In re the EXXON VALDEZ

Filing 9843

ORDER: granting 9804 Motion Motion to Lift Stay and for Entry of Judgment. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Nautilus Marine Enterprises and M. Thomas Waterer in the amount of $3,150,140.16 ($2,864,009.24 in additional prejudgment interest plus $286,400.92 in attorney's fees) with an off-set $496,724.26. (See order for details). Signed by Judge H. Russel Holland on 11/28/2016. (CME, COURT STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

In re:
)
THE EXXON VALDEZ
)
_______________________________________)
)
This document relates to:
)
)
NAUTILUS MARINE ENTERPRISES, )
M. THOMAS WATERER, and the
)
EXXON DEFENDANTS
)
_______________________________________)

No. 3:89-cv-0095-HRH

ORDER
Motion to Lift Stay and for Entry of Judgment
Exxon Mobil Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company (referred to collectively as
“Exxon” hereinafter) move1 to lift the stay that was entered in this case in 2009 and for entry
of final judgment in favor of Nautilus Marine Enterprises in the amount of $2,245,622.87
less an offset of $496,724.26 for fees and costs awarded to Exxon in state court. This motion
is opposed in part and Nautilus Marine Enterprises and M. Thomas Waterer2 (referred to
collectively as “NME” hereinafter) cross-move for entry of judgment in their favor in the

1

Docket No. 9804.

2

Docket No. 9812.
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amount of either $8,537,834.23 or $7,044,360.28, with no offset.3 The cross-motion is
opposed.4 Oral argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary.
Background
On or about September 29, 2006, Exxon, NME,5 and Cook Inlet Processing (“CIP”)
entered into a settlement agreement, which resolved NME’s and CIP’s claims6 against Exxon
for 1992 and 1993 damages arising out of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez. However, the
parties were not able to agree as to the amount of prejudgment interest that should be paid
on the principal amount of the settlement. Exxon contended that federal law controlled the
prejudgment interest question; NME and CIP contended that Alaska law controlled the
prejudgment interest question. The parties agreed that the prejudgment interest dispute
would be submitted to this court for resolution.
On February 20, 2007, NME and CIP filed motions on the prejudgment interest issue.7
After the briefing was completed on those motions, but before this court had ruled on the

3

The cross-motion indicates that it is also being brought by Waterkist Corporation.
However, Waterkist is not and never has been a party to this lawsuit.
4

Docket No. 9820.

5

Waterkist Corporation, although not a party to this action, was a party to the
Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement between Exxon and the Nautilus Marine and
Cook Inlet Processing at 4, ¶ 2.8, Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Dawn Sestito [etc.], Docket No.
9805.
6

NME’s and CIP’s claims were originally filed in state court but removed by Exxon
based on federal question jurisdiction.
7

Docket Nos. 8467 and 8468.
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motions, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision in the Sea Hawk Seafoods case. See In re Exxon
Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2007). Sea Hawk was a fish processor which, like NME and
CIP, had pursued claims against Exxon arising out of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.
Sea Hawk and Exxon reached a settlement as to Sea Hawk’s claims but could not agree on
whether federal or state law should apply to the determination of prejudgment interest. This
court had ruled that federal law applied, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that state law
governed prejudgment interest.
After the Sea Hawk decision issued, this court called for supplemental briefing from
the parties.8 The parties agreed that pursuant to Sea Hawk, the Alaska prejudgment interest
rate of 10.5 percent should be applied to them. The parties also agreed that Alaska state law
provides that prejudgment interest should be simple interest, unless the parties had otherwise
agreed. Exxon contended that there was no agreement between the parties as to whether
prejudgment interest should be simple or compound. NME and CIP contended that the
parties had agreed that prejudgment interest would be compound no matter which rate
governed.
In Order No. 370,9 this court held that NME and CIP were “entitled to prejudgment
interest at a rate of 10.5% compounded annually.”10 In reaching this holding, the court
focused upon the structure and text of the parties’ integrated Settlement Agreement. The

8

Docket No. 8502.

9

Docket No. 8616.

