Lawson v. Gregg et al

Filing 93

ORDER: granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 87 and denying Motion for Summary Judgment 72 . Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 10/20/2015. (AEM, CHAMBERS STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

LEONARD A. LAWSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFERY GREGG, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:11-cv-00151-SLG
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court at Docket 72 is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants opposed at Docket 77, and Plaintiff replied at Docket 81. Shortly afterwards,
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity at Docket 87. Plaintiff
opposed at Docket 89, and Defendants replied at Docket 92. Oral argument was not
requested by either party and was not necessary to the Court’s determination of these
motions.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified
Immunity.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants applied for and received an anticipatory warrant to retrieve a package

that was packed with cocaine and addressed to an address on Stella Place. 1 The
package was fitted with a beeper that would emit a different tone when the box was
opened. 2 The anticipatory warrant listed as triggering conditions for its execution that the
package be
delivered and received by a person at [the Stella Place home], or left at the
front door, and a person takes the box inside, or a person takes the box to
another location and one of the following has occurred: a change of tone
indicating the box has been opened, the electronic device fails to transmit
or at least two hours has elapsed with no change indicting the box remains
unopened inside the residence. 3
As Defendants were delivering the package to the Stella Place home the beeper
malfunctioned and submitted the tone indicating that the box had been opened. 4 The
package was picked from the Stella Place home by Mr. Lawson’s co-defendant and
delivered to his residence. 5 Defendants entered the home and performed a sweep to
retrieve the package. 6
On November 16, 2010, Mr. Lawson was indicted for drug conspiracy, possession
of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, attempted possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. 7 Mr. Lawson

1

Docket 87-1 (Gregg Decl.) at 2. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute these background facts.
See Docket 34 (SAC); Docket 89 (Lawson Opp’n).
2

Docket 87-1 (Gregg Decl.) at 3.

3

Docket 89-1 (Warrant) at 3.

4

Docket 87-1 (Gregg Decl.) at 3–4.

5

Docket 87-1 (Gregg Decl.) at 4–6; see also Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC).

6

Docket 87-1 (Gregg Decl.) at 6; see also Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC).

7

Docket 2, United States v. Lawson, Case No. 3:10-cr-00116-TMB (Indictment).

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moved to suppress evidence secured during the search of his residence. 8 The Magistrate
Judge issued a Recommendation Regarding Motions to Suppress, which recommended
denying Mr. Lawson’s motion to suppress because the search complied with the
anticipatory warrant or, alternatively, because exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless entry. 9 The District Court Judge issued an order adopting the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation in April 2011. 10
In July 2011, Mr. Lawson, representing himself, initiated this action by filing a Civil
Rights Complaint in which he alleged “police, governmental, prosecutorial, and judicial
misconduct of falsified statements, writings and documents; and illegal entry, search &
seizure, arrest and incarceration; also improper investigation of alleged crime against this
plaintiff, in reference to [the criminal case].”11 Shortly thereafter, the Court issued an order
staying Mr. Lawson’s civil case until the conclusion of the criminal case. 12
In September 2011, Mr. Lawson’s criminal case was tried before a jury. The jury
found Mr. Lawson not guilty on the first three counts of the indictment but guilty of being
a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. 13 Mr. Lawson appealed. 14 On
November 30, 2012, the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum disposition vacating his

8

Docket 32, United States v. Lawson (Mot. to Suppress).

9

Docket 103, United States v. Lawson (Final Recommendation re Mots. to Suppress).

10

Docket 110, United States v. Lawson (Order Adopting Recommendation).

11

Docket 1 (Compl.) at 1.

12

Docket 3 (Order Staying Case).

13

Dockets 166, 170, United States v. Lawson (Jury Verdicts).

14

Docket 202, United States v. Lawson (Notice of Appeal).

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conviction and holding the firearm used to convict Mr. Lawson “was seized during an
unlawful search and should have been suppressed.” 15

The Circuit Court held that (1)

the triggering conditions in the anticipatory search warrant had not been fulfilled and (2)
Defendants had failed to demonstrate that there were exigent circumstances because
they did not show it would have been time consuming to get a second search warrant.
The Appeals Court did not consider Mr. Lawson’s warrantless arrest. 16
On February 27, 2013, the Court issued an order lifting the stay of this case and
permitting Mr. Lawson to file an amended complaint. 17 Mr. Lawson filed an Amended
Complaint on April 29, 2013. 18 On June 19, 2013, the Court issued an order dismissing
certain claims and defendants named in the Amended Complaint. That order stated that
only one claim had been adequately pled in the Amended Complaint: “the claim asserting
constitutional violations of Mr. Lawson’s right to be free from an illegal home entry and an
illegal search and seizure.” 19 The order explained that Mr. Lawson could pursue that

15

United States v. Lawson, 499 F. App’x 711, 712 (9th Cir. 2012).

