Bolt v. Honeywell International, Inc., et al
Filing
55
ORDER denying Plaintiff's 41 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court also denies without prejudice Plaintiff's Request for an Award of Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge David A Ezra on 09/09/11.(ESL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
TIMOTHY BOLT,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL )
INC., a Foreign Corporation;
)
METROPOLITAN LIFE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
)
Foreign Corporation,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CV. NO. 10-00071 PHX-DAE
ORDER: (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY BOLT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2) DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY BOLT’S REQUEST
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(f), the Court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing. After reviewing the motion and the supporting and
opposing memoranda, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Timothy Bolt’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 41). The Court also DENIES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Request for an Award of Attorney Fees.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Timothy Bolt (“Plaintiff” or “Bolt”) seeks an order from this
Court determining that Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(“MetLife”) arbitrarily and capriciously terminated his disability payments under a
long-term disability plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”).
I.
Bolt’s Benefits Under the ERISA Plan
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Honeywell International, Inc.
(“Honeywell”) from 1996 until 2003. (“AR,” Docs. ## 25–35, at
MetBCF000661.) When Bolt left Honeywell in 2003 he was Manager of
Information Technology. (Id. at MetBCF000366.) In this position he managed
129 employees, a budget of over 1.5 million dollars, and negotiated corporate wide
contracts for service and support programs. (Id. at MetBCF000366–67.) He was
also responsible for preparing and completing operations, productivity, tactical and
strategic reports, budget oversight and planning. (Id.)
In February 2003, Bolt resigned his position with Honeywell because
of health problems. (“Compl.,” Doc. # 1, ¶ 11.) His initial symptoms included
significant pain, blindness in his left eye, blurred vision in his right eye, and
numbness and weakness on the left side of his body. (AR at MetBCF000661.)
2
Bolt’s primary care physician, Dr. Jerry Shockey, said Bolt was “unable to work
w[ith] loss of vision.” (Id. at METBCF00591.)
At the time of Bolt’s resignation, Honeywell had an ERISA-governed
Long Term Disability Benefit Plan (the “Plan”). (Id. at MetBPlan000001.) The
Plan gave MetLife discretion to determine entitlement to benefits, (id. at
MetBPlan000054), and defined disability as follows:
Disabled or Disability means that, due to Sickness or as a direct
result of accidental injury:
•
You are receiving Appropriate Care and Treatment and
complying with the requirements of such treatment; and
•
You are, during the Elimination Period and the next 24 months
of Sickness or accidental injury:
•
Unable to earn more than 80% of Your Predisability
Earnings at Your Own Occupation from any employer in
Your Local Economy; and
•
Unable to perform each of the material duties of Your
Own Occupation;
•
You are, after such period:
•
Unable to earn more than 80% of Your Predisability
Earnings at any gainful occupation for any employer in
Your Local Economy; and
•
Unable to perform the duties of any gainful occupation
for which You are reasonably qualified taking into
account Your training, education, and experience.
(Id. at MetBPlan000022.) Thus, for the first twenty-four months of sickness or
accidental injury, disability is defined in terms of the insured’s own occupation.
(Id.) After the first twenty-four months, disability is defined as the insured’s
3
ability to perform any gainful occupation for which the insured is reasonably
qualified. (Id.) Disability, as defined under the Plan, also requires the insured to
“receiv[e] appropriate care and treatment and [to comply] with the requirements of
such treatment.” (Id.)
MetLife approved Bolt’s claim for long-term disability under the
“own occupation” standard effective August 24, 2003. (Id. at MetBCF000586.)
Bolt was also approved for social security disability benefits effective August
2003. (Id. at MetBCF00071.)
