Samson Tug and Barge Co., Inc et al v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union et al

Filing 129

ORDER DENYING 107 Motion for Certification and Stay. Signed by Judge Timothy M. Burgess on January 10, 2022. (NMG, CHAMBERS STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
SAMSON TUG & BARGE, CO. INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:20-cv-00108-TMB
Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB
Consolidated

v.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE &
WAREHOUSE UNION, ALASKA
LONGSHORE DIVISION, and
ILWU UNIT 222,
Defendants.

I.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR CERTIFICATION & STAY
(DKT. 107)

INTRODUCTION

The matter comes before the Court on Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse
Union, Alaska Longshore Division, and ILWU Unit 222’s (collectively “ILWU”) Motion for
Certification and Stay Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (the “Motion”). 1 Plaintiff Samson Tug and
Barge, Co. Inc. (“Samson”) opposes the Motion. 2 The Court held oral argument on December 7,
2021. 3 For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion.
II.

BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is set forth in detail at Dockets 81 and 82 and will not
be repeated here. 4

1

Dkt. 107 (Motion); Dkt. 112 (Reply); Dkts. 113, 114 (Declarations).

2

Dkt 111 (Opposition).

3

Dkt. 124 (Minute Entry).

4

Dkt. 81 (Order Denying Preliminary Injunction); 82 (Order on ILWU’s Motion to Dismiss
Petition); see also Dkt. 85 (Order on ILWU’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss).
1

A. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration
At issue in ILWU’s underlying motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration is whether
Samson’s Complaint plausibly alleges ILWU committed an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) by
“threaten[ing], coerc[ing], or restrain[ing]” Samson for the purpose of forcing Samson to assign
particular work to ILWU members instead of members of another labor organization, in violation
of § 8(b)(4)(D) 5 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). 6 ILWU’s position in each motion
is that Samson’s Complaint fails to allege coercion as a matter of law and, thus, should be
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 7
In the Complaint, Samson alleges ILWU and Samson’s landlord, Matson, “participated in
an arbitration pursuant their CBA” in which “the Coast Arbitrator issued an award that purports to
require Samson to utilize ILWU represented individuals to operate any cargo handling equipment
at Samson’s Womens Bay terminal instead of Samson’s MEBA represented employees who have
traditionally done this work.” 8 Samson further alleges that “[b]ased on the Coast Arbitrator’s
decision (Exhibit 4), 9 the ILWU has made a number of demands on Samson, a stranger to the

5

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D). The NLRA subsection at issue here is cited by the parties and by
courts as either § 8(b)(4)(D) or § 8(b)(4)(ii)(D), interchangeably.
6

Samson has one damages claim remaining under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act. Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB, Dkt. 1 (Complaint). Section 303 provides a private cause of
action in district court to a party injured by a union’s ULP as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4),
which is § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 187. Here, Samson alleges ILWU committed the
ULP defined in § 8(b)(4)(D): threatening, coercing, or restraining an employer with the goal of
forcing it to assign work to a particular union instead of another.
7

See generally Dkts. 38, 39 (12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss); Dkt. 86 (Motion for Reconsideration);
Dkt. 107.
8

Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 14, 16.

9

The arbitration decision is attached to Samson’s Complaint. Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB,
Dkt. 1-5. In the decision, the arbitrator interpreted the language in an agreement between ILWU
and Matson as entitling ILWU to operate cargo handling equipment on facilities owned by Matson,
2

Matson-ILWU collective bargaining agreement.” 10 Those demands include, according to Samson,
(1) “that Matson apply the Coast Arbitrator’s decision by terminating Samson’s Womens Bay
lease thereby canceling Samson’s occupancy of its terminal at Womens Bay if Samson does not
use ILWU represented individuals for its Womens Bay cargo operations or pay ILWU’s time in
lieu charges,” 11 (2) that “Samson use ILWU represented individuals for cargo operations at other
ports and locations including the waterside operations at Pier II, a separate Kodiak terminal,”12
and (3) “that Matson charge Samson for the time card labor hours submitted by ILWU for cargo
handling work done by Samson’s MEBA represented individuals at Womens Bay.” 13
Construing these allegations as true, the Court found in its Order on the motion to dismiss
that Samson alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for damages under Section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 14 The Court also concluded that “Samson can state a claim for a ULP
on the basis that ILWU pursued an arbitration decision for an unlawful purpose.” 15
ILWU moved for reconsideration, arguing the Court applied the wrong standard for
coercion because, as a matter of law, “a union does not violate NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) by filing

even where Matson is a passive owner. Id. at 7–9. The arbitrator concluded the agreement “is
required to be enforced” but did not specify how the agreement was to be enforced. Id. at 9. The
arbitration decision did not, on its face, order Matson (or Samson, which was not a party to the
arbitration) to pay time-in-lieu payments to ILWU.
10

Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB, Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.

