Salerno v. Schriro, et al

Filing 82

ORDER denying 74 Motion to Reopen Case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See document for complete details. Signed by Senior Judge Roslyn O Silver on 11/15/2022. (WLP)

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Fox Joseph Salerno, Petitioner, 10 11 v. 12 Dora B Schriro, et al., 13 No. CV-05-01277-PHX-ROS ORDER Respondents. 14 15 On March 30, 2007, the Court issued an Order adopting a Report and 16 Recommendation and denied Petitioner Fox Salerno’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 17 (Doc. 64). As relevant here, that Order addressed and rejected Petitioner’s arguments that 18 his sentences from state court convictions were unlawful under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 19 530 U.S. 466 (2000) or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Less than a week 20 later, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 66). That motion presented 21 additional arguments regarding what Petitioner viewed as “Apprendi/Blakely” errors in his 22 sentences. (Doc. 66). The Court denied that motion on April 13, 2007. (Doc. 71). On 23 November 7, 2007, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of 24 appealability. (Doc. 73). 25 On September 24, 2022, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Re-Open Case.” (Doc. 74). 26 That motion argues Petitioner recently “came across [the] R&R and re-read it.” (Doc. 74 27 at 2). In doing so, Petitioner realized his sentences violated the requirements of Apprendi, 28 apparently in some way he did not articulate in his original petition or motion for 1 reconsideration. (Doc. 74 at 3). In his motion filed this year, Petitioner claims his sentence 2 was “a miscarriage of justice, and a structural and fundamental error.” (Doc. 74 at 1). 3 Petitioner also claims the sentencing error meant the state trial court “did not have subject 4 matter jurisdiction” and jurisdiction “cannot be waived and cannot be time barred.” (Doc. 5 74 at 5). Respondents filed an opposition arguing Petitioner’s motion is untimely, fails on 6 its merits, and likely qualifies as a “second or successive” habeas petition that must be 7 authorized by the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 80). 8 While unclear, Petitioner’s “Motion to Re-Open Case” appears to be seeking relief 9 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. (Doc. 74 at 5-6). Because of the statutory 10 limitations on repetitive habeas litigation, the threshold issue is whether that motion should 11 be viewed as a Rule 60 motion that may be heard by this Court or if Petitioner’s motion 12 should be viewed as a “second or successive habeas corpus application” that can only be 13 heard by this Court after Petitioner obtains permission from the Court of Appeals. 28 14 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (b)(3)(A). 15 A post-judgment filing purporting to be a Rule 60 motion actually is a “second or 16 successive habeas corpus application” if it “seeks to add a new ground for relief or attacks 17 the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 18 F.3d 619, 638 (9th Cir. 2020). Of special relevance here, a motion must be viewed as a 19 “second or successive habeas corpus application” if it “argues a change in substantive law 20 justifies relief from the previous denial of a claim.” Id. Under this standard, Petitioner’s 21 motion is a “second or successive habeas corpus application” that cannot be heard absent 22 permission from the Court of Appeals. 23 Petitioner’s “Motion to Re-Open Case” makes clear he is attacking on the merits the 24 denial of his habeas petition in 2007. According to Petitioner, the R&R issued in 2007, 25 and subsequently adopted by the Court, “incorrectly concluded” his state court sentences 26 were permissible. (Doc. 74 at 4). Petitioner’s motion also states, at the time Petitioner 27 filed his habeas petition in 2005, “Apprendi was still being hashed out and the defining 28 case laws came out in 2006 & 2007.” (Doc. 74 at 2). In effect, Petitioner argues there have -2- 1 been changes in the governing law since 2007 such that he is now entitled to relief. Arguing 2 the merits of the previous denial, and claiming subsequent legal developments mean he is 3 now entitled to relief, establish Petitioner’s “Motion to Re-Open Case” qualifies as a 4 second or successive habeas corpus application. That motion, therefore, cannot be heard 5 without permission from the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). 6 Finally, a certificate of appealability “is required in order to appeal the denial of a 7 Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a district court’s judgment denying federal habeas relief.” 8 Martinez v. Shinn, 33 F.4th 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2022). Petitioner’s motion is not, in fact, 9 a proper Rule 60 motion. But even if so construed, the motion does not present any 10 plausible basis for relief. Therefore, jurists of reason would not “find it debatable whether 11 the [Court] abused its discretion in denying” Petitioner’s Rule 60 motion. Id. No certificate 12 of appealability will be issued. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Reopen Case (Doc. 74) is DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. 16 Dated this 15th day of November, 2022. 17 18 19 Honorable Roslyn O. Silver Senior United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3-

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