Holladay v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District

Filing 49

ORDER: re Motion For Summary Judgment 31 and scheduling a telephonic trial-setting conference for July 21, 2017 at 2:30 p.m. before Judge Sharon Gleason in Anchorage Courtroom 3. Telephonic participation is anticipated via Meet-Me-Bridge D (see order for full details). Signed by Judge Sharon L. Gleason on 07/07/2017. (AEM, CHAMBERS STAFF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
JAMIE ELAINE HOLLADAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 4:15-cv-00011-SLG
FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOROUGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court at Docket 31 is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The
motion is fully briefed. 1 Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the
Court’s decision.
BACKGROUND 2
Plaintiff Jamie Elaine Holladay brought this action alleging employment
discrimination on the grounds of age and disability, interference with her right to seek
medical leave, defamation, and contractual grievances. Ms. Holladay began working for

1

2

See Docket 40 (Opp.); Docket 43 (Reply).

The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Holladay for this summary
judgment motion as she is the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). These facts
are drawn not only from the documents submitted by Defendant in support of its summary
judgment motion, see Docket 32 (Partnow Decl.), but also from the sworn Complaint, Docket 1
at 8 (declaration under penalty of perjury), and the documents there-attached. The Court also
credits as evidence the factual statements in Ms. Holladay’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, as that document also includes a sworn oath. See Docket 40 at 13. In
its reply, Defendant objected to some of this evidence as inadmissible hearsay, see Docket 43
(Reply) at 2, but to the extent the comments were allegedly made by Defendant’s employees in
the course of their employment they would be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D).

Defendant—the Fairbanks North Star Borough School District (the District)—in 2010, as
an aide in the Autism Outreach (AO) program. 3 As an employee of the District, Ms.
Holladay was a member of the Education Support Staff Association (ESSA), which had
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the District. 4
From September 2011 through April 2013, Ms. Holladay alleges that she was given
less desirable work assignments, was more closely supervised than her coworkers, and
was treated differently from coworkers during office training sessions. 5 She adds that she
was criticized for inappropriate work attire, was given “glares, blank stares, and
downgrading looks” from supervisors, was spoken to in a “demeaning tone,” and “was
treated as if nothing she said or did was correct.” 6 During this period, Ms. Holladay
received two “negative evaluations,” one in March 2012 and the other in April 2012. 7
Susan Nugent (a contractor hired by the District to assist in running the AO program)
allegedly made negative comments about Ms. Holladay during meetings to discuss these
evaluations. 8

3

See Docket 32-2 (Position Authorization Form).

4

See Docket 32-1 (Holladay Dep.) at 10, 40:3–8; see also Docket 32-3 (CBA).

5

See, e.g., Docket 32-21 (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s First Disc. Requests) at 2 (describing some early
incidents of what Ms. Holladay perceived as disparate treatment); Docket 1 at 4–6 (detailing
later treatment).
6

Docket 11-1 at 4 (Halverson Decl.).

7

See Docket 1 at 4–6; Docket 11-1 at 20–37 (Evaluation Paperwork); Docket 32-1 at 16–17,
80:7–81:25.

8

See, e.g., Docket 1 at 2, ¶ 3.c.xii; Docket 32-21 at 5–6. Ms. Holladay’s focus seems to be on
Ms. Nugent’s alleged assertion that Ms. Holladay had exhibited “stalking behaviors.” See
Docket 32-1 at 6, 8. One or two other individuals were also present at these meetings. See
Docket 32-1 at 16, 80:7–9; 18, 82:9–10.
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In 2012 the District restructured by terminating the AO program and starting up a
new program in its place, the Autism Behavior and Educational Liaison (ABEL) program. 9
In July 2012, as a result of this restructuring, Ms. Holladay and all of the other workers in
the AO program were laid off. 10 In August 2012, Ms. Holladay applied for but was not
hired to a similar position in the restructured ABEL program. 11 Ms. Holladay contends
that the hiring decisions for ABEL were based on age, and that she was not hired because
she was over 50 years old. Ms. Holladay then complained of her treatment to school
officials, who found “no wrongdoing.” 12 In December 2012, while her administrative
complaint was still being evaluated by the District, Ms. Holladay was rehired to fill a
different position at a different school. 13 Ms. Holladay received a third negative evaluation
in “[l]ate April 2013.”14
During the summer of 2013, Ms. Holladay was notified that she would be
transferred to a different school in the District. 15 At the beginning of August 2013, the

9

See Docket 32-1 (Holladay Dep.) at 8, 25:4–12; Docket 1 at 5.

10

Docket 1 at 5; Docket 32-5 (July 19, 2012 “Notification of Layoff”).

11

Docket 1 at 5 (“I was not hired.”); Docket 32-13 (Employment Records) at 8.

12

Docket 1 at 5; Docket 1-2 (various “grievances”). Ms. Holladay also expresses some
frustration with her union or its representatives. While that information is essential for
understanding the context of and reasons for Ms. Holladay’s actions, neither the union itself nor
any of its employees is a party to this case.

13

See Docket 32-6 (Dec. 19, 2012 “Notice of Recall”).

14

Docket 1 at 6. Although Ms. Holladay disputes the merit of that evaluation, she does not
assert that there was anything defamatory in either the evaluation or any meeting related to that
evaluation. See Docket 32-21 at 5–6.

15

Docket 32-7 (July 12, 2013 “Assignment for the 2013-2014 School Year”).

