Galbreath v. Hale County Alabama Commission et al

Filing 110

ORDER GRANTING in part & DENYING in part Plf's 82 Motion for Reinstatement or, Alternatively, Front Pay as set out. Dfts are to pay unto Plf $70,269.03 in front pay as set out. Signed by Senior Judge Callie V. S. Granade on 8/8/2017. (tot)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
TRICIA GALBREATH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HALE COUNTY, ALABAMA
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.

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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-308-CG-N
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OR FRONT PAY
This matter is before the Court on a motion for equitable relief in the form of
reinstatement or, alternatively, front pay filed by Plaintiff Tricia Galbreath
(“Galbreath”) (Doc. 82), a response in opposition filed by Defendants Hale County,
Alabama Commission and Hale County, Alabama (“Defendants”) (Doc. 98), and a
reply filed by Galbreath (Doc. 107). Based on the reasons set forth below,
Galbreath’s motion is DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Galbreath’s termination from the Hale County
Commission as its County Administrator. When Galbreath began her employment
with the Hale County Commission, she was provided and signed for a copy of the
Hale County Personnel Policy (the “Policy”). Additionally, Galbreath and
Defendants executed several employment contracts throughout her term of
employment. During a county commission meeting on June 18, 2013, the Hale
County Commission voted to terminate Galbreath’s employment.

Based on her termination, Galbreath filed a multi-count complaint against
Defendants. After the Court dismissed several claims at the motion to dismiss and
summary judgment stage, Galbreath proceeded to trial with three claims
remaining: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a state-law breach of contract claim; and (3) a
state-law wrongful termination claim. Galbreath’s claims were tried before a jury
on March 23, 2017, through March 27, 2017. The jury returned a verdict in
Galbreath’s favor on all three claims. See (Doc. 73-1). The jury awarded Galbreath
$8,000.00 in damages for any emotional pain and mental anguish she suffered from
the date of her termination to the date of the jury’s verdict. Id. at 5. The jury also
awarded Galbreath $128,600.00 in damages for lost wages and lost benefits from
the date of Galbreath’s discharge to the date of the jury’s verdict. Id. Galbreath
now contends she is due reinstatement to her position as County Administrator for
Hale County. Alternatively, she argues for front pay if the Court determines that
reinstatement is unsuitable.
II. WHETHER REINSTATEMENT IS AN AVAILABLE REMEDY
Galbreath contends that she prefers to be and is entitled to reinstatement as
County Administrator for Hale County. (Doc. 82, p. 2). Reinstatement, she
continues, is the most likely means of redress that would provide complete relief
and allow her to further her career. Id. at 3. She contends that she is well qualified
for the position, which has not been filled. Id. Further, she points out that the 2012
Contract required a unanimous termination vote from the Commission. Id.

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Because there was not a unanimous vote, Galbreath insists that she was never
actually terminated. Id.
Defendants begin their response by resurrecting their McKinney v. Pate, 20
F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), argument and contend Galbreath is not due prospective
equitable relief because they are entitled judgment as a matter of law on
Galbreath’s due process claim. (Doc. 98, p. 1). The Court has previously rejected
Defendants’ McKinney argument at multiple points in this case. For the reasons
previously stated, the Court again finds unpersuasive Defendants’ claim for relief
on this basis.
Next, Defendants argue that Galbreath offers no caselaw to support her
position. (Doc. 98, p. 4). Defendants maintain that the proper measure of
prospective equitable relief due “is simply to order a hearing take place.” Id.
Defendants aver that what Galbreath now asks the Court to order would “bypass
the termination process altogether and rule on the merits of her termination” by
reinstating Galbreath. Id. at 6. Defendants continue, the Court can only assess
whether the necessary procedures were utilized, not whether the termination
decision was wise or substantively correct. Defendants insist that reinstatement
would be inequitable for several reasons: (1) it would put Galbreath in a better
position than she would have been had she had a pre-termination hearing and (2) it
punishes Defendants when Galbreath did not avail herself of any post-termination
grievance procedures. Id. at 8–9.
It is a “well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to

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be determined by the violation, which means simply that federal-court decrees must
directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.” Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977). The leading case for damages in a procedural
due process case is Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The Carey Court held that
compensation for injuries emanating from the deprivation of a constitutional right
“should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question.”
Id. at 259. The Carey Court went on to conclude that “compensatory damages for a
procedural due process violation may not be awarded absent proof of actual injury.
The Court further held, however, that even in the absence of such proof, ‘the denial
of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages.’ ” Franklin v.
Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 266)).
Carey, however, did not reach the particular issue of equitable relief.
It is within the sound discretion of a district court whether to award
equitable relief. Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11th Cir.
1985). A court decides “the propriety of equitable relief based on the facts as found
by the jury.” Haskins v. Boaz, 822 F.2d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
Neither party offers caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressing whether and when reinstatement is an available remedy for a pretermination procedural due process violation. In fact, Defendants maintain
Galbreath provides no such citation “apparently because no such case exists.” (Doc.
98, p. 4). But the Court is not left rudderless in its current analysis. A case from