10

Id. at 15.
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integrated Settlement Agreement included a proposed final judgment which provided for
compounded interest, regardless of what rate of interest applied. After observing that the
Settlement Agreement was silent about the compounding of interest issue, this court found
that it was “the unequivocal statement of the agreed judgment form that the prejudgment
interest should be compounded.”11
Exxon moved for reconsideration12 of Order No. 370 and for leave to file a
Supplemental Answer to NME’s complaint.13 Exxon sought to amend its answer to include
a claim for reformation of the Settlement Agreement. This court denied the motion for
reconsideration and the motion for leave to supplement.14
After Exxon’s motions for reconsideration and leave to supplement were denied, this
court entered a Final Judgment.15 On August 17, 2007, Exxon appealed Order No. 370 and
the Final Judgment.
On October 17, 2007, Exxon filed a complaint in state court which alleged a single
cause of action for reformation of the Settlement Agreement. On November 2, 2007, NME
and CIP removed the reformation case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Exxon
moved to remand, arguing that there was no jurisdictional basis for removal. On April 22,

11

Id. at 8.

12

Docket No. 8628.

13

Docket No. 8629.

14

Docket No. 8635.

15

Docket No. 8634.
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2008, this court denied the motion to remand.16 NME and CIP then moved to dismiss
Exxon’s complaint. On November 18, 2008, this court granted the motion to dismiss,
holding that Exxon’s reformation claim was barred by res judicata,17 and a final judgment
dismissing the reformation case was entered.18
Exxon appealed. However, before the parties had begun briefing the appeal, on
March 10, 2009, the Ninth Circuit ruled on Exxon’s appeal of Order No. 370 and the Final
Judgment in the interpretation case. The Ninth Circuit held that this court “erred in failing
to consider extrinsic evidence regarding whether the parties agreed to compound interest.”
In re Exxon Valdez, Case No. 07-35715, 2009 WL 605900, at *2 (9th Cir. March 10, 2009).
The court of appeals also held that this court “did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to supplement the answer to add a counterclaim for reformation.” Id. Thus, the court of
appeals reversed in part and remanded the interpretation case to this court. Upon remand,
this court vacated the Final Judgment, Order No. 370, and the portion of its July 23, 2007
order that addressed Exxon’s motion for reconsideration.19

16

Docket No. 27 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH.

17

Order re Motion to Dismiss at 20, Docket No. 53 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH.

18

Docket No. 54 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH.

19

Docket No. 9202.
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On May 14, 2009, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment in the reformation case
because it was based upon the Final Judgment in the interpretation case, which had been
reversed in part.20 The reformation case was remanded to this court for further proceedings.
On June 5, 2009, Exxon filed a second complaint in Alaska state court seeking a
declaratory judgment interpreting the parties’ rights and obligations under the Settlement
Agreement, or, in the alternative, for reformation of the Settlement Agreement. NME and
CIP removed the 2009 case to this court.21 Exxon moved to remand both the original
reformation case and the 2009 case to state court.22 The court granted both motions to
remand23 and stayed the interpretation case pending the outcome of the state court cases.24
The state court cases were consolidated and trial was scheduled for November 2010.
Shortly before the trial, CIP and Exxon reached a settlement.
NME and Exxon proceeded to trial. On March 17, 2011, the state court judge entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.25 The state court judge
[a]fter reviewing the written exchange of offers and counteroffers, the Letter Agreement, as well as the testimony of Mr.
20

Docket No. 68 at 1 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH.

21

Case No. 3:09-cv-0131-HRH.

22

Docket No. 69 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH; Docket No. 8 in Case No. 3:09-cv0131-HRH.
23

Docket No. 77 in Case No. 3:07-cv-0224-HRH; Docket No. 14 in Case No. 3:09-cv0131-HRH.
24

Docket No. 9307.