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District offered a week-long training program; Ms. Holladay did not receive notice of this
training and did not attend. 16 On August 22, 2013, shortly after having commenced work
for that school year, Ms. Holladay met with her new school’s principal to discuss her
employee improvement plan. In this meeting Ms. Holladay became, in her own words,
“exasperated and addled” as she explained her past history with Ms. Nugent related to
the negative evaluations. At Ms. Holladay’s request, she was excused from work for the
remainder of that day. 17
The next day Ms. Holladay was called to a meeting with Traci Gatewood, another
school administrator, who apparently was concerned about Ms. Holladay’s mental health
and how it might impact her interaction with students. 18 Ms. Holladay did not return to
work at the District after the August 23 meeting. 19 She asked to take leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act 20 (FMLA) and sought accommodations for her disability
pursuant to the ADA; these requests were not immediately granted. 21 Although Ms.
Holladay did not return to work after August 23, the record does not reveal whether she

16

See Docket 1-2 at 15 (Oct. 25, 2013 email from Jamie Holladay to Sandra Kowalski).

17

See Docket 40 (Sworn Opp. to Def.’s Mot for Summ. J.) at 10.

18

Docket 32-8 (Sept. 3, 2013 letter from Traci V. Gatewood to Jamie Holladay); Docket 40 at 11;
Docket 1 at 7; Docket 1-2 at 13 (Aug. 28, 2013 email from Jamie Holladay to Sandra Kowalski).

19

See Docket 40 at 9; see also Docket 1 at 7.

20

29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

21

See Docket 1-2 at 19–23 (Oct. 25, 2013 letter from Jamie Holladay to Sandra Kowalski);
Docket 1 at 7.

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was in a paid or unpaid status. In October 2013, Ms. Holladay’s doctor indicated that she
could return to work under certain conditions. 22
On November 4, 2013, Ms. Holladay met with District personnel. During the
course of that meeting, she was terminated from her position.

According to Ms.

Holladay’s unrebutted evidence, she “was told [she] was terminated because of the
accommodations.”23 In a letter to Ms. Holladay from Ms. Gatewood documenting that
November 4 meeting, Ms. Gatewood explained that “all parties agreed that no reasonable
accommodation could be made to continue [Ms. Holladay’s] employment” in her assigned
position. 24 At that meeting, Ms. Holladay was offered an opportunity to accept a job in
either a janitorial or part-time clerical position. 25 Ms. Holladay rejected that offer on
November 8, 2013 and resigned from the District because she “considered the work
environment so hostile” that she could not “accept[]” any offer. 26
On August 29, 2014—294 days after she rejected the alternative job offers and
298 days after she had been terminated—Ms. Holladay faxed a letter to the EEOC
describing these events. 27 On or about November 28, 2014, Ms. Holladay added charges

22

See Docket 32-18 (Oct. 18, 2013 letter from Mikki King Barker to Traci Gatewood). Among
those conditions were that Ms. Holladay not work more than 20 hours per week for the next 60
days and that she “not work with profane or deliberately disruptive students or staff or faculty.”

23

Docket 1 at 7.

24

Docket 32-19 at 1 (Nov. 6, 2013 letter from Trace Gatewood to Jamie Holladay).

25

Docket 40 at 11–12; see also Docket 32-19 at 1.

26

Docket 40 at 12; Docket 1 at 7.

27

See Docket 11-1 at 7 (Aug. 29, 2014 letter from Jamie Holladay to EEOC). The fax cover
sheet was apparently transmitted on September 4, 2017. See Docket 11-1 at 11. But the fax
header on the actual letter sent to the EEOC indicates it was originally transmitted on August

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of unlawful retaliation. 28 The EEOC dismissed Ms. Holladay’s complaints and issued a
right to sue letter on February 3, 2015. 29 Ms. Holladay filed this suit on May 7, 2015,
seeking injunctive relief and damages. 30
DISCUSSION
I.

Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff’s claims

arise under federal law. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the related
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
II.

Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The burden of showing the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact lies with the moving party. 31 If the moving party
meets this burden, the non-moving party must present specific factual evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact. 32 The non-moving party may not

29, 2014. See Docket 11-1 at 7–10.
28

See Docket 32-10 (Notification of Charge).

29

Docket 1-1.

30

Docket 1 at 8. Ms. Holladay seeks an order requiring the District to remove “the retaliatory
and negative evaluations and unwarranted Improvement Plans” from her personnel file and
various types of damages, including incurred medical expenses, lost wages, and lost
employment benefits such as a pension and health insurance. Id.

31

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

32

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986).

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rely on mere allegations or denials. 33 Rather, that party must demonstrate that enough
evidence supports the alleged factual dispute to require a finder of fact to make a
determination at trial between the parties’ differing versions of the truth. 34
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court views the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws “all justifiable inferences” in the
non-moving party’s favor. 35 To reach the level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must
be such “that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” 36
If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is “merely colorable” or “not significantly
probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. 37
III.

Analysis
Ms. Holladay’s claims fall into four categories. First, she presents employment-

related discrimination claims—her claims of retaliation, age discrimination, and disability
discrimination fall into this category. Second, she alleges a claim of defamation under
Alaska law. Third, she claims she was improperly denied benefits under the FMLA. And
fourth, she asserts contract claims based on her employment agreement with the District.
The Court will address each category in turn.

33

Id. at 248–49.

34

Id. (citing First National Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)).

35

Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).

36

Id. at 248.

37

Id. at 249.

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a.