16

See Lawson, 499 F. App’x at 712 (absence).

17

Docket 24 (Order Lifting Stay & Permitting Am. Compl.).

18

Docket 27 (Am. Compl.).

19

Docket 31 (Order re Am. Compl.) at 21. The Order held that the Amended Complaint failed to
state a claim for unlawful arrest, but it granted Mr. Lawson leave to amend with respect to this
claim. Docket 31 at 10, 24.

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claim on the basis of the Amended Complaint “against the appropriate, individually
participating officers,” or he could file a Second Amended Complaint. 20
Mr. Lawson filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on September 3, 2013. 21
The SAC contains two causes of action: (1) violation of Mr. Lawson’s Fourth Amendment
right “to not be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure,” and (2) violation of
Mr. Lawson’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The SAC names Anchorage
police officers Jeffery Gregg and Monique Doll, as well as DEA agents Michael
Dahlstrom, Nathaniel Clementson, and Richard F. Youngblood, as Defendants.
The SAC alleges that on July 14, 2010, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Mr. Lawson
was unlawfully arrested while standing on his back porch. The SAC alleges that law
enforcement then conducted a “warrantless” search of Mr. Lawson’s home and seized
property within the home, including the shotgun that was used as evidence in
Mr. Lawson’s criminal case. 22 The SAC alleges that prior to Mr. Lawson’s arrest, he “was
not a person of interest of any investigation,” and law enforcement “did not even know
[his] name.”23 The SAC asserts that Mr. Lawson’s arrest and the subsequent search of
his home and seizure of evidence were unlawful. The SAC also asserts that Mr. Lawson’s
indictment was “a direct result of the unlawful arrest, search and seizure” and therefore
violative of his due process rights. The SAC requests $100,000 in compensatory
damages, $1,000,000 in punitive damages, “[a]n order requiring defendant(s) to possess

20

Docket 31 (Order re Am. Compl.) at 21.

21

Docket 34 (SAC).

22

Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC); Docket 34-3 (Attachment 3 to SAC).

23

Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC) (emphasis in original).

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a valid warrant to search and or seize people or property ‘before’ they enter a home or
arrest a non-suspect,” and “[a] declaration that it won’t happen again[.]” 24
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 27, 2014, relying on qualified
immunity. The Court denied that motion by order dated August 25, 2014. 25 The order
stated that the allegations in the SAC, when taken as true, alleged a violation of clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights.
Mr. Lawson filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment on June 1, 2015. He
asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum decision in the criminal case demonstrates
that he had clearly established Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
which Defendants violated. Mr. Lawson maintains that there were no exigent
circumstances to allow a warrantless arrest, and he assets that Defendants’ application
for a second warrant is evidence that they knew the first warrant was invalid. 26
Defendants opposed on June 29, 2015, 27 and Mr. Lawson replied on July 13, 2015. 28
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity on
August 10, 2015. 29 Defendants have attached supporting documentation to their motion
to dismiss, so the Court will treat it as a motion for summary judgment. 30 Defendants

24

Docket 34 (SAC) at 8.

25

Docket 65 (Order re Mot. to Dis.).

26

Docket 73 (Lawson SJ Mot.).

27

Docket 77 (Defendants Opp’n).

28

Docket 81 (Lawson Reply).

29

Docket 87 (Defendants Mot. to Dis.).

30

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56.”). Moreover, in the body of the motion Defendants state that they are
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assert that a reasonable officer would not have known he was violating clearly established
law by reading the triggering conditions broadly.

And they assert that they were

reasonable in relying on exigent circumstances after the beeper malfunctioned and
Mr. Lawson’s co-defendant informed them that there were people in the home. Plaintiff
opposed on August 24, 2015, 31 and Defendants replied on September 8, 2015. 32

DISCUSSION
I.