In December 2003, Bolt had a pulmonary embolism resulting from a
blood clot in his lung. (Id. at MetBCF000546.) One month later he was diagnosed
with a weakened heart muscle due to inadequate blood supply and was found to
have an ejection fraction of twenty-five percent.1 (Id. at MetBCF000541,
MetBCF000521.) The ejection fraction rose three months later to between thirtyfive and forty percent and Bolt’s cardiologist, Dr. Ryk Linden, noted that Bolt was
“capable of doing sitting and sedentary activity but even this [was] somewhat
limited based on his symptoms.” (Id. at MetBCF000538, MetBCF000520.)
1
An “ejection fraction” is the percentage of blood pumped with each heart
beat. (“Opp’n,” Doc. # 47, at 3 n.1.)
4
In May 2004, Bolt submitted a Personal Profile Evaluation (“PPE”) in
which he described his day-to-day activities as well as his conditions. Bolt told
MetLife he was unable to engage in more than twenty to thirty minutes of activity
under Dr. Linden’s rest orders. (Id. at MetBCF000514.) He said he slept through
the day, was unable to do any work around the house and did not go shopping or
driving. (Id. at MetBCF000514–16.) He responded “n/a” when asked what his
hobbies were and stated that aside from his family taking him to medical
appointments, he did not leave the house. (Id.)
In January 2005, MetLife requested updated information on Bolt’s
condition because, per the Plan, Bolt now had to demonstrated he was unable to
work in “any gainful occupation” to continue receiving benefits. (Id. at
MetBCF000497; see also id. at MetBPlan000022.) Bolt submitted a new PPE
dated January 30, 2005, in which he reported suffering consistent with his May
2004 PPE. When asked to provide a detailed description of his daily routine, Bolt
stated:
I wake up at varied times—in the AM I get up, take care of my
personal hygiene needs, take AM medication, and return to bed. In
the PM I eat one meal, take meds, and return to bed.
(Id. at MetBCF000484.) He claimed to sleep so much because of the fatigue he
experienced when awake and “performing minimal functions.” (Id. at
5
MetBCF00484–86.) He restated that he did not shop and did not drive “unless
there is no other means of travel.” (Id.) Bolt submitted an attending physician
statement (“APS”) from Dr. Linden which stated that Bolt could only sit two hours
a day intermittently, and could not stand or walk and was unable to work. (Id. at
MetBCF000477–79.) Dr. Linden also stated that Bolt’s “activities of daily living
are substantially limited by his fatigue and loss of stamina.” (Id.) Based on these
documents, MetLife approved Bolt’s claim for continuing benefits under the “any
occupation” standard in the plan. (Id. at MetBCF000474.) MetLife continued to
pay benefits to Bolt for three years while receiving periodic updates on Bolt’s
condition.
II.
Termination of Benefits
In January 2008, MetLife received a tip on its confidential fraud
hotline that Bolt was “very active and rides [his] motorcycle with [a] club.” (Id. at
MetBCF000124, 135.) MetLife referred Bolt’s claim to its Special Investigations
Unit and hired private investigators Bonnamy & Associates to perform surveillance
on Bolt. (Id. at MetBCF000704, 727–37.)
The first round of surveillance was conducted on January 27, 28, and
29. (Id.) The surveillance video, which the parties provided to the Court, shows
Bolt grocery shopping. Bolt is seen pushing a cart full of groceries to his vehicle
6
and helping load the back of the vehicle with groceries. He and his companion
enter the vehicle, and Bolt drives away.
After reviewing the January surveillance, MetLife conducted a second
round of surveillance from February 15–17, 2008. (See id at MetBCF000124, 135;
MetBCF000743–53.) Video surveillance from February 16, 2008 shows Bolt
squatting in his garage near his motorcycle. Video surveillance from February 17,
2008 shows Bolt driving on a seven hour and thirty minute, 170-mile motorcycle
trip with a passenger and a group of friends. The latter video shows that the group
took periodic breaks during the trip. (See id. MetBCF000364–65, 753.)
After reviewing the video surveillance, MetLife telephoned Bolt and
requested further information on March 7, 2008, including an updated PPE and
APS. (Id. at MetBCF000126.) During that phone conversation, Bolt stated that his
condition had not changed. (Id.)
