Kamkoff et al v. Hedberg

Filing 24

ORDER RE AMENDED MOTION FOR STAY, MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: Defendant's Amended Motion for Stay at Docket 21 is DENIED. Defendant shall file a response to the portion of Plaintiffs� 39; Motion for Class Certification concerning the proposed Language Access Class at Docket [7-21] within 14 days of the date of this order. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Docket [7-22] is DENIED without prejudice to its renewal. Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 2/5/2024. (SCD, COURT STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
DELLA KAMKOFF, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HEIDI HEDBERG, in her official
capacity as Commissioner of the
Alaska Department of Health,

Case No. 3:23-cv-00044-SLG

Defendant.
ORDER RE AMENDED MOTION FOR STAY, MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION, AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Before the Court at Docket 21 is Defendant’s Amended Motion for Stay. 1
Plaintiffs responded in opposition at Docket 22, to which Defendant replied at
Docket 23. A previous stay in this case expired on October 31, 2023. 2 Thus, also
ripe are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at Docket 7-21—with respect to
the Language Access Class only 3—and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at Docket 7-22. 4 Oral argument was not requested for any of these motions and
was not necessary to the Court’s determinations at this time.

1

Defendant’s original Motion for Stay is at Docket 17.

2

See Docket 14.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court has certified two subclasses: an Untimely
Eligibility Class and a Right to File Class. There has been no stipulation for certification as to
the proposed Language Access Class. See Docket 13; Docket 15.

3

4

See also Docket 7-18 (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification); Docket 7-19

BACKGROUND
This case is about the State of Alaska’s (“State”) administration of the
federally funded Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP” or
“Program”), which was established by the Food Stamp Act of 1964. 5 The Program,
codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036d, is meant “to safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation’s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income
households.” 6 The Program is overseen by the Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”)
within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). 7 In Alaska, the Department
of Health (“DOH”), Division of Public Assistance (“DPA”), administers the
Program.8 Households must meet certain eligibility requirements and apply to
participate in the Program, which is administered by the states in accordance with
federal laws and regulations. 9 The regulations provide for numerous procedures
in administering the Program, including application processing procedures and

(Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj.).
See Docket 1-1 at ¶¶ 1-4, 32-37; Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 4, 78 Stat.
703, 704 (1964). Originally called the Food Stamp Program, the program was renamed in 2008
to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 4001-02, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).

5

6

7 U.S.C. § 2011.

7

See 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.2, 271.3(a).

See Alaska Department of Health, Division of Public Assistance, Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), https://health.alaska.gov/dpa/Pages/SNAP/default.aspx (last
visited Jan. 23, 2024).

8

9

See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2020; 7 C.F.R. § 271.1 et seq.

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timelines, and language access requirements, among other things. 10 If a state is
not in compliance with the federal regulations, then the Secretary of the USDA will
give the state a period of time to correct the failures, but if the failures continue,
the federal government may seek injunctive relief requiring compliance. 11 Courts
have also recognized a private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12
Plaintiffs bring this suit on behalf of themselves and “three proposed classes
of similarly situated low-income Alaskans,” which consist of (1) an “Untimely
Eligibility Class,” “comprised of all Alaska residents who since January 20, 2021
have applied, are applying, or will apply for SNAP benefits through an initial
application or an application for recertification and did or will not receive an
eligibility determination within the legally required timeframes”; (2) a “Right to File
Class,” “comprised of all Alaska residents who since January 20, 2021, were or
will be denied the right to file a SNAP application the first time they contact the
agency”; and (3) a “Language Access Class,” “comprised of all Alaska residents
with limited English proficiency who since January 20, 2021, did or will not receive

10

See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(2), (g), (h); 7 C.F.R. § 272.4(b).