25

Exhibit 3, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No. 9805.
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Daum and Mr. Weidner [the two attorneys who negotiated the
Settlement Agreement], ... f[ound] there is no evidence that the
parties discussed and reached agreement that only compound
interest would apply regardless of whether state or federal law
controlled.[26]
In short, the state court judge concluded that “[a]ll of the extrinsic evidence demonstrates that
the parties never agreed that interest would be compounded” and “that the proposed
judgment ... was intended to provide a form of judgment that [this court] could use to
implement the parties’ agreement” but that “[t]he proposed judgment was not intended to
include or be an agreement to pay compound interest.”27
Judgment was entered in the consolidated state court case in Exxon’s favor and Exxon
was awarded attorney’s fees. NME appealed the trial court’s conclusion that the parties had
not agreed that interest would be compound. On July 19, 2013, the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
305 P.3d 309, 312 (Alaska 2013). NME also appealed the award of attorney’s fees to Exxon.
On August 22, 2014, the Alaska Supreme Court “reverse[ed] the awards of attorney fees and
costs and remand[ed] for a recalculation of the fees award based on local rates and for the
apportionment of fees and costs” but affirmed as to “all other issues.” Nautilus Marine
Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 332 P.3d 554, 565 (Alaska 2014).

26

Id. at 8, ¶ 33.

27

Id. at 25, ¶¶ 94-95.
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After the attorney’s fees were re-calculated, on October 8, 2015, the state trial court
entered a second revised final judgment.28 The second revised final judgment provided:
1.
The September 2006 settlement between Exxon ... and
NME did not require Exxon to pay compound interest regardless
of the applicable law. The parties intended that Judge Holland
of the U.S. District Court determine both the correct rate of
interest and the method of computing that interest under federal
or state law.
2. Plaintiff Exxon’s request for reformation is denied.
3. It is for Judge Holland to decide the appropriate law that
applies, the proper interest rate, and the method of calculating
that interest rate.
4. Exxon is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$340,211, expert costs in the amount of $67,500 and costs
of $89,013.26 for a total award of $496,724.26.[29]
The state court proceedings having been completed, Exxon now moves to lift the stay
of this case (the interpretation case) and for entry of judgment in NME’s favor. NME does
not oppose lifting the stay nor does NME oppose entry of judgment in its favor. However,
the parties disagree as to the amount of the judgment to be entered.
Discussion
There being no disagreement between the parties, the stay is lifted.
With the stay lifted, what remains is for the court to enter judgment. In order to enter
judgment, the court must determine the amount that is still owed to NME under the
Settlement Agreement.

28

Exhibit 4, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No. 9805.

29

Id. at 4.
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Under the Settlement Agreement, Exxon paid NME and CIP an initial settlement
amount of $8,500,000.30 This amount represented $824,601.09 for CIP’s 1992 and 1993
damages and $3,726,556.16 for NME’s 1992 and 1993 damages plus prejudgment interest
on both of those amounts calculated at the applicable federal rate.31 NME received $5
million of the initial settlement amount and CIP received $3.5 million.32 Exxon also agreed
to pay a Supplemental Settlement Amount, which would be “the amount, if any, that may
become payable pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 3.1, 3.2 and/or 3.3” of the
Settlement Agreement.33
Paragraph 3.1 requires Exxon to pay the difference between prejudgment interest
calculated at the federal rate and prejudgment interest calculated at whatever rate the court
finds is the correct rate.34 There is now no dispute the correct rate of prejudgment interest
is the state rate of 10.5% simple. The parties agree that the difference between prejudgment
interest calculated at the federal rate up to November 1, 2006 and the state rate of 10.5%
simple is $3,470,716.32.35
30

Settlement Agreement between Exxon and the Nautilus Marine and Cook Inlet
Processing at 3, ¶ 2.6, Exhibit 1, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No. 9805.
31

Id. at 3-4.

32

Id. at 11, ¶ 5.1.

33

Id. at 5, ¶ 2.13.

34

Id. at 6, ¶ 3.1.