One month after his motorcycle trip, Bolt completed and submitted
another PPE for MetLife. (Id. at MetBCF 000389–94.) Bolt claimed that his
medical conditions caused “fatigue, dizziness, shortness of breath, pain (foot, leg,
hip, lower back, shoulders, arm, hand, neck).” (Id.) He described his daily
activities as follows:
7
Morning Hygiene, Shower, Shave, Brush Teeth, Eat Morning Snack
(Toast), Lay in bed till dinner, Back to Resting, Converse with wife
and sleep between 8 & 10 pm. I make doctors appts as early in the
day as possible.
(Id. at MetBCF000390.) Bolt added that his wife drove him on trips “outside of
local” but that he had “not traveled any distance recently.” (Id. at
MetBCF000392.) In response to the question of whether there had been “[a]ny
change in the distance or time you travel,” Bolt responded “I don’t travel.” (Id.)
Bolt further stated that he was not involved in any activities or hobbies, nor was he
“[a]ctive with family, church, social or other groups.” (Id. at MetBCF000392–93)
Bolt also stated that he did not shop. (Id. at MetBCF000392.) With his PPE, Bolt
submitted another APS from Dr. Linden which stated that Bolt had severe
cardiomyopathy and an ejection fraction of twenty-five percent. (Id. at
MetBCF000413.) Dr. Linden opined that Bolt could only sit for two hours
intermittently during the day and could not stand or walk more than intermittently.
(Id. at MetBCF000414.) Dr. Linden also stated that Bolt was unable to twist, bend,
or stoop due to “short[ness] of breath, fatigue, chronic severe pain, lack of
stamina.” (Id.)
After receiving Dr. Linden’s APS, MetLife faxed a copy of the
surveillance report to Dr. Linden on April 15, 2007. (Id. at MetBCF000131–33.)
8
MetLife explained that it did not believe that his report was consistent with the
video surveillance and asked for comment. (Id.) MetLife stated that if it did not
hear back within a week it would “take that to mean that your patient has the
ability to do his light duty occupation as IT Manager.” (Id.) Dr. Linden did not
respond. (Id. at MetBCF000140.)
Subsequently a MetLife nurse consultant reviewed Bolt’s claims and
agreed that Bolt’s activities were inconsistent with his self-reported limitations.
(Id. at MetBCF000134–36.) MetLife’s Claim Specialist then evaluated all the
information in Bolt’s claim file and concluded that he was not entitled to
continuing benefits under the plan’s “any occupation” standard. (Id. at
MetBCF000139–40.) By letter dated May 15, 2008, MetLife notified Bolt that his
benefits under the Plan were terminated. (Id. at MetBCF000386–88.) MetLife
stated that Bolt “no longer met the plan definition of total disability from your job
based on your observed activities of having the ability to fix, maintain and ride
your motorcycle around town and on road trips.” (Id.) MetLife also stated that the
surveillance was inconsistent with the restrictions described in Dr. Linden’s APS
and Bolt’s PPE. (Id.)
9
III.
Bolt’s Appeals
On or about November 5, 2008, Bolt’s counsel filed a timely appeal of
the May 15, 2008 decision. (Id. at MetBCF000359–62.) Bolt included an affidavit
and additional medical records with his appeal. (Id.) Bolt explained that the
motorcycle ride was taken by a group of older adults with health issues and
stopped for breaks every hour or so.2 (Id. at MetBCF000363–66.) Bolt also
submitted a new APS from Dr. Linden which echoed his May APS except that it
stated Bolt could only sit for one hour a day, and even then, only intermittently.
(Id. at MetBCF000371, 414.) Bolt submitted further evidence, mostly from Dr.
Linden, which suggested his ejection fraction was at thirty-eight percent and that
he had decreased blood pressure when he stood up. (Id. at MetBCF000377.)
