Henry v. Rabeau

Filing 52

ORDER: re Summary Judgment 36 . Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 05/11/2015. (AEM, CHAMBERS STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
TIMOTHY LEE HENRY
Plaintiff,
v.
B. WREGGLESWORTH
Defendant.
Case No. 3:13-cv-00208-SLG

ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court at Docket 36 is Mr. Wregglesworth’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed January 5, 2015. The motion has been fully briefed. 1 Oral argument was
not requested and was not necessary to the Court’s decision. For the reasons set forth
below, Mr. Wregglesworth’s motion will be granted and Mr. Henry’s pending motions
denied as moot.
I.

Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Henry’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to its

28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The burden of showing the absence

1

Docket 43 (Opp.); Docket 42 (Reply). Plaintiff’s opposition was received by the Court before
Defendant’s reply but was not docketed until directly after the reply was electronically filed.

of a genuine dispute of material fact initially lies with the moving party. 2 If the moving
party meets this burden, the non-moving party must present specific evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact. 3 The non-moving party may not
rely on mere allegations or denials. It must demonstrate that enough evidence supports
the alleged factual dispute to require a finder of fact to make a determination at trial
between the parties’ differing versions of the truth. 4
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must accept as true all
evidence presented by the non-moving party and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the
non-moving party’s favor. 5 To reach the level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must
be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” 6 The
non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” 7 If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is “merely
colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. 8

2

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d
376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

3

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986); Oracle, 627 F.3d at 387.

4

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253
(1968)).

5

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).

6

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

7

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)).

8

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967); First
Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290).

Case No. 3:13-cv-00208-SLG, Henry v. Wregglesworth
Order re Motion for Summary Judgment
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III.

Discussion
Mr. Henry’s Amended Complaint alleges that he was subjected to cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when, on or about September
23, 2013, he was placed in a “dry cell” for 59 hours after a body scan revealed that he
might have contraband hidden inside his body. Mr. Henry alleges that he was treated in
this manner despite explaining to prison staff that the objects the body scan showed in
Mr. Henry’s pelvic area were due to Mr. Henry having had surgery, and that he showed
prison staff a corresponding surgical scar. Mr. Henry alleges he was released only after
four bowel movements and after a nurse confirmed that the objects were the result of
surgery. Mr. Henry alleges that Mr. Wregglesworth is the prison official who operated the
body scanner and ordered Mr. Henry’s placement in the cell. 9
Mr. Wregglesworth seeks summary judgment on Mr. Henry’s claim due to Mr.
Henry’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect
to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
as are available are exhausted.”10 Accordingly, in order for a prisoner suit to go forward
“a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the
applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in
federal court.”11

9

Docket 12 (Am. Compl.) at 2–3.

10

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

11

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006).

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Order re Motion for Summary Judgment
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Alaska Department of Corrections Policy 808.03 establishes the prisoner
grievance process that Mr. Henry must have exhausted before his suit may move forward
in this Court. In summary, a prisoner must initiate a grievance within 30 days of the
incident that is the subject of the grievance. If the submitted grievance complies with the
policy’s requirements, it is assigned to an investigator who reports his findings in writing
to the prison Superintendent. The Superintendent issues a decision on the grievance
that is routed to the prisoner, who may then appeal to the Director for the Department of
Corrections. 12
Mr. Wregglesworth has submitted prison grievance records for Mr. Henry that
show Mr. Henry has filed grievances on January 28, 2002, September 9, 2013, and May
19, 2014. 13 The May 19, 2014 incident is unrelated to this claim and the others predate
the incident in question. Because prison records show that Mr. Henry did not file a
grievance related to the September 23, 2013 incident, Mr. Wregglesworth asserts that
Mr. Henry did not attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit and
accordingly his claims is barred. Mr. Henry’s response in opposition does not address
whether or not he filed an administrative grievance related to the September 23, 2013
incident. 14 Accordingly, the Court finds that no dispute exists that Mr. Henry did not file
an administrative grievance related to the September 23, 2013 incident.

12

See Docket 37 (Price Decl.) at 2; id. at 5-16 (Policy 808.03).

13

Id. at 4.

14

See Docket 43 (Opp.).

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Order re Motion for Summary Judgment
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Mr. Henry may be arguing that filing this lawsuit satisfies his obligation to exhaust
administrative remedies. 15 But it is a prisoner’s administrative remedies within the prison
that must be exhausted before suit can be filed, because “[r]equiring exhaustion allows
prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their
responsibilities before being haled into court.”16 Prisoners are required to “exhaust prison
grievance remedies before filing a lawsuit” in order to promote “fewer and better prisoner
suits.” 17 Because Mr. Henry failed to exhaust his prison grievance remedies before filing
this lawsuit, Mr. Wregglesworth is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the motion
for summary judgment will be granted. 18
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The motion for summary judgment at Docket 36 is GRANTED;
2. The discovery motions at Dockets 40, 44, 49, and 50 are DENIED as moot; and
3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for Defendant.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2015 at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

See Docket 43 (Opp.) at 1 (“The plaintiff Timothy Lee Henry submitted a Civil Complaint on
January 27, 2013 against B. Wrigglesworth or wregglesworth for cruel and unusual
punishment . . . .”).
16

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).

17

Id. at 203–04 (emphasis added).

18

See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (proper disposition on failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is summary judgment). The Court notes that Mr.
Wregglesworth cites to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) to support his
explanation of the proper procedure to be applied here. That case has been expressly
overruled by Albino.

Case No. 3:13-cv-00208-SLG, Henry v. Wregglesworth
Order re Motion for Summary Judgment
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