Jurisdiction.
The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Lawson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to

its 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When considering a motion for
summary judgment, a court must accept as true all evidence presented by the nonmoving party and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-moving party’s favor. 33 The
burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact initially lies with the

moving for summary judgment. Docket 87 at 1. None of the supporting documentation specifically
discusses Mr. Lawson’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, so the Court will view Defendants’ motion
in that regard as a motion to dismiss.
31

Docket 89 (Lawson Opp’n).

32

Docket 92 (Defendants Reply).

33

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
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moving party. 34 If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must present
specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact. 35 The nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials. To reach the level of a genuine
dispute, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non[-]moving party.” 36 If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is “merely
colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment to the moving party is
appropriate. 37
III.

Qualified Immunity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 38 The purpose of
qualified immunity is to “balance[] two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 39
Government officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the facts taken in
the light most favorable to plaintiff show the officials’ conduct violated a constitutional

34

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376,
387 (9th Cir. 2010).

35

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Oracle, 627 F.3d at 387.

36

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

37

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1967); First
Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).
38

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)).
39

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

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right, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. 40 A
plaintiff must establish both prongs of the analysis, so that if a court determines that one
prong is not met, then qualified immunity applies. The Supreme Court has “stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” 41
And the Ninth Circuit has held that summary judgment is appropriate when “the material,
historical facts are not in dispute, and the only disputes involve what inferences properly
may be drawn from those historical facts.”42
“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours ‘must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.’” 43 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[e]ven absent probable cause, qualified
immunity is available if a reasonable police officer could have believed that his or her
conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly established law and the information the
searching officers possessed.”44

“Qualified immunity gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 45

40

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

41

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)).

42

Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu,
335 F.3d 970, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1218 (2004)).

43

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
44

Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Fuller
v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991)).

45

Messerschmidt v. Millender, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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These principles were applied in Pearson v. Callahan. 46 In that case, Callahan
was convicted of unlawful possession and distribution of methamphetamine after a search
of his home. On appeal the search was held unconstitutional and Callahan’s conviction
was overturned. 47 Callahan then brought a § 1983 action against the police officers who
had performed the search. But the United States Supreme Court held that even though
Callahan’s constitutional rights had been violated, the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because “it was not clearly established at the time of the search that their
conduct was unconstitutional.” 48

The Court ruled that the inquiry “turn[ed] on the

‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
clearly established at the time it was taken.’” 49 The Court held that although the “consentonce-removed” doctrine the officers relied on had not been adopted in their circuit, it had
“gained acceptance in the lower courts” and the officers were entitled to rely on it. 50
Therefore, it could not have been clearly established that by relying on the “consent-onceremoved” doctrine the officers were violating Callahan’s rights.
IV.

Analysis.
The Ninth Circuit has held that that Defendants’ search of Mr. Lawson’s residence

violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, with regard to the search, this Court is only
required to determine whether Mr. Lawson has presented sufficient facts to demonstrate

46

555 U.S. 223 (2009).

47

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 228.

48

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227.

49

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)).

50

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244.

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a triable issue regarding whether Mr. Lawson’s right to be free of an unreasonable search
based on the facts then present was clearly established at the time of the violation.
The Ninth Circuit did not consider the constitutionality of Mr. Lawson’s warrantless
arrest. 51 Thus, qualified immunity for the arrest is appropriate if Defendants prove either
that the arrest was constitutional or that a reasonable officer would not have known he
was violating Mr. Lawson’s constitutional rights in making the arrest.
A. Mr. Lawson’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mr. Lawson leans heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum decision holding that
the search was performed unlawfully. He asserts that “the [Fourth] [A]mendment of the
Constitution had been clearly established.” Mr. Lawson also asserts that there has been
a clear violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 52
Although Mr. Lawson is correct that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment
rights, that is only one part of the question that the Court must answer. Government
officials may be shielded by qualified immunity so long as their mistaken actions were
reasonable, as explained above.

As in Pearson, a court of appeals may find a

constitutional violation but the officers may still be entitled to qualified immunity so long
as they satisfy the second prong of the test.
Mr. Lawson’s motion argues that the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment were “clearly established” at the time of the search and seizure, but he reads

51

See Lawson, 499 F. App’x at 712.

52

See Docket 73 (Lawson SJ Mot.) at 2. Mr. Lawson also makes a double jeopardy argument
under the Fifth Amendment pertaining to Defendants’ interrogatories. Docket 73 (Lawson SJ Mot.)
at 6–7. But the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy is inapplicable in this civil
case. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy
Clause only applies to criminal penalties, not civil ones.”).