As a part of the appeal process, MetLife had a second nurse consultant
review the file. (Id. at MetBCF000148–54.) She concluded that Dr. Linden’s
restrictions were inconsistent with Bolt’s documented functionality. (Id. at
MetBCF000153.) MetLife also obtained an independent medical review by a
board-certified cardiologist, Dr. Michael Rosenberg, who reviewed Bolt’s medical
records dating back to 2003 and the surveillance video. (Id. at MetBCF000330.)
2
Bolt also explained that Dr. Linden did not respond as a result of MetLife’s
“underhanded” tactics in video recording him. (AR at MetBCF00067.)
10
Dr. Rosenberg then twice attempted to contact Dr. Linden for comment but never
received a response. (Id. at MetBCF000331.)
Dr. Rosenberg subsequently issued an assessment to MetLife based on
the information provided to him. (Id. at MetBCF00033.) The assessment
reviewed Bolt’s medical history and commented that it was a “complicated one.”
Dr. Rosenberg went on to state as follows:
The claimant was observed working in his garage on a motorcycle
repair, was noted to make fluid movements at all times, carrying items
that appeared to be of moderate weight, walking freely, and carrying
and loading groceries into a truck. He was noted to ride a motorcycle,
as well as drive other vehicles, and was seen to be taking a “road trip”
with other motorcycle riders. The patient remained active for many
hours at a time.
At all times, his movements appeared fluid, unlabored, and consistent
with at least a medium level of activity, tolerating this for hours at a
time. From the surveillance videotapes made in January and February
2008, it becomes clear that the claimant was capable of doing
mechanical work on his motorcycle, riding the motorcycle, loading
groceries, and at least capable of medium work. The activities
observed are clearly inconsistent with the presence of an objectively
assessed significant functional impairment precluding the employee
from performing a sedentary or light job.
(Id. at MetBCF000332.) Dr. Rosenberg then responded to a series of questions
submitted to him by MetLife as follows:
1.
Does the medical information support functional limitations
(physical) beyond 05/16/08 on going? Functional limitations include
any reduction in the ability to work full time.
11
Based upon the information reviewed, the medical information does
not support functional limitations beyond 05/16/08. . . .
3.
If no, please describe . . .
The claimant has demonstrated fluid activity on the surveillance tapes.
His ejection fraction has been stable since his unrecognized anterior
wall myocardial infarction that occurred presumably in the time frame
between 2003 and 2004. His ejection fractions have been stable in the
30% to 40% range throughout that period of time and he has had no
findings of congestive heart failure. Furosemide has been
discontinued. He is not shown to have any objective evidence of
ongoing myocardial ischemia.
(Id. at MetBCF000332–33.)
MetLife then faxed Dr. Rosenberg’s assessment to Dr. Linden and Dr.
Shockey for comment. (Id. at MetBCF000321–24.) Dr. Shockey responded he
had not seen Bolt in over a year. (Id. at MetBCF000326.) Dr. Linden did not
respond.
Similarly, MetLife had Dr. George Yanik, a board-certified
ophthalmologist, review Bolt’s file. (Id. at MetBCF000336–40.) Dr. Yanik began
by noting that “all records referred to in the ophthalmologic records in regard to
Mr. Bolt are five years old, and as such, any change in his visual status cannot be
inferred or estimated based upon five-year old records.” (Id. at MetBCF000337.)
Dr. Yanik went on to review Bolt’s medical history before assessing the impact of
the surveillance video, stating as follows:
12
While [the video] shows that Mr. Bolt . . . has sufficient visual acuity
to operate a motor vehicle at present, the objective notes which detail
what the visual acuity is are not in evidence in the medical record.
Additionally, the operation of a motor vehicle, either in motorcycle or
car, does prove that he has sufficient visual activity to drive, it does
not in itself prove he has sufficient physical stamina to return to work.
Since driving, either a car or motorcycle, is relatively a sedentary
activity, many patients who have significant medical impairment are
able to do so without difficulty since very little strenuous work is
required to operate such a vehicle. As to the other comorbid
conditions that Mr. Bolt experiences . . . these would best be reviewed
by a cardiologist or internal medicine specialist more in tune with
those diagnoses.
