived.

Officers
 Marcus
 Williams,
 Ellen
 Campbell
 and
 Kevin
 Johnson
 from
 the
 Demopolis

Police
 Department
 responded
 to
 the
 call.

 When
 they
 arrived
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 seated
 in
 the

van.

 The
 officers
 called
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 who
 was
 their
 supervisor.

 When
 he
 arrived,
 Ms.

2
 The
 majority
 of
 the
 findings
 of
 fact
 are
 taken
 from
 the
 Howards’
 statement
 of
 facts
 and
 the

Court
 has
 made
 its
 findings
 by
 “review[ing]
 the
 record,
 and
 all
 its
 inferences,
 in
 the
 light

most
 favorable
 to”
 the
 Howards
 as
 the
 nonmoving
 party.”
 Benson
 v.
 Tocco,
 Inc.,
 113
 F.3d

1203,
 1207
 (11th
 Cir.
 1997).
 However,
 “what
 is
 considered
 to
 be
 ‘facts’
 at
 the
 summary

judgment
 stage
 may
 not
 turn
 out
 to
 be
 the
 actual
 facts
 if
 the
 case
 goes
 to
 trial,
 but
 those
 are

the
 facts
 at
 this
 stage
 of
 the
 proceeding
 for
 summary
 judgment
 purposes.”
 Cottrell
 v.

Caldwell,
 85
 F.3d
 1480,
 1486
 (11th
 Cir.
 1996).

3

Howard
 and
 the
 officers
 were
 standing
 on
 the
 passenger
 side
 of
 the
 van,
 watching
 Mr.

Howard
 who
 was
 sitting
 in
 the
 front
 passenger
 seat.

 Mr.
 Howard
 remembers
 that
 he
 was

“sitting
 there
 quiet”.
 (Doc.
 23-­‐3,
 p.
 2,
 Howard
 Deposition)

 Sergeant
 Bryant
 asked
 Ms.

Howard
 if
 she
 had
 clothes
 for
 Mr.
 Howard.

 She
 responded
 that
 she
 did,
 and
 she
 and
 Officer

Campbell
 went
 to
 the
 rear
 of
 the
 van
 to
 get
 the
 clothes.

 Ms.
 Howard
 got
 a
 pair
 of
 pants
 and

shirt.

 She
 gave
 the
 clothes
 to
 Officer
 Campbell.

 Mr.
 Howard
 put
 on
 the
 clothes
 and
 got
 back

into
 the
 van.

At
 this
 point,
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 was
 standing
 by
 the
 front
 passenger
 door,
 Officer

Williams
 was
 standing
 on
 the
 passenger
 side
 front
 and
 Officer
 Campbell
 was
 at
 the
 rear
 of

the
 van
 with
 Ms.
 Howard
 as
 she
 “put
 things
 away”.

Ms.
 Howard
 then
 heard
 “tussling
 and
 words,
 talking
 words.”
 (Doc.
 23-­‐2,
 p.
 52,

Ledora
 Howard
 deposition)

 She
 looked
 up
 and
 saw
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 “tussling
 and
 pulling”

Mr.
 Howard
 through
 the
 window
 of
 the
 van.

 She
 stopped
 repacking
 and
 went
 to
 see
 what

was
 going
 on.

 She
 saw
 Mr.
 Howard
 on
 the
 ground
 with
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

 She
 did
 not
 see

Sergeant
 Bryant
 hit
 Mr.
 Howard,
 but
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 lip
 was
 bleeding.

 Ms.
 Howard
 did
 not

hear
 any
 statements
 made
 by
 Mr.
 Howard
 to
 the
 officers.

Mr.
 Howard
 states
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 approached
 the
 window
 and
 began
 to
 talk

to
 him
 and
 in
 response,
 he
 asked
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 where
 was
 his
 wife,
 Ms.
 Howard.

Sergeant
 Bryant
 kept
 “hammering”
 at
 Mr.
 Howard,
 asking
 “what
 was
 his
 problem”
 and

“kept
 rattling
 at”
 him,
 and
 in
 response,
 “every
 time
 he
 asked”
 Mr.
 Howard
 asked
 “where
 is

my
 wife”.
 (Doc.
 23-­‐3,
 p.
 3,
 Louis
 Howard
 deposition)

 At
 this
 time,
 the
 door
 to
 the
 van
 was

closed
 but
 the
 window
 was
 all
 the
 way
 down.

 Officer
 Johnson
 was
 standing
 by
 the

passenger
 door.

 Officer
 Williams
 was
 standing
 two
 feet
 away
 from
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 and

4

Mr.
 Howard.

 Mr.
 Howard
 states
 that
 he
 had
 complied
 with
 the
 officers’
 instructions
 to

remain
 in
 his
 seat.

Mr.
 Howard
 states
 that
 he
 did
 not
 try
 to
 hit
 Officer
 Johnson.

 Instead,
 while
 Mr.

Howard
 was
 sitting
 in
 the
 vehicle,
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 punched
 him
 twice,
 which
 knocked
 him

out
 and
 caused
 him
 to
 slump
 out
 the
 window.
 When
 Mr.
 Howard
 woke
 up
 he
 was”
 kind
 of

whaling
 his
 arms”,
 and
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 grabbed
 him
 and
 pulled
 him
 out
 of
 the
 window
 and

onto
 the
 ground.
 (Doc.
 23-­‐4,
 p.
 2,
 Campbell
 deposition)

 According
 to
 Mr.
 Howard,
 while
 he

was
 on
 the
 ground,
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 hit
 him
 with
 his
 fist
 and
 busted
 his
 lip.

 Mr.
 Howard
 did

not
 strike
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

 He
 did
 not
 refuse
 to
 get
 up
 off
 the
 ground,
 nor
 fight
 back,

struggle
 or
 try
 to
 resist.3

Officer
 Johnson
 testified
 that
 when
 he
 arrived
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 agitated,
 making

irrational
 and
 vulgar
 statements
 and
 twice
 tried
 to
 come
 out
 of
 the
 van
 window.

 Officer

Johnson
 testified
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 was
 asking
 Mr.
 Howard
 to
 calm
 down
 and
 then
 Mr.

Howard
 came
 back
 out
 of
 the
 van
 window
 and
 “just
 started
 swinging”
 at
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

He
 testified
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 hit
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 and
 then
 Bryant
 hit
 Mr.
 Howard
 twice
 and

pulled
 him
 out
 of
 the
 van.

 (Doc.
 20-­‐4,
 p.
 3-­‐4)

Officer
 Williams
 testified
 that
 when
 he
 arrived
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 “lashing
 out”

verbally,
 threatening
 his
 wife,
 threatening
 the
 officers,
 “pointing
 and
 swinging
 his
 arms”,

and
 acting
 “violent
 and
 belligerent”.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐5,
 p.
 2-­‐3)

 Officer
 Williams
 testified
 that
 Mr.

3
 At
 his
 deposition,
 defense
 counsel
 asked
 Mr.
 Howard

 –
 “Do
 you
 remember
 hitting
 a
 police

officer?

 Do
 you
 remember
 taking
 a
 swing
 at
 a
 police
 officer?

 He
 answered
 “No”.

 (Doc.
 20-­‐
1,
 p.
 10)

 Mr.
 Howard
 submitted
 an
 affidavit
 wherein
 he
 states
 that
 he
 did
 not
 hit,
 punch
 or

threaten
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 or
 any
 other
 police
 officer.

 He
 explained
 that
 “[d]uring
 the

deposition,
 the
 attorney
 asked
 me
 if
 I
 remembered
 taking
 a
 swing
 at
 a
 police
 officer.

 I

answered
 “no’
 because
 I
 did
 not
 take
 a
 swing
 at
 any
 police
 officer.”
 (Doc.
 23-­‐8)

 The
 court

does
 not
 find
 the
 affidavit
 to
 be
 clearly
 inconsistent
 with
 the
 deposition.

5

Howard
 threatened
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 who
 then
 told
 him
 to
 calm
 down,
 but
 Mr.
 Howard

“leaped
 out
 the
 window”
 and
 “slapped”
 or
 “hit”
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 “open
 handed
 in
 the
 face

twice.”
 (Id.,
 p.
 4)

Officer
 Campbell
 stated
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 became
 irate
 with
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 while

he
 was
 questioning
 him.

 She
 stated
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 yelled
 and
 cursed
 at
 Sergeant
 Bryant,

threatened
 to
 beat
 him
 and
 tried
 to
 start
 a
 fight.
 Mr.
 Howard
 then
 came
 half
 way
 out
 the

window
 and
 hit
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 on
 the
 cheek
 on
 the
 left
 side
 and
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 hit
 Mr.

Howard
 two
 times
 in
 the
 face.

 Mr.
 Howard
 then
 slumped
 over
 the
 vehicle
 and
 Sergeant

Bryant
 pulled
 him
 out
 the
 window.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐8)

Sergeant
 Bryant
 testified
 that
 when
 he
 first
 arrived
 the
 officers
 were
 trying
 to
 get

Mr.
 Howard
 to
 take
 his
 medication
 and
 after
 he
 took
 his
 medication,
 they
 were
 “waiting
 on

the
 medication
 to
 take
 hold”
 and
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 “irate”.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐3,
 p.
 4)

 He
 also

testified
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 was
 acting
 and
 talking
 irrationally
 and
 making
 threats
 to
 the

officers
 and
 Ms.
 Howard.

 Sergeant
 Bryant
 testified
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 came
 out
 of
 the
 van

window,
 up
 to
 his
 waist,
 and
 struck
 him
 twice
 before
 he
 struck
 Mr.
 Howard
 and
 knocked

him
 out.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐3,
 p.
 6-­‐7,
 12)

 Sergeant
 Bryant
 pulled
 Mr.
 Howard
 out
 of
 the
 window,

placed
 him
 on
 the
 ground,
 and
 he
 arrested
 Mr.
 Howard
 for
 assaulting
 an
 officer.4

 Mr.

Howard
 resisted
 but
 was
 handcuffed
 by
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 with
 the
 assistance
 of
 Officer

Williams,
 placed
 in
 leg
 restraints
 by
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 put
 in
 the
 patrol
 car,
 and
 taken
 to
 the

jail
 by
 Officer
 Williams.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐3,
 p.
 7,
 12,
 Bryant
 Deposition;
 Doc.
 20-­‐5,
 p.
 8,
 Williams

deposition)

 Officer
 Williams
 testified
 that
 it
 took
 four
 officers
 to
 place
 Mr.
 Howard
 in
 the

jail
 cell
 because
 of
 his
 resistance.
 (Doc.
 20-­‐5,
 p.
 8,
 Williams
 deposition)

4

 The
 charge
 was
 later
 reduced
 to
 harassment.

