Flores v. United States Attorney General, et al.

Filing 7

ORDER OF DISMISSAL: RE 3 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. RE 5 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and Motion to Transfer is DENIED. This case is DISMISSED, as required by 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), with prejudice. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 05/20/2015. (CME, COURT STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

ERIC FLORES,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,

Case No. 2:15-cv-00002-SLG

Respondents.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On April 24, 2015, Eric Flores, a self-represented resident of Texas, filed a
class action Petition to Challenge the Constitutionality of the First Amendment, an
Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee, and a Motion to Transfer his
case to the District of Columbia. 1 Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 requires the Court
to review the action, and to dismiss if the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 2

1
2

Dockets 1, 3, 5, 6.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 n. 10 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“Congress inserted 1915(e)(2) into the in forma pauperis statute, and we must
follow this clear statutory direction.”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The
district court . . . properly concluded that Calhoun’s [non-prisoner] complaint should not
be allowed to proceed. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring dismissal of in forma
pauperis proceedings that seek monetary relief against immune defendants).”); Bilal v.
Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2001) (Under section § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . .
“dismissal is now mandatory. . . . [T]he complaint now may . . . be dismissed under section
1915 for failure to state a claim.”); Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir.1997) (en
banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “requires dismissal of frivolous IFP actions even if they are
brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”).

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Flores cannot file a class action without
counsel. 3 Only an “attorney admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at
law before the courts of the State of Alaska, is eligible for admission to practice in
the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.” 4 And “[a] person may
not engage in the practice of law in the state unless the person is licensed to
practice law in Alaska and is an active member of the Alaska Bar.’” 5 Mr. Flores is
not a member of the Alaska Bar, 6 and may not bring a class action in this Court.
Moreover, Mr. Flores has filed similar cases in numerous other United States
District Courts. 7 In one of his filings to this Court, Mr. Flores indicates he has

3

See, e.g., Simon v. Hartfield Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 provides that in federal court, ‘parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein.’ Significant is the language contained in the statute
that limits the authorization of civil litigants to ‘plead and conduct their own cases
personally.’ Id. (Emphasis added).
. . . It is well established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by § 1654
is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.”) (citations
omitted).
4

D. Ak. LR 83.1(a)(1).

5

Christensen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d 345, 346 (Alaska 1993) (citing Alaska Bar Rule 63);
see also Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(1) (“only attorneys who are members of the
Alaska Bar Association shall be entitled to practice in the courts of this state”).

6

See www.alaskabar.org.

7

See, e.g., Flores v. U.S. Atty., 4:15–CV–58, 2015 WL 2193784 *1 (E.D. N.C. May 11,
2015) (“[T]his action [is] DISMISSED as frivolous”); Gen. Flores v. United States Attorney
General, et al., 2:15–cv–1207, 2015 WL 2085561 *1 (S.D. Ohio, May 5, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2).”); Flores v. U.S.
Attorney General, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2:15-cv-00288 (D. Utah, opened
4/24/15); Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 4:15-cv-00048 (N.D. Miss., opened
4/20/15); Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 1:15-cv-00010 (D. Guam, opened
2:15-cv-00002-SLG, Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, et al.
Order of Dismissal
Page 2 of 6

instituted this same civil cause of action in over twenty five United States District
Courts throughout the country. 8 In the Petition Mr. Flores filed in this Court, he
states:
In this particular civil case, the petitioner has established venue of
jurisdiction in the United States District Court in Arkansas by asserting
that ; (1) the respondants residency or place of business is within the
geographic location of Arkansas and that ; (2) the respondants acts
or omissions that give rise to the legal claims occurred from within the
geographic location Arkansas where the legal claims are being filed
in the United States District Court in Arkansas.
The aforementioned two jurisdictional factors satisfy the burden of
establishing the prerequisite of venue of jurisdiction in the United
States District Court in Arkansas for the purpose of adjudicateing the
petitioners "Petition to Challenge the Constitutionality of the First
Amendmentt Right to Free Exercise of Religious Belief"' for want of
prosecution. 9
Mr. Flores has made no allegations that appear to have anything to do with the
District of Alaska.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, in
dismissing Mr. Flores’ similar case filed in that court, explains as follows:
Petitioner filed a 64–page complaint entitled “Petition to
Challenge the Constitutionality of the First Amendment.” A review of
PACER reveals that Petitioner recently filed the same complaint in
many other district courts throughout the country. He names as
4/20/15);
4/17/15);
4/17/15);
4/17/15);
4/17/15).
8

9

Flores
Flores
Flores
Flores

v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 1:15-cv-00039 (D.
v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 3:15-cv-00217 (D.
v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 1:15-cv-00842 (D.
v. U.S. Attorney General, F.B.I., 2:15-cv-02851 (C.D.