(Id. at MetBCF000337.) In response to questions asked by MetLife, Dr. Yanik
responded as follows:
1.
Does the medical information support functional limitations
(physical) beyond 05/16/08 on going? Functional limitations include
any reduction in the ability to work full time.
As to his visual acuity, which is the reason for this evaluation, the
surveillance videos do show that he has sufficient visual acuity to
operate a motor vehicle safely, whether it be a motorcycle or a motor
vehicle. As to other physical limitations of a medical nature that Mr.
Bolt may have, which include his cardiac status, these are beyond the
scope of this review. . . . Finally, as to Mr. Bolt’s ongoing present
visual status, this cannot be commented upon since the records I
received for review are over five years old.
2.
If yes, specify the types of limitations the claimant would have.
Describe the specific clinical findings/data noted in the records in
support of functional limitations. . . .
13
What can be seen from the five-year-old record is that Mr. Bolt does
have a significant impairment of vision of his left eye. I have no
doubt that this has remained as such and has not improved given the
extent of damage to the macula of that eye as a result of the choroidal
neovascular membrane. As to the right eye, it is unknown to this
reviewer based on the available information . . . . Therefore, any
greater specificity into the limitation [sic] his vision would be
speculation and not belong in an objective report.
(Id. at MetBCF000338.) Dr. Yanik concluded:
What can be stated from the medical record present and the
surveillance video, is that Mr. Bolt does have sufficient visual acuity
to operate safely a motor vehicle and/or motorcycle. As such, whether
this translates on his being able to return to work from a visual
standpoint, the answer is he could return to work. [As to his cardiac
status,] that will be reviewed by the cardiologist and commented upon
by that specialist.
(Id. at MetBCF000340 (emphasis added).)
MetLife also conducted an employment analysis, which identified
several occupations, all sedentary, that Bolt could perform based on his education
and training and that would meet the plan’s eighty percent of pre-disability
earnings requirement. (Id. at MetBCF000304–05.)
By letter dated January 14, 2009, MetLife upheld its decision to
discontinue Bolt’s benefits. (Id. at MetBCF000298–302.) MetLife summarized
Dr. Rosenberg and Dr. Yanik’s decisions and relied upon them in reaching its
conclusion. (Id.) MetLife, nonetheless, provided Bolt with another opportunity to
14
appeal its decision with respect to Bolt’s ophthalmological condition given that the
information on file was over five years old. (See id. at MetBCF000301.)
By letter dated July 9, 2009, Bolt appealed MetLife’s decision that he
was not disabled based on his ophthalmological condition. (Id. at
MetBCF000282–83.) With this letter, Bolt provided medical documentation from
2007 through 2009 which established a diagnosis of “recurrent central serous
retinopathy (CSR) in the right eye and a history of vascular occlusion in the left
eye.” (Id. at MetBCF000285.) The CSR was first diagnosed in March 2003; Bolt
lost the central vision of his left eye to wet abnormal macular degeneration and has
had CSR in his right eye since March 2003. (See id. MetBCF000284–97.) Bolt’s
subjective complaints relating to the ophthalmic conditions, including pain and
blurred vision, are similarly reflected in these retinology records. (See id.)
In response to this appeal, MetLife referred Bolt’s file to Dr. Gary
Edwards, another board-certified ophthalmologist, for further independent medical
review. (Id. at MetBCF000270–73.) Dr. Edwards reviewed and summarized the
medical documentation submitted by Bolt. (Id. at MetBCF000271.) Dr. Edwards
summarized Bolt’s 2009 visits to his own ophthalmologist, Dr. Jamie Gaitan, as
follows:
15
On 05/04/09, [Bolt] was seen by Dr. Jaime Gaitan. His vision then
was found to be 20/30 in the right eye and 20/400 in the left eye, and
there is a note made that there is a suspicion of fluid near the optic
nerve in the right eye. His last visit was on 6/15/09 by Dr. Gaitan. He
found no [CSR] in the right eye and poor vision in the left eye due to
old choroidal neovascularization effects in the left. The visions at that
time were 20/30 in the right and counting fingers of two feet in the
left.
