Willard v. Natural Resources Conservation Service

Filing 23

ORDER Granting Motion to Dismiss at Docket 14 and Denying Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 17 . (CC: DQA) (Jan, Chambers Staff)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
KATHY M. WILLARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATURAL RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERVICE,

Case No. 4:14-cv-00026 RRB
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AT DOCKET 14 AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AT DOCKET 17

Defendant,

Before the Court at Docket 14 is Defendant, Natural Resources Conservation Service
(NRCS), with a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. The Plaintiff
responds at Docket 17 with a Motion for Summary Judgment, with Defendant replying and
responding at Docket 21 and Plaintiff replying and responding at Docket 22.
According to the exhibits filed by the parties, Plaintiff has received $55,321 as part of her
participation with NRCS in an Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) whereby Plaintiff
received financial assistance in implementing conservation practices on her land, including
Irrigation Water Management (IWM). Had the contract been completed to each party’s
satisfaction, Plaintiff could have received a total of $66,120.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
4:14-cv-00026-RRB

Following a quality review spot check in 2012, disagreement arose between the parties as
to whether or not Plaintiff was fulfilling her side of the agreement. NRCS determined that not only
was Plaintiff's recordkeeping and documentation insufficient to meet the required standards, but
that IWM was not occurring at the farm. Docket 17 at 2-3. Due to the practices and recordkeeping
of Plaintiff, NRCS has maintained that it overpaid Plaintiff $4,082.40, while Plaintiff asserts that
she is entitled to $8,164.80, the remainder of the contract price. On March 25, 2014, NRCS
terminated the contract due to Plaintiff's continued noncompliance. On November 3, 2014, the
present litigation was filed. In the present Motion to Dismiss, NRCS asserts that Plaintiff failed to
timely appeal the NRCS decision before filing the present litigation.
“Where a statute explicitly requires exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review, it should
be strictly enforced.” Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153–54 (1993). 7 USC § 6912(e) requires
that a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative appeal procedures before bringing suit against the
NRCS. This requirement allows the administrative agency in question "to exercise its expertise
over the subject matter and to permit the agency an opportunity to correct any mistakes that may
have occurred during the proceeding, thus avoiding unnecessary or premature judicial intervention
into the administrative process." Buckingham v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Agr., 603 F.3d 1073, 1080
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United Farm Workers v. Ariz. Agric. Employment Relations Bd., 669 F.2d
1249, 1253 (9th Cir.1982). Given the clear dispute between the parties in the present mater, proper
use of administrative remedies may have resolved this short of litigation or, at a minimum, the
Court would have a better record to work with in addressing the parties' dispute.
While 7 USC § 6912(e) "does not limit the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiffs' claims," the Court still requires compliance unless the underlying suit alleges "a

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
4:14-cv-00026-RRB

constitutional claim which is (1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement, (2) colorable, and
(3) one whose resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion." McBride Cotton & Cattle
Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d 973, 980-82 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's complaint alleges no such
claim. The Court must then look to what actions Plaintiff took to appeal NRCS's decision, when
Plaintiff took action to appeal, and whether Plaintiff was made aware of the administrative
remedies available.
According to documents before the Court, filed by NRCS and undisputed by Plaintiff,
Plaintiff made three attempts to dispute the actions by NRCS once Plaintiff's request for payment
was officially denied on May 15, 2013. Plaintiff's first letter to State Conservationist Robert Jones,
dated July 17, 2013, was clearly a request for reconsideration of the decision to withhold payment.
However, Plaintiff has not disputed that this request was made 24 days after the 30-day deadline
to seek administrative remedies. Following the official termination of the contract on March 25,
2014, Plaintiff sent NRCS another letter on April 4, 2014, which demanded payment under the
contract and threatened legal action. While timely, this correspondence did not ask for a review of
the adverse decision, nor did it "set out reasons for appeal and include any supporting
documentation." 7 C.F.R. § 614.2. Finally, on September 8, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to the USDA
National Appeals Division (NAD) to dispute the July 11, 2014, Final Debt Notice she received
from the Chief Financial Officer, Controller Operations Division for improper payments received
in 2012. This correspondence, while correctly sent to NAD, was untimely and sent far more than
30 days after Plaintiff received notice of the adverse decision. 7 C.F.R. section 11.6(b). 7 C.F.R.
§ 11.6(b) (2014).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
4:14-cv-00026-RRB

Moreover, Plaintiff was explicitly notified of her rights to seek equitable relief,
reconsideration, mediation, or to appeal the decision on four separate occasions in correspondence
dated May 15, 2013, February 10, 2014, March 25, 2014, and April 11, 2014. These notices were
very clear in not only explaining the types of administrative remedies available to Plaintiff, but
also in explaining the manner by which she could exercise these rights and the deadlines for her to
do so. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, and as asserted by NRCS, the Court concludes
that Plaintiff did not timely exhaust her administrative remedies and is precluded from proceeding
in this litigation.
In regard to Plaintiff's responsive Motion for Summary Judgment, even if the Court found
that Plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies, there are presently insufficient facts to
support summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff has alleged NRCS breached the EQIP
contract by failing to pay Plaintiff for IWM work in 2013. Docket 1. Plaintiff asserts that the blank
IWM Job Sheet from 2010, her receipt of payments in previous years, NRCS's emails that
acknowledge ambiguity in the IWM plan requirements for Plaintiff, as well as 3 years of identical
documentation all support her breach of contract claim. However, Plaintiff has failed to establish
what affirmative obligations there were between the parties under the contract. There are clearly
some questions raised by the documents submitted by Plaintiff, such as the existence of an actual
IWM plan associated with the Job Sheet and what verbal directions were given by the District
Conservationist who signed off on the incomplete IWM Job Sheet.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the
record show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
4:14-cv-00026-RRB

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Moreover, it is the party moving for summary
judgment that bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Because reasonable minds could
differ on the material facts at issue, Plaintiff has not met her burden and summary judgment would
not be appropriate. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983).
For the reasons set forth above, NRCS's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies at Docket 14 is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at Docket 17 is DENIED. This matter is therefore DISMISSED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of December, 2015.
S/RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
4:14-cv-00026-RRB