Huntley v. Barnhart
Order on Motion to Remand to Agency
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
DAWN M. HUNTLEY,
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
Motion at Docket 10]
I. MOTION PRESENTED
Dawn M. Huntley filed a claim for Social Security Disability benefits and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments in April of 2001,1 alleging she had
been unable to work since August 24, 2000, due to fatigue and body aches.2 The
Regional Commissioner for the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)3 denied her claim
and so did an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).4 Huntley requested that the Social
Security Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision, but the council turned her down.5
Doc. 6, Administrative Record (“A.R.”), p. 262.
Id., p. 80.
Id., p. 26.
Id., p. 16.
Id., p. 5.
On June 7, 2005, Huntley filed a complaint in this court challenging the ALJ’s
decision. At docket 10, she has filed a motion seeking reversal of the ALJ’s decision
and remand to the SSA for disbursement of disability benefits and SSI payments. At
docket 11, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, has filed an
opposition to Huntley’s motion. At docket 12, Huntley has filed a reply in support of her
motion. Oral argument has not been requested and would not assist the court.
A. Huntley’s Medical History
1. Reports of Treating Physicians
The first physician to treat Huntley for the ailments that form the basis of her
claim was William H. Bell, who saw Huntley between February and July of 2000. During
that time, his notes show she reported depression and feeling “tired all the time” and
wanting “to sleep all the time on weekends.”6 Bell thought she had an “[i]nflammatory
The second physician to treat Huntley was Michael B. Armstrong, a specialist in
rheumatology, who first saw her on June 21, 2000. At that visit, he described her
“[m]ost prominent symptoms” as fatigue and body pain for the past three years, a “lowgrade fever” for the past year, and disturbed sleep for an unspecified amount of time.8
He also recorded her problems performing “[w]ork-related activities” and her
accentuated “aching” for one or two days after an increase in physical activity.9 He
examined her but found no “tender points,” which he thought “preclude[d] the diagnosis
of fibromyalgia,” but he also concluded the symptoms she was presenting were “highly
suggestive” of that disease and prescribed Plaquenil to treat it.10
Id., pp. 135-36, 138.
Id., p. 135.
Id., p. 173.
Id., p. 175.
On September 8, 2000, Armstrong reported that since Huntley began taking
Plaquenil, she had “had some ‘good days’ with little or no pain until about a week ago
when symptoms recurred in a fluctuating fashion with fatigue and stiffness as well as
pain limiting her ability to work.”11 After examining her and discovering “[o]nly 2
fibromyalgia tender points,” he noted “[h]er clinical presentation is suggestive of
fibromyalgia although lacking more tender points makes the diagnosis less attenuous.”12
Armstrong continued to treat Huntley through spring of 2003. His notes from that
period show Huntley reported sleeping problems, fatigue, muscle aches, and difficulty
concentrating.13 She also described her struggles with daily activities, such as her need
to take two or three days to recover from doing two loads of laundry.14 One note, dated
February 19, 2003, indicates Huntley had “begun [an] oil painting class.”15
Besides Armstrong’s treatment notes, the record also includes three letters he
wrote and one questionnaire he filled out on Huntley’s behalf. The first letter is dated
November 10, 2000, and addressed to “To Whom It May Concern.” Armstrong wrote he
had seen Huntley “for evaluation of symptoms of diffuse pain [and] fatigue” and
confessed that the cause of those symptoms was “uncertain, although possibilities
include fibromyalgia, as well as chronic fatigue syndrome.”16 He closed the letter with
his “considered medical opinion that [Huntley] is not able to fulfill the requirements of
her position as a social worker with the State of Alaska due to her medical illness.”17
Armstrong’s next letter is dated December 11, 2001, and addressed to the State
of Alaska’s Disability Determination Unit. He listed “her most troublesome symptoms”
Id., pp. 170-71, 189.
Id., p. 170.
Id., p. 187.
Id., p. 172.