11

7 U.S.C. § 2020(g).

See Briggs v. Bremby, 792 F.3d 239, 245-46 (2d Cir. 2015); Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d
1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987); Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 724 (5th Cir. 1987); Barry v. Lyon,
834 F.3d 706, 717 (6th Cir. 2016); Garnett v. Zeilinger, 323 F. Supp. 3d 58, 71-73 (D.D.C. 2018).
12

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application materials or vital eligibility documents in their primary language and/or
access to oral interpretation services, as required by the SNAP Act.” 13
Plaintiffs allege six causes of action, the first five of which allege violations
of federal law: (1) failure to timely process SNAP initial and recertification
applications; (2) failure to ensure that Alaskans can submit SNAP applications on
the first day they contact the agency; (3) “failure to provide interpretation services,
bilingual personnel, or translated written certification materials necessary for
SNAP participation”; (4) “failure to provide written notice and opportunity to request
a fair hearing to SNAP applicants whose eligibility was not determined within
legally mandated timeframes”; and (5) violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the sixth cause of action alleges a violation of the Due
Process Clause of Article I, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution. 14 Plaintiffs seek
injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant.15
Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in Alaska state court in January
2023. 16 That same month, they also filed a Motion for Class Certification and
Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the state court. 17 Defendant removed the case

13

Docket 1-1 at ¶¶ 4, 19.

14

Docket 1-1 at ¶¶ 297-310.

15

Docket 1-1 at 42-46.

16

Docket 1-1.

17

Docket 7-21; Docket 7-22.

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to federal court in March 2023. 18 The parties then stipulated to two stays of the
case; the second stay ended on October 31, 2023. 19 They also stipulated to class
certification of the Untimely Eligibility Class and the Right to File Class, but not the
Language Access Class.20 Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification—with
respect to the Language Access Class only—and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction became ripe for review when the second stay expired.

However,

Defendant filed the instant Motion for Stay in November 2023, requesting an
additional stay “for a maximum of six months” or until the State finalizes a new
Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”) with FNS, whichever occurs first. Plaintiffs oppose
the requested stay. 21
JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 because this is a civil action with certain claims arising under federal law: the
Food Stamp Act and its implementing regulations, together with the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. 22

The Court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

18

Docket 1.

19

Docket 8; Docket 14.

20

See Docket 13; Docket 15.

21

See Docket 17; Docket 21 at 29; Docket 22.

22

See Docket 1 at 2.

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LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 23

“A trial court may, with

propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties
to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent
proceedings which bear upon the case. This rule applies whether the separate
proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not
require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action
before the court.” 24
In deciding whether to grant a stay, the Ninth Circuit instructs courts to weigh
“the competing interests which will be affected,” which include (1) “the possible
damage which may result from the granting of a stay”; (2) “the hardship or inequity
which a party may suffer in being required to go forward”; and (3) “the orderly
course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues,
proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.”25 “The

23

See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).

Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted).

24

Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300
F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)).
25

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proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need”26 and “must make
out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to some one else.”27
“Generally, stays should not be indefinite in nature” and “should not be granted
unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable
time.” 28
DISCUSSION
In its Motion for Stay, the State explains that Alaska has been and is
currently subject to a Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”) with FNS to address the
backlog in processing SNAP applications. 29

The State asserts that it has

“demonstrated commitment to resolving the backlog while this case has been
stayed,” and it points out that “FNS has unique expertise in the administration of
the SNAP program and . . . [can] impose significant monetary sanctions on the
State if the State fails to comply with the CAP.” 30 Because it “expects the process

26

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (citation omitted).

27

Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.

Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).

28

Docket 21 at 2. Because Defendant Heidi Hedberg is sued in her official capacity as the
Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Health, the Court will refer to Defendant and the
Department of Health as the “State” for simplicity. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d
630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is
equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity itself.”).

29

30

Docket 21 at 2-3.

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of updating the CAP to be complete within the next six months, likely sooner,” the
State requests that the Court stay the proceedings “for a maximum of six months
to allow the State to finalize the CAP with FNS.” 31 Specifically, the State asserts
that the doctrine of “primary jurisdiction” applies and that staying this litigation
would “avoid[] the inefficiency of parallel proceedings covering the same ground
and avoid[] the risk of conflicting obligations.” 32
The Court first addresses the stay motion with regard to the proposed
certification of the Language Access Class and then with regard to the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.
I.