Employment Discrimination Claims

Because Ms. Holladay is self-represented, the Court construes her Complaint
liberally. The Court discerns four distinct employment discrimination–related claims in
the Complaint. First, Ms. Holladay claims that she was retaliated against—in the form of
increased and demeaning supervision and negative personnel evaluations from 2011
until “late April 2013”—for her participation in a workplace investigation. 38 Second, Ms.
Holladay alleges that in the summer of 2012 she was not hired into the ABEL program
because of her age. 39 Third, she claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment
on account of her disability during some period between September 2011 and late April
2013. 40 And fourth, she claims that she was terminated or forced to resign in November
2013 because of her disability. 41
The District raises two arguments that it contends entitle it to judgment as a matter
of law on each of these claims. First, the District contends the claims are untimely. 42
Second, the District contends that each claim fails on the merits.
1.

Timeliness

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “in a case of an unlawful
employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted

38

Docket 1 at 3–4.

39

Docket 1 at 6.

40

Docket 1 at 3–6.

41

Docket 1 at 7.

42

See Docket 31 at 5. The District contends the FMLA claim is also untimely for the same
reason; that claim is addressed separately below.

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proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such
practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice
thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 43 The federal
regulation implementing that statutory section provides that “a charge is sufficient when
the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement
sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices
complained of.”44 Once a charge has been filed, it “may be amended to cure technical
defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify
allegations made therein.” 45

And “[s]uch amendments and amendments alleging

additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out
of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first
received.” 46 These provisions governing timeliness of Title VII claims also extend to
claims under the ADA and the ADEA. 47

43

42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(1). The District does not contest that the 300-day period applies.
See Docket 31 at 7 (arguing that the complaint was filed “well after the 300-day period within
which Ms. Holladay was required to file”). By regulation, a filing within 300 days is deemed
timely even without the complainant having first filed with the state agency if the state agency
has waived its right to exclusive processing of the charge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(ii).
Alaska is such a state. See EEOC, San Francisco District Office, Timeliness,
https://www.eeoc.gov/field/sanfrancisco/timeliness.cfm.

44

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).

45

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).

46

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).

47

See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (extending Title VII remedies to disability discrimination); 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (detailing the limitations period for an age discrimination action).

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Ms. Holladay asserts that she first filed her complaint with the EEOC on August
29, 2014, and the District accepts that as the relevant date for the purposes of its
summary judgment motion. 48 Thus, Ms. Holladay can bring claims only for actions that
occurred on or after November 2, 2013. 49 There are two basic types of employment
claims: hostile environment claims and discrete-action claims.

Hostile environment

claims by their nature involve continuing conduct, and thus under the “continuing
violation” doctrine that applies to hostile environment claims, conduct prior to the 300-day
period may be actionable if the conduct also extended into the filing period. 50 But discrete
discriminatory acts “such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal
to hire”—which comprise many of Ms. Holladay’s claims—“are not actionable if time
barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 51
Ms. Holladay was first laid off in July 2012, and was not selected for hire into the
ABEL program in August 2012. Any claims related to these discrete acts—including Ms.
Holladay’s claim that she was not hired into the ABEL program because of her age—are
well outside the 300-day period and are time barred. Ms. Holladay also asserts a
retaliation claim, but Ms. Holladay does not assert that her termination (or resignation) in

48

See, e.g., Docket 31 at 7 (“She did not file with the EEOC until August 29, 2014 (at the
earliest).”). But see Docket 31 at 4 & n.5 (disputing whether it was actually filed on that date).
As noted above, the initial fax appears to have been sent on August 29, 2014. See supra note
27.

49

The District suggests that the Court should use the date Ms. Holladay amended her EEOC
claim—November 13, 2014—to determine the timeliness of this claim. See Docket 31 at 7. But
as explained above, amendments relate back to the original filing.
50

See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002); see also Raad v.
Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).
51

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113–14.

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November 2013 was itself in retaliation for any involvement in a protected activity. Rather,
her retaliation claim is apparently limited to Ms. Nugent’s conduct—more specifically, Ms.
Nugent’s negative evaluations of Ms. Holladay and Ms. Nugent’s increased supervision
of Ms. Holladay’s work—up to “late April 2013.” 52 Because all this conduct took place
outside the 300-day limitations period, the retaliation claim is also time barred.
Ms. Holladay’s filings indicate she is also pursuing a hostile environment claim
based on her treatment while in the AO program and under the supervision of Ms. Nugent.
Assuming—solely for the purposes of assessing timeliness—that the alleged conduct
constituted a hostile environment claim, 53 Ms. Holladay apparently left that environment
by August 23, 2013 at the latest, and any such claim therefore is also time barred.
But Ms. Holladay’s actual termination or resignation in November 2013, and the
meeting discussing reasonable accommodations, were within the 300 day period. 54

52

See Docket 1 at 3–6.

53

A hostile work environment claim requires that the allegedly hostile conduct be related to a
“protected characteristic” of the plaintiff, such as the plaintiff’s age, race, or sex. See, e.g.,
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623
(prohibiting age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (identifying protected characteristics
under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination based on disability). Although Ms.
Holladay alleges that some employees were treated differently than her, she does not allege
abusive conduct related to any protected characteristic. Cf. Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496
F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a hostile work environment predicated on sex
discrimination requires a plaintiff to show he or she “was subjected to verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature” (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995))
(emphasis added)).
54

The “termination meeting” took place on November 4, 2013, although Ms. Holladay did not
“resign” until November 8, 2013. See Docket 32-20 (Nov. 18, 2013 letter from Traci Gatewood
to Jamie Holladay). Either date is within the 300-day period; and even if Ms. Holladay was not
formally terminated, but chose to resign, removing her from her from one position and
transferring her to an apparently less desirable one would itself be a “tangible employment
action” necessary to sustain a discrimination suit. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998).

