Hollis v. Colvin

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER entered GRANTING 22 Motion for Attorney Fees (EAJA). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney's fee in the amount of $2,083.29, as further set out. Signed by Magistrate Judge Bert W. Milling, Jr on 3/16/2016. (clr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMARIS HOLLIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commission of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION 15-270-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Hollis’s Attorney’s Application
for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(hereinafter EAJA), with supporting Documentation (Doc. 22).
After consideration, it is ORDERED that the Motion be GRANTED
and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney’s fee in the
amount of $2,083.29.
Plaintiff filed this action on May 22, 2015 (Doc. 1).

On

January 11, 2016, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum
Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner
and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 20).
Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
(Doc. 21).
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On February 10, 2016, William T. Coplin, Jr., Plaintiff’s
Attorney, filed an EAJA Fee Application requesting a fee of
$2,083.29, computed at an hourly rate of $189.39 for 11 hours
spent in this Court (Doc. 22).

Though five weeks have passed

since Coplin filed this Application, the Government has not
responded.
The EAJA requires a court to
award to a prevailing party . . . fees and
other expenses . . . incurred by that party
in any civil action . . . including
proceedings for judicial review of Agency
action, brought by or against the United
States . . . unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

EAJA requires a prevailing party to

file an application for attorney’s fees within thirty days of
final judgment in the action.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

The

court’s judgment becomes final sixty days—the time an appeal may
be taken pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. Rule 4(a)—after it is entered.
See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
Three statutory conditions must be satisfied before EAJA
fees may be awarded.
(11th Cir. 1990).

See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666

First, the claimant must file a fee
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application within the thirty-day period following the entry of
final judgment.
party.

Second, the claimant must be a prevailing

Third, the Government’s position must not be

substantially justified.
The Court finds that all three statutory requirements have
been met in this action.
Having found the prerequisites satisfied, the Court will
discuss the fee to be awarded.

EAJA is a fee-shifting statute.

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting
point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate.’”

Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985 (EAJA) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (§ 1988)).

In describing this lodestar

method of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:
This calculation provides an objective basis
on which to make an initial estimate of the
value of a lawyer’s services. The party
seeking an award of fees should submit
evidence supporting the hours worked and the
rates claimed. Where the documentation of
hours is inadequate, the district court may
reduce the award accordingly. The district
court also should exclude from this initial
fee calculation hours that were not
“reasonably expended.” . . . Cases may be
overstaffed, and the skill and experience of
lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the
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prevailing party should make a good-faith
effort to exclude from a fee request hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private
practice ethically is obligated to exclude
such hours from his fee submission. In the
private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an
important component in fee setting. It is
no less important here. Hours that are not
properly billed to one’s client also are not
properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant
to statutory authority.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted).
professional judgment in billing under EAJA.

Counsel must use
A lawyer should

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he
would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on
vindicating similar rights.

Norman v. Housing Authority, 836

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).
After examining Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Application, and
supporting documentation (Doc. 22), and considering the
reasonableness of the hours claimed, the Court finds that the
eleven hours expended in prosecuting this action is reasonable.
In determining the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA
case, express statutory language provides as follows:
The amount of fees awarded under this
subsection shall be based upon prevailing
market rates for the kind and quality of the
services furnished, except that . . .
attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess
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of $125 per hour unless the court determines
that an increase in the cost of living or a
special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the
proceedings involved, justified a higher
fee.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).
In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA established a two-step
analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be
applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the Act:
The first step in the analysis, . . . is to
determine the market rate for “similar
services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and
reputation.” . . . The second step, which is
needed only if the market rate is greater
than $75 per hour, is to determine whether
the court should adjust the hourly fee
upward . . . to take into account an
increase in the cost of living, or a special
factor.
Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).1
The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory
evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing
market rates.

NAACP V. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338

(11th Cir. 1987).

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Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more

Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to

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than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).

Blum v.

Where the fees or time

claimed seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or
testimony in support thereof, the court may make an award on its
own experience.

Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,

1303 (11th Cir. 1988).

Where the documentation is inadequate,

the court is not relieved of its obligation to award a
reasonable fee; traditionally, it has had the power to make an
award with no need of further pleadings or an evidentiary
hearing.

Id.

Beginning in 2001, the prevailing market rate in the
Southern District of Alabama was $125.00 per hour.

See, e.g.,

Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (S.D. Ala. October
25, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (S.D.
Ala. April 12, 2001).

However, in 2007, United States

Magistrate Judge Cassady fashioned a formula to adjust the
prevailing market hourly rate to account for the ever-increasing
cost-of-living.

Lucy v. Barnhart, Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D.

Ala. July 5, 2007 (Doc. 32)).

As set out in Lucy, the formula

for calculating all future awards of attorney’s fees under the
EAJA is as follows:

“‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

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Items Index,” South Urban, for month and year of temporal
midpoint2)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the
month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.’”
32, at p. 11) (quoting Lucy, Doc. 31, at p. 2).

(Lucy, Doc.

The undersigned

also adopts this formula in EAJA fee petition actions for use in
arriving at the appropriate hourly rate.
The complaint was filed on May 22, 2015 (Doc. 1) and the
Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment on
January 11, 2016 (Docs. 20-21), so the temporal midpoint in this
action was September 16, 2015.
230.913.

The CPI-U for September 2016 was

Plugging the relevant numbers into the foregoing

formula renders the following equation:

$125.00 x

230.913/152.4, the computation of which renders an hourly rate
of $189.39.

This hourly rate for 11 hours equals $2,083.29.

The Court notes that, in the application for Attorney’s
Fees, Counsel for Plaintiff requests that any award of
attorney’s fees be paid to the Attorney rather than to Plaintiff
(Doc. 22).

Coplin includes an Assignment in which Hollis

authorizes his Attorney to receive all fees on his behalf (Doc.
2

“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living
adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which the
compensable services were rendered[;] . . . [t]he temporal midpoint is
calculated by computing the number of days from the date the claim
was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or District Judge’s
Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart. Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D.

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22 Attachment).
As noted earlier, EAJA allows a Court to make an “award to
a prevailing party.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

In Panola Land

Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988), the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t is readily
apparent that the party eligible to recover attorneys’ fees
under the EAJA as part of its litigation expenses is the
prevailing party.”

See also Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1072 (2008) (“We conclude the
EAJA means what it says:

attorney’s fees are awarded to the

‘prevailing party,’ not to the prevailing party’s attorney”).
The United States Supreme Court, in the unanimous decision of
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), held “that a §
2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore
subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt
that the litigant owes the United States,” removing any doubt as
to whom the award should be paid.
Under the reasoning of Reeves and Ratliff, the Court finds
that the award should be paid to Plaintiff, Jamaris Hollis, and
not to his Attorney.
In conclusion, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application

Ala. Doc. 31, at p. 3).

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be GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an
EAJA Attorney’s fee in the amount of $2,083.29.
DONE this 16th day of March, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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