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the test too broadly. The United States Supreme Court has held that a court should
“not . . . define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” 53 “Qualified immunity
is no immunity at all if ‘clearly established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 54 Thus, Mr. Lawson’s arguments based
on the Ninth Circuit’s decision do not end the Court’s analysis. 55 Mr. Lawson has not
demonstrated that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims.
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they
reasonably could have believed they were acting lawfully. They assert that the Fourth
Amendment does not require triggering conditions to be listed on the warrant’s face, so
presumably it was not clearly established that they needed to precisely follow the wording
of any such conditions. And they contend that based on the warrant’s language, they
could have reasonably believed that the triggering conditions were satisfied by either
delivery of the package to the Stella Place home or by the beeper malfunction.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they were acting in accordance with established

53

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)) (internal quotation mark omitted).

54

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif., 135 S. Ct. at 1776.

55

Mr. Lawson also appears to assert that Defendants were unreasonable because (1) they
asserted both the warrant and exigent circumstances to support the constitutionality of the search,
and (2) they received a second warrant later. Docket 89 (Lawson Opp’n) at 2; Docket 73 (Lawson
SJ Mot.) at 5. But for many searches where it could be reasonable to enter under a warrant there
may also be exigent circumstances. Asserting exigent circumstances as a ground for immunity
does not show that Defendants knew the warrant was invalid. And, so far as Mr. Lawson is
arguing that the necessity for a second warrant to search the home makes reliance on the warrant
to retrieve the package unreasonable, this argument is unavailing. The two warrants were not
connected—even were the retrieval warrant valid, Defendants would have needed to procure a
warrant to search the house.
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exigent circumstances case law because the evidence could have been easily disposed
of. Finally, they argue the warrantless arrest did not violate Mr. Lawson’s constitutional
rights under the first prong of the immunity test because the officers had probable cause
to make a warrantless arrest. 56
Both parties cite to United States v. Grubbs. 57 In Grubbs, the Supreme Court
considered whether anticipatory warrants were categorically unconstitutional and whether
the triggering conditions for an anticipatory warrant needed to be included on the face of
the warrant. The Court answered both questions in the negative. It held that a triggering
condition listed in the warrant affidavit—that the parcel be received by a person and taken
inside—did not need to be duplicated on the face of the warrant.

It reached this

conclusion after holding that the particularity requirement for warrants set forth in the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to triggering conditions. 58
The Court disagrees with Defendants that Grubbs is conclusive. For here the issue
is not in the placement of the triggering conditions, it is in their fulfilment. If the triggering
conditions had been omitted from the warrant but were precisely followed pursuant to the
specifications in the affidavit, Defendants’ conduct would be in accordance with clearly
established law under Grubbs.

But here, Defendants did not precisely follow the

triggering conditions listed on the face of the warrant. The Court does not read Grubbs

56

Docket 87 (Defendants Mot. to Dis.).

57

547 U.S. 90 (2006). See Docket 87 (Defendants’ Mot. to Dis.) at 20–21; Docket 89 (Lawson
Opp’n) at 6.

58

Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97–99.

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as holding that triggering conditions need not be followed; rather, the Court reads it as
holding that these conditions do not need to be included on the face of the warrant.
More on point is United States v. Vesikuru. 59 There, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
a triggering condition listed on the face of the warrant that officers “observe” the package
being delivered inside. The defendant asserted that the officers needed to actually view
the package being taken inside, but the Circuit Court held that it was sufficient that the
officers deduced the package had been taken inside, even if they did not actually observe
that. It directed trial courts to read triggering conditions in a “common sense fashion.” 60
The warrant at issue here states as a triggering condition that the box be “tak[en]
to another location and . . . the electronic device fails to transmit.” 61 The language “fails
to transmit” could reasonably encompass a situation where the beeper stops transmitting
a signal once inside the home. In such a case the officers would be unable to tell when
the package was opened. Thus, the purpose of the condition appears to address a
situation where the beeper is no longer able to alert the officers when the package is
opened.
The Court concludes that because established law directs officers to read
triggering conditions in a common sense manner, Defendants were reasonable in reading
the triggering condition to cover the situation here: the beeper malfunction indicating that
the package had been opened. The beeper malfunctioned in such a way that it would
not be able to transmit when the package was actually opened.

59

314 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2002).

60

314 F.3d at 1123.

61

Docket 89-1 (Warrant) at 3.