11

Id. ¶ 19.

12

Id. ¶ 20.

13

Id. ¶ 23.

14

Dkt. 85 at 19–21.

15

Id. at 19.
3

arguably meritorious work assignment grievances prior to the issuance of the [National Labor
Relations] Board’s 10(k) determination.” 16 According to ILWU, pursuing an arguably meritorious
grievance through arbitration cannot be coercive unless the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) has already awarded the disputed work to a different union through a decision under
§ 10(k) of the NLRA. 17 In making this argument, ILWU relied on authority from outside of this
circuit; the Ninth Circuit has not yet weighed in on the issue. 18 Primarily for that reason, the Court
denied reconsideration. 19 ILWU then filed the instant Motion.
B. Motion for Certification and Stay
ILWU now asks the Court to allow it to seek an interlocutory appeal by amending the Order
denying reconsideration, pursuant to § 1292(b), to certify that the Order “involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” 20 ILWU also asks for a stay pending appeal. 21
According to ILWU, the “controlling question of law” is as follows:
[W]hether “Samson can state a claim for a ULP on the basis that ILWU pursued an
arbitration decision for an unlawful purpose” under NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) in the
absence of a NLRA § 10(k) work assignment order assigning the work awarded in
the arbitration to another workforce and in the absence of any allegations that
ILWU struck, threatened to strike, picketed, threatened to picket, or engaged in any

16

Dkt. 107 at 3 (internal quotations omitted).

17

See Dkt. 86 at 4–7.

18

Id.

19

Dkt. 103.

20

Dkt. 107 at 2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).

21

Id.
4

‘self-help’ to coerce [Samson] or non-party [Matson] to assign the work to ILWU
longshoremen. 22
In other words, ILWU argues there is substantial ground for disagreement as to whether Samson
can state a claim for coercion on the basis that ILWU pursued arbitration without either (1) a
contrary § 10(k) decision, or (2) alleging ILWU struck, threatened to strike, picketed, threatened
to picket, or engaged in self-help. 23 ILWU relies largely on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. NLRB, 24 which it cited for the first time in its motion for reconsideration, to
establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the issue. 25 ILWU asserts, “the NLRB
and every Court of Appeals to consider the question has found no violation of NLRA Section
8(b)(4)(D) prior to issuance of a contrary NLRA Section 10(k) work assignment order and in the
absence of striking, picketing, engaging in ‘self-help,’ or threatening to engage in such conduct.”26
ILWU also claims that its stated question of law is controlling and that an appeal would materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the issue is dispositive: if, as a matter of
law, pursuing arbitration is not coercive absent a contrary § 10(k) determination and absent any
allegation of striking or similar conduct, Samson has failed to state a claim. 27

22

Id. at 4 (quoting Dkt. 85).

23

Id.

24

892 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

25

Dkt. 107 at 5.

26

Id.

27

Id.
5

C. Samson’s Opposition
Samson responds that the “controlling question” at issue in the Order denying
reconsideration is, in fact, whether it plausibly alleged ILWU committed a ULP—i.e., whether it
plausibly alleged ILWU engaged in “coerc[ion].” 28 Samson argues it has alleged ILWU was
coercive not only by pursuing arbitration, but also by unfairly leveraging the arbitrator’s decision:
“Samson is alleging that ILWU used the arbitration process as a step in its quest to have Matson
use its vastly superior economic power and leverage as landlord to force Samson to hire ILWU
workers.” 29 As Samson said in its opposition to ILWU’s motion for reconsideration, “ILWU also
took actions outside of the arbitration with the same unlawful objective of coercing Samson.” 30
Thus, according to Samson, the legal question ILWU identifies is not controlling or dispositive.
Rather, “ILWU’s formulation of the ‘controlling question’ is self-serving and not particularly
relevant to the actual claims made by Samson.” 31
Samson then argues there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion because the
cases ILWU cites are distinguishable. Samson believes Georgia-Pacific has no bearing in a
Section 303 suit primarily because it did not involve one; rather, Georgia-Pacific was on appeal
from an NLRB decision. 32 As to ILWU’s limited definition of coercion, Samson argues that
“[c]ontrary to the specific definitions ILWU would attach to ‘coercion’ the courts have recognized

28

Dkt. 111 at 8.