Stay as to Motion for Class Certification
The Court does not find a basis to stay the determination of whether the

remaining proposed subclass, the Language Access Class, should be certified.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ language access claims, the State asserts that it “has
already complied with many of the specific requests and continues to make efforts
at improvement,” with the result that “DPA [now] has a healthy and active language
access program” such that the matter does not “requir[e] urgent attention.” 33 While
the State maintains that “it would be most efficient to litigate [these] claims
concurrently with” the preliminary injunction claims, the State also acknowledges

31

Docket 21 at 3.

32

Docket 21 at 3. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is discussed infra Section II.

33

Docket 21 at 27; Docket 23 at 9-10.

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that the Court could “bifurcate the language access claims for separate litigation if
this Court chooses.” 34 The Court finds that further delaying the resolution of this
issue could cause potential damage to the proposed class members and that there
would be no apparent hardship to the State in proceeding with the resolution of
this issue at this time. Accordingly, Defendant shall file a response to that portion
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification addressing the proposed Language
Access Class within 14 days of the date of this order.
II.

Stay as to Motion for Preliminary Injunction
The State asserts that the Court should stay the issues in Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Preliminary Injunction “for a maximum of six months or until finalization of the
FNS CAP” because the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. 35

“Primary

jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine that permits courts to determine ‘that an
otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions that should
be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority over the
relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch.’” 36 When evaluating whether
primary jurisdiction should apply, courts consider “(1) the need to resolve an issue
that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative

34

Docket 23 at 10.

35

Docket 21 at 21, 28.

Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Clark v. Time
Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008)).

36

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body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry
or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or
uniformity in administration.” 37

However, “courts must also consider whether

invoking primary jurisdiction would needlessly delay the resolution of claims,”
because “efficiency is the deciding factor in whether to invoke primary
jurisdiction.” 38
The State contends that the doctrine “is squarely on point” in this case,
because “the SNAP Act subjects all state agencies participating in SNAP to FNS’s
comprehensive regulatory authority,” “determining how best to resolve the SNAP
backlog requires both expertise and uniformity in administration,” and “FNS has
unique expertise and authority to craft the resolution of this situation that it
considers best, in light of the entire program administration within Alaska and
nationwide.” 39 The State asserts that there are complex policy questions on how
best to bring the State back into compliance, such as: balancing effort between
clearing the backlog and processing new applications; “balancing swift processing
of applications against the possibility of inaccurate decisions or inaccurate benefit
amounts”; and how to measure the State’s progress and compliance.40 The State
Id. (quoting Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir.
2002)).
37

38

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

39

Docket 21 at 21-22.

40

Docket 21 at 22-23.

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contends that primary jurisdiction is “particularly suitable . . . in this case where
FNS is actively and deeply engaged on the issue,” only a limited duration stay is
sought, and a stay of the issues would be efficient because “[l]itigation of the
plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion would cover all the same ground that FNS
is already comprehensively covering.” 41
The State also maintains that “DPA is doing everything possible to resolve
the backlog,” but that doing so has been complicated by a variety of factors such
as understaffing and the need to choose between clearing the backlog or
processing new applications. 42 The State explains that while it had cleared the
entirety of the first backlog of 10,598 cases by October 20, 2023, the time and
focus it took to clear that backlog resulted in “a new backlog of ‘younger’ cases.” 43
It notes that it has been “actively working on an online application portal, which [it
indicated was] scheduled to go live at the end of December 2023,” and that it has
recruited and trained additional employees to process applications. 44 Given its
efforts and its expectation of a finalized CAP in the near future, the State contends
that, should the Court deny the motion to stay and issue an order that runs contrary

Docket 21 at 23-25 (citing Astiana, 783 F.3d at 760-61 (holding that “even when agency
expertise would be helpful, a court should not invoke primary jurisdiction when the agency is
aware of but has expressed no interest in the subject matter of the litigation,” and that
“‘efficiency’ is the ‘deciding factor’ in whether to invoke primary jurisdiction”)).
41

42

Docket 23 at 10; Docket 21 at 22-23.