as “[r]educed stamina[,] difficulty concentrating and maintaining focus on intellectual
activities[, and] distal extremity aching.”18 He repeated much of what is recorded in his
treatment notes, but he also gave new information: Huntley avoided stairs, being on her
feet more than a half hour and sitting more than two hours, but she was able “to drive
from Homer to Anchorage with one or two stops.”19 Armstrong also noted several drugs
failed to relieve her symptoms.20 Based on those observations, his “impression” of her
condition was she suffered from Hashimoto’s thyroiditis and had a “[h]istory of chronic
fatigue, low-grade fever and myalgias possibly related to [her thyroiditis].”21
Armstrong’s third letter is dated June 17, 2003, and addressed to the director of
the State of Alaska’s Public Employees Retirement System. He wrote he was treating
Huntley for “fibromyalgia with dominant symptoms of neck, shoulder, hand, hip, and arm
pain continuous in these areas, 8 out of 10 in severity with disturbed and non[-]
restorative sleep.”22 He also noted her sleeping problems had “somewhat improved
with Zanaflex,” but she continued to deal with fatigue, “difficult[y] concentrating and
impaired short-term memory.”23
The questionnaire Armstrong filled out is a “physical residual functional capacity
questionnaire” dated January 28, 2004. He described Huntley’s diagnosis as
fibromyalgia, and her symptoms as fatigue, pain, and an “abnormal tender point
exam.”24 He also noted stress exacerbates her symptoms and functional limitations and
her symptoms prevented her from doing even “low-stress” jobs because they
Id., p. 139.
Id., p. 140.
Id., p. 139.
Id., p. 141.
Id., p. 224.
Id., p. 217.
“constantly” interfered with her ability to concentrate on “even simple work tasks.”25
With her hindrances, Armstrong concluded Huntley could sit “about 4 hours” in an eighthour workday and stand or walk “less than 2 hours,” occasionally lift less than ten
pounds, rarely lift ten pounds, and never lift twenty or more pounds.26 He estimated she
would miss work more than four days per month.27
2. DDS Physician’s Report
On January 13, 2002, someone the record identifies only as a “DDS physician”
signed a form assessing Huntley’s residual functional capacity. That person concluded
Huntley could occasionally lift fifty pounds, frequently lift twenty-five pounds, and stand
or walk at least two hours and sit about six hours in an eight-hour workday.28
B. Testimony at the Hearing on January 6, 2004
1. Huntley’s Testimony
At a hearing before an ALJ on January 6, 2004, Huntley testified the last times
she worked were the summers of 2001 and 2002. Each of those summers she spent
ninety days aboard a ninety-foot salmon tender her husband operated in Prince William
Sound.29 She could not do “regular” deckhand work because the hours and physical
demands were too much for her.30 But during the “brief period[s] of time” when a
regular deckhand was absent for some reason, she would help out by writing down
weights of fish as they came aboard and by driving the boat, which were jobs she
performed sitting down.31 Recording fish weights consumed two hours of her day and
Id., pp. 217-18.
Id., pp. 218-19.
Id., p. 220.
Id., p. 143.
Id., p. 265.
Id., pp. 265, 270.
Id., pp. 265-66, 271-72.
driving the boat took four hours.32 Some days, she would do both jobs for a work day of
six hours, but on those days she would nap between jobs.33 Living on the boat was “a
little bit more comfortable” than living at home in Seward, Alaska, because she did not
cook or clean and sleeping was more comfortable due to the boat’s movement, which
made it easier on her muscles.34
Huntley also testified about her last full-time job, a social worker with the State of
Alaska. By February of 2000, she was feeling so tired that, at a doctor’s suggestion,
she took a couple weeks off work.35 She did that and felt better, but by August of 2000
she could “barely make it to work” and would close her office door and lie on the floor
because of her fatigue and pain.36 Eventually, she could not make it to work and, at that
point, she did case work in bed.37 She took medical leave some time after August of
2000 and resigned in January of 2001.38
A third topic Huntley discussed was her comfort level with daily activities. She
testified she can vacuum a six-foot by eight-foot section of the trailer in which she and
her husband reside in Seward and do the dishes but cannot keep up with the laundry
and dusting or even make the bed.39 She gets out of bed most days, but not every day,
especially on days when she has “overdone it the day before.”40 As an example of
overdoing it, she cited riding a snow machine with her husband “for about an hour.”41
Id., p. 272.
Id., p. 273.
Id., pp. 274-75
Id., pp. 266-67.
Id., pp. 266-67, 278.
Id., p. 267.
Id., pp. 276, 280-81.
Id., p. 281.
Id., pp. 281-82.
Huntley also talked about her sleeping problems. She testified she does not
sleep well unless she takes Zanaflex, which relaxes her muscles.42 If she does not take
Zanaflex, she cannot sleep and her condition deteriorates until she “basically can’t
move.”43 Besides the physical ailments associated with her sleeping problems, Huntley
also testified those problems caused her mental distress. When she gets tired her eyes
will not focus and she cannot maintain a train of thought.44 That also happens when she
comes under “[a]ny type of stress.”45
Huntley briefly touched on three other topics. One topic was her time at a mining
camp in the Bush north of Fairbanks, Alaska, in the summer of 2003. She testified she
did not work at the mining camp,46 which is consistent with one of her letters in the
record in which she wrote she was unable to cook for the men in the camp.47 The
second topic was a letter she wrote to Armstrong in November of 2000, which contained
the sentence, “While I [Huntley] know I am not totally disabled, I also know I cannot
continue to do the job I am doing, either.”48 She explained she did not consider herself
“totally disabled” because she did not like to think of herself as “unable to do anything.”49
The third topic was her pain. She testified she suffered pain “throughout [her] body” and
felt like she has the flu all the time.50
Id., p. 276.