29

Id.

30

Dkt. 98 at 8 (Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration).

31

Dkt. 111 at 8.

32

Id. at 13–14.
6

that the concept of coercion is “nonspecific, indeed vague.” 33 It also asserts this argument is new
and unsupported by authority. 34
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court “shall” certify an order for appeal if the
“order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.” 35 The statute, therefore, imposes three requirements for certification:
(1) a controlling question of law, (2) substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to that
question, and (3) that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.36 If a court believes these conditions are met but did not “so state in writing” 37 as is
required by § 1292(b), it “may amend its order, either on its own or in response to a party’s motion,
to include the required permission or statement.” 38

33

Id. at 18 (quoting Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 1407,
1413 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
34

Id. at 6, 20.

35

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

36

In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981); Furie Operating Alaska, LLC
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:12-CV-00158 JWS, 2014 WL 2986662, at *2 (D. Alaska
July 1, 2014).
37

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

38

Fed. R. App. P. 5(a)(3).
7

Overall, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that § 1292(b) is “to be used only in extraordinary
cases where decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and expensive litigation”
and “was not intended merely to provide review of difficult rulings in hard cases.” 39
i.

Controlling Question of Law

A question of law is “controlling” when “resolution of the issue on appeal could materially
affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” 40 The Ninth Circuit has said that “[w]hile
Congress did not specifically define what it meant by ‘controlling,’ the legislative history of
1292(b) indicates that this section was to be used only in exceptional situations in which allowing
an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” 41
ii.

Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion

“A substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might
disagree on an issue’s resolution.” 42 Courts typically find a substantial ground for difference of
opinion where (1) “the circuits are in dispute on the question and the court of appeals of the circuit
has not spoken on the point,” (2) “complicated questions arise under foreign law, or” (3) “novel
and difficult questions of first impression are presented.” 43 A party’s disagreement with a court’s

39

U. S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); see also In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.
40

In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.

41

Id.

42

Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011); Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00096-RRB, 2012 WL 12871660, at *2 (D. Alaska
Sept. 13, 2012).
43

Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 3 Federal Procedure,
Lawyers Edition § 3:212 (2010)).
8

decision, however strong, is not enough. 44 Rather, the party must establish that “fair-minded jurists
might reach contrary conclusions” on the issue. 45
iii.

Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance the Ultimate Termination of the
Litigation

Finally, an appeal must “possess the possibility of materially advancing the litigation.”46
In evaluating this requirement, courts consider the impact of a reversal by the court of appeals. 47
For example, courts have found an appeal “may materially advance” the litigation if reversal would
take defendants or claims out of the case 48 or would terminate the litigation altogether. 49
IV.

DISCUSSION

The Court concludes that its Order denying reconsideration does not meet the requirements
for certification and DENIES the Motion accordingly.
B. Requirement Two: Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion
Beginning with the second requirement for certification, the Court concludes there might
be “substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to whether a plaintiff can state a Section 303
claim for coercion under § 8(b)(4)(D) on the basis that a union pursued arbitration without a
contrary § 10(k) decision. The Court has said that “Samson can state a claim for a ULP on the

44

Id.