(Id. at MetBCF000271.) Dr. Edwards also reached out to Dr. Gaitan who opined
that Bolt “was able to function in his original job as far as his ophthalmological
status [] was concerned.” (Id.) In response to MetLife’s specific questions, Dr.
Edwards responded as follows:
1.
Does the medical information support functional limitations
(physical) beyond 05/16/08 on going? Functional limitations include
any reduction in the ability to work full time.
No. . .
3.
If no, please describe . . .
The patient works at a sedentary job as an IT manager. This involves
looking at a computer monitor. He has good vision in his remaining
right eye compatible with doing this type of work. In fact, there are
blind people who do excellent IT work.
(Id. at MetBCF000272.) Dr. Edwards concluded that Bolt “has had numerous
visits with the retinologists. They all support the fact that he has very good vision
in his right eye and poor vision in his left eye. This is compatible with working at
sedentary work.” (Id. at MetBCF000273.)
16
On August 20, 2009, MetLife upheld its May 15, 2008 termination of
Bolt’s benefits. (Id at MetBCF000257.)
On January 13, 2010, Bolt filed his Complaint with this Court.
(See Doc. # 1.) On September 27, 2010, Bolt filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (“Mot.,” Doc. # 41.) On December 6, 2010,
MetLife filed its Response to the Motion. (“Resp.,” Doc. # 47.) On December 29,
2010, Bolt filed his Reply. (“Reply,” Doc. # 51.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under ERISA § 502, a beneficiary or plan participant may sue in
federal court “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004). The ususal legal standard for summary
judgment motions does not apply where the Court is asked to review an ERISA
plan administrator’s decision. Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL
3796177, at * 4 (9th Cir. August 26, 2011); see also Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co.,
185 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds by Abatie v. Alta
Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Instead, a
motion for summary judgment is “merely the conduit to bring the legal question
17
before the district court and the usual tests of summary judgment . . . do not apply.”
Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 942.
A claim of denial of benefits in an ERISA case “is to be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989); Montour v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 588 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir.
2009). If the plan confers such discretion, then the denial is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 110–11 (2008)
(“Glenn ”).
“Commonly, . . . the same entity that funds an ERISA benefits plan
also evaluates claims, as is the case here.” Montour, 588 F.3d at 630 (citing Glenn,
489 U.S. at 108, 111–12). In these circumstances “the plan administrator faces a
structural conflict of interest: since it is also the insurer, benefits are paid out of the
administrator’s own pocket, so by denying benefits, the administrator retains
money for itself.” Id. “[A] reviewing court must take into account the
administrator’s conflict of interest as a factor in the analysis.” Id. (citing Glenn,
489 U.S. at 108, 111–12). The existence of a conflict, however, does not alter the
standard of review, but instead affects only its application. Id. at 631; see also
18
Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863, 868 (9th
Cir. 2008). If a conflict exists, “abuse of discretion review applies” and “that
conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of
discretion.” Abatie, 458 F.3d at 965 (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see also Harlick, 2011 WL 3796177, at *4. In effect, the review the court
conducts will be “tempered by skepticism.” Harlick, 2011 WL 3796177, at *4.
An administrator can mitigate a conflict “by walling off claims
administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by imposing management
checks that penalize inaccurate decision making irrespective of whom the
inaccuracy benefits.” Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117. In addition, “[w]hen an
administrator can show that it has engaged in an ongoing, good faith exchange of
information between the administrator and the claimant, the court should give the
administrator's decision broad deference . . . .” Abatie, 458 F.3d at 972 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In sum, then, a “court must consider numerous case-specific factors,
including the administrator’s conflict of interest, and reach a decision as to whether
discretion has been abused by weighing and balancing those factors together.”