6

III.

Conclusions
 of
 law

A.

Summary
 judgment
 should
 be
 granted
 “if
 the
 movant
 shows
 that
 there
 is
 no
 genuine

Summary
 judgment
 standard

dispute
 as
 to
 any
 material
 fact
 and
 the
 movant
 is
 entitled
 to
 judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law.”

Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(a).
 If
 a
 party
 asserts
 “that
 a
 fact
 cannot
 be
 or
 is
 genuinely
 disputed”,
 the

party
 must

(A)
 cit[e]
 to
 particular
 parts
 of
 materials
 in
 the
 record,
 including
 depositions,

documents,
 electronically
 stored
 information,
 affidavits
 or
 declarations,

stipulations
 (including
 those
 made
 for
 purposes
 of
 the
 motion
 only),

admissions,
 interrogatory
 answers,
 or
 other
 materials;
 or

(B)
 show[]
 that
 the
 materials
 cited
 do
 not
 establish
 the
 absence
 or
 presence

of
 a
 genuine
 dispute,
 or
 that
 an
 adverse
 party
 cannot
 produce
 admissible

evidence
 to
 support
 the
 fact.

Fed.
 R.
 Civ.
 P.
 56(c)(1)(A)(B).

Defendants,
 as
 the
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 bear
 “the
 initial
 burden
 to

show
 the
 district
 court,
 by
 reference
 to
 materials
 on
 file,
 that
 there
 are
 no
 genuine
 issues
 of

material
 fact
 that
 should
 be
 decided
 at
 trial.”
 Clark
 v.
 Coats
 &
 Clark,
 Inc.,
 929
 F.2d
 604,
 608

(11th
 Cir.
 1991).

 The
 party
 seeking
 summary
 judgment
 “always
 bears
 the
 initial

responsibility
 of
 informing
 the
 district
 court
 of
 the
 basis
 for
 its
 motion,
 and
 identifying

those
 portions
 of
 ‘the
 pleadings,
 depositions,
 answers
 to
 interrogatories,
 and
 admissions
 on

file,
 together
 with
 the
 affidavits,
 if
 any,’
 which
 it
 believes
 demonstrate
 the
 absence
 of
 a

genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.”
 Clark,
 929
 F.2d
 at
 608
 (quoting
 Celotex
 Corp.
 v.
 Catrett,
 477

U.S.
 317,
 323,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 2548,
 2553
 (1986)).

Once
 defendants
 have
 satisfied
 their
 responsibility,
 the
 burden
 shifts
 to
 plaintiffs
 as

the
 non-­‐movant,
 to
 show
 the
 existence
 of
 a
 genuine
 issue
 of
 material
 fact.
 Id.
 “In
 reviewing

7

whether
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 has
 met
 its
 burden,
 the
 court
 must
 stop
 short
 of
 weighing
 the

evidence
 and
 making
 credibility
 determination
 of
 the
 truth
 of
 the
 matter.
 Instead,
 the

evidence
 of
 the
 non-­‐movant
 is
 to
 be
 believed,
 and
 all
 justifiable
 inferences
 are
 to
 be
 drawn

in
 his
 favor.”
 Tipton
 v.
 Bergrohr
 GMBH-­‐Siegen,
 965
 F.2d
 994,
 999
 (11th
 Cir.
 1992)
 (citing

Anderson
 v.
 Liberty
 Lobby,
 477
 U.S.
 242,
 255,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 2505
 (1986));
 Adickes
 v.
 S.H.
 Kress
 &

Co.,
 398
 U.S.
 144,
 158-­‐159,
 90
 S.
 Ct.
 1598,
 1608-­‐1609
 (1970);
 see
 Feliciano
 v.
 City
 of
 Miami

Beach,
 707
 F.3d
 1244,
 1252
 (11th
 Cir.2013)
 (“Even
 if
 a
 district
 court
 believes
 that
 the

evidence
 presented
 by
 one
 side
 is
 of
 doubtful
 veracity,
 it
 is
 not
 proper
 to
 grant
 summary

judgment
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 credibility
 choices.”).

However,
 “[a]
 moving
 party
 is
 entitled
 to
 summary
 judgment
 if
 the
 nonmoving
 party

has
 ‘failed
 to
 make
 a
 sufficient
 showing
 on
 an
 essential
 element
 of
 her
 case
 with
 respect
 to

which
 she
 has
 the
 burden
 of
 proof.’”
 In
 re
 Walker,
 48
 F.
 3d
 1161,
 1163
 (11th
 Cir.
 1995)

(quoting
 Celotex
 Corp.,
 477
 U.S.
 at
 323,
 106
 S.
 Ct.
 at
 2552).

 Additionally,
 the
 mere
 existence

of
 any
 factual
 dispute
 will
 not
 automatically
 necessitate
 denial
 of
 a
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment;
 rather,
 only
 factual
 disputes
 that
 are
 material
 preclude
 entry
 of
 summary

judgment.
 Lofton
 v.
 Secretary
 of
 Dept.
 of
 Children
 and
 Family
 Services,
 358
 F.3d
 804,
 809

(11th
 Cir.
 2004).

 “An
 issue
 of
 fact
 is
 material
 if
 it
 is
 a
 legal
 element
 of
 the
 claim
 under
 the

applicable
 substantive
 law
 which
 might
 affect
 the
 outcome
 of
 the
 case.
 It
 is
 genuine
 if
 the

record
 taken
 as
 a
 whole
 could
 lead
 a
 rational
 trier
 of
 fact
 to
 find
 for
 the
 nonmoving
 party.”

Reeves
 v.
 C.H.
 Robinson
 Worldwide,
 Inc.,
 594
 F.3d
 798,
 807
 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (citation

omitted).
 Overall,
 the
 court
 must
 “resolve
 all
 issues
 of
 material
 fact
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 [non-­‐
movant],
 and
 then
 determine
 the
 legal
 question
 of
 whether
 the
 [movant]
 is
 entitled
 to

judgment
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law
 under
 that
 version
 of
 the
 facts.”
 McDowell
 v.
 Brown,
 392
 F.3d

8

1283,
 1288
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004)
 (citing
 Durruthy
 v.
 Pastor,
 351
 F.3d
 1080,
 1084
 (11th
 Cir.

2003)).

B.

Analysis

1.
 The
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department.

Defendants
 argue
 that
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department
 is
 not
 a
 proper
 defendant

because
 it
 is
 not
 a
 separate
 legal
 entity
 capable
 of
 being
 sued.

 The
 Howards
 did
 not

respond
 to
 this
 argument.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 they
 have
 abandoned
 their

claims
 against
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department.

 Edmondson
 v.
 Bd.
 of
 Trustees
 of
 Univ.
 of

Ala.,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 250,
 253
 (11th
 Cir.
 2007)
 (“In
 opposing
 a
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment,
 a
 party
 may
 not
 rely
 on
 her
 pleadings
 to
 avoid
 judgment
 against
 her.
 There
 is
 no

burden
 upon
 the
 district
 court
 to
 distill
 every
 potential
 argument
 that
 could
 be
 made
 based

upon
 the
 materials
 before
 it
 on
 summary
 judgment.
 Rather,
 the
 onus
 is
 upon
 the
 parties
 to

formulate
 arguments;
 grounds
 alleged
 in
 the
 complaint
 but
 not
 relied
 upon
 in
 summary

judgment
 are
 deemed
 abandoned.”)
 (citing
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.
 v.
 Dunmar
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d

587,
 599
 (11th
 Cir.1995));
 Floyd
 v.
 Home
 Depot
 USA,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 763,
 765
 (11th
 Cir.

2008)
 (finding
 that
 the
 district
 court
 properly
 determined
 that
 Floyd
 had
 abandoned
 his

ADA
 retaliation
 termination
 claim
 because
 he
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 Home
 Depot's
 argument

on
 that
 claim)
 (citing
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599).

Moreover,
 in
 Dean
 v.
 Barber,
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 Court
 of
 Appeals
 explained
 that

“Sheriff's
 departments
 and
 police
 departments
 are
 not
 usually
 considered
 legal
 entities

subject
 to
 suit”
 .
 .
 .
 but
 “capacity
 to
 sue
 or
 be
 sued
 shall
 be
 determined
 by
 the
 law
 of
 the

state
 in
 which
 the
 district
 court
 is
 held.”
 951
 F.2d
 1210,
 1214
 (11th
 Cir.1992),
 (quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P.
 17(b)).

 In
 that
 regard,
 this
 Court
 has
 previously
 determined
 that
 police

9

departments
 are
 not
 a
 proper
 legal
 entity
 capable
 of
 being
 sued.
 Blunt
 v.
 Tomlinson,
 2009

WL
 921093,
 *4
 -­‐5

 (S.D.
 Ala.
 Apr.
 1,
 2009)
 (“In
 Alabama,
 a
 city's
 police
 department
 is
 not
 a

suable
 entity
 or
 a
 proper
 party
 under
 state
 law
 or
 for
 §
 1983
 purposes.”)
 (citing
 Hawkins
 v.

City
 of
 Greenville,
 101
 F.Supp.2d
 1356,
 1363
 (M.D.Ala.
 2000);
 accord
 Lee
 v.
 Wood,
 2007
 WL

2460756,
 at
 *7
 (S.D.Ala.
 Aug.27,
 2007)
 (finding
 that
 the
 City
 of
 Mobile
 Police
 Department
 is

not
 a
 suable
 entity
 under
 state
 law);
 Pierre
 v.
 Schlemmer,
 932
 F.Supp.
 278,
 279–80

(M.D.Fla.1996)
 (finding
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 adheres
 to
 the
 approach
 that
 a
 city
 police

department
 is
 not
 a
 separate
 legal
 entity
 which
 is
 subject
 to
 suit
 and
 is
 not
 a
 “person”
 for
 §

1983
 purposes);
 Eddy
 v.
 Miami,
 715
 F.Supp.
 1553,
 1556
 (S.D.Fla.1989)
 (“Where
 a
 police

department
 is
 an
 integral
 part
 of
 the
 city
 government
 as
 the
 vehicle
 through
 which
 the
 city

government
 fulfills
 its
 policing
 functions,
 it
 is
 not
 an
 entity
 subject
 to
 suit.”);
 Reese
 v.

Chicago
 Police
 Dept.,
 602
 F.Supp.
 441,
 443
 (N.D.Ill.1984)
 (finding
 a
 police
 department
 does

not
 have
 a
 legal
 existence
 separate
 from
 the
 city
 and,
 therefore,
 is
 not
 a
 suable
 entity).”);

Cheatham
 v.
 City
 of
 Tallassee,
 2012
 WL
 3890127,
 *6
 (M.D.
 Ala.
 Sept.
 7,
 2012)
 (finding
 that

the
 Tallassee
 Police
 Department
 was
 due
 summary
 judgment
 as
 to
 all
 claims
 brought

against
 it).