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the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is instructive and persuasive as to when the
equitable remedy of reinstatement is an available remedy. In Hopkins v. Saunders,
199 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2000), a terminated employee brought a § 1983 action against
his employer for, among other things, a violation of procedural due process at the
pre-termination stage. On remand from the Eighth Circuit for several reasons, the
district court found that the plaintiff had a property interest in his employment and
did not receive the notice and a hearing due process requires prior to his
termination. Id. at 975. Even so, the district court awarded only nominal damages
to the plaintiff because the court found the termination was justified and, therefore,
refused reinstatement. Id.
Both parties appealed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s property interest determination; however, the district
court’s award of nominal damages was found to constitute “legal relief” rather than
equitable relief, which was contrary to the court’s earlier decision and remand. This
portion of the district court’s order was vacated. Relying on Carey’s holding that
federal law dictates the appropriate remedy in a procedural due process claim, the
Eighth Circuit explained, in relevant part:
The Supreme Court defined the proper remedy for the denial of
procedural due process in Carey v. Piphus, holding that the remedy for
a procedural due process violation is defined by the extent of the injury
that resulted from the denial of constitutionally required process. 435
U.S. at 263–64; see also Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir.
1987). Thus, in the context of public employment, reinstatement is
proper only where a tenured employee would not have been dismissed if
his procedural due process right had been observed…. Where an
employee would have been discharged even if he had received due
process, i.e. was discharged for cause, his sole injury is the lack of

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process and only nominal damages are proper.
Saunders, 199 F.3d at 979 (emphasis supplied). The Saunders Court went on to
find that under the “Carey remedial framework” the district court’s finding that the
plaintiff “would have been dismissed even if he had received due process” was
supported by evidence and was not “clear error.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Saunders is in line with the Eleventh
Circuit’s interpretation of Carey—that the pertinent inquiry in determining the
proper scope of damages in the context of a procedural due process violation is
whether the deprivation is justified. See, e.g., Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289,
1300 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that a justifiable injury a habeas petitioner may
sustain is not properly compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Cnty. of Monroe v.
United States Dep’t of Labor, 690 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
“injury caused by justified termination is not compensable in the form of back pay”).
And although applied in different contexts, the Eleventh Circuit has allowed
a § 1983 plaintiff to receive back pay, lost benefits, loss of future income and
damages for mental anguish and emotional distress arising from procedural due
process violations based on the unjustified discharges of a public employee. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir. 1984) (back pay reduced by the
amount of other income received after his initial termination awarded to an
unlawfully discharged police officer); Murphy v. City of Flagler Beach, 846 F.2d
1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 1988) (mitigated damages is consistent with the compensatory
purposes of Section 1983); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir.

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1985) (the injury in civil rights cases may be intangible and need not be financial or
physical but may include damages for humiliation and emotional distress (citing
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64 & n. 20 (1978)). Further, although analyzed
in the context of First Amendment claims under § 1983, “reinstatement is a base
element of the appropriate remedy in wrongful employee discharge cases and,
except in extraordinary cases, is required.” Allen v. Autauga Cnty. Bd. of
Education, 685 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit even
explained in dicta, as it relates to a procedural due process claim, that the
appropriate prospective remedy is “reinstatement and a correction in any
procedural defects of the pre-termination hearing.” McKinney v. Pate, 151 F.3d
1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Given this, the Court cannot say that
reinstatement is not an available remedy within the Eleventh Circuit for a § 1983
procedural due process claim when a discharge is be unjustified.
During trial Defendants contended that Galbreath had been rightfully
terminated. In other words, the jury was asked whether Galbreath’s termination
was justified. (Doc. 79-1, p. 341). And as it related to her breach of contract claim,
the jury was asked whether Galbreath would have been fired anyway due to afteracquired-evidence. Id. at 337–38. To both of these questions the jury answered in
the negative. (Doc. 73-1, pp. 2, 4). Based on this, the scope of the jury’s
determination appropriately includes prospective relief in the form of
reinstatement.
This conclusion is supported by numerous decisions from various United