Montour, 588 F.3d at 630 (citing Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 116–19). Factors that
frequently arise in the ERISA context include whether the fiduciary failed to
19
investigate a claim adequately or ask the plaintiff for necessary evidence, whether
the fiduciary failed to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, and whether the
fiduciary’s decision is against the weight of evidence in the record. Abatie, 458
F.3d at 972. Other factors courts have found relevant include whether the
administrator acknowledged or distinguished a contrary disability determination by
the Social Security Act (“SSA”), Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118, whether the administrator
presented outside medical reviewers with all the relevant evidence, id., and
whether the administrator conducted an in-person medical evaluation or relied
instead on a paper review, Montour, 588 F.3d at 630.
DISCUSSION
I.
Structural Conflict
The parties spend much of their briefing debating the extent to which
the Court should afford deference to MetLife’s decision because it operated under
a structural conflict of interest. (See Mot. at 6; Resp. at 13–17; Reply at 2.)
Plaintiff contends that because MetLife was both the Plan administrator and
insurer, it operated under a structural conflict of interest—i.e. MetLife both paid
benefits and decided whether to issue benefits. (Mot. at 6.) As a result, according
to Plaintiff, “the court is required to weigh a conflict of interest as a factor in abuse
of discretion review” and “must not be so deferential to MetLife in determining if
20
MetLife’s decision to terminate Bolt’s . . . benefits was arbitrary and capricious.”
(Id.) MetLife, for its part, argues that this factor is “less important” and that there
“is simply no basis to afford the mere structural conflict of interest any weight.”
(Resp. at 16.)
The presence of a structural conflict, as here, is only one of many
factors a Court considers. Montour, 588 F.3d at 630 (holding that a “court must
consider numerous case-specific factors, including the administrator’s conflict of
interest, and reach a decision as to whether discretion has been abused by weighing
and balancing those factors together.”). While the structural conflict factor must be
considered by a court, see id. at 626 (“a reviewing court must take into account the
conflict” (emphasis added)), how much weight this factor is afforded depends on
the facts and circumstances of the case. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 126 (“The conflict
of interest . . . should prove more important (perhaps of great importance) where
circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision . . . .
It should prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the
administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote
accuracy, for example, by walling off claims administrators from those interested
in firm finances, or by imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate
decision making irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.”); see also Abatie,
21
458 F.3d at 968 (“The level of skepticism with which a court views a conflicted
administrator’s decision may be low if a structural conflict of interest is
unaccompanied, for example, by any evidence of malice, of self-dealing, or of a
parsimonious claims-granting history. A court may weigh a conflict more heavily
if, for example, the administrator provides inconsistent reasons for denial, fails
adequately to investigate a claim or ask the plaintiff for necessary evidence, fails to
credit a claimant’s reliable evidence . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
Here, MetLife has produced evidence, which Plaintiff has not
disputed, that suggests the structural conflict “should prove less important” and
“perhaps [reach] the vanishing point.” Glenn, 554 U.S. at 126. MetLife has taken
steps to minimize any bias that may arise from the structural conflict of interest.
As described in a declaration provided by MetLife to the Court:
MetLife’s finances are kept completely separate from claims.
MetLife’s claims offices are geographically separate from its
finance offices.
Claims specialists do not report up to Finance Department
employees.
Finance Department employees do not make, direct, or have
any association with claim determinations.
Claims specialists do not have access to claim reserve
information
22
Claims specialists receive no compensation, awards, bonuses,
other financial benefits or performance recognition based upon either
the value or the number of the claims they deny or terminate
Claims determinations are expected to be accurate regardless of
the outcome of the determination.
MetLife administers all claims consistently, regardless of
whether the plan is funded by the employer or by MetLife.