 Accordingly,
 the
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department
 are

dismissed.

2.

 The
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 Mayor
 Grayson
 in
 his
 official
 or
 individual
 capacity.

Defendants
 argue
 that
 there
 are
 no
 factual
 allegations
 or
 legal
 claims
 against
 Mayor

Grayson
 but
 instead
 his
 name
 only
 appears
 in
 the
 style
 of
 the
 case.

 They
 specifically
 point

out
 that
 the
 Howards
 did
 not
 allege
 that
 Mayor
 Grayson
 supervised
 or
 trained
 Sergeant

Bryant
 or
 developed
 any
 policies
 for
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department.

 The
 Howards
 did

not
 respond
 to
 this
 argument.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 they
 have
 abandoned
 any

10

claims
 against
 Mayor
 Grayson.

 Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253
 (“grounds
 alleged
 in
 the

complaint
 but
 not
 relied
 upon
 in
 summary
 judgment
 are
 deemed
 abandoned”);

 Floyd,
 274

Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599
 (“[T]he
 onus
 is
 upon
 the
 parties
 to

formulate
 arguments;
 grounds
 alleged
 in
 the
 complaint
 but
 not
 relied
 upon
 in
 summary

judgment
 are
 deemed
 abandoned”);
 Fils
 v.
 City
 of
 Aventura,
 647
 F.3d
 1272,
 1284
 (11th
 Cir.

2011)
 (the
 “district
 courts
 cannot
 concoct
 or
 resurrect
 arguments
 neither
 made
 nor

advanced
 by
 the
 parties.”);
 Case
 v.
 Eslinger,
 555
 F.3d
 1317,
 1329
 (11th
 Cir.
 2009)
 (a
 party

“cannot
 readily
 complain
 about
 the
 entry
 of
 a
 summary
 judgment
 order
 that
 did
 not

consider
 an
 argument
 [they]
 chose
 not
 to
 develop
 for
 the
 district
 court
 at
 the
 time
 of
 the

summary
 judgment
 motions”)
 (citation
 omitted).

Additionally,
 any
 claims
 against
 Mayor
 Grayson
 in
 his
 official
 capacity
 are
 essentially

claims
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis,
 which
 has
 been
 sued
 directly.

 Kentucky
 v.
 Graham,

473
 U.S.
 159,
 165–166,
 167
 n.14
 (1985)
 (“As
 long
 as
 the
 government
 entity
 receives
 notice

and
 an
 opportunity
 to
 respond,
 an
 official-­‐capacity
 suit
 is,
 in
 all
 respects
 other
 than
 name,

to
 be
 treated
 as
 a
 suit
 against
 the
 entity.
 .
 .
 .

 It
 is
 not
 a
 suit
 against
 the
 official
 personally,
 for

the
 real
 party
 in
 interest
 is
 the
 entity.”
 .
 .
 .
 “[T]here
 is
 no
 longer
 a
 need
 to
 bring
 official-­‐
capacity
 actions
 against
 local
 government
 officials
 for
 ...
 local
 government
 units
 can
 be
 sued

directly
 for
 damages
 and
 injunctive
 and
 declaratory
 relief”)
 (italics
 in
 original)
 (internal

citations
 omitted).

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 Mayor
 Grayson

and
 the
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 him
 in
 his
 individual
 and
 official
 capacity
 are
 dismissed.

3.
 The
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 official
 capacity.

In
 the
 complaint,
 the
 Howards
 allege
 generally
 that
 Chief
 Reese
 “in
 his
 capacity
 as

Chief
 of
 Police,
 .
 .
 .
 is
 responsible
 for
 making
 and/or
 implementing
 policies
 and
 practices

11

used
 by
 law
 enforcement
 officers
 employed
 by
 the
 City
 regarding
 arrests
 and
 the
 use
 of

force.”
 (Doc.
 1-­‐1,
 p.
 3)

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 any
 claims
 against
 Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 official

capacity
 should
 be
 dismissed
 because
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 is
 named
 as
 a
 defendant.

 The

Howards
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 this
 argument.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 the
 Howards

have
 abandoned
 their
 claims
 against
 Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 official
 capacity.
 Edmondson,
 258

Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253
 (“grounds
 alleged
 in
 the
 complaint
 but
 not
 relied
 upon
 in
 summary

judgment
 are
 deemed
 abandoned”);

 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43

F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

 Moreover,
 the
 claims
 against

Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 official
 capacity
 are
 essentially
 claims
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis,

which
 has
 been
 sued
 directly.

 Kentucky
 v.
 Graham,
 473
 U.S.
 at
 165–166,
 167
 n.14.

Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 official
 capacity

and
 the
 Howards’
 claims
 against
 him
 in
 his
 official
 capacity
 are
 dismissed.

4.
 The
 Howards’
 claims
 of
 constitutional
 violations
 (42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983,
 Count
 One)

In
 Count
 One,
 the
 Howards
 alleged
 that
 the
 “defendants”
 violated
 their

constitutional
 rights
 under
 the
 Fourth,
 Fifth
 and
 Fourteenth
 Amendment
 including
 but
 not

limited
 to
 “a)
 the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 unreasonable
 searches
 and
 seizures;
 b)
 the
 right
 not

to
 be
 deprived
 of
 liberty
 without
 due
 process
 of
 law;
 c)
 the
 right
 not
 to
 be
 deprived
 of

property
 without
 due
 process
 of
 law;
 d)
 the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 excessive
 use
 of
 force
 by

persons
 acting
 under
 color
 of
 state
 law;
 e)
 the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 false
 arrest;
 and
 the

right
 to
 just
 compensation
 for
 taking
 of
 property”
 (doc.
 1-­‐1,
 Count
 One,
 p.
 5).

  In
 support,

the
 Howards
 re-­‐alleged
 and
 incorporated
 by
 reference
 all
 of
 the
 factual
 allegations
 set
 forth

in
 pages
 1
 through
 8
 of
 their
 complaint,
 but
 without
 specifying
 which
 factual
 allegations

support
 which
 constitutional
 violation
 except
 to
 state
 that
 defendants
 “conducted
 an

12

unauthorized
 and
 warrantless
 search
 and
 seizure
 of”
 Mr.
 Howard,
 and
 “used
 excessive

force
 in
 violation
 of”
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 rights.

On
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 defendants
 argue
 that
 substantive
 due
 process
 is

not
 implicated
 since
 excessive
 force
 claims,
 unreasonable
 search
 and
 seizure
 claims,
 and

false
 arrest
 claims
 are
 analyzed
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 and
 not
 under
 a
 substantive

due
 process
 standard.

 They
 also
 argue
 that
 there
 was
 an
 adequate
 post-­‐deprivation

remedy
 such
 that
 procedural
 due
 process
 violations
 were
 not
 implicated.

 Defendants
 point

out
 that
 since
 they
 are
 unaware
 of
 any
 property
 taken
 from
 the
 Howards,
 the
 Fifth

Amendment’s
 “takings
 clause”
 is
 not
 applicable
 to
 the
 facts
 in
 this
 case.

The
 Howards
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 the
 defendants’
 argument
 except
 to
 argue
 that

certain
 rights
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendments
 have
 been
 violated
 by
 the
 defendants.5

 Thus,

the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 they
 have
 abandoned
 any
 claims
 pursuant
 to
 the
 Fifth

Amendment.

 Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253;
 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution

Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

 Accordingly,

5

 Specifically,
 the
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 unreasonable
 searches
 and
 seizures,
 excessive
 use

of
 force,
 and
 false
 arrest;
 all
 of
 which
 are
 analyzed
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment.
 Graham
 v.

Connor,
 490
 U.S.
 386,
 395,
 109
 S.Ct.
 1865,
 1871,
 104
 L.Ed.2d
 443
 (1989)
 (holding
 that
 “all

claims
 that
 law
 enforcement
 officers
 have
 used
 excessive
 force
 –
 deadly
 or
 not
 –
 in
 the

course
 of
 an
 arrest,
 investigatory
 stop,
 or
 other
 ‘seizure’
 of
 a
 free
 citizen
 should
 be
 analyzed

under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 and
 its
 ‘reasonableness’
 standard,
 rather
 than
 under
 a

‘substantive
 due
 process’
 approach.”)
 (italics
 in
 original);
 Brown
 v.
 City
 of
 Huntsville,
 608

F.3d
 724,
 737
 (11th
 Cir.2010)
 (“The
 Fourth
 Amendment's
 [right
 to]
 freedom
 from

unreasonable
 searches
 and
 seizures
 encompasses
 the
 plain
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from
 the
 use
 of

excessive
 force
 in
 the
 course
 of
 an
 arrest.”);
 Davis
 v.
 Williams,
 451
 F.3d
 759,
 764
 n.
 8
 (11th

Cir.
 2006)
 (“.
 .
 .
 it
 is
 clearly
 established
 that
 an
 arrest
 made
 without
 probable
 cause
 violates

the
 Fourth
 Amendment.”);

 Hamm
 v.
 Powell,
 893
 F.2d
 293,
 294
 (11th
 Cir.1990)

(acknowledging
 that
 wrongful
 arrest
 and
 use
 of
 excessive
 force
 claims
 under
 §
 1983
 are

analyzed
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 ).

 Moreover,
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 has
 been

made
 applicable
 to
 the
 States
 through
 the
 Fourteenth
 Amendment.

 See
 Brescher
 v.
 Von

Stein,
 904
 F.
 2d
 572,
 578
 (11th
 Cir.
 1990).

13

summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 defendants
 as
 to
 any
 claims
 for
 constitutional

violations
 under
 the
 Fifth
 Amendment,
 and
 those
 claims,
 if
 any,
 are
 dismissed.

5.

 The
 Howards’
 claim
 of
 excessive
 force
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant

In
 Count
 One,
 the
 Howards
 allege
 that
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 constitutional
 right
 under
 the

Fourth
 Amendment
 to
 be
 free
 from
 excessive
 force
 has
 been
 violated
 because
 Sergeant

Bryant
 struck
 him
 twice
 in
 the
 face,
 pulled
 him
 out
 of
 the
 van
 window,
 hit
 him
 again
 while

he
 was
 on
 the
 ground,
 and
 then
 restrained
 him.