Id., pp. 278-79.
Id., p. 279.
Id., p. 285.
Id., p. 56.
Id., p. 203.
Id., p. 279.
Id., pp. 277, 280.
2. Vocational Expert Testimony
Robert M. Sullivan testified as a vocational expert, but his testimony was limited
to listing Huntley’s past jobs and describing each job by its exertional demands and skill
level, according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.51
C. ALJ’s Decision
In deciding whether Huntley is disabled, the ALJ ran through the first four steps
of the “five-step sequential evaluation process” set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)
and 416.920(a)(4). At the first step, the ALJ concluded Huntley “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of [her alleged] disability.”52 Second,
the ALJ determined Huntley suffers from fibromyalgia and that her fibromyalgia is a
“severe impairment.”53 Third, the ALJ decided the severity of Huntley’s fibromyalgia did
not “meet or medically-equal any of the listed impairments” in SSA regulations.54
Fourth, the ALJ found Huntley could perform all her “past relevant work.”55 Based on
that finding, the ALJ concluded Huntley was not disabled56 and did not proceed to step
five, which asks whether Huntley could perform other work besides her past work.
As part of the ALJ’s analysis, the ALJ discredited Huntley’s testimony about her
“symptoms and limitations” because she: 1) “spent the summers in 2001 and 2002
working as a deck hand for as many as 90 days in a row on a fishing boat”; 2) “planned
to live in the [B]ush north of Fairbanks” in the summer of 2003; 3) “requested that
Dr. Armstrong fill out disability forms even though she knew she was ‘not totally
Id., pp. 283-84.
Id., p. 23.
Id., p. 24.
disabled’”; and 4) “reported constant pain that was eight on a scale of one to ten, yet
could take oil painting classes and drive several hours from Homer to Anchorage.”57
The ALJ also rejected some of Armstrong’s opinions. The ALJ wrote, “Armstrong
opined that [Huntley] has fibromyalgia and filled out a form with his opinions of [her]
limitations,” but then dismissed “these conclusions” as “simply boxes that [Armstrong]
marked without providing objective medical evidence to support his opinions.”58 Next,
the ALJ criticized “[t]he majority of Dr. Armstrong’s treatment notes [as] simply
[Huntley’s] subjective reports in support of her litigation efforts to obtain disability
benefits.”59 The ALJ also derided Armstrong’s notes as “contain[ing] contradictory
statements about [Huntley’s] condition and diagnosis,” contrasting Armstrong’s June 21,
2000 statement about the absence of tender points precluding a fibromyalgia diagnosis
with his January 28, 2004 diagnosis of fibromyalgia and finding of abnormal tender
After discrediting Huntley’s testimony and rejecting Armstrong’s opinions, the ALJ
characterized the vocational expert as having testified Huntley “could return to all of her
past relevant work”61 and found Huntley could do light work, all her past relevant work
was light and, therefore, she could do all her past relevant work.62
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must “uphold the [ALJ’s] decision denying benefits if the [ALJ] applied
the proper legal standard and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to
Id., p. 20.
Id., pp. 20-21.
Id., p. 23.
Id., pp. 22-23.
support the decision.”63 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but less
than a preponderence.”64
A. The ALJ Improperly Discredited Huntley’s Testimony
The test courts use to evaluate credibility decisions by ALJs is known as the
Smolen or Cotton test.65 That test’s first step requires claimants to “produce objective
medical evidence of [an] underlying ‘impairment,’ and ... show that the impairment ...
‘could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other symptoms.’”66 If claimants
make it past the first step and they are not malingerers, then an ALJ may reject their
“testimony about [the] severity of [their] symptoms [only] with ‘specific findings stating
clear and convincing reasons’”67 that are based on “substantial evidence.”68
The disease from which Huntley suffers, fibromyalgia, makes it impossible to
apply Smolen/Cotton’s first step because, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Benecke v.
Barnhart, it “eludes [objective] measurement.”69 The Benecke court emphasized that
point by noting that diagnosing fibromyalgia depends “entirely on ... patients’ reports of
pain and other symptoms ... [because] there are no laboratory tests to confirm the
diagnosis.”70 To this court’s knowledge, the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the
Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hoffman v. Heckler, 785
F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1405
(9th Cir. 1986)).
Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82).
Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284).
Id. at 1197.
379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99,
108 (2d Cir. 2003)) (alteration added).
Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
consequence of fibromyalgia’s incompatibility with the first step of the Smolen/Cotton
test. In the absence of the circuit court’s guidance, this court will excuse Huntley from
having to meet that step because the fact she suffers from a disease for which there is
no objective measurement should not be held against her.
Turning to the Smolen/Cotton test’s second step, there is no evidence that
Huntley is a malingerer and so the question is whether the ALJ’s reasons for
discrediting her testimony were clear, convincing, and based on substantial evidence.
None of the ALJ’s reasons meets that standard.
The ALJ’s first reason, that Huntley “spent the summers in 2001 and 2002
working as a deck hand for as many as 90 days in a row on a fishing boat,” is not
convincing because it is not accurate. The record shows Huntley could not perform
regular deckhand work and instead only took on chores involving minimal physical
exertion on the rare occasions a deckhand was absent.
The ALJ’s second reason, that Huntley “planned to live in the [B]ush north of
Fairbanks” in the summer of 2003, is not clear. The ALJ does not explain why planning
to live in the Bush is inconsistent with Huntley’s testimony, and there is no obvious
inference to draw from that fact. One possible inference is that Bush living would be
less comfortable for Huntley than living elsewhere, but the record contains no evidence
on that issue. And, making an assumption about the correct inference to draw from the
ALJ’s reason only emphasizes its lack of clarity.
The ALJ’s third reason, Huntley’s “request that Dr. Armstrong fill out disability
forms even though she was ‘not totally disabled,’” refers to Huntley’s November of 2000
letter to Armstrong. It is true Huntley asked Armstrong to fill out disability forms and
said she was “not totally disabled.” But, the ALJ’s suggestion that Huntley was
scheming to get undeserved benefits finds no support in her letter. The full sentence
from which the ALJ quoted was, “While I [Huntley] know I am not totally disabled, I also
know I cannot continue to do the job I am doing, either.” Far from being evidence of
dishonesty, Huntley’s feeling she could not perform her job shows her efforts at
obtaining disability benefits were in good faith. Furthermore, her explanation at the
hearing that by “not totally disabled” she meant she did not consider herself “unable to
do anything” is consistent with the law. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Vertigan v. Halter,
“[o]ne does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.”71
The ALJ’s fourth reason, that Huntley “reported constant pain that was eight on a
scale of one to ten, yet could take oil painting classes and drive several hours from
Homer to Anchorage,” seeks to impeach Huntley’s pain testimony with her statements
about her physical activities. If Huntley was “able to spend a substantial part of [her]
day[s] engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are
transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be sufficient to
discredit [her] allegations.”72 That finding is required because “the mere fact [she]
carried on certain daily activities ... does not in any way detract from [her] credibility as
to [her] overall disability.”73 Also, some activities “are not necessarily transferable to the
work setting ... [because she may have done them] despite pain for therapeutic
reasons,” but be unable to overcome the pain to concentrate on work.74 Here, the ALJ
noted Huntley’s undertaking of two pursuits involving physical functions without finding
she spent substantial parts of her days doing them and the functions were transferable
to a work setting. Without that finding, the ALJ’s fourth reason for discrediting Huntley’s
testimony is not convincing.
That reason suffers another defect, too. It gives the impression Huntley was
driving and painting contemporaneously with experiencing severe pain, but the record
does not support that impression. It shows Armstrong reported Huntley’s driving in a
December 11, 2001 letter, her painting in his February 19, 2003 treatment notes, and
her pain in a June 17, 2003 letter. Thus, Huntley’s driving and painting were not
contemporaneous with her pain, but instead occurred one-and-a-half years and four
months, respectively, beforehand.
260 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Fair,
885 F.2d at 603).
Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Because the ALJ erred in discrediting Huntley’s testimony, the court credits it as
B. The ALJ Improperly Rejected Armstrong’s Opinions on Huntley’s Functional
Because Armstrong was Huntley’s treating physician, the ALJ may reject his
opinions “only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons supported by substantial evidence in
the record” if his opinions are “not contradicted by another doctor.”76 And “[e]ven if [his]
opinion[s are] contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject [them] without
providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the
record.”77 These standards apply to Armstrong’s medical opinions about the nature of
Huntley’s impairment and his opinions about the effects of that impairment on her
The ALJ rejected Armstrong’s opinions after a confusing discussion. The
discussion’s first problem was that the ALJ seemed to criticize both Armstrong’s opinion
that Huntley suffers from fibromyalgia and his opinion about the extent to which that
condition limits her ability to work. Given the ALJ’s conclusion at step two of the
disability analysis that Huntley suffers from fibromyalgia, the court will presume the ALJ
meant to criticize only Armstrong’s opinions on Huntley’s functional limitations. The
discussion’s second problem was that the ALJ did not say whether those opinions were
contradicted by another physician. This is a significant oversight because that fact
determines the level of scrutiny the court applies to the ALJ’s reason for rejecting
Armstrong’s opinions. As it turns out, however, that error is harmless because the
ALJ’s reason does not meet even the lesser of the two levels of scrutiny.