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According to Ms. Holladay, she was told that she was terminated “because of the
accommodations” she was seeking under the ADA. 55 This is an allegation of disability
discrimination that occurred within the 300-day period. 56
The record is somewhat unclear as to whether Ms. Holladay was “fired” or
“resigned” in November 2013. But even assuming that Ms. Holladay resigned, Ms.
Holladay alleges that she did so and that she declined the alternative job options because
the District did not offer “a solution to remove or even attempt to address the
circumstances which support the hostile work environment.”57 “A claim of constructive
discharge . . . has two basic elements.

A plaintiff must prove first that [she] was

discriminated against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in [her]
position would have felt compelled to resign. . . . [and] [she] must also show that [she]
actually resigned.” 58 Such a claim accrues when the employee notifies her employer that

55

Docket 1 at 7; see also Docket 32-18 (Oct. 18, 2013 letter from Mikki King Barker to Traci
Gatewood); Docket 32-19 (Nov. 6, 2013 letter from Trace Gatewood to Jamie Holladay).
56

See Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1088 (“The ADA’s definition of discrimination includes
‘not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . .’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A))).

57

Docket 1-2 at 25 (Nov. 8, 2013 email from Jamie Holladay to Sandra Kowalski).

58

Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016). To prevail on the discrimination element of
her constructive discharge claim, Ms. Holladay must meet the same requirements that attach to
an independent hostile work environment claim. See also Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542
U.S. 129, 143 (2004). Thus, the same evidence which might support her time-barred hostile
environment claim would also be relevant to the constructive discharge claim. That this is so
does not revive the independent hostile work environment claim. Cf. Green, 136 S. Ct. at 1777–
78 (comparing the two types of claims). If Ms. Holladay prevails, she can recover only those
damages flowing from her constructive discharge, and cannot recover damages related solely to
the alleged hostile work environment prior to November 2013.

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she intends to resign. 59 Since Ms. Holladay gave notice on November 8, 2013, within the
300-dayu limitation period, she has asserted a timely constructive discharge claim.
In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendant as to Ms. Holladay’s hostile work environment claim, retaliation claim, ADEA
claim, and any other claims she intended to assert with regard to the District’s decision
not to hire her into the new ABEL program because those claims are time-barred. The
Court will not grant summary judgment to the District on timeliness grounds as to Ms.
Holladay’s claims of wrongful termination or constructive discharge in November 2013
because the discrete employment actions related to those claims occurred within the
applicable 300-day period.
2.

Merits

The District argues that, even if timely, each of Ms. Holladay’s discrimination
claims fails on the merits.

Ms. Holladay advances two theories supporting timely

discrimination claims 60: First, she maintains that she was denied reasonable
accommodation and then fired “because of” her disability; and second, she asserts that
she was constructively discharged because of disability discrimination “by [her] employer

59

Green, 136 S. Ct. at 1782.

60

See Docket 1 at 7 (asserting that Ms. Holladay was fired “because of her accommodations”
and that she rejected reassignment because it would not address “ongoing harassment,
retaliation and discrimination”). The Court has already noted that the age discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile environment claims are untimely, and therefore the Court does not
address the merits of those claims. The Court will address the FMLA claim (as it is not a
discrimination claim), the defamation claim, and the contract claims separately below.
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to the point where a reasonable person in [her] position would have felt compelled to
resign.” 61
The District addresses the merits only as to the reasonable accommodations
claim. “The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual
with a disability ‘because of the disability.’” 62 An ADA claim entails three elements: (1)
that the plaintiff was disabled; (2) that the plaintiff was a qualified individual; and (3) that
the defendant discriminated against plaintiff “because of the disability.” “The ADA's
definition of discrimination includes ‘not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . .’” 63 The District does not challenge, at this stage, that Ms. Holladay had a
disability. 64 Nor does the District challenge (or even address) the requirement that Ms.

61

Green, 136 S. Ct. at 1777.

62

Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a)).

63

Dark, 451 F.3d at 1088 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). A defendant-employer may
defeat such a claim if it “demonstrate[s] that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The District has not made such
a showing here.

64

See Docket 31 at 10. The District nonetheless asserts in its briefing that Ms. Holladay
“claimed she was not disabled,” but in context the record suggests that Ms. Holladay was
decoupling her disability from a separate request to reopen her grievances. See Docket 32-1 at
20, 89:14–17; see also Docket 32-19 (“During the meeting you indicated you were not disabled,
but you also stated that your current disability would not exist had you prevailed in past
complaints/grievances filed against the District.”). Drawing all inferences in Ms. Holladay’s
favor, the Court cannot find that she was disclaiming a disability. The Court accordingly makes
no ruling as to this element, but notes that Ms. Holladay has been formally diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. See
Docket 32-18 at 2.
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Holladay be a qualified individual. 65

Rather, the District focuses on whether it

discriminated against Ms. Holladay by refusing to make reasonable accommodations.
In the District’s view, Ms. Holladay’s accommodation claim fails because “she
claimed that in order for her to continue working, defendant was required to re-open the
various grievances which she had filed and to resolve them in the manner desired by
plaintiff.”66 But Ms. Holladay specifically testified that although she “asked for that to
happen,” she “didn’t ask for it to be an accommodation.” 67 One accommodation that Ms.
Holladay did seek was that she not be assigned to work with “profane or deliberately
disruptive students.”68
Ms. Holladay has the burden of showing the existence of a reasonable
accommodation. But “[t]o avoid summary judgment,” Ms. Holladay “need only show that
an accommodation seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.”69
Ms. Holladay’s request that she not be assigned to profane or deliberately disruptive
students seems reasonable on its face, and the District does not now suggest

65

See Docket 31 at 10–11. A “qualified individual” is an individual “with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

66

Docket 31 at 10.