 Mr.
 Howard’s
 claim
 of
 excessive
 force

occurring
 during
 his
 arrest
 is
 construed
 as
 arising
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment.6
 See

Hadley
 v.
 Gutierrez,
 526
 F.3d
 1324,
 1329
 (11th
 Cir.2008)
 (“In
 an
 excessive
 force
 case

arising
 out
 of
 an
 arrest,
 whether
 a
 constitutional
 violation
 occurred
 is
 governed
 by
 the

Fourth
 Amendment's
 ‘objective
 reasonableness'
 standard.”)
 (quoting
 Brosseau
 v.
 Haugen,

543
 U.S.
 194,
 197,
 125
 S.Ct.
 596
 (2004))).

 In
 that
 regard,
 the
 Court
 must
 consider
 certain

factors
 “in
 determining
 whether
 an
 officer's
 use
 of
 force
 was
 objectively
 reasonable,

including
 ‘(1)
 the
 need
 for
 the
 application
 of
 force,
 (2)
 the
 relationship
 between
 the
 need

and
 the
 amount
 of
 force
 used,
 (3)
 the
 extent
 of
 the
 injury
 inflicted
 and,
 (4)
 whether
 the

6

 The
 Eleventh
 Circuit
 has
 held
 that
 “a
 claim
 that
 any
 force
 in
 an
 illegal
 stop
 or
 arrest
 is

excessive
 is
 subsumed
 in
 the
 illegal
 stop
 or
 arrest
 claim
 and
 is
 not
 a
 discrete
 excessive
 force

claim.”
 Lee
 v.
 Ferraro,
 284
 F.3d
 1188,
 1193
 (11th
 Cir.2002)
 (quoting
 Jackson
 v.
 Sauls,
 206

F.3d
 1156,
 1171
 (11th
 Cir.2000)
 (in
 turn
 citing
 Williamson
 v.
 Mills,
 65
 F.3d
 155,
 158–59

(11th
 Cir.1995))).

 The
 Howards’
 complaint
 contains
 a
 claim
 of
 false
 arrest
 against
 Sergeant

Bryant.

 Thus,
 arguably
 their
 excessive
 force
 claim
 is
 “subsumed”
 in
 that
 claim.

 However,
 in

the
 response,
 the
 Howards
 assume
 for
 purpose
 of
 argument
 that
 if
 Mr.
 Howard
 did
 hit

Sergeant
 Bryant
 and
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 knocked
 Mr.
 Howard
 unconscious,
 then
 “any

further
 force
 to
 subdue
 him
 was
 unnecessary.”
 (Doc.
 23,
 p.
 14)

 Therefore,
 the
 claims
 of

excessive
 force
 and
 false
 arrest
 are
 analyzed
 separately.

 See
 Rigas
 v.
 City
 of
 Rogersville,

Ala.,
 2013
 WL
 5229998
 (N.D.
 Ala.
 Sept.
 17,
 2013)
 (slip
 copy)
 (stating
 that
 because
 Rigas
 did

“not
 allege
 excessive
 force
 during
 the
 commission
 of
 a
 legal
 arrest,
 even
 as
 an
 alternative

basis
 for
 recovery,
 any
 claim
 for
 excessive
 force
 is
 subsumed
 under
 [his]
 false
 arrest

claims”)
 (italics
 in
 original).

14

force
 was
 applied
 in
 good
 faith
 or
 maliciously
 and
 sadistically.’
 “
 Hadley,
 526
 F.3d
 at
 1329

(quoting
 Slicker
 v.
 Jackson,
 215
 F.3d
 1225,
 1233
 (11th
 Cir.
 2000)).

Defendants
 argue
 that
 there
 is
 no
 dispute
 of
 fact
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 struck
 Sergeant

Bryant
 and
 that
 the
 amount
 of
 force
 applied
 during
 the
 arrest
 was
 not
 excessive.

Alternatively,
 they
 argue
 that
 if
 the
 amount
 of
 force
 applied
 was
 found
 to
 be
 excessive,

Sergeant
 Bryant
 is
 still
 entitled
 to
 qualified
 immunity.

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 the
 testimony

of
 the
 four
 police
 officers
 is
 un-­‐contradicted
 evidence
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 struck
 Sergeant

Bryant,
 despite
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 statements
 to
 the
 contrary.

However,
 the
 Court
 finds
 that
 there
 is
 a
 material
 issue
 of
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 Mr.

Howard
 struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 and
 whether
 the
 use
 of
 this
 force
 was
 excessive.

Defendants
 argue
 that
 there
 is
 no
 evidence
 in
 Mr.
 Howards’
 favor
 because
 he
 cannot

remember
 whether
 he
 struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 and
 because
 his
 post-­‐deposition
 affidavit

contradicts
 his
 deposition
 testimony.

 The
 Court
 disagrees
 and
 finds
 that
 the
 affidavit
 does

not
 contradict
 the
 deposition.

 Mr.
 Howard’s
 statements
 that
 he
 did
 not
 strike
 Sergeant

Bryant
 are
 based
 on
 his
 “first-­‐hand
 personal
 knowledge,
 not
 [his]
 subjective
 beliefs”
 and

“they
 directly
 contradict
 the
 officers’
 assertions”.

 Feliciano
 v.
 City
 of
 Miami
 Beach,
 707
 F.
 3d

1244,
 1253
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (“The
 contradiction
 presents
 a
 classic
 swearing
 match,
 which

is
 the
 stuff
 of
 which
 jury
 trials
 are
 made.”)

“When
 considering
 a
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 including
 one
 asserting

qualified
 immunity,
 courts
 must
 construe
 the
 facts
 and
 draw
 all
 inferences
 in
 the
 light
 most

favorable
 to
 the
 nonmoving
 party
 and
 when
 conflicts
 arise
 between
 the
 facts
 evidenced
 by

the
 parties,
 [they
 must]
 credit
 the
 nonmoving
 party's
 version.

 Even
 if
 a
 district
 court

15

believes
 that
 the
 evidence
 presented
 by
 one
 side
 is
 of
 doubtful
 veracity,7
 it
 is
 not
 proper
 to

grant
 summary
 judgment
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 credibility
 choices.”
 Feliciano,
 707
 F.
 3d
 at
 1252

(citations
 omitted)
 (internal
 quotations
 omitted).

 “This
 is
 because
 credibility

determinations
 and
 the
 weighing
 of
 evidence
 ‘are
 jury
 functions,
 not
 those
 of
 a
 judge.’”
 Id.

(citing
 Anderson
 v.
 Liberty
 Lobby,
 Inc.,
 477
 U.S.
 242,
 255,
 106
 S.Ct.
 2505,
 2513
 (1986)).

 A

determination
 as
 to
 whether
 Mr.
 Howard
 struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 is
 material
 to
 whether

Sergeant
 Bryant
 needed
 to
 apply
 the
 force
 used
 to
 arrest
 Mr.
 Howard
 and
 to
 whether
 the

force
 was
 applied
 in
 good
 faith
 or
 maliciously
 or
 sadistically.

 Moreover,
 the
 prohibition

against
 excessive
 force
 is
 clearly
 established
 such
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 could
 not
 claim

immunity
 if
 he
 engaged
 in
 the
 alleged
 behavior.

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 denied

as
 to
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 claim
 of
 excessive
 force
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

6.
 The
 Howards’
 claims
 pursuant
 to
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis

(Use
 of
 Excessive
 Force,
 Count
 Two)

The
 City
 may
 be
 a
 defendant
 under
 Section
 1983.

 Title
 42
 United
 States
 Code,

Section
 1983
 sets
 forth
 as
 follows:

Every
 person
 who,
 under
 color
 of
 any
 statute,
 ordinance,
 regulation,
 custom,

or
 usage,
 of
 any
 State
 or
 Territory
 or
 the
 District
 of
 Columbia,
 subjects,
 or

causes
 to
 be
 subjected,
 any
 citizen
 of
 the
 United
 States
 or
 other
 person
 within

the
 jurisdiction
 thereof
 to
 the
 deprivation
 of
 any
 rights,
 privileges,
 or

immunities
 secured
 by
 the
 Constitution
 and
 laws,
 shall
 be
 liable
 to
 the
 party

7

 “As
 a
 general
 principle,
 a
 plaintiff's
 testimony
 cannot
 be
 discounted
 on
 summary

judgment
 unless
 it
 is
 blatantly
 contradicted
 by
 the
 record,
 blatantly
 inconsistent,
 or

incredible
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law,
 meaning
 that
 it
 relates
 to
 facts
 that
 could
 not
 have
 possibly

been
 observed
 or
 events
 that
 are
 contrary
 to
 the
 laws
 of
 nature.”

 Feliciano,
 707
 F.
 3d
 at

1253-­‐1254
 (citing
 Scott
 v.
 Harris,
 550
 U.S.
 372,
 380–81,
 127
 S.Ct.
 1769,
 1776,
 167
 L.Ed.2d

686
 (2007)
 (holding
 that
 a
 court
 should
 not
 adopt
 a
 party's
 version
 of
 the
 facts
 when
 it
 is

“blatantly
 contradicted
 by
 the
 record”
 in
 the
 form
 of
 videotaped
 evidence)).

16

injured
 in
 an
 action
 at
 law,
 suit
 in
 equity,
 or
 other
 proper
 proceeding
 for

redress
 .
 .
 .

42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983.

 Local
 governments,
 such
 as
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis,
 are
 considered

“persons”
 for
 the
 purposes
 of
 the
 statute
 and
 may
 be
 subject
 to
 liability.
 Monell
 v.
 Dept.
 of

Soc.
 Servs.,
 436
 U.S.
 658,
 690,
 98
 S.
 C.t
 2018
 (1978);
 McDowell
 v.
 Brown,
 392
 F.3d
 1283,

1289
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004).

The
 Howards
 allege
 that
 the
 City
 adopted
 policies,
 procedures,
 practices
 or
 customs

within
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department
 that
 allow
 the
 use
 of
 excessive
 force
 and
 that
 the

City’s
 actions
 “amount
 to
 deliberate
 indifference”
 to
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 constitutional
 right
 to
 be

free
 from
 excessive
 force.8

 On
 motion
 for
 summary
 judgment,
 the
 defendants
 argue
 that

the
 Howards
 cannot
 show
 that
 the
 City
 has
 an
 unconstitutional
 policy,
 which
 can
 be

attributed
 to
 a
 municipal
 policymaker
 or
 inadequate
 police
 training.

 The
 defendants
 point

out
 that
 the
 Police
 Department’s
 Standard
 Operating
 Procedure
 (SOP)
 includes
 Use
 of

Force
 policies
 and
 procedures
 and
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 had
 been
 trained
 on
 the
 Use
 of

Force
 and
 had
 been
 trained
 in
 regard
 to
 addressing
 the
 mentally
 ill.

The
 Howards
 “cannot
 rely
 upon
 the
 theory
 of
 respondeat
 superior
 to
 hold
 the
 C[ity]

liable”
 for
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 actions.
 McDowell,
 392
 F.
 3d
 at
 1289.