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States Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the scope of damages
available in procedural due process actions and similarly found reinstatement to be
within this scope. See, e.g., Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir.
2005) (barring suit based on Eleventh Amendment grounds but explaining that
“plaintiff’s entitlement to more than nominal damages in a procedural due process
case turns on whether the constitutional violation—the failure to provide a pretermination opportunity to contest termination—did in fact cause the harm
asserted—the loss of the job and related benefits. If [the plaintiff] would have been
terminated even after a proper hearing, he would not be eligible for either
reinstatement or damages flowing from his unemployment.”); Pace v. Moriarty, 83
F.3d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that while qualified immunity shielded a
defendant from damage claims related to denial of due process, the defendant
officials were not shielded from the plaintiff’s claims “for reinstatement or other
equitable remedies”); Newsom v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 928 (6th
Cir. 1988) (reasoning that to the extent a plaintiff “seeks reparative relief aimed at
restoring him to the position he would have occupied but for the due process
violation, he is entitled to such relief unless the school district can prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that, even had it not deprived [the plaintiff] of his
right to procedural due process, he would have still rightfully been expelled”); see
also Broday v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2003)
(analyzing a due process violation involving the lack of proper notice in land
condemnation proceedings, the court explained that “[t]he appropriate remedy for a

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proven due process violation often depends on the state at which the violation is
found and the relief sought” and holding that where the plaintiff was seeking the
reconveyance of his property rather than monetary damages, the plaintiff “is
entitled to a return of his property only if he can prove that any denial of due
process made a difference in the condemnation proceedings”).
Notwithstanding this caselaw, Defendants attempt to argue that the only
means of prospective relief available to Galbreath “is simply to order that a hearing
take place.” (Doc. 98, p. 4). In support, Defendants cite Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d
1543 (9th Cir. 1988); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Langford v. Hale County,
Alabama Commission, 2016 WL 4974960 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2016); Earl v. Dupree,
2001 WL 36152178 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2001); and Wyatt v. Bronner, 500 F. Supp.
817 (M.D. Ala. 1980). However, these cases lend no support to Defendants.
To begin, although the Brady Court found reinstatement was unavailable
based solely on a procedural due process claim, the court did not go so far as to
exclude reinstatement as a prospective remedy “when another substantive right
coexists with the right to procedural due process.” 859 F.2d at 1552. Here,
Galbreath brought and was successful on a procedural due process claim and a
breach of contract claim; therefore, she had another coexisting substantive right.
Next, the Codd Court referenced a hearing being the proper prospective
remedy that the Due Process Clause requires in the context of a Fourteenth
Amendment stigma plus claim. 429 U.S. at 627. Here, the Court dismissed
Galbreath’s stigma plus claim; therefore, she has no need or right to “clear her

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name.” Additionally, a hearing was the proper prospective remedy in Earl and
Wyatt because there had been no factual finding in those cases of whether the
termination in question was justified. Here, the trier of fact has already determined
that Galbreath’s termination was unjustified. A hearing, therefore, would be
pointless.
That the jury found Galbreath’s termination was unjustified in this matter is
also distinguishable from Langford. In Langford, Hale County was able to prove
that it would have terminated the employee without regard to political affiliation.
2016 WL 4974960 at *2. Here, Defendants did not convince the jury that it would
have fired Galbreath based on after-acquired-evidence or with justification, even
though Defendants strangely now contend it is undisputed Galbreath would have
been terminated regardless of the procedure offered. See (Doc. 73-1, pp. 2, 4).
Further the employee in Langford was unable to establish any damages beyond
“emotional distress and embarrassment in the community.” Id. at 3. Here,
Galbreath convinced the jury that the 2012 Contract was valid, which proved
damages extending beyond the date of Defendants’ termination vote.
Because the jury already determined that Galbreath’s termination was
unjustified, her reinstatement request does not “prove too much” or show Galbreath
is trying to “game the system” as Defendants contend. And because the jury has
already determined that Galbreath’s termination was unjustified, the Court does
not have to, nor is Galbreath asking the Court to, decide the merits of her
termination. The jury decided this at trial upon Defendants’ request. Therefore,