67

Docket 32-1 at 21, 90:16–17.

68

Docket 32-18 (Oct. 7, 2013 letter from Mikki King Barker to Traci Gatewood). Ms. Holladay
also sought a temporary limitation to part-time work. The District recognized this letter as a
request for accommodation. See Docket 32-19 at 1 (“[Y]ou provided a request for an
accommodation supported by medical opinion from your doctor.”).

69

Dark, 451 F.3d at 1088 (quoting U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002)).

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otherwise. 70 And yet the District apparently rejected this request at the November 4, 2013
termination meeting, telling Ms. Holladay in the November 6 letter that she “did not offer
any reasonable accommodations that would allow [her] to do [her] job.” 71
Under the ADA, however, “[a]n employer is not obligated to provide an employee
the accommodation [she] requests or prefers, the employer need only provide some
reasonable accommodation.” 72

The District asserts that it “offered several possible

accommodations to plaintiff” but the record reveals only two: reassignment to a part-time
secretarial position or reassignment to a janitorial position. 73

But “[i]n general,

reassignment should be considered only when accommodation within the individual's
current position would pose an undue hardship.” 74 The record contains no evidence
suggesting that Ms. Holladay’s proffered accommodation—assignment to a student that
was not “profane or deliberately disruptive”—would constitute an undue hardship to the
District. To the contrary, the only evidence on this matter is Ms. Holladay’s testimony that
it was feasible. 75 The Court cannot conclude, on this record, that as a matter of law the

70

See Docket 32-1 at 23–24, 128:22–129:18 (discussing the feasibility of this accommodation).

71

Docket 32-19 at 1.

72

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting E.E.O.C. v.
Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir.2001) (en banc)).

73

See Docker 32-19 at 1.

74

Appendix to 29 C.F.R 1630, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA, available at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/29/appendix-to_part_1630; see also Austin v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 4936480 at *9 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2008).
75

Docket 32-1 at 23–24, 128:22–129:18.

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District offered a reasonable accommodation or that Ms. Holladay did not present a
reasonable accommodation that the District could have provided.
The District “bore an affirmative obligation to engage in an interactive process,”
and summary judgment is unavailable unless the undisputed facts show the employer
engaged in that process in good faith. 76 The only evidence before the Court on this
process is the unsworn letter from the District’s human resources director that asserts,
with little elaboration, that “all parties agreed that no reasonable accommodation could
be made.” 77 The District asserts that an employer is absolved of its duty to engage if the
employee fails to engage in the process or “terminates” it “by voluntarily resigning.” 78 But
after setting forth these propositions of law, the District does not then demonstrate that
they apply here. And the record—as it now stands—does not support their application:
Ms. Holladay “resigned” on November 8, 2013, but the District’s own records indicate that
the interactive process had concluded at the November 4, 2013 meeting. 79 And because
the current record as to that meeting is so sparse, the Court cannot conclude as a matter
of law that the interactive process was undertaken in good faith.

76

Dark, 451 F.3d at 1088 (citing Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th
Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th
Cir. 2007)).

77

Docket 32-19 at 1.

78

See Docket 31 at 11 (citing Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.
2011); Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999); Beck v. University of
Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996); and Templeton v. Neodata Servs. Inc., 162
F.3d 617 (10th Cir. 1998)).

79

See Docket 32-19 at 1 (“As a result of that [November 4, 2013] conversation, all parties
agreed that no reasonable accommodation could be made to continue your employment in the
Special Education Extended Resource Aide position.”).

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The Court will therefore deny summary judgment as to Ms. Holladay’s ADA
accommodations claim and the ADA constructive discharge claim. 80

80

The District has not meaningfully addressed the merits of Ms. Holladay’s constructive
discharge claim. See Docket 31 at 4 (identifying this claim); Docket 31 at 10 (discussing Ms.
Holladay’s resignation as a termination of the interactive process). As explained above, a
constructive discharge claim under the ADA requires demonstrating both discrimination and that
this discrimination caused the employee’s resignation. See supra page 12. The discrimination
must be “to the point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to
resign.” Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016). As also noted above, the
discrimination must be related to a “protected characteristic” of the plaintiff. See supra note 53.
Here, then, Ms. Holladay must show that she resigned because she was discriminated against
with regard to her disabled status to the point where a hypothetical reasonable person would
feel compelled to resign.

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b.

Defamation Claim

Ms. Holladay claims that she was defamed by certain District employees. 81 This
claim arises from statements made during evaluation meetings in March and April of
2012. 82 The District contends that these statements were privileged and not “published,”
and in any event are time barred.
The statute of limitations for a defamation claim is two years. 83 This lawsuit was
filed in May 2015—more than three years after the comments allegedly were made. The
defamation claims are thus time barred and the District is entitled to summary judgment
as to those claims. Accordingly, the Court does not reach the issues of privilege or
publication.
c.

FMLA Claim

Ms. Holladay claims that she was denied benefits to which she had an entitlement
under the FMLA. 84 The District suggests that this claim is time barred for the same
reasons as Ms. Holladay’s discrimination claims (that is, that they fall outside the 300-day
limitation period). 85 But FMLA claims are not subject to the 300-day period that governs
employment discrimination claims. Indeed, under the separate statutory and regulatory

81

See Docket 1 at 2, ¶ 3(c)(xii).

82

See Docket 32-19 at 5–6; Docket 32-1 at 15–19, 79:1–83:23.