35

NME has transposed the 1 and 6 in its briefing, but there is no disagreement that this
(continued...)
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The $3,470,716.32 number is based on the report of Exxon’s expert, Bruce Budge.
Budge reached this number by calculating prejudgment interest at a rate of 10.5% simple on
CIP’s and NME’s combined 1992 damages ($3,778.584.56) and on CIP’s and NME’s
combined 1993 damages ($2,862,112.94).36 Adding these two numbers together results in
the total prejudgment interest on CIP’s and NME’s 1992 and 1993 damages through
November 1, 2006, when calculated at 10.5% simple, being $6,640,697.50.37 In the initial
settlement amount, Exxon paid CIP and NME $3,169,981.19 in prejudgment interest.38 The
difference between $6,640,697.50 and $3,169,981.19 is $3,470,761.13.
Despite the $3,470,761.13 being based on both CIP’s and NME’s 1992 and 1993
damages, NME argues that it is entitled to the entire $3,470,716.32. NME argues that
paragraph 3.1 is not ambiguous and that it does not provide for any allocation of any
additional prejudgment interest that might become payable. NME argues that if there were
confusion over how the additional prejudgment interest was to be paid, then Exxon should

35

(...continued)
number is based on the expert report of Bruce P. Budge. Budge’s report calculated the
“additional prejudgment interest due using the method in the Settlement Agreement and a
rate of 10.5% simple interest [to] equal $3,470,716.31[.]” Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge
at 4, Exhibit 11, Declaration of Edward P. Weigelt, Jr., Docket No. 9813. Exxon has raised
a number of objections to the averments in Mr. Weigelt’s declaration, which is filled with
improper legal argument and improper opinions. However, Exxon raised no objections to
the exhibits attached to Mr. Weigelt’s declaration.
36

Budge Expert Report at 3, Exhibit 11, Weigelt Declaration, Docket No. 9813.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 4.
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have moved to reform paragraph 3.1, which it did not do. NME contends that Exxon has
never claimed that the language of paragraph 3.1 is vague or ambiguous. NME argues that
Exxon is relying on a subrogation theory to attempt to modify its obligations under the
Settlement Agreement and that such an attempt should fail. NME contends that Exxon’s
status in this case is that of a debtor which had an obligation to pay NME and CIP and thus
any monies that Exxon paid to CIP were in payment of Exxon’s own obligations to CIP and
not payments of NME debts.39 NME insists that any claim of allocation is between NME and
CIP, not NME and Exxon. NME insists that there is simply no contract provision that would
allow modification of Exxon’s liability under paragraph 3.1 due to a settlement with one
party to the Agreement.
NME is not entitled to the entire $3,470,716.32. Paragraph 5.1 of the Settlement
Agreement provides that “[a]ny Supplemental Settlement Amount shall be paid pursuant to
further written instructions from Seafood Processors Counsel, Counsel for NMI, Tom
Waterer, and Mike Shupe [CIP’s president].”40 That both CIP and NME had to provide
payment instructions as to any Supplemental Settlement Amount is a clear indication that any
Supplemental Settlement Amount was to be allocated between CIP and NME.

39

NME’s position that it is entitled to the entire $3,470,716.32 seems to be driven in
large part by the fact that it does not know the details of CIP’s settlement with Exxon. NME
repeatedly refers to this as a “secret” settlement.
40

Settlement Agreement between Exxon and the Nautilus Marine and Cook Inlet
Processing at 11, ¶ 5.1, Exhibit 1, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No. 9805.
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The Settlement Agreement is silent, however, as to how such an allocation should be
made. When faced with such a situation, the Alaska Supreme Court looks to Section 204 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. “Under section 204..., ‘[w]hen the parties to a
bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court.’” Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 896 (Alaska
2004).
Exxon argues that it would be reasonable for the court to apply the same allocation
formula the parties agreed to at the time of the settlement, which was that NME received
58.82% of the initial settlement amount and CIP received 41.18%. Under that allocation
scenario, NME would be entitled to recover $2,041,475.34 in additional prejudgment
interest.
But, NME has offered evidence that the payment instructions for the initial settlement
amount were “based on other business relations between [CIP and NME], including loans
and joint fish processing agreements, and also a joint prosecution agreement which included
sharing the initial settlement proceeds”41 and that “[t]he joint prosecution agreement and
sharing obligations between CIP and the other parties were terminated shortly after the