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As Defendants

persuasively argue, in both this scenario and if the beeper stopped transmitting entirely
(as likely envisioned in the warrant), the beeper malfunctions in the same way—it can no
longer alert Defendants to the opening of the package. A common sense reading of the
condition could be that it covered other types of beeper malfunctions as well, so long as
the end result was leaving Defendants unable to monitor the package. Defendants would
not reasonably have known they were violating Mr. Lawson’s clearly established
constitutional rights by entering the home based on a more relaxed reading of the
condition.
Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law,” 62 and Defendants’ actions were neither incompetent nor a knowing
violation of the law. Rather, these actions were reasonable in light of existing law and the
specific circumstances confronting the officers. Accordingly, even though Defendants
violated Mr. Lawson’s constitutional rights, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
for their actions in entering the home because reasonable officials would not have
realized they were violating the law.
This decision is bolstered by the fact that reasonable jurists did, in fact, disagree
regarding whether Defendants violated Mr. Lawson’s rights with their actions. In Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, the Supreme Court noted as persuasive that eight Court of Appeals judges
from the Ninth Circuit had agreed with Ashcroft’s eventually unconstitutional interpretation
of the law. 63 This case presents a similar situation in which both the Magistrate Judge

62

Messerschmidt v. Millender, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).

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and the District Court Judge held that Defendants’ actions did not violate Mr. Lawson’s
Fourth Amendment rights, but the Ninth Circuit later reversed. 64 If two reasonable jurists
ruled that Defendants’ conduct did not violate Mr. Lawson’s Fourth Amendment rights, it
is hard to say that Defendants’ actions were so clearly contrary to established law that
they should have “underst[ood] that what [they were] doing violate[ed]” Mr. Lawson’s
constitutional rights. 65
Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity for Mr. Lawson’s warrantless
arrest. Plaintiff was detained in handcuffs on the porch but was read his Miranda rights
and questioned once he was moved to the garage. 66 Established Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence allows officers to make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable
cause. 67 Probable cause is knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information that is
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person being arrested. 68 Here Defendants had probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest under the circumstances: Mr. Lawson was found at the home where the narcotics
were delivered, Defendants knew of Mr. Lawson’s prior convictions for drug trafficking,

64

Although the Court declined to take judicial notice of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings
while considering Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss for Qualified Immunity, see Docket 65
(Order re Mot. to Dis.) at 8–9, the Court will now consider the Magistrate Judge’s and District
Court Judge’s legal conclusions because they help to show that Defendants would not have
known they were violating Mr. Lawson’s rights. See Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (considering as
additional support).

65

See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).

66

Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC); Docket 87-3 (Doll Decl.) at 3; Docket 87-4 (Clementson
Decl.) at 3.

67

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).

68

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

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and Defendants had viewed a firearm and plastic baggies in the home. 69 The Court holds
that the facts—when viewed in the light favorable to Mr. Lawson—show that Mr. Lawson’s
constitutional rights were not violated at the time of his arrest. 70 The Court grants
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on Qualified Immunity with regard to the
warrantless arrest.
Finally, the Court also grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 71 with respect to
Mr. Lawson’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “[a]ll factual
allegations set forth in the complaint ‘are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to [p]laintiff[].’” 72 “Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”73

Accordingly, the Court grants

69

87-4 (Clementson Decl.) at 3; 87-5 (Dahnstrom Decl.) at 2; Docket 34-2 (Attachment 2 to SAC);
Docket 74, Lawson v. Unites States, at 113; Docket 75, Lawson v. United States, at 9; Docket 87,
Lawson v. United States (Report & Rec.) at 11–12. Lawson does not present any evidence to
counter the evidence Defendants have provided and asserted.
70

Courts may address either prong of the test first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

71

Because Defendants did not attach any extra documentation regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment claims to their Motion to Dismiss, the Court will treat that as a motion to dismiss and
not as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

72

Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996)).
73

Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386, 393–95 (1989) (holding that the first step in § 1983 analysis
should be “identifying the specific constitutional right alleged infringed,” which will usually be the
Fourth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment).
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Order re Mot. Dismiss & Mot. Summary Judgment
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Mr. Lawson’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. Mr. Lawson’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 72 is DENIED.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at Docket 87 is GRANTED.
3. Any outstanding deadlines are vacated and any other outstanding motions are
denied as moot.
4. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter a judgment accordingly.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2015.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3:13-cv-00151-SLG, Lawson v. Gregg, et al.
Order re Mot. Dismiss & Mot. Summary Judgment
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