 Instead,
 the
 Howards

must
 “prove
 that
 [the
 City]
 had
 a
 ‘policy
 or
 custom’
 of
 deliberate
 indifference
 that
 led
 to
 the

violation
 of
 [Mr.
 Howard’s]
 constitutional
 right.”
 Craig
 v.
 Floyd
 County,
 Ga.,
 643
 F.3d
 1306,

8

 Embedded
 in
 Count
 Two
 is
 the
 allegation
 that
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 right
 to
 be
 free
 of

unreasonable
 seizure
 was
 violated.

 However,
 in
 the
 response
 to
 the
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment,
 the
 Howards
 addressed
 only
 the
 City’s
 liability
 for
 his
 alleged
 use
 of
 excessive

force.

 Therefore,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 the
 Howards
 have
 abandoned
 any
 claim
 against

the
 City
 for
 liability
 for
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 alleged
 unreasonable
 seizure.
 Edmondson,
 258

Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253;
 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,

647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;

 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

17

1310
 (11th
 Cir.
 2011)
 (quoting
 Monell,
 436
 U.S.
 at
 694,
 98
 S.
 Ct.
 2037-­‐2038).

 To
 do
 so,
 they

must
 show

 “a
 direct
 causal
 link
 between
 a
 municipal
 policy
 or
 custom
 and
 the
 alleged

constitutional
 deprivation.”
 Snow
 ex
 rel.
 Snow
 v.
 City
 of
 Citronelle,
 AL,
 420
 F.3d
 1262,
 1271

(11th
 Cir.2005)
 (quoting
 City
 of
 Canton
 v.
 Harris,
 489
 U.S.
 378,
 385,
 109
 S.Ct.
 1197
 (1989)).

To
 do
 so,
 Mr.
 Howard
 must
 show:
 “(1)
 that
 his
 constitutional
 rights
 were
 violated;
 (2)
 that

the
 municipality
 had
 a
 custom
 or
 policy
 that
 constituted
 deliberate
 indifference
 to
 that

constitutional
 right;
 and
 (3)
 that
 the
 policy
 or
 custom
 caused
 the
 violation.”
 McDowell,
 392

F.3d
 at
 1289
 (citing
 Canton,
 489
 U.S.
 at
 388).

 Since
 municipalities
 generally
 do
 not
 have

official
 policies
 that
 endorse
 a
 constitutional
 violation,
 the
 Howards
 must
 show
 that
 the

City
 had
 a
 custom
 or
 practice
 of
 permitting
 the
 alleged
 violations.

 Craig,
 643
 F.3d
 at
 1310

(quoting
 Grech
 v.
 Clayton
 County,
 Ga.,
 335
 F.3d
 1326,
 1329
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)
 (en
 banc)).

Moreover,
 the
 policy,
 custom,
 or
 practice
 must
 be
 the
 “moving
 force”
 behind
 the

constitutional
 violation
 and
 not
 just
 “tangentially
 related
 to
 a
 constitutional
 deprivation.”

Cuesta
 v.
 Sch.
 Bd.
 of
 Miami–Dade
 Co.,
 285
 F.3d
 962,
 967
 (11th
 Cir.
 2002).

The
 Howards
 argue
 that
 the
 SOP
 did
 not
 contain
 written
 procedures
 for
 the
 use
 of

force
 when
 interacting
 with
 the
 mentally
 ill,
 but
 instead
 contained
 only
 generic
 instructions

for
 use
 of
 force.

 They
 argue
 that
 because
 of
 this
 inadequacy,
 the
 City
 failed
 to
 establish

policies
 or
 procedures
 to
 prevent
 Fourth
 Amendment
 violations
 for
 use
 of
 excessive
 force

when
 dealing
 with
 the
 mentally
 ill,
 and
 therefore,
 is
 liable
 to
 Mr.
 Howard.

 The
 Howards

appear
 to
 assert
 that
 the
 absence
 of
 a
 written
 policy
 specifically
 addressing
 the
 mentally
 ill,

shows
 a
 custom
 or
 practice
 of
 deliberate
 indifference
 to
 his
 constitutional
 rights,
 which

resulted
 in
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 use
 of
 excessive
 force.

18

Assuming
 for
 purposes
 of
 summary
 judgment
 that
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 constitutional

rights
 were
 violated,
 “[p]roof
 of
 a
 single
 incident
 of
 unconstitutional
 activity
 is
 not

sufficient
 to
 impose
 liability
 against”
 the
 City.

 Craig,
 643
 F.3d
 at
 1310
 (quoting
 City
 of
 Okla.

City
 v.
 Tuttle,
 471
 U.S.
 808,
 823–24,
 105
 S.
 Ct.
 2427,
 2436
 (1985)
 (plurality
 opinion))

(internal
 quotations
 omitted).

 The
 Howards
 would
 need
 to
 show
 a
 “pattern
 of
 similar

constitutional
 violations[.]”
 Craig,
 643
 F.3d
 at
 1310.

 “A
 single
 incident
 would
 not
 be
 so

pervasive
 as
 to
 be
 a
 custom,
 .
 .
 .
 because
 a
 custom
 must
 be
 such
 a
 longstanding
 and

widespread
 practice
 [that
 it]
 is
 deemed
 authorized
 by
 the
 policymaking
 officials
 because

they
 must
 have
 known
 about
 it
 but
 failed
 to
 stop
 it[.]”

 Id.,
 citing
 Grech,
 335
 F.3d
 at
 1330

n.6,
 and
 Brown
 v.
 City
 of
 Fort
 Lauderdale,
 923
 F.2d
 1474,
 1481
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991))
 (internal

citations
 and
 quotations
 omitted).

 The
 Howards
 have
 presented
 no
 evidence
 that
 the

police
 officers
 for
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 have
 used
 excessive
 force
 against
 other
 mentally
 ill

persons.

 Moreover,
 the
 Howards
 present
 no
 evidence
 that
 the
 absence
 of
 a
 written
 policy

regarding
 use
 of
 force
 when
 interacting
 with
 the
 mentally
 ill,
 was
 the
 “moving
 force”

behind
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 actions.

Since
 the
 Howards
 have
 not
 shown
 a
 series
 of
 “constitutional
 violations
 from
 which

deliberate
 indifference
 can
 be
 inferred”
 they
 “must
 show
 that
 the
 policy
 itself
 is

unconstitutional.”
 Craig,
 643
 F.3d
 at
 1311
 (citing
 Estate
 of
 Novack
 ex
 rel.
 Turbin
 v.
 Cnty.
 of

Wood,
 226
 F.3d
 525,
 531
 (7th
 Cir.2000)).

 In
 that
 regard
 they
 appear
 to
 rely
 on
 the

decision
 in
 Rivas
 v.
 Freeman,
 940
 F.
 2d
 1491,
 1495
 (11th
 Cir.
 1991)
 for
 the
 premise
 that
 if
 a

final
 policymaker,
 such
 as
 the
 City,
 “fails
 to
 establish
 policies
 and
 procedures
 to
 prevent

constitutional
 intrusions
 by
 police
 officer
 under
 [its]
 command,
 ‘liability
 may
 be
 imposed

due
 to
 the
 existence
 of
 an
 improper
 policy
 or
 the
 absence
 of
 a
 policy.’”

 From
 this,
 the

19

Howards
 appear
 to
 reason
 that
 the
 City’s
 SOP
 is
 unconstitutional
 because
 it
 does
 not
 have
 a

written
 policy
 for
 addressing
 use
 of
 excessive
 force
 when
 interacting
 with
 the
 mentally
 ill,

i.e.,
 the
 ”absence
 of
 a
 policy”.

 However,
 the
 Howards
 did
 not
 present
 any
 case
 law
 wherein

a
 city’s
 police
 procedures
 have
 been
 held
 unconstitutional
 because
 there
 were
 no

specifically
 delineated
 procedures
 for
 use
 of
 force
 when
 interacting
 with
 the
 mentally
 ill.

The
 Court
 declines
 to
 make
 the
 Howards’
 constitutional
 argument
 for
 them.

 See
 Case,
 555

F.3d
 at
 1329
 (11th
 Cir.
 2009)
 (a
 litigant
 “cannot
 readily
 complain
 about
 the
 entry
 of
 a

summary
 judgment
 order
 that
 did
 not
 consider
 an
 argument
 they
 chose
 not
 to
 develop
 for

the
 district
 court
 at
 the
 time
 of
 the
 summary
 judgment
 motions”)
 (citation
 omitted).

Additionally,
 in
 Rivas,
 the
 sheriff
 was
 found
 liable
 for
 wrongful
 arrest
 and

incarceration
 resulting
 from
 mistaken
 identity
 where
 similar
 arrests
 had
 previously

occurred
 but
 the
 sheriff
 had
 no
 procedures
 or
 written
 policy
 to
 monitor
 or
 account
 for

inmates
 in
 the
 jail.

 Again,
 the
 Howards
 present
 no
 evidence
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 or
 any

officer
 with
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department
 had
 had
 a
 similar
 altercation
 with
 a
 mentally

ill
 person
 such
 that
 the
 City
 would
 have
 been
 aware
 of
 this
 alleged
 inadequacy
 of
 its
 SOP,

and
 acted
 with
 deliberate
 indifference.
 9

9
 The
 undisputed
 evidence
 shows
 that
 the
 City
 trained
 its
 officers
 regarding
 interaction

with
 the
 mentally
 ill.

 The
 Howards
 admit
 as
 much
 in
 their
 statement
 of
 facts:
 The

“Demopolis
 Police
 Department
 had
 mandatory
 in-­‐service
 training
 in
 community
 policing

and
 the
 mentally
 ill.

 The
 goal
 of
 the
 training
 provided
 to
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department

was
 to
 help
 police
 officers
 to
 know
 the
 signs
 and
 symptoms
 exhibited
 by
 persons
 with

mental
 illness
 so
 that
 they
 would
 know
 how
 to
 deal
 effectively
 with
 them.
 The
 training

emphasized
 that
 there
 are
 some
 circumstances
 when
 an
 officer
 should
 stop
 talking,
 step

back
 and
 try
 to
 defuse
 a
 crisis
 situation
 when
 it
 involves
 a
 person
 with
 mental
 illness.

 The

training
 taught
 the
 officers
 to
 be
 sensitive
 to
 the
 fact
 that
 a
 person
 has
 a
 mental
 illness.

 The

training
 taught
 the
 officers
 to
 stay
 a
 reasonable
 distance
 from
 the
 mentally
 ill
 person
 to

avoid
 being
 struck.

 The
 training
 also
 taught
 officers
 to
 avoid
 any
 aggressive
 moves
 toward

the
 mentally
 ill
 person.