41

Weigelt Declaration at 4, ¶ 6, Docket No. 9813.
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settlement.”42 In light of this evidence, it would not be reasonable to allocate the Supplemental Settlement Amount based on how the initial settlement amount was allocated.
It would, however, be reasonable to allocate the additional prejudgment interest based
on NME’s actual damages. During the negotiations that led to the Settlement Agreement,
the parties’ lawyers signed what became known as the “Letter Agreement” which “[t]hey
intended ... to ‘constitute an agreement’ to settle the case” and which the state court judge
found was “binding between NME and Exxon.”43 In the Letter Agreement, Exxon expressly
agree[d] to pay CIP ... $710,750.06 on account of damages
accrued in 1992 and NMI ... $1,797,859.50 on account of
damages accrued in 1992, and to pay CIP $113,851.03 on
account of damages accrued in 1993, and NMI $1,928,969.65 on
account of damages accrued in 1993, together with pre-judgment interest on those sums as provided by law[.44]
In short, Exxon agreed to pay NME prejudgment interest on the damages that NME actually
incurred. Exxon’s expert has calculated that NME is entitled to $2,864,009.2445 in additional
prejudgment interest based on its 1992 and 1993 damages. Thus, the court finds that NME
is entitled to recover $2,864,009.24 of the $3,470,716.32 in additional prejudgment interest
that has become payable pursuant to paragraph 3.1 of the Settlement Agreement.

42

Id.

43

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8, ¶ 31, Exhibit 3, Sestito Affidavit,
Docket No. 9805.
44

Letter Agreement at 1, Exhibit 3, Weigelt Declaration, Docket No. 9813 (emphasis

added).
45

Budge Report at 4, Exhibit 11, Weigelt Declaration, Docket No. 9813.
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NME argues, however, that this is not the only amount that has become payable.
NME argues that it is also entitled to interest from November 1, 2006 to the present on
whatever portion of the $3,470,716.32 is allocated to it. NME argues that the $3,470,716.32
represents the “balance” of NME’s economic damages arising from the oil spill and thus it
is entitled to prejudgment interest on these damages. NME contends that interest is a
consequential economic damage and that under the Settlement Agreement, Exxon still owes
NME its unpaid economic damages. NME argues that it is entitled to prejudgment interest
on its portion of the $3,470,716.32 in order to be made “whole”. NME points out that
prejudgment interest is intended to compensate for the “loss of use of money” that a plaintiff
“actually suffers ... between accrual of his claim and judgment[.]” State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d
266, 273 n.27 (Alaska 1970). Here, NME argues that it has lost the use of its portion of the
$3,470,716.32 for almost ten years and thus it insists that it is entitled to prejudgment interest
on whatever additional prejudgment interest Exxon owes under paragraph 3.1. NME points
out that under Alaska law “[i]t is only when ... an award” of prejudgment interest “would do
an injustice that it should be denied” and that “[t]he only ground for denial [the Alaska
Supreme Court has] so far recognized has been double recovery.” Farnsworth v. Steiner, 638
P.2d 181, 184 (Alaska 1981). As the court in Farnsworth noted, “[t]he real question in
awarding interest to a judgment creditor is whether the debtor has had use of money for a
period of time when the creditor was actually entitled to it.” Id. Here, NME argues that there
can be no dispute that Exxon had the use of the $3,470,716.32 from November 1, 2006 until

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now, a period of time during which NME was actually entitled to a portion of that money.
NME contends that Exxon could have paid the additional money after the Sea Hawk decision
made it clear that state law would govern the interest issue and thus avoided having to pay
prejudgment interest from November 1, 2006 to the present, as Exxon’s counsel recommended.46 But because Exxon made a business decision to further delay payment and
continue to use the money until now, NME argues that Exxon must live with that choice now
and pay post-November 1, 2006 prejudgment interest.
NME’s argument ignores the express terms of the Settlement Agreement. Paragraph
3.1 of the Settlement Agreement provides:
The period for which interest shall be payable on the sum of
$2,508,609.56 shall commence on July 1, 1992, and continue
through November 1, 2006, or the date the Court enters judgment, whichever is earlier. The period for which interest shall
be payable on the sum of $2,042,547.68 shall commence on July
1, 1993, and continue through November 1, 2006, or the date on
which the Court enters judgment, whichever is earlier.[47]
There is nothing ambiguous about this provision. It plainly provides that the accrual
of prejudgment interest stops on November 1, 2006. NME has long been aware that this is
what the Settlement Agreement provided. During oral argument before this court in July
2007, NME’s attorney, Mr. Weidner, stated that Exxon “bargained for and got an agreement

46

SEALED Exhibit 15 at 3, Docket No. 9833.