83

See MacDonald v. Riggs, 166 P.3d 12, 17 & n.9 (Alaska 2007) (citing AS 09.010.070).

84

See Docket 1 at 7. Ms. Holladay also alleges that she was denied benefits protected by the
Alaska Family Leave Act (AFLA). AS 39.20.500–.550. The Alaska statute provides no judicial
remedy for violations. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Gregg, 101 P.3d 181, 186 n.6 (Alaska
2004) (citing AS 39.20.540). Ms. Holladay cannot pursue a claim under AFLA in this forum, and
the Court accordingly does not discuss her eligibility for benefits under that statute.
85

See Docket 31 at 8.

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structure of the FMLA, an employee “has the choice” between filing a complaint with the
Department of Labor (not the EEOC) or filing a private lawsuit. 86 And, as relevant here,
“an action may be brought under [the FMLA] not later than 2 years after the date of the
last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” 87

Ms.

Holladay sought (and was denied) FMLA leave no earlier than August 23, 2013. She filed
this suit May 7, 2015. Accordingly, Ms. Holladay’s FMLA claim is timely.
On the merits, the District contends that the undisputed facts show that Ms.
Holladay was not qualified for benefits under the FMLA, and that the District is therefore
entitled to summary judgment on that claim even if it is timely. 88 FMLA benefits are
available only to “eligible employees.”89 An employee is eligible if she has been employed
“for at least 12 months” by the employer and has worked “at least 1250 hours of service
with such employer during the previous 12-month period.” 90
Ms. Holladay sought leave under the FMLA on August 28, 2013. 91 The District
asserts that Ms. Holladay did not work 1,250 hours in the preceding 12 months (that is,
between August 29, 2012 and August 28, 2013). In support of this position, the District

86

29 C.F.R. § 825.400(a).

87

29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1).

88

See Docket 31 at 9–10.

89

See 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (“[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period.”).

90

29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). There are different eligibility rules—not applicable here—for certain
types of employees, see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(D), and different rules for calculating the benefit
for certain school employees once eligibility is established, see 29 U.S.C. § 2618.

91

See Docket 32-16 (June 4, 2015 letter from Joe Dunham, Statewide Supervising Investigator,
Alaska Wage and Hour Administration to Jamie Holladay) at 2.

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relies on its letter to the state agency investigating Ms. Holladay’s AFLA claim. During
that period, Ms. Holladay worked from December 19, 2012 until some date in June 2013,
and again for a few days in August, 2013. 92 The District claims that “School District payroll
records reflect that during that 12-month period, Ms. Holladay worked only 805 hours.”93
This is indeed short of the 1,250-hour requirement for FMLA benefits. But Ms. Holladay
contends that the payroll logs do not account for additional time she worked each day. 94
She contends that she worked through lunch and other scheduled breaks and stayed
after hours to accommodate her increased workload from being assigned to work with
two students. 95
Ms. Holladay does not quantify this time, but the Court reasonably infers that she
asserts her total hours to exceed 1,250. The Court is thus faced with Ms. Holladay’s
sworn assertion that she worked more than 1,250 hours and the District’s assertion—in
the letter justifying denial of benefits—that its records reflect she worked less than 1,250
hours. 96 That calculation appears to be based on Ms. Holladay’s compensation, but “[t]he
determination [of hours worked] is not limited by methods of recordkeeping, or by
compensation agreements that do not accurately reflect all of the hours an employee has

92

See Docket 32-16 at 2. Ms. Holladay was in a lay-off status until recalled in December 2012.
See Docket 32-6 (Dec. 19, 2012 Recall Notice).
93

Docket 31 at 9.

94

See Docket 32-21 (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s First Disc. Requests) at 4.

95

Docket 32-21 at 4–5.

96

The District did not submit the payroll records themselves, or even a declaration or affidavit
attesting to their contents, but rather relies on its subsequent unsworn letter—itself purportedly
based on payroll records—submitted to the state agency. See Docket 32-17 (Jan. 27, 2015
letter from Traci Gatewood to Joe Dunham) at 2–3.

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worked for or been in service to the employer.” 97 Rather, “[a]ny accurate accounting of
actual hours worked under FLSA’s principles may be used.” 98 Given the dispute as to
the number of hours actually worked, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that
Ms. Holladay was not entitled to FMLA benefits and therefore will not grant summary
judgment on this claim. 99
Moreover, Ms. Holladay’s claim is more nuanced than a straightforward denial of
FMLA benefits. She also asserts that the District interfered with her right to pursue those
benefits by demanding that she sign a medical release form before she could obtain
FMLA benefits (if she were eligible). 100 The FMLA expressly prohibits any employer from
interfering or restraining “the attempt to exercise[] any right” provided under the FMLA. 101
As neither party has briefed the substance of this claim, the Court will make no decision
as to its merits at this juncture.
d.

Contractual Claims and Grievance Procedures

The District classifies Ms. Holladay’s remaining claims as “grievances” subject to
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 102 These claims are wide-ranging, covering, for

97

29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c)(1).

98

Id.

99

Cf. Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2012)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment to defendant premised on an hours calculation derived
from a collective bargaining agreement when the plaintiff—a high school teacher—averred that
he worked an additional 1.5 unpaid hours each day).

100

See Docket 1 at 7; Docket 32-21 at 11.

101

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

102

See Docket 31 at 13–15.