 ‘You
 are
 to
 treat
 him
 just
 like
 he
 was
 normal
 and
 try
 not
 to
 insult

20

At
 the
 summary
 judgment
 stage,
 the
 Howards
 must
 “set
 forth
 specific
 facts

supported
 by
 the
 requisite
 evidence
 to
 establish
 the
 existence
 of
 an
 element
 essential
 to

[their]
 case
 and
 on
 which
 they
 will
 bear
 the
 burden
 of
 proof
 at
 trial.”
 Celotex,
 477
 U.S.
 at

322;
 see
 Holifield
 v.
 Reno,
 115
 F.3d
 1555,
 1564
 n.
 6
 (11th
 Cir.1997)
 (“Holifield's
 conclusory

assertions
 to
 the
 contrary,
 in
 the
 absence
 of
 supporting
 evidence,
 are
 insufficient
 to

withstand
 summary
 judgment”)
 (citations
 omitted)).

 Because
 the
 Howards
 have
 failed
 to

present
 sufficient
 evidence
 to
 support
 this
 allegation
 against
 the
 City,
 defendants’
 motion

for
 summary
 judgment
 as
 to
 Count
 Two
 is
 granted
 and
 this
 claim
 against
 the
 City
 is

dismissed.

7.
 False
 arrest
 pursuant
 to
 42
 U.S.C.
 §
 1983
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 (Count
 Three)

The
 Howards
 allege
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 acting
 under
 color
 of
 law,
 falsely
 arrested

Mr.
 Howard
 and
 violated
 his
 constitutional
 rights.

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 viewing
 the

evidence
 in
 the
 light
 most
 favorable
 to
 the
 Howards,
 establishes
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 had

probable
 cause
 to
 arrest
 Mr.
 Howard
 because
 “[i]t
 is
 undisputed
 by
 the
 four
 officers
 on
 the

scene
 that
 Louis
 Howard
 struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 in
 the
 face
 as
 he
 swung
 out
 the
 passenger

window.”

 Defendants
 assert
 that
 Mr.
 Howard
 cannot
 remember
 what
 happened
 and

cannot
 dispute
 the
 officers’
 testimony.

 The
 Howards
 argue
 that
 because
 Mr.
 Howard
 did

not
 hit
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 neither
 an
 assault
 nor
 harassment
 charge
 was
 appropriate.

The
 Court
 has
 determined
 that
 there
 is
 a
 dispute
 of
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 Mr.
 Howard

struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

 This
 fact
 is
 material
 to
 a
 determination
 whether
 Sergeant
 Bryant

had
 probable
 cause
 to
 arrest
 Mr.
 Howard
 for
 either
 assault
 under
 Code
 of
 Alabama
 §
 13A-­‐6-­‐

him.’

 The
 training
 further
 taught
 officers
 to
 de-­‐escalate
 the
 situation
 when
 dealing
 with

someone
 who
 has
 a
 mental
 illness
 or
 disease.

 The
 training
 emphasized
 calling
 the

paramedics
 to
 assist
 with
 someone
 who
 had
 a
 mental
 illness.
 “
 (Doc.
 23,
 p.
 7-­‐8)

21

21
 or
 harassment
 under
 Code
 of
 Alabama
 §13A-­‐11-­‐8,
 and
 thus
 whether,
 he
 violated
 Mr.

Howard’s
 rights
 under
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 to
 be
 free
 from
 an
 unreasonable
 seizure
 or

arrest.

 “A
 warrantless
 arrest
 without
 probable
 cause
 violates
 the
 Fourth
 Amendment
 and

forms
 a
 basis
 for
 a
 section
 1983
 claim.”

 Ortega
 v.
 Christian,
 85
 F.
 3d
 1521,
 1525
 (11th
 Cir.

1996).

 “If
 probable
 cause
 for
 arrest
 exists,
 however,
 then
 the
 individual
 has
 no
 claim
 for

false
 arrest
 under
 §
 1983.”

 Arrington
 v.
 Kinsey,
 512
 Fed.
 Appx.
 956,
 958
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013).

Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 denied
 as
 to
 Count
 Three
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

8.
 Negligent
 Supervision
 (Count
 Four)

The
 Howards
 plead
 Count
 Four
 for
 negligent
 supervision
 alleging
 that
 Chief
 Reese

“undertook
 to
 train
 and
 supervise”
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 police
 officers
 and
 “negligently

supervised
 Defendant
 Sgt.
 Bryant
 by
 failing
 to
 provide
 proper
 training
 and
 outline
 proper

procedure
 in
 confronting
 mentally
 ill
 persons.”

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 any
 claims
 against

Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 personal
 or
 individual
 capacity
 for
 negligent
 training
 and
 supervision

should
 be
 dismissed
 on
 grounds
 of
 state-­‐agent
 immunity
 because
 his
 conduct
 falls
 within

the
 factors
 identified
 in
 Ex
 parte
 Cranman,
 792
 So.
 2d
 392,
 405
 (Ala.
 2003).

 The
 Howards

did
 not
 respond
 to
 the
 defendants’
 argument.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 they
 have

abandoned
 this
 claim
 as
 to
 Chief
 Reese.
 Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253;

 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.

Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at

1329.

Defendants
 also
 argue
 that
 there
 is
 no
 cause
 of
 action
 under
 Alabama
 law
 against

the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 for
 Chief
 Reese’s
 negligent
 hiring,
 supervising
 or
 training
 a

subordinate,
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 and
 therefore,
 the
 Howards
 fail
 to
 state
 a
 claim
 upon
 which

relief
 can
 be
 granted.

 The
 Howards
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 the
 defendants’
 argument.

 Thus,
 the

22

Court
 concludes
 that
 they
 have
 abandoned
 this
 claim
 against
 the
 City.
 Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.

Appx.
 at
 253;
 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647

F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

However,
 while
 historically,
 “no
 Alabama
 court
 has
 expressly
 recognized
 a
 cause
 of

action
 against
 a
 municipality
 for
 a
 supervisor's
 negligent
 training
 or
 supervision
 of
 a

subordinate[,]
 “
 Borton
 v.
 City
 of
 Dothan,
 734
 F.
 Supp.
 2d
 1237
 (1258-­‐1259)
 (M.D.
 Ala.

2010)
 (citations
 omitted);
 Hamilton
 v.
 City
 of
 Jackson,
 508
 F.Supp.2d
 1045,
 1057–58
 (S.D.

Ala.
 2007);
 Ott
 v.
 City
 of
 Mobile,
 169
 F.Supp.2d
 1301,
 1314–1315
 (S.D.
 Ala.2001),

 in
 Hughes

v.
 City
 of
 Montgomery,
 the
 district
 court
 found
 that
 “[a]lthough
 many
 federal
 district
 courts

have
 made
 this
 statement
 over
 the
 years,
 the
 statement
 may
 no
 longer
 be
 accurate[]”

because
 the
 “Alabama
 Supreme
 Court
 recently
 recognized
 the
 potential
 for
 a
 negligent

hiring,
 training,
 and
 supervision
 claim
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Montgomery”.

 2013
 WL
 5945078,

*2
 (M.D.
 Ala.
 Nov.
 6,
 2013)
 (slip
 copy)
 (citing
 Ex
 parte
 City
 of
 Montgomery,
 99
 So.
 3d
 282

(Ala.
 2012)).

Based
 upon
 the
 decision
 in
 Ex
 parte
 City
 of
 Montgomery,
 the
 district
 court
 analyzed

whether
 the
 City
 of
 Montgomery
 was
 entitled
 to
 immunity
 from
 suit
 for
 the
 negligent

hiring,
 training,
 and
 supervision
 of
 a
 police
 officer
 pursuant
 to
 Alabama
 statutory
 and
 case

law,
 and
 held
 that
 because
 the
 Police
 Chief
 was
 a
 “peace
 officer,
 state-­‐agent
 immunity

protects
 him
 and
 the
 city
 from
 suit
 based
 on
 negligence
 in
 his
 discretionary
 acts
 in
 hiring,

training
 and
 supervising”
 the
 police
 officer.
 Id.
 at
 *3.

 Thus,
 even
 should
 such
 a
 cause
 of

action
 exist,
 the
 Howards
 have
 failed
 to
 present
 any
 evidence
 that
 Chief
 Reese
 was
 not

entitled
 to
 immunity
 from
 suit
 and
 thus,
 he
 and
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis
 are
 protected
 by

state-­‐agent
 immunity.

 Moreover,
 should
 such
 a
 cause
 of
 action
 exist
 against
 a
 municipality,

23

the
 Howards
 must
 proffer
 affirmative
 proof
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 incompetence
 was

actually
 or
 constructively
 known
 by
 Chief
 Reese
 and
 the
 City.

 Borton,
 734
 F.
 Supp.
 2d
 at

1259.

 They
 have
 provided
 no
 evidence
 to
 support
 this
 element.

 Accordingly,
 summary

judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 City
 and
 Chief
 Reese
 and
 the
 Howards’
 negligent

supervision
 claim
 is
 dismissed.

9.
 Negligence
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 (Count
 Five)

The
 Howards
 allege
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 “negligently,
 recklessly
 or
 unskillfully

assaulted
 and
 arrested”
 Mr.
 Howard.

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 is
 entitled
 to

state-­‐agent
 immunity
 as
 to
 this
 state
 law
 claim
 because
 there
 is
 no
 dispute
 of
 fact
 that
 he

was
 exercising
 judgment
 in
 the
 enforcement
 of
 the
 criminal
 laws
 of
 the
 state
 while

arresting
 Mr.
 Howard,
 i.e.,
 a
 discretionary
 function.

 Defendants
 argue
 that
 there
 is
 no

evidence
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 actions
 fall
 within
 any
 exception
 to
 state-­‐agent
 immunity.

The
 Howards
 argue
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 striking
 Mr.
 Howard,
 pulling
 him
 out
 the
 van

window,
 throwing
 him
 on
 the
 ground,
 and
 handcuffing
 him
 establishes
 that
 he
 acted
 in
 bad

faith,
 with
 malice
 or
 willfully,
 and
 therefore,
 is
 not
 entitled
 to
 state-­‐agent
 immunity.

Under
 Alabama
 law,
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 as
 a
 city
 police
 officer,
 is
 immune
 from
 tort

liability
 “arising
 out
 of
 his
 []
 conduct
 or
 performance
 of
 any
 discretionary
 function
 within

the
 line
 and
 scope
 of
 his
 []
 law
 enforcement
 duties.”
 Ala.
 Code
 §
 6–5–338(a).

 This
 rule
 of

immunity
 was
 initially
 stated
 in
 Ex
 parte
 Cranman,
 792
 So.2d
 392
 (Ala.2000)
 and
 later

revised
 in
 Hollis
 v.
 City
 of
 Brighton,
 950
 So.2d
 300
 (Ala.2006).