47

Settlement Agreement between Exxon and the Nautilus Marine and Cook Inlet
Processing at 6, ¶ 3.1, Exhibit 1, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No. 9805.
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that the interest would stop last November, that’s about seven months ago, because under
state law the interest goes all the way until the judgment.”48 Mr. Weidner further stated that
we’re not asking for any more prejudgment interest than we
agreed to in the settlement. We’re not saying, hey, wait a
minute, go back and start the accrual a couple months extra or
it’s been seven months because we thought the judge was going
to rule by then, give us the seven months. A deal’s a deal and
we’re sticking with it.[49]
In addition, in the proposed final judgment that NME submitted to the court on July 20, 2007,
NME calculated prejudgment interest as accruing only through November 1, 2006.50
NME’s contention that the parties to the Settlement Agreement did not intend there to be a
“gap” period is unavailing. While the parties may not have foreseen that it would take almost
ten years to resolve their prejudgment interest dispute, the parties expressly agreed that
prejudgment interest would stop accruing on November 1, 2006. NME is not entitled to postNovember 1, 2006 prejudgment interest.
As set out above, the Supplemental Settlement Amount is also to include any amounts
that became payable under paragraph 3.2, which governs the issue of attorney’s fees. The
parties agree that NME is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of whatever the
court ultimately decides NME is owed under paragraph 3.1.

NME is entitled to

48

Transcript of Oral Argument at 37:6-9, Exhibit 5, Sestito Affidavit, Docket No.

9805.
49

Id. at 41:14-18.

50

Exhibit A at 2, Notice of Filing Conforming Proposed Final Judgment Re: Order
Number. 370, Docket No. 8625.
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$2,864,009.24 in additional interest pursuant to paragraph 3.1, which means that NME is
entitled to $286,400.92 in attorney’s fees pursuant to paragraph 3.2.
Finally, Exxon argues that it is entitled to an off-set of $496,724.26 in fees and costs
awarded in the state court action plus post-judgment interest on that amount. NME, however,
argues that an off-set would not be appropriate because Exxon’s obligations are to Nautilus
Marine Enterprises, Mr. Waterer, and Waterkist Corporation but only Nautilus Marine
Enterprises owes Exxon money pursuant to the state court judgment.
The court finds that an off-set would be appropriate here. Exxon has no obligation to
Waterkist Corporation because as noted above, Waterkist Corporation is not now and never
has been a party to this lawsuit. As for Mr. Waterer, Exxon has submitted evidence that Mr.
Waterer is the president and general manager of Nautilus Marine, that his job responsibilities
were “everything relating to the operations, financing and sales of the corporation”, that he
owns 100% of the shares of Nautilus Marine, that he and his wife are Nautilus Marine’s
officers and directors but that his wife is not very involved in the business, that he was
Nautilus Marine’s only live witness in the state court trial, that he attended seven depositions
that were taken in that matter, and that he telephonically attended four of the state court
hearings.51 Given this unrefuted evidence, the court finds that Mr. Waterer is in privity with

51

Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, Sestito Reply Affidavit, Docket No. 9821; SEALED Exhibit 5,
Docket No. 9825.
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Nautilus Marine such that an off-set would be appropriate even though Mr. Waterer was not
a party to the state court action.
Conclusion
The motion to lift the stay and for entry of judgment is granted. Judgment shall be
entered in favor of Nautilus Marine Enterprises and M. Thomas Waterer in the amount of
$3,150,410.16 ($2,864,009.24 in additional prejudgment interest plus $286,400.92 in
attorney’s fees) with an off-set $496,724.26.
DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 28th day of November, 2016.
/s/ H. Russel Holland
United States District Judge

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