45

Reese, 643 F.3d at 688.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc., 2012 WL 12871660, at *3.
9

basis that ILWU pursued an arbitration decision for an unlawful purpose.” 50 The Ninth Circuit has
not weighed in on the issue. The NLRB and courts outside of this circuit have held, albeit under
different circumstances, that merely pursuing an arguably meritorious grievance is not coercive
without a contrary § 10(k) determination. 51 While those decisions might be distinguishable, they
establish there are likely grounds for difference of opinion on the issue.
However, whether a union can be coercive by pursuing arbitration without a contrary
§ 10(k) decision is only part of ILWU’s purported controlling question. ILWU also asserts—in an
apparent attempt to ensure the question is dispositive—that coercion is limited to an enumerated
list of acts: (1) pursuing arbitration after the NLRB issues a § 10(k) decision awarding the work to
another union, (2) striking, (3) picketing, (4) threatening to strike or picket, or (5) using self-help.
ILWU raised this argument for the first time in this Motion, and the issue was not addressed in the
Order denying reconsideration. 52 In short, the Court has never considered, because ILWU has
not—until now—asked the Court to consider, whether “coercion” under § 8(b)(4)(D) is so limited.
Because the issue was not considered, or raised, in the Order underlying the Motion, it cannot
properly be certified for appeal. 53 “As the text of § 1292(b) indicates,” a court of appeals may

50

Dkt. 85 at 19.

51

See Ga.-Pac., 892 F.2d at 133.

52

ILWU claims it “has made this argument consistently throughout the briefing on the motion to
dismiss as well as at oral argument on the motion,” citing several spans of pages in its briefing.
Dkt. 112 at 3 (citing Dkt. 39 at 14–16, 24–25; Dkt. 46 at 15–20; Dkt. 63 at 15–17, n.4; Dkt 86 at
3–5). However, ILWU has not quoted any portions of its briefing in which it makes the argument
explicitly, and the Court has found none. See id. While ILWU has previously asserted that Samson
has failed to allege coercion and has provided striking and picketing as examples of coercion, it
has not, until now, advocated for a limited definition of coercion.
53

See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996).
10

address only “issue[s] fairly included within the certified order because it is the order that is
appealable.” 54
Even assuming this was not a new argument from ILWU, the Court concludes there is no
substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether coercion is limited to ILWU’s
enumerated list of acts. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad definition of “coerce” as used in
§ 8(b)(4): “[W]hen Congress used ‘coerce’ in Section 8(b)(4)(B) it did not intend to proscribe only
strikes or picketing, but intended to reach any form of economic pressure of a compelling or
restraining nature.” 55 Of course, this particular decision involved subsection (B), whereas Samson
invokes subsection (D). But the Ninth Circuit has applied this broad definition of “coerce” to
subsection (D) as well:
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
“threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” with the objective of “forcing or requiring
any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor
organization.” We have interpreted the scope of section 8(b)(4)(ii) pragmatically,
looking to the “coercive nature of the conduct, whether it be picketing or
otherwise,” and finding an unfair labor practice when there is “proof which if
viewed realistically tends to show” a coercive effect. 56
Applying this broad definition of “coerce” to subsection (D) makes sense. First, the word “coerce”
is used only once in § 8(b)(4) and modifies both subsections (B) and (D). 57 Second, the rationale
behind the Circuit’s broad definition applies equally to both subsections. The Ninth Circuit has
explained, “Congress enacted Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 8(e) to shield unoffending employers

54

Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Couch, 611 F.3d at 634.

55

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1975).

56

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 32 v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 773 F.2d 1012,
1018 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).

57

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii).
11

from union pressures designed to involve them in disputes not their own. The other subsections of
Section 8(b)(4) were similarly intended to protect employers in the position of neutrals between
contending parties.” 58
The Court is aware of only one justification for treating coercion differently under these
subsections: that subsection (D) must be read in light of § 10(k), that § 10(k) explicitly incentivizes
private settlement, and that there is no such incentive under subsection (B). The D.C. Circuit used
this rationale in Georgia-Pacific to justify why, in its view, a union can be coercive by pursuing
arbitration absent a § 10(k) decision for the purposes of subsection (B) but not subsection (D).59
The court was hesitant to disincentivize arbitration and settlement in the context of jurisdictional
disputes. 60 But that rationale does not justify limiting coercion under subsection (D) to ILWU’s
enumerated list of acts. Such a limitation is unlikely to incentivize private settlement and, instead,
might leave a party without a remedy where a union has applied “economic pressure of a
compelling or restraining nature” to coerce an employer into using its workers instead a different
union. 61
In addition, ILWU’s limited definition of coercion is found nowhere in the text of the
statute. The Court will not read an extra-textual limitation into the language of § 8(b)(4) without a

58

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 514 F.2d at 437 (emphasis added); see also NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Loc. 760, 377 U.S. 58, 68 (1964) (“[T]he
prohibition of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the conduct, whether it be picketing or
otherwise.”).
59

See Ga.-Pac., 892 F.2d at 132–33.