 In
 relevant
 part,
 the
 Court
 in

Hollis
 explained
 that
 category
 (4)
 of
 Cranman,
 was
 modified
 to
 read

“A
 State
 agent
 shall
 be
 immune
 from
 civil
 liability
 in
 his
 or
 her
 personal

capacity
 when
 the
 conduct
 made
 the
 basis
 of
 the
 claim
 against
 the
 agent
 is

based
 upon
 the
 agent's

24

“....

“(4)
 exercising
 judgment
 in
 the
 enforcement
 of
 the
 criminal
 laws
 of
 the
 State,

including,
 but
 not
 limited
 to,
 law-­‐enforcement
 officers'
 arresting
 or

attempting
 to
 arrest
 persons,
 or
 serving
 as
 peace
 officers
 under

circumstances
 entitling
 such
 officers
 to
 immunity
 pursuant
 to
 §
 6-­‐5-­‐338(a),

Ala.Code
 1975.”

Hollis,
 950
 So.
 2d
 at
 309.
 10

 However,
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 would
 not
 be
 immune
 from
 civil

liability,
 if
 he
 acted
 “willfully,
 maliciously,
 fraudulently,
 in
 bad
 faith,
 beyond
 his
 []
 authority,

or
 under
 a
 mistaken
 interpretation
 of
 the
 law.”

 Hollis,
 950
 So.
 2d
 at
 308
 (quoting
 Cranman,

792
 So.
 2d.
 at
 405).

The
 Court
 has
 determined
 that
 there
 is
 a
 dispute
 of
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 Mr.
 Howard

struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 before
 he
 struck
 Mr.
 Howard.

 This
 issue
 of
 fact
 is
 material
 to
 a

determination
 as
 to
 whether
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 acted
 in
 a
 manner
 that
 would
 preclude

application
 of
 state-­‐agent
 immunity.

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 denied
 as
 to
 Count

Five
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

9.

 Malicious
 prosecution
 (Count
 Seven)

a)
 The
 Howards’
 plead
 Count
 Seven
 for
 malicious
 prosecution
 against
 all

“defendants”,
 which
 possibly
 could
 include
 a
 claim
 against
 the
 City.

 However,
 the
 “Alabama

Supreme
 Court
 has
 held
 that
 claims
 alleging
 intentional
 torts
 against
 municipalities
 are

barred
 under”
 Ala.
 Code
 §
 11-­‐47-­‐190.11

 Walker
 v.
 City
 of
 Huntsville,
 62
 So.3d
 474,
 501–02

10

 In
 Blackwood
 v.
 City
 of
 Hanceville,
 936
 So.2d
 495,
 504
 (Ala.2006),
 the
 Court
 explained

that
 by
 enacting
 Ala.
 Code
 §
 6-­‐5-­‐338,
 the
 Legislature
 extended
 to
 municipal
 law

enforcement
 officers
 the
 same
 immunity
 as
 that
 of
 state
 law
 enforcement
 officers

“performing
 their
 discretionary
 functions
 within
 the
 line
 and
 scope
 of
 their
 law

enforcement
 duties”.

 (citations
 omitted).

11

 “No
 city
 or
 town
 shall
 be
 liable
 for
 damages
 for
 injury
 done
 to
 or
 wrong
 suffered
 by
 any

person
 or
 corporation,
 unless
 such
 injury
 or
 wrong
 was
 done
 or
 suffered
 through
 the

neglect,
 carelessness,
 or
 unskillfulness
 of
 some
 agent,
 officer,
 or
 employee
 of
 the

25

(Ala.
 2010)
 (finding
 that
 claims
 of
 malicious
 prosecution,
 tort
 of
 outrage,
 and
 invasion
 of

privacy
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Huntsville
 are
 intentional
 torts
 and
 barred
 by
 §
 11–47–190).

Therefore,
 the
 City
 may
 be
 found
 liable
 for
 the
 negligent
 acts
 of
 its
 employees
 but
 not
 their

intentional
 torts.
 Brown
 v.
 City
 of
 Huntsville,
 Ala.,
 608
 F.3d
 724,
 743
 (11th
 Cir.
 2010)
 (“In

sum,
 under
 §
 11–47–190,
 a
 city
 is
 liable
 for
 negligent
 acts
 of
 its
 employees
 within
 the
 scope

of
 their
 employment,
 but
 not
 intentional
 torts
 of
 its
 employees.”).

 Accordingly,
 summary

judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 City
 and
 the
 Howards’
 malicious
 prosecution
 claim

against
 the
 City
 is
 dismissed.

b)
 Because
 they
 have
 pled
 this
 count
 against
 the
 “defendants”,
 the
 Howards’

possibly
 allege
 a
 claim
 for
 malicious
 prosecution
 against
 Chief
 Reese
 in
 his
 individual

capacity
 as
 Sergeant
 Bryant’s
 supervisor.

 Defendants
 moved
 to
 dismiss
 on
 basis
 that
 the

Howards
 could
 not
 produce
 evidence
 in
 support
 of
 the
 elements
 of
 the
 claim.

 In
 response,

the
 Howards
 assert
 that
 the
 elements
 are
 met
 and
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 maliciously

prosecuted
 Mr.
 Howard
 by
 filing
 the
 charge
 of
 harassment
 against
 him.

 However,
 to
 the

extent
 that
 they
 attempt
 to
 assert
 this
 claim
 against
 Chief
 Reese,
 “[i]t
 is
 [
 ]
 well
 established

in
 this
 [c]ircuit
 that
 supervisory
 officials
 are
 not
 liable
 under
 §
 1983
 for
 the

unconstitutional
 acts
 of
 their
 subordinates
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 respondeat
 superior
 or
 vicarious

liability.”
 Miller
 v.
 King,
 384
 F.3d
 1248,
 1261
 (11th
 Cir.
 2004)
 (quoting
 Cottone
 v.
 Jenne,
 326

F.3d
 1352,
 1360
 (11th
 Cir.
 2003)),
 vacated
 on
 other
 grounds,
 449
 F.3d
 1149
 (11th
 Cir.

2006).

 Chief
 Reese
 as
 a
 supervisory
 official
 may
 be
 liable
 under
 §
 1983,
 only
 if
 he

personally
 participated
 in
 the
 alleged
 malicious
 prosecution
 or
 if
 there
 is
 a
 causal

municipality
 engaged
 in
 work
 therefor
 and
 while
 acting
 in
 the
 line
 of
 his
 or
 her
 duty.”
 Ala.

Code
 §
 11-­‐47-­‐190.

26

connection12
 between
 his
 official
 actions
 and
 the
 alleged
 constitutional
 deprivation.

Ganstine
 v.
 Williams,
 476
 Fed.Appx.
 361,
 363
 (11th
 Cir.
 2912)(quoting
 Cottone,
 326
 F.3d
 at

1360).

 Thus,
 the
 Howards
 must
 plead
 that
 Chief
 Reese,
 through
 his
 individual
 actions,
 has

violated
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 constitutional
 rights.

 Ashcroft
 v.
 Iqbal,
 556
 U.S.
 662,
 676
 (2009).

The
 Howards’
 pled
 in
 their
 complaint
 and
 delineated
 in
 their
 response,
 only
 the

actions
 taken
 by
 Sergeant
 Bryant.13

 They
 did
 not
 present
 any
 evidence
 from
 which
 a
 jury

could
 reasonably
 infer
 that
 Chief
 Reese
 participated
 in
 or
 was
 connected
 to
 the
 alleged

malicious
 prosecution.

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 Chief
 Reese

and
 the
 Howards’
 malicious
 prosecution
 claim
 against
 Chief
 Reese
 is
 dismissed.

c)

 As
 to
 Sergeant
 Bryant,
 defendants
 argue
 that
 the
 Howards
 have
 failed
 to
 establish

the
 necessary
 elements
 of
 a
 malicious
 prosecution
 claim.

 The
 Howards
 distinguish
 the
 case

upon
 which
 defendants
 rely
 and
 point
 out
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 completed
 a
 police
 report

and
 filed
 a
 complaint
 in
 the
 municipal
 court,
 that
 Ms.
 Howard
 had
 to
 post
 a
 bond,
 and
 assert

that
 the
 “decision
 to
 prosecute
 hinged
 solely
 on
 Sgt.
 Bryant’s
 complaint.”
 (Doc.
 23,
 p.
 20)

They
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 the
 defendants’
 argument
 that
 the
 prosecution
 was
 not
 terminated

in
 favor
 of
 Mr.
 Howard.

12

 “A
 plaintiff
 may
 establish
 a
 causal
 connection
 by
 showing
 that:
 (1)
 a
 history
 of

widespread
 abuse
 puts
 the
 responsible
 supervisor
 on
 notice
 of
 the
 need
 to
 correct
 the

alleged
 deprivation
 and
 he
 fail[ed]
 to
 do
 so;
 (2)
 the
 supervisor's
 improper
 custom
 or
 policy

le[d]
 to
 deliberate
 indifference
 to
 constitutional
 rights;
 or
 (3)
 facts
 support
 an
 inference

that
 the
 supervisor
 directed
 the
 subordinates
 to
 act
 unlawfully
 or
 knew
 that
 the

subordinates
 would
 act
 unlawfully
 and
 failed
 to
 stop
 them
 from
 doing
 so.”

 Hendrix
 v.

Tucker,

 -­‐
 -­‐
 -­‐
 Fed.
 Appx.
 -­‐
 -­‐
 -­‐
 ,
 2013
 WL
 4504595,
 1
 (11th
 Cir.
 2013)
 (citations

omitted)(internal
 quotation
 marks
 omitted).

13

 Plaintiffs
 state
 that
 “Defendants
 maliciously
 and
 without
 probably
 cause
 therefore,

arrested
 Plaintiff
 .
 .
 .”
 (doc.
 1-­‐1).

 However,
 the
 Howards
 raised
 no
 allegation
 of
 fact
 that

Chief
 Reese
 participated
 or
 was
 causally
 connected
 to
 the
 arrest.

 Instead,
 their
 factual

allegations
 indicate
 that
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 arrested
 Mr.
 Howard.

27

In
 Grider
 v.
 City
 of
 Auburn,
 618
 F.3d
 1240
 (11th
 Cir.
 2010),
 the
 Eleventh
 Circuit

explained
 that
 it
 had
 “identified
 malicious
 prosecution
 as
 a
 violation
 of
 the
 Fourth

Amendment
 and
 a
 viable
 constitutional
 tort
 cognizable
 under
 §
 1983”
 and
 that
 while
 both

state
 and
 federal
 law
 “inform[ed]
 the
 elements
 of
 the
 common
 law
 tort
 of
 malicious

prosecution,
 a
 Fourth
 Amendment
 malicious
 prosecution
 claim
 under
 §
 1983
 remains
 a

federal
 constitutional
 claim,
 and
 its
 elements
 and
 whether
 they
 are
 met
 ultimately
 are

controlled
 by
 federal
 law.”
 Id.,
 at
 1257
 (citation
 omitted).