Docket 5 at 1.
Docket 1 at 5.

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N.D.,
Nev.,
Colo.,
Calif.,

opened
opened
opened
opened

Respondents the U.S. Attorney General, with an address in
Washington, D.C., and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with an
address in Texas. Petitioner’s address is also in Texas. None of the
allegations in the complaint appear to have anything to do with the
Western District of Kentucky. 10
The Court concluded that “[t]he instant action must be dismissed as frivolous. An
action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or ‘rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.’” 11
Likewise, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon states:
This is not the first time Plaintiff has attempted to litigate these,
or similar, claims. Plaintiff filed the Complaint currently pending before
this Court with 28 other United States courthouses. . . . Over the years,
he has filed similar claims in federal courts across the country. Those
courts have summarily dismissed as frivolous Plaintiff’s claims of
government employees directing satellite transmissions at Mexican–
American citizens.
...
This Court reaches the same conclusion. Even liberally
construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is facially frivolous. 12
And the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri concluded
as follows:
Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes
that plaintiff's factual allegations are delusional and fail to state a claim
or cause of action. In this regard, the Court takes judicial notice of two
substantially similar cases that plaintiff filed in the District of Maine.
See Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 2:13–CV–52–DBH
(D.Me.2013); Flores v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 2:13–CV–7–DBH
10

Flores v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 5:15-cv-85, 2015 WL 2018384 *1 (W.D. Ken. May 1, 2015).

11

Id. at *2 (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

12

Flores v. U.S. Atty Gen., 1:15-cv-00644, 2015 WL 2260551 *3 (D. Oregon, May 12,
2015) (citations omitted).
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(D.Me.2013). In both cases, the District Court of Maine summarily
dismissed plaintiff's allegations under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and warned
plaintiff that any further frivolous filings would result in filing restrictions
being placed upon him.
...
For these reasons, the instant action will be dismissed as
legally frivolous and delusional under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff is
warned that any further frivolous filings may result in filing restrictions
being placed upon him in the Eastern District of Missouri. 13
As with the similar cases Mr. Flores has filed in other jurisdictions, 14 the case
he filed in this Court is frivolous. 15

13

Flores v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 1:15-cv-55, 2015 WL 1757523 *2 - *3 (E.D. Missouri April 17,
2015) (The Court also denies class certification, because Mr. Flores is not an attorney,
and lists a number of other cases filed by Mr. Flores around the country, noting that
sanctions have been imposed by courts as a result.).

14

See, e.g., Flores, 2015 WL 2018384 at *1 (“Petitioner alleges that ‘executive employees
of the federal government’ used ‘advanced technology with a direct signal to the satellite
in outerspace that has the capability of calculateing genetic code to cause the
petitioner[‘]s Uncle Jorge Salas severe heart pain for long durations’ and then used their
official capacity to influence the county forensic laboratory to ‘fabercate frivolous
documents resembleing legitimate adtopysy reports’ that his uncle died of natural causes.
He also alleges that the ‘organized group of executive employees’ used the direct signal
of a satellite to cause him severe mental pain which impaired his thought process in order
to prevent him from pursuing his appellate remedies. He further alleges that the
‘advanced technology with a direct signal to the satellite in outerspace that has the
capability of calculateing a genetic code’ to cause suffering and to control mental states
has been used on various of his family members.”).
15

See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (“Factual frivolousness includes allegations that are
clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, or delusional.”) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325, 327, 328 (1989); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (“[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where
it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,
1105 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1995) (A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it “merely repeats
pending or previously litigated claims.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.

This case is DISMISSED, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with
prejudice. 16

2.

All outstanding motions are DENIED.

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a Judgment in this case.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this 20th day of May, 2015.
/s/ SHARON L. GLEASON
United States District Judge

16

See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal, with prejudice,
upheld after “weigh[ing] the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice
to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the
public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.”) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963
F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).

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