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the Court does not act as a “super-personnel department” in deciding whether
reinstatement is an available means of prospective equitable relief. And what
Defendants do not consider is that this is not merely the failure to conduct a pretermination hearing but rather the unjustified actual loss of employment by
Galbreath.
Reinstatement is not an inequity against Defendants as they contend. The
2012 Contract anticipates that Galbreath will be employed through November 25,
2018. (Doc. 72-1, p. 32). She has an expectation that she can provide services for
Defendants until this time and receive compensation for these services.
Defendants, likewise, have an expectation of services for compensation. This means
that Galbreath would not receive a windfall or be in a better position if she was
reinstated. Instead, both parties would receive what they bargained for under the
2012 Contract.
The fact that Galbreath did not pursue any of the grievance procedures
within the Hale County Personnel Policy does not work an inequity upon
Defendants. To begin, the 2012 Contract clearly states that the Hale County Board
of Commissioners may terminate Galbreath’s employment upon an unanimous vote.
(Doc. 72-1, p. 33). But the evidence at trial proved Galbreath was not terminated
based on an unanimous vote. Also, the 2012 Contract requires any notice provided
under the contract (i.e., a termination notice) be in writing and either be personally
delivered or sent by mail to Galbreath. Id. at 34. Defendants produced no such
notice. So it was reasonable for Galbreath to believe that she was not properly

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terminated. If the overseer of the grievance policy did not properly terminate
Galbreath, what good would grieving her termination do? Moreover, had Galbreath
utilized the grievance procedure, the same commissioners that voted to terminate
Galbreath would be the final deciding body that has the authority to adopt or reject
any decision rendered in the grievance procedure. Id. at 14. Any efforts to grieve
her termination would likely have been futile.
Further, the position Galbreath held with Hale County has not been filled.
Therefore, reinstatement does not work an inequity upon Defendants. And,
reinstatement is not inequitable for Defendants because, as Galbreath rightfully
concedes, it is up to Defendants whether Galbreath would serve out the remainder
of her contract. (Doc. 107, p. 10). The 2012 Contract and the Due Process Clause do
not bar her future termination as long as Galbreath were to receive the process due
and the terms of the contract were followed.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ contention that reinstatement is
an unavailable remedy for this procedural due process violation.
III. WHETHER REINSTATEMENT IS A FEASIBLE REMEDY
Having determined reinstatement is an available remedy for this procedural
due process violation, the question stands whether reinstatement is a feasible
remedy in this case. While reinstatement is the preferred prospective equitable
remedy, it is not the only possible equitable prospective remedy. “When
extenuating circumstances warrant, a trial court may award a plaintiff front pay in
lieu of reinstatement.” United States EEOC v. W & O Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 619 (11th

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Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “In deciding whether to award front pay, rather than
reinstatement, courts look to whether ‘ “discord and antagonism between the
parties would render reinstatement ineffective as a make-whole remedy,” ’ Lewis v.
Federal Prison Indus., 953 F.2d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Goldstein v.
Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435, 1449 (11th Cir. 1985)), the ‘ “defendant’s
management [had] intimidated or threatened” ’ the plaintiff, id. (quoting Elvins v.
Adventist Health Sys., 660 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (D. Kan. 1987)), or the termination
had harmed the plaintiff’s well-being, id.” W & O Inc., 213 F.3d at 619. Another
relevant consideration in deciding front pay is the plaintiff’s retirement date.
Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1280. And just as it does with back pay, a failure to mitigate
damages will “limit the amount of front pay available.” Castle v. Sangamo Weston,
Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
“[B]ecause of the potential for windfall, [the] use [of front pay] must be
tempered.” Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1281 (citation omitted) (second and third bracket in
original). “Front pay remains a special remedy, warranted only by egregious
circumstances.” Id. Although the caselaw outlined here evaluated the propriety of
front pay in age discrimination and Title VII cases, the Eleventh Circuit has found
no error in applying these rules to determine whether front pay is appropriate in
regards to a § 1983 claim. Haskins v. Boaz, 822 F.2d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir. 1987)
(citing Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1448–49).
In the instant case, there has been no evidence that Defendants are willing or
amenable to reinstating Galbreath. And Defendants do not even broach the

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question of whether reinstatement is a feasible option. They only argue that
Galbreath is entitled to neither reinstatement nor front pay. Galbreath, however,
did convey to the Court that Defendants’ counsel communicated to her counsel that
it “was doubtful that Defendants would be willing to reinstate Galbreath.” (Doc. 82,
p. 7). This in and of itself is sufficient to establish that reinstatement is unfeasible.
Austrum v. Fed. Cleaning Constrs., Inc., 2016 WL 3526130 at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 23,
2016) (“Given Federal’s unwillingness to hire Austrum, the Court finds that
instatement is unfeasible and could likely lead to an acrimonious situation.”) The
Court is reluctant to order reinstatement only to potentially create a contempt
proceeding in an already prolonged suit.
Trial evidence establishes that animosity and discord exists between the
parties. At least one commissioner testified that he stayed away from the Hale
County offices due to his seemingly negative relationship with Galbreath. (Doc. 791, p. 61). Additionally, one commissioner testified that the county administrator
was the face of the commission and needed to represent them in the commissioners’
absence. However, upon terminating Galbreath, Hale County did not hire a
replacement. That a replacement was not hired further establishes the animosity
between the parties. More simply, it seems that the commissioners did not desire
an ever-present county administrator as much as they just wanted to be rid of
Galbreath. The Court is unoptimistic that these feelings would subside upon
reinstatement.
As to mitigation, there is no reason to deny front pay based on Galbreath’s

