Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, et al

Filing 376

ORDER denying 373 Defendant's Motion to Review Taxation of Costs. Signed by Judge James A Teilborg on 6/22/12.(LSP)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Pamela Goodman,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Staples the Office Superstore, LLC,
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Defendant.
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No. CV 08-0445-PHX-JAT
ORDER

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Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Review Taxation of Costs. (Doc.
373). The Court now rules on the Motion.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant alleging a tort claim of negligence. At the

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conclusion of discovery, Defendant served Plaintiff with an offer of judgment for $150,000

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(Doc. 174), which was rejected. After an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the

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case proceeded to jury trial before this Court. The jury found for Plaintiff in the amount of

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$35,000. However, the jury assigned Plaintiff seventy-five percent of the fault and,

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consequently, Plaintiff’s award was reduced to $8,750. Because Plaintiff’s recovery was

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lower than the Offer of Judgment, Defendant was entitled to recover its costs for the period

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following the Offer of Judgment under Rule 68(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Plaintiff was presumptively entitled to recover her costs prior to the Offer as the prevailing

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party. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court awarded Plaintiff $12,324.25 and Defendant

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$104.32 in costs. Defendant then filed the pendent Motion, seeking to set aside the award

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of costs to Plaintiff. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was not the prevailing party, and

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alternatively that the Court should exercise its discretion to set aside the Clerk’s judgment

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based on: (1) the amount recovered being nominal in comparison to the amount sought; (2)

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the costs exceeding the verdict; and (3) Defendant litigating in good faith.

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II.

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A district court reviews the clerk’s taxation of costs de novo. Escriba v. Foster

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Poultry Farms, CV-09-1878 LJO-MJS, 2012 WL 174847, *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012). A

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district court is not bound by the record nor required to show any deference to the Clerk’s

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conclusions. See Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu–Mar Lobster and Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054,

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1058 (9th Cir. 2001).

LEGAL STANDARD

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Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.1 provides that “[g]enerally, a party in whose favor

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judgment is rendered is the prevailing party.” LRCIV 54.1(d). A prevailing party is one who

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succeeds on “any significant issue” in litigation which “achieves some of the benefit the

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parties sought in bringing the suit.” Park v. Anaheim Union High School Dist., 464 F.3d

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1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these

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rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be

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allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(1). “By its terms, the rule creates

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a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, but vests in the district court

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discretion to refuse to award costs.” Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California,

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231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Proper grounds for denying costs include “(1) a losing party’s limited financial
resources; (2) misconduct by the prevailing party; and (3) ‘the chilling effect
of imposing . . . high costs on future civil rights litigants,’” as well as (4)
whether “the issues in the case were close and difficult”; (5) whether “the
prevailing party’s recovery was nominal or partial”; (6) whether “the losing
party litigated in good faith”; and (7) whether “the case presented a landmark
issue of national importance.”

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Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Champion

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Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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III.

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DISCUSSION
A.

Prevailing Party

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Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case. Defendant cites Perlman v. Zell, 185 F.3d

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830 (7th Cir. 1999), to support its argument that a party recovering only a small amount of

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the total amount sought is not the prevailing party. There, the plaintiff lost on numerous

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causes of action, and prevailed only on state law claims that the defendant had conceded. The

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award the plaintiff received was entirely nominal. Here, Plaintiff received an award of

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$8,750. Although this was only a small fraction of the damages she sought, the verdict was

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in her favor and damages were awarded. Plaintiff thus achieved some of the benefit she

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sought in bringing the suit, and prevailed on the negligence issue in that Defendant was

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found twenty-five percent at fault. Thus, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is presumptively

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entitled to taxable costs incurred prior to the Offer of Judgment.

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B.

DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS

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Defendant fails to persuade the Court to exercise its discretion and deny Plaintiff her

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taxable costs. It is true that Plaintiff’s costs exceed the jury award. However, this factor is

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not included in the list from Quan, nor does Defendant cite to any authority for this factor

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justifying the denial of costs. Of the seven Quan factors, (1), (2), (3), and (7) do not apply

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here, nor does Defendant contend that they do.

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With regard to the fourth factor, the issues in the case were arguably close and

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difficult, since the case involved a three week jury trial, and resulted in a judgment of fault

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by both parties. With regard to the sixth factor, there is no question that Defendant litigated

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in good faith. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fractional recovery of $8,750, when she was

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seeking over $1,000,000 in damages, justifies a reversal of costs. The Court recognizes the

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limited nature of Plaintiff’s recovery, compared with what she sought, and Defendant’s

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success in demonstrating that Plaintiff was at fault. However, given the strong presumption

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in favor of awarding costs, Defendant has not established that this case was sufficiently

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extraordinary to justify denying costs.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
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Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Review Taxation of Costs. (Doc.

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373).
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2012.

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