43

Docket 23 at 8.

44

Docket 21 at 20.

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to the CAP, it would put the State in the “impossible position” of trying to meet two
different sets of requirements. 45 The State thus asserts that the Court should stay
the case until the CAP is finalized. 46
In response, Plaintiffs assert that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not
apply because SNAP issues “are not matters of first impression, nor do they raise
issues requiring the specialized competence of FNS.” 47

Plaintiffs assert that

“[c]ourts have routinely issued declaratory and injunctive relief in instances where
state agencies have failed to comply with the SNAP Act and controlling federal
regulations.” 48 Plaintiffs maintain that a court order enforcing compliance with
federal law is “straightforward” and “requires little technical expertise to know
whether DOH has processed applications in a timely manner or offered language
access as required under the law.” 49 Plaintiffs assert that because Defendant “has
no concrete timeline for FNS’s amendment of the CAP[,] . . . [a]sking the Court to
defer its authority indefinitely . . . is against the interests of efficiency.”50 Plaintiffs
also point out that multiple courts have recognized “a private right of action under

45

Docket 21 at 25.

46

Docket 21 at 25.

47

Docket 22 at 9, 11.

See Docket 22 at 11 & n.49 (citing to a collection of cases in which courts have addressed
SNAP application processing).

48

49

Docket 22 at 12.

50

Docket 22 at 13.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983, wholly separate and apart from FNS’s oversight functions,” and
that the State’s position “leaves Plaintiffs unsure of which claims a resolution
through FNS will address” and “wholly fails to discuss the claims that FNS has not
raised thus far.” 51 Thus, Plaintiffs contend that “concurrent resolution would be
most efficient and best serve the interests of Alaskans.” 52
This case began over a year ago and was already stayed for several months
so that the State could try to resolve its SNAP applications backlog under federal
oversight. 53 While the parties dispute the applicability of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, the Court declines to apply the doctrine because it finds that further delay
in this case would be inefficient, particularly given that FNS may not address all of
Plaintiffs’ claims in the forthcoming CAP. 54

However, the Court recognizes

Defendant’s concern of “being subject to conflicting orders from this Court and
FNS.” 55 Thus, if necessary, the Court intends to amend any order it may issue to
address any conflicting obligations with the CAP, once complete. In addition,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, applying the state standard for

51

Docket 22 at 14-16.

52

Docket 22 at 16.

53

See Docket 6; Docket 12.

See Astiana, 783 F.3d at 760 (holding that “‘efficiency’ is the ‘deciding factor’ in whether to
invoke primary jurisdiction”).

54

55

Docket 21 at 21.

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preliminary injunctive relief, was filed over one year ago in the Alaska state court. 56
In light of the age of the motion, its application of Alaska law, and the subsequent
changes by DPA, the Court finds that the pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction
should be denied without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ filing of a renewed motion for
preliminary injunctive relief applying the federal standard for preliminary injunctive
relief and articulating the relief now sought in light of the current status of the SNAP
program in Alaska.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Amended Motion
for Stay at Docket 21 is DENIED. Defendant shall file a response to the portion of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification concerning the proposed Language Access
Class at Docket 7-21 within 14 days of the date of this order. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 7-22 is DENIED without
prejudice to its renewal.
DATED this 5th day of February, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

See Docket 7-19 at 14 (first citing Alsworth v. Seybert, 323 P.3d 47, 54 (Alaska 2014); then
citing State v. Arctic Vill. Council, 495 P.3d 313, 319 (Alaska 2021); then citing Randle v. Bay
Watch Condo. Ass’n, 488 P.3d 970, 974 (Alaska 2021); and then citing State, Div. of Elections v.
Metcalfe, 110 P.3d 976, 978 (Alaska 2005)).
56

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