 The
 Circuit
 Court
 then
 explained

that

[t]o
 establish
 a
 §
 1983
 malicious
 prosecution
 claim,
 the
 plaintiff
 must
 prove

two
 things:
 (1)
 the
 elements
 of
 the
 common
 law
 tort
 of
 malicious

prosecution;
 and
 (2)
 a
 violation
 of
 his
 Fourth
 Amendment
 right
 to
 be
 free

from
 unreasonable
 seizures.
 Kingsland
 v.
 City
 of
 Miami,
 382
 F.3d
 1220,
 1234

(11th
 Cir.2004);
 Wood
 [v.
 Kesler],
 323
 F.3d
 [872,]
 881
 [(11th
 Cir.2003)].
 As
 to

the
 first
 prong,
 the
 constituent
 elements
 of
 the
 common
 law
 tort
 of
 malicious

prosecution
 are:
 “(1)
 a
 criminal
 prosecution
 instituted
 or
 continued
 by
 the

present
 defendant;
 (2)
 with
 malice
 and
 without
 probable
 cause;
 (3)
 that

terminated
 in
 the
 plaintiff
 accused's
 favor;
 and
 (4)
 caused
 damage
 to
 the

plaintiff
 accused.”
 Wood,
 323
 F.3d
 at
 882.
 The
 elements
 under
 Alabama
 law

for
 the
 common-­‐law
 tort
 of
 malicious
 prosecution
 are
 the
 same,
 except
 that

they
 require
 only
 a
 “judicial
 proceeding”
 not
 a
 “criminal
 prosecution.”

Delchamps,
 Inc.
 v.
 Bryant,
 738
 So.2d
 824,
 831–32
 (Ala.1999).

Id.,
 at
 1256
 (11th
 Cir.2010)
 (footnote
 omitted).

The
 Court
 has
 determined
 that
 there
 is
 a
 dispute
 of
 fact
 as
 to
 whether
 Mr.
 Howard

struck
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 before
 he
 struck
 Mr.
 Howard.
 This
 dispute
 of
 fact
 is
 material
 to
 a

determination
 whether
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 violated
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 right
 to
 be
 free
 from

unreasonable
 seizures
 and
 upon
 whether
 he
 acted
 with
 malice
 and
 without
 probable
 cause

in
 arresting
 Mr.
 Howard
 for
 harassment.

Additionally,
 the
 undisputed
 facts
 establish
 that
 the
 Municipal
 Court
 Judge
 for
 the

City
 of
 Demopolis
 dismissed
 the
 criminal
 charges
 against
 Mr.
 Howard
 by
 noting
 “Dismissed.

28

Sheriff
 Bates’
 request.”
 (Doc.
 20-­‐10,
 Case
 Action
 Summary,
 State
 v.
 Howard,
 MC-­‐11-­‐
351,“Bench
 Notes:
 Dismissed.

 Sheriff
 Bates’
 request”,
 dated
 June
 6,
 2011,
 Demopolis

Municipal
 Court).

 In
 Uboh
 v.
 Reno,
 141
 F.
 3d
 1000,
 1004-­‐1005
 (11th
 Cir.
 1998),
 the

Eleventh
 Circuit
 stated
 that
 “[c]ourts
 have
 [
 ]
 reasoned
 that
 only
 terminations
 that
 indicate

that
 the
 accused
 is
 innocent
 ought
 to
 be
 considered
 favorable.

 .
 .
 .

 Thus,
 courts
 have
 found

that
 withdrawal
 of
 criminal
 charges
 pursuant
 to
 a
 compromise
 or
 agreement
 does
 not

constitute
 favorable
 termination
 .
 .
 .
 Similarly,
 courts
 have
 refused
 to
 permit
 a
 finding
 of

favorable
 termination
 where
 the
 stated
 basis
 for
 the
 dismissal
 of
 criminal
 charges
 has
 been

in
 the
 interests
 of
 justice,
 or
 where
 a
 conviction
 has
 been
 reversed
 and
 the
 cause
 expressly

remanded
 for
 retrial[.]”

 The
 Circuit
 Court
 also
 explained
 that
 “[c]onsistent
 with
 each
 of
 the

policies
 underlying
 the
 favorable
 termination
 requirement,
 however,
 courts
 have
 found

favorable
 termination
 to
 exist
 by
 virtue
 of
 .
 .
 .

 an
 order
 of
 dismissal
 reflecting
 an
 affirmative

decision
 not
 to
 prosecute,

 .
 .
 .
 [and]

 an
 entry
 of
 a
 nolle
 prosequi[.]”
 Id.,
 at
 1005.

The
 Municipal
 Court
 Judge’s
 order
 indicates
 that
 the
 Sheriff’s
 request
 for
 dismissal

was
 granted.

 From
 the
 Sheriff’s
 actions,
 a
 finder
 of
 fact
 could
 reasonably
 infer
 that
 there

had
 been
 an
 affirmative
 decision
 not
 to
 prosecute
 Mr.
 Howard.

 See
 Woodard
 v.
 Town
 of

Oakman,
 885
 F.
 Supp.
 2d
 1216,
 1233-­‐1234,
 (N.D.
 Ala.
 2012)
 (drawing
 all
 reasonable

inferences
 from
 Woodard’s
 assertion
 that
 the
 Town
 abandoned
 the
 criminal
 charges

against
 him,
 the
 district
 court
 found
 it
 likely
 that
 the
 evidence
 would
 show
 that
 the
 Town

“made
 an
 affirmative
 decision
 not
 to
 prosecute.”).

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is

denied
 as
 to
 Mr.
 Howard’s
 claim
 for
 malicious
 prosecution
 against
 Sergeant
 Bryant.

10.
 The
 Howards’
 state
 law
 claims
 for
 outrage
 and
 assault
 (Counts
 Six
 and
 Eight)

29

Defendants
 argue
 that
 the
 Howards’
 claim
 for
 outrage
 should
 be
 dismissed
 because

this
 is
 an
 extremely
 limited
 cause
 of
 action
 and
 the
 defendants’
 actions
 do
 not
 rise
 to
 the

level
 of
 outrage
 as
 established
 by
 Alabama
 law.

 Defendants
 also
 argue
 that
 the
 Howards’

claim
 for
 assault
 raises
 the
 identical
 issues
 as
 the
 §
 1983
 claim
 alleging
 excessive
 force
 and

that
 the
 force
 used
 was
 not
 excessive.

The
 Howards
 did
 not
 respond
 to
 either
 argument.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that

they
 have
 abandoned
 their
 state
 law
 claims
 for
 outrage
 and
 assault
 against
 the
 defendants.

Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253;
 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution
 Trust
 Corp.,
 43

F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

 Therefore,
 summary
 judgment

is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of
 the
 defendants
 and
 the
 Howards’
 state
 law
 claims
 for
 assault
 and

outrage
 are
 dismissed.

11.

 Ledora
 Howard’s
 claim
 for
 loss
 of
 consortium
 (Count
 Nine)

Defendants
 argue
 that
 Ms.
 Howard’s
 claim
 fails
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 law
 because
 she
 did

not
 meet
 the
 statutory
 prerequisites
 for
 filing
 a
 tort
 claim
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis.

Specifically,
 she
 did
 not
 file
 a
 timely
 notice
 and
 a
 sworn
 statement
 with
 the
 City
 Clerk
 as

required
 by
 Alabama
 Code
 §
 11-­‐47-­‐23
 and
 §
 11-­‐47-­‐192.

 Ms.
 Howard
 did
 not
 respond
 to

this
 argument
 and
 did
 not
 dispute
 the
 allegation
 that
 she
 had
 not
 met
 the
 statutory

prerequisites.

 Thus,
 the
 Court
 concludes
 that
 she
 has
 abandoned
 her
 claim
 for
 loss
 of

consortium.

 Edmondson,
 258
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 253;
 Floyd,
 274
 Fed.
 Appx.
 at
 765;
 Resolution

Trust
 Corp.,
 43
 F.3d
 at
 599;
 Fils,
 647
 F.3d
 at
 1284;
 Case,
 555
 F.3d
 at
 1329.

Moreover,
 “[p]ursuant
 to

 Ala.
 Code
 §
 §
 11–47–23
 and
 11–47–192,
 no
 claim
 will
 lie

against
 a
 city
 or
 town
 for
 personal
 injury
 unless
 a
 sworn
 statement
 by
 the
 party
 injured
 is

filed
 with
 the
 city
 clerk
 within
 six
 months
 of
 the
 date
 of
 injury.”
 Cobb
 v.
 Aponte,
 2010
 WL

30

2609279,
 *2
 (M.D.
 Ala.
 2010)(noting
 that
 the
 statutes
 are
 to
 be
 read
 “in
 pari
 materia”).
 “The

law
 is
 well-­‐settled
 in
 Alabama
 that
 a
 sworn
 statement
 is
 a
 prerequisite
 before
 a
 suit
 against

a
 city
 or
 municipality
 is
 allowed
 to
 proceed.”
 Id.

 Accordingly,
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted

in
 favor
 of
 defendants
 and
 Ms.
 Howard’s
 claim
 is
 dismissed.

 IV.
 Conclusion

In
 accordance
 with
 foregoing
 analysis,
 the
 defendants’
 motion
 for
 summary

judgment
 is
 GRANTED
 as
 to
 all
 claims
 against
 the
 City
 of
 Demopolis,
 Mayor
 Grayson,
 Chief

Reese,
 and
 the
 Demopolis
 Police
 Department;
 summary
 judgment
 is
 granted
 in
 favor
 of

Sergeant
 Bryant
 as
 to
 Count
 Six
 for
 assault,
 Count
 Eight
 for
 outrage,
 and
 Count
 Nine
 for
 loss

of
 consortium;
 and
 denied
 as
 to
 Sergeant
 Bryant
 as
 to
 Count
 One
 for
 excessive
 force,
 Count

Three
 for
 false
 arrest,
 Count
 Five
 for
 negligence,
 and
 Count
 Seven
 for
 malicious

prosecution.

DONE
 and
 ORDERED
 this
 the
 25th
 day
 of
 November
 2013.

s/
 Kristi
 K.
 DuBose

KRISTI
 K.
 DuBOSE

UNITED
 STATES
 DISTRICT
 JUDGE

31