The ALJ rejected Armstrong’s opinions about Huntley’s functional limitations on
the ground they were based on Huntley’s “subjective reports” rather than on “objective
Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594 (citations omitted).
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830).
medical evidence.” That is not a legitimate reason because it faults Armstrong for
relying on subjective reports this court has deemed credible and “effectively requir[es]
‘objective’ evidence for a disease that eludes such measurement.”79 The ALJ also
expressed a concern about what the ALJ represented were contradictions in
Armstrong’s notes, but the supposed contradictions pertained to his diagnosis of
Huntley’s fibromyalgia and not his opinions about her functional limitations.
Because the ALJ erred in rejecting Armstrong’s opinions about Huntley’s
functional limitations, the court credits them as true.80
C. The ALJ’s Decision Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
The ALJ’s decision to deny Huntley’s claim on the ground she could perform all
her past work is not supported by substantial evidence. The only evidence in the record
supporting that decision is the DDS physician’s assessment of Huntley’s residual
functional capacity. But that assessment is outweighed by Armstrong’s assessment
because he and not the DDS physician was Huntley’s treating physician81 and his
assessment does not support the ALJ’s decision. Also, another piece of evidence the
ALJ relied on does not actually support the ALJ’s decision. Although the ALJ thought
Sullivan, the vocational expert, testified Huntley “could return to all of her past relevant
work,” Sullivan did not say that. His testimony simply described Huntley’s past work
experience and what the Dictionary of Occupational Titles says about those jobs.
D. The Appropriate Remedy Is To Remand Huntley’s Claim to the SSA for Further
In Harman v. Apfel, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n cases where the testimony of
the vocational expert has failed to address a claimant’s limitations as established by
improperly discredited evidence, [the circuit court] consistently [has] remanded for
Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594 (quoting Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 108) (alteration
Id. (citations omitted).
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830).
further proceedings rather than payment of benefits.”82 Here, no vocational expert
testified about Huntley’s limitations and so a remand for further proceedings is required.
Huntley argues a remand is not required on the ground any vocational expert,
when confronted with a hypothetical based on her limitations as established by her
testimony and Armstrong’s opinions, inevitably would conclude she is disabled. She
cites no authority recognizing an “inevitable conclusion” exception to the rule requiring
remand in the absence of vocational expert testimony on a claimant’s limitations. The
Harman court did not recognize such an exception and neither does the case in which
the Ninth Circuit undertook to “clarify” Harman.83
That case is Benecke, and the issue before the circuit court was a claimant’s
ability to perform sedentary jobs,84 which are the least physically demanding jobs under
the SSA’s classification system.85 If the Benecke claimant had not been able to do
those jobs, she would not have been able to do any job and, therefore, would have
been disabled. A vocational expert testified her psychological limitations prevented her
from doing one sedentary job, telemarketing, but did not discuss whether they kept her
from doing other sedentary jobs.86 That oversight convinced the district court there
remained an issue about the claimant’s disability and that a remand for further
proceedings was appropriate under Harman.87 But the circuit court held otherwise,
explaining a remand was unnecessary because the vocational expert’s testimony, when
combined with other evidence in the record, clearly established the claimant could not
perform any other sedentary jobs and so was disabled.88
211 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Gamer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
815 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
379 F.3d at 592-93.
Id. at 595.
Benecke is not authority for remanding for benefits in this case because no
vocational expert testified about Huntley’s ability to do any job, let alone a sedentary
one. Although her testimony and Armstrong’s opinions suggest she is not able to
perform any job, no vocational expert expressed an opinion on her ability to work based
on that or any other evidence. Consequently, a remand for further proceedings is
For the reasons set out above, the motion at docket 10 is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The ALJ’s decision denying Huntley’s claim for benefits is reversed,
but rather than remanding her claim to the SSA for disbursement of disability benefits
and SSI payments, the court hereby REMANDS her claim for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 24th day of March, 2006.
JOHN W. SEDWICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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