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example “[r]eassigning [Ms. Holladay] to non essential duties,” “[i]ncreased surveillance,”
“[d]enial of training opportunities,” and “[f]ailure to investigate witnesses in
complaints/grievances.” 103
Under the exhaustion doctrine, “employees must first exhaust their contractual or
administrative remedies, or show that they are excused from doing so, before they may
pursue direct judicial actions against their employers.” 104 The District asserts that Ms.
Holladay’s grievance claims must be dismissed because Ms. Holladay did not bring her
grievances to binding arbitration, the third (and final) step in the grievance process. 105
At the outset, the Court notes that the contractual grievance process applies only
to “a claim by a grievant that a dispute or disagreement exists involving interpretation or
application of the terms of this Agreement.” 106 The doctrine’s application in this case is
therefore limited to Ms. Holladay’s contractual claims arising from the collective
bargaining agreement; it does not apply to Ms. Holladay’s claims arising under federal
law or Alaska law. 107
The agreement provides that, after completion of the second step in the grievance
process, “the ESSA or the District may, upon written notification to the other party, submit

103

Docket 1 at 2, ¶ 3(c)(ii), (vi), (x), & (xv).

104

State v. Beard (Beard III), 960 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1998); see also Beard v. Baum (Beard I),
796 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133, 1136
(Alaska 1983)).

105

See Docket 32-3 (Collective Bargaining Agreement) at 12, ¶ 5.4(d).

106

Docket 32-3 at 11, ¶ 5.1(b).

107

Cf. Beard I, 796 P.2d at 1349 n.3 (contrasting the expansive “any controversy or dispute” with
those that “involve[] the application or interpretation of the terms of this agreement” (alteration in
original)).

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the grievance to arbitration.” There is no question that the disputes between Ms. Holladay
and the District did not advance to arbitration, and no suggestion that any written
notification was given.

But Ms. Holladay contends that under the contract’s terms,

arbitration was not actually required and was not actually available to her. 108
Ms. Holladay’s first argument is premised on the use of the word “may” in the
arbitration provision. The Court is not persuaded that arbitration was “optional” in the
manner that Ms. Holladay suggests. The word “may” does not mean that a party could
skip arbitration entirely and immediately seek judicial relief.

Such a reading would

abrogate the exhaustion doctrine, as each step of the grievance process is similarly
optional. Rather, “may” means that a party “may” pursue the next step in the process if
that party is dissatisfied with the resolution at the previous step. 109 Under the terms of
the contract, “[a]ny grievance not advanced from one step to the next within the time limits
of that step shall be deemed resolved by the answer at the previous step.”110
Ms. Holladay’s second argument is more persuasive. Ms. Holladay contends that
the phrasing of the third step suggests that the right to pursue arbitration belongs only to
the District and the ESSA, and not to an individual employee. Accordingly, Ms. Holladay
maintains that she is excused from failing to seek arbitration because she had no right to
do so. This interpretation of her rights is consistent with the language of the provision in

108

See Docket 40 (Opp.) at 4,

109

See Docket 32-3 at 12 (using “may” for each of the three steps).

110

Docket 32-3 at 11, ¶ 5.2(c).

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isolation: “[T]he ESSA or the District may . . . submit the grievance to arbitration.” 111 An
individual employee, such as Ms. Holladay, is not explicitly given a right to pursue
arbitration.
This reading is also buttressed by examining related terms of the contract. For the
first and second step of the process, different language is used. Thus, “the grievant” may
submit a written grievance to a supervisor, just as “the grievant” may submit a written
grievant to the Superintendent. 112 And the term “grievant” is expressly defined by the
contract to include “an employee or group of employees or the ESSA filing a
grievance.” 113 When two provisions of a contract use different terms, those terms are
presumed to have different meanings; and when a contract uses one specific word it
generally excludes others. 114 The contract gives the individual employee and the ESSA
the right to pursue relief at steps one and two, but as to the third step provides that right
only to the ESSA (and the District). Based on the foregoing, the contract does not permit
Ms. Holladay to unilaterally seek arbitration. 115

111

Docket 32-3 at 12.

112

See Docket 32-3 at 12, ¶ 5.4(b)(1), 5.4(c)(1).

113

Docket 32-2 at 11, ¶ 5.1(a).

114

Cf. Mahan v. Mahan, 347 P.3d 91, 95 (Alaska 2015) (discussing interpretive principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one is the exclusion of the other).

115

The text of the contract, as the most persuasive evidence of the parties’ intent, resolves this
issue. But the Court also notes that this arrangement makes eminent sense: according to the
contract, the costs of arbitration are to be “borne equally” by the ESSA and the District. See
Docket 32-3 at 12, ¶ 5.4(d)(5). Thus, the contract provides that the parties that would bear the
costs of arbitration retain control whether to invoke it.
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But that Ms. Holladay’s reading of the contract is correct does resolve the matter.
In Casey v. City of Fairbanks, the seminal Alaska Supreme Court case on the exhaustion
doctrine, the employee contended that he was excused from the exhaustion requirement
“when the Union failed to pursue his grievance, because the Working Agreement did not
contain any measures by which an aggrieved employee could ensure enforcement of the
grievance procedure.” 116 There, the Alaska Supreme Court did not conclude that the
employee was automatically excused from exhausting contractual remedies. Rather, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that he was excused only because he had “made a good faith
effort” to fully exhaust his contractual remedies by raising his concerns with several union
representatives, each of whom told him that the union could not help him. 117
The Alaska Supreme Court reinforced this requirement—that an employee
dependent on a union to represent him in grievance procedures make a good faith effort
to get the union to do so—in a series of opinions, the last of which is titled Alaska v.
Beard. 118 There, as here, the governing agreement provided for arbitration as the final
step in the grievance process and reserved the decision to pursue it to the union. 119 In
the first Beard appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on
summary judgment that Beard, the employee, had failed to exhaust his administrative

116

Casey, 670 P.2d at 1135. That agreement gave the employee the right to pursue only the
first step of a five-step process. See id. at 1135 n.1.
117

See Casey, 670 P.2d at 1136–37.