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mitigation efforts. Mitigation of damages was an affirmative defense raised and
argued by Defendants. When posed with an interrogatory on this affirmative
defense, the jury found that Defendants failed to prove that Galbreath did not
exercise reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages.
As to her well-being, Galbreath testified that she suffered emotional distress
and mental anguish as a result of Defendants’ procedural due process violation.
Specifically, she was embarrassed, she suffered stress, and she suffered from a
shingles outbreak. The jury apparently found this testimony credible and that
these harms would not have occurred but for the due process violation because the
jury awarded Galbreath $8,000 in emotional distress and mental anguish damages.
(Doc. 73-1, p. 4). The jury’s determination in this aspect shows that the due process
violation harmed Galbreath’s well-being and supports front pay as opposed to
reinstatement.
The 2012 Contract term is also a relevant consideration. Galbreath is now
approximately 56 years old. She already came out of retirement once. The 2012
Contract is set to expire November 25, 2018. She will be approximately 58 years
old. It is reasonable that either she would not seek renewal after the 2018
expiration or Defendants would not renew the contract at that time.
There are 82 weeks from the jury’s verdict to the end of the contract. This is
a relatively short period of time. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Galbreath
would remain there until that time. See Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1281 (“Lewis was only
four years away from the date of his mandatory retirement, so we may fairly

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assume that Lewis would have remained at FCI until the time of that retirement.”)
That Galbreath would remain in her position until contract expiration, that the
contract is soon to expire, and that the contract would likely not be renewed weighs
in favor of front pay. Reinstatement would require money, resources, and time to
train Galbreath on what has changed since 2013. To train up an employee whose
term is so brief is inefficient.
Moreover, as discussed above, Galbreath has an expectation that she will
receive the benefit of the bargain under the 2012 Contract. The 2012 Contract
states that Galbreath will receive “full compensation” and “benefits” “due and
payable” to Galbreath in the wake of a breach by Hale County. (Doc. 72-1, p. 35).
This shows that the parties envisioned some type of front pay.
Based on the above factual findings, the Court finds reinstatement is
unfeasible and front pay is the appropriate prospective equitable remedy. See W &
O, Inc., 213 F.3d at 606 (concluding that a district court must “make factual
findings as to whether reinstatement is feasible” if it awards a plaintiff front pay).
Because the 2012 Contract spells out the compensation Galbreath would
receive, there is no need for another hearing to establish front pay. Galbreath
agrees that there is no need to calculate future increases in pay. This means that
there is no need to discount a front pay award to present value. Stratton v. Dep’t for
the Aging for the City of New York, 132 F.3d 869, 882 (2d Cir. 1997). Further,
Galbreath agrees that the cost of her health insurance established at trial will
remain the same throughout the term of the 2012 contract. Defendants do not

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contest these figures, just that Galbreath is not due front pay as a whole.
The total of her compensation and health insurance premiums would be
$42,000.00 per year ($30,000.00 per year compensation plus $12,000.00 per year
health insurance premiums). This would equal $807.69 per week in total
compensation. The relevant period of time upon which front pay is awarded is from
the date of the jury’s verdict in this case (March 27, 2017) through the end of the
2012 Contract (November 25, 2018). This timespan is made up of 87 weeks.
Therefore, the total front pay due to Galbreath in this matter is $70,269.03.1
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES, in part, and GRANTS, in part
Galbreath’s Motion for Reinstatement or, Alternatively, Front Pay (Doc. 82).
Defendants are hereby ORDERED to pay unto Galbreath $70,269.03 in front pay.
DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of August, 2017.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Galbreath offers another figure for the total front pay due: $71,750.00. She
contends that this is the sum of her weekly compensation ($875.00) for a period of
82 weeks. But as discussed above, the proper per week compensation for Galbreath
is $807.69. Further, the proper number of weeks is 87. The Court presumes
Galbreath’s per week, number of weeks, and total figure are a typo given the motion
also references “Ms. Langford,” who was the plaintiff in a separate action against
Defendants.
1

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