60

Id.

61

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 514 F.2d at 438.
12

clear justification and contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent. 62 Again, the Ninth Circuit defines
“coerce” broadly to include “any form of economic pressure of a compelling or restraining
nature.” 63 Samson alleges ILWU applied such economic pressure outside of the arbitration. 64 The
Court concludes there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether ILWU’s
behavior outside of the arbitration is plausibly coercive. Accordingly, the Court will assume for
the purposes of analyzing the first and third requirements for certification, that the operative legal
question is whether a union can be coercive by pursuing arbitration absent a § 10(k) decision. That
is the question the Court considered in its Order denying reconsideration. It is also the question
not directly answered by the Ninth Circuit and about which reasonable jurists might disagree.
C. Requirements One and Three: Controlling Question / Immediate Appeal May Materially
Advance the Ultimate Termination of the Litigation
Turning to the first and third requirements for certification, the Court concludes the
question of whether a union can be coercive by pursuing arbitration absent a § 10(k) decision is
not “controlling” and that an interlocutory appeal of the Order denying reconsideration will not

62

At oral argument, ILWU cited Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), for the
proposition that coercion is limited to strikes or threats to strike. Carey involved a different
question than the one at issue here—namely, whether to compel an employer to arbitrate. While
Carey’s rationale in answering that question might be inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
definition of “coerce,” it is not the role of a district court to make that decision. In any event, ILWU
has not argued that Pac. Mar. Ass’n was wrongly decided. And if it had, certification under
§ 1292(b) does not appear to be the proper vehicle for a party to challenge whether Ninth Circuit
precedent is inconsistent with preexisting Supreme Court caselaw. Cf. Couch, 611 F.3d at 633
(listing types of issues appropriate for certification; noting, “just because counsel contends that
one precedent rather than another is controlling does not mean there is such a substantial difference
of opinion”) (quoting 3 Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 3:212 (2010)).
63

See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 514 F.2d at 437; see also Carrier Air Conditioning
Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178, 1192 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]he use of a wide range of economic
sanctions is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(ii).”).

64

See Case No. 3:20-cv-00248-TMB, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 19–23.
13

“materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Because these requirements are
similar as applied here, the Court will address them together.
ILWU argues that the Order meets the first and third requirements for certification because
the legal question it identifies is dispositive. The Court disagrees. Here, Samson alleges ILWU
was coercive not only by filing and prosecuting a grievance but also by coercively leveraging the
arbitration decision outside of the arbitration. And the Court relied in part on Samson’s allegations
involving conduct outside of the arbitration to conclude Samson has sufficiently pleaded
coercion. 65 Accordingly, if the Ninth Circuit were to conclude that, as a matter of law, ILWU was
not coercive by pursuing arbitration, its conclusion would not require dismissal. Nor would it take
defendants or claims out of the case. 66 Thus, an interlocutory appeal would not “avoid protracted
and expensive litigation.” 67 And to the extent an interlocutory appeal might impact Samson’s
theory of coercion moving forward, the Court can use jury instructions to ensure that if this case
is ultimately appealed, the Ninth Circuit can evaluate the theory of coercion upon which the jury
made its decision. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Order denying reconsideration does not
meet the requirements for certification under § 1292(b). The Court DENIES the Motion on that
basis.
Because the Court will not certify its Order for appeal, it need not reach whether to grant a
stay.

65

See, e.g., Dkt. 85 at 19 (“Construing Samson’s allegations as true at this stage, at its heart, this
appears to be a jurisdictional dispute between work allocated to two unions, ILWU and MEBA,
and an attempt by ILWU to exert leverage over Samson to cooperate at another location, Pier II,
and use ILWU labor.”).
66

See Reese, 643 F.3d at 688.

67

See U. S. Rubber Co., 359 F.2d at 785.
14

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion at Docket 107.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 10th day of January, 2022.
/s/ Timothy M. Burgess
TIMOTHY M. BURGESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15