118

Beard III, 960 P.2d 1; see also Cameron v. Beard (Beard II), 864 P.2d 538 (Alaska 1993);
Beard I, 796 P.2d 1344.

119

See Beard III, 960 P.2d at 8 (explaining five-step process); Beard I, 796 P.2d at 1249
(explaining union’s role in process).

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remedies. The Supreme Court noted that “[u]nder the terms of the CBA grievance
procedures, Beard could not pursue his grievance past the initial steps without the
cooperation of [a union] representative.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Beard, as the nonmovant, the Court concluded that “Beard could not comply” with the
grievance procedures “because his union representative refused to represent him.”120
Beard II clarified that Beard I had not definitively resolved the issue of exhaustion
in Beard’s favor, but had instead turned on the presumption that favored Beard in his
opposition to summary judgment. 121 On the second remand, the trial court concluded
that the union knew of Beard’s grievances but did not pursue them, and that Beard was
thus excused for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 122 But on the third appeal,
the Alaska Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that while the union had refused to file
some grievances, Beard had never asked it to pursue the constructive discharge
grievance at issue and the union representative had testified that he would have pursued
it if asked. 123 As the Supreme Court explained, “the union must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to represent the employee” before the employee’s failure to exhaust
contractual remedies can be excused. 124

120

Beard I, 796 P.2d at 1249.

121

See Beard II, 864 P.2d at 545 (“The superior court erroneously interpreted our decision in
Beard I as conclusively deciding the exhaustion issue.”).

122

See Beard III, 960 P.2d at 6 (describing the superior court’s ruling).

123

Beard III, 960 P.2d at 7 (describing evidence).

124

Beard III, 960 P.2d at 7.

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Thus, in order to avoid the requirements of exhaustion, Ms. Holladay must have
made a good faith effort to have the union pursue her grievances through arbitration. The
District asserts that “plaintiff fails to provide evidence that she sought to have either her
union or the defendant initiate arbitration or that either her union or the defendant denied
any such request” and that it is not “aware of any such evidence.”125 Ms. Holladay—
representing herself and perhaps unfamiliar with the contours of Alaska’s exhaustion
doctrine—has not explicitly addressed whether, how, or when she asked her union to
pursue arbitration. But her testimony indicates that she “went to ESSA probably four or
five different times . . . to present my complaint to get the grievance process started” and
that she “was following their instructions.” 126 She testified that the union knew she
“wanted to file a grievance, and that they were preparing to file a grievance” but that “then
it didn’t happen.”127 Ms. Holladay was “starting to push” the union, but “could not get
them to move.” 128

Because she felt she “was being obstructed [] from filing [her]

grievance,” she met with a lawyer who told her she had to exhaust her contractual rights
first. 129 She also claims that, at one point, the union informed her that it would no longer
represent her in her grievances. 130

125

Docket 43 at 3.

126

Docket 32-1 (Holladay Dep.) at 11, 41:14–18.

127

Docket 32-1 at 11, 41:21–23.

128

Docket 32-1 at 11–12, 41:25–42:2

129

Docket 32-1 at 12, 42:7–8.

130

See Docket 1 at 5 (“[T]he union notified me they were ending representation of me for my
grievance . . . .”).

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Given this record with regard to Ms. Holladay’s interactions with the union, the
Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Ms. Holladay failed to pursue her
contractual remedies in good faith. Like the Supreme Court in Beard I, the Court does
not conclude that Ms. Holladay is in fact excused for her failure to seek arbitration.
Rather, the Court concludes only that in light of the current record before it, and drawing
all reasonable inferences in Ms. Holladay’s favor as the nonmovant, the District is not
entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of nonexhaustion—at least as to grievances
for which Ms. Holladay pursued the first and second step of the grievance process. As
the District has not advanced any other argument in favor of dismissing any contractual
claim Ms. Holladay intends to assert, summary judgment as to such claims will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket 31 is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART, as outlined below.
Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant as to the following claims:
•

Plaintiff’s ADEA claim and all other employment discrimination claims arising from
Plaintiff’s termination from the AO program and Defendant’s subsequent failure to
hire Plaintiff into the ABEL program in the summer of 2012;

•

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim;

•

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim;

•

Plaintiff’s defamation claims; and

•

Plaintiff’s AFLA claim.

Summary judgment is denied as to the following claims:

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•

Plaintiff’s ADA constructive discharge claim related to the November 2013
termination or resignation;

•

Plaintiff’s ADA reasonable accommodations claim related to the November 2013
termination or resignation;

•

Plaintiff’s FMLA claims; and

•

Plaintiff’s contractual “grievance” claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a telephonic hearing to schedule trial is set for

Friday, July 21, 2017 at 2:30 p.m. 131 Telephonic participants are directed to call (907)
677-6248 five minutes before the start of the hearing. When prompted, please enter the
following access code: 668160.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2017 at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

131

The Court offers the following additional observation: This case concerns matters by now
long past. On the one side is an employee troubled and sincerely affected by what she
apparently perceived to be a toxic work environment (whether such characterization is accurate
is beside the point). On the other side is a government entity. If the parties have not yet
attempted mediation, the Court strongly urges them to consider it. From the Court’s admittedly
limited perspective, a mutual and good-faith attempt at a settled disposition of this case would
likely advance both parties’ interests.

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