(“Hafner Decl.,” Doc. # 48-1, at 2.) The declaration makes clear that MetLife has
taken steps to reduce the impact of the structural bias as the Court in Glenn
contemplated. 554 U.S. at 126 (“The conflict of interest . . . should prove less
important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active
steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off
claims administrators from those interested in firm finances , or by imposing
management checks that penalize inaccurate decision making irrespective of whom
the inaccuracy benefits.”). Indeed, Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence which
suggests that malice, self-dealing, or a parsimonious claims-granting history was at
issue here, and, accordingly, the Court views MetLife’s structural conflict with a
low level of skepticism. See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968 (“The level of skepticism
with which a court views a conflicted administrator’s decision may be low if a
structural conflict of interest is unaccompanied, for example, by any evidence of
23
malice, of self-dealing, or of a parsimonious claims-granting history.”).3 In sum,
the Court has considered the impact of the structural bias here and, while cognizant
of it, concludes that it should not be afforded much weight in determining whether
MetLife abused its discretion in denying Bolt’s benefits.
II.
Abuse of Discretion
As outlined above, MetLife discontinued Bolt’s benefits because it
found that Bolt’s cardiac and ophthalmic conditions did not suffice to qualify Bolt
as disabled as defined in the Plan.4 (AR at MetBCF000301.) Bolt argues that
“MetLife did not undertake a full and thorough review of Bolt’s records, and
instead based its decision on the surveillance video and report, which is insufficient
to support MetLife’s decision that Bolt is capable of work” and therefore abused its
discretion. (Mot. at 7.) The Court is not persuaded.
3
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a court should weigh a conflict
more heavily if the administrator provides inconsistent reasons for denial, fails
adequately to investigate a claim or ask the plaintiff for necessary evidence, fails to
credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, has repeatedly denied benefits to deserving
participants, or makes decisions against the weight of the evidence in the record.
Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968. None of these hallmarks of bias stemming from a
structural conflict are present here. As discussed, infra, the record instead reflects
that MetLife took steps to avoid these potential pitfalls; MetLife’s actions were
consistent with those of a disinterested plan administrator.
4
More than two years after the onset of the medical condition, disabled as
defined in the plan means the insured’s inability to perform any gainful occupation
for which the insured is reasonably qualified. (AR at MetBPlan000022.)
24
A.
Cardiac Condition
MetLife did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bolt’s cardiac
condition did not qualify him as disabled within the meaning of the Plan.
First, MetLife received an anonymous tip stating that Bolt was “very
active” and regularly took motorcycle trips with a club.5 (Id. at MetBCF000124,
135.) It is clear here that MetLife did not on its own begin an investigation of Bolt
in the hopes of finding “something” upon which to deny his claims. Bolt’s
inconsistent actions were rather independently reported to MetLife by a third party.
MetLife then hired a private party to investigate Bolt and video
surveillance revealed that Bolt was in fact fully capable of grocery shopping, as
well as taking a seven and one-half hour day trip on his motorcycle which covered
170 miles.
After the video surveillance was recorded, MetLife asked for an
updated PPE from Bolt. (Id. at MetBCF000126.) At best, Bolt’s response can be
characterized only as misleading. Bolt claimed that his medical conditions caused
“fatigue, dizziness, shortness of breath, pain (foot, leg, hip, lower back, shoulders,
5
This illustrates that MetLife did not on its own begin an investigation into
Bolt in the hopes of finding something with which to deny his claim. Bolt’s
activities were rather independently reported to MetLife by a third-party.
25
arm, hand, neck).” (Id. at MetBCF 000389–94.) He described his daily activities
as follows:
Morning Hygiene, Shower, Shave, Brush Teeth, Eat Morning Snack
(Toast), Lay in bed till dinner, Back to Resting, Converse with wife
and sleep between 8 & 10 pm. I make doctors appts as early in the
day as possible.
(Id. at MetBCF000390.) Bolt added that his wife drove him on trips “outside of
local” but that he had “not traveled any distance recently.” (Id. at
MetBCF000392.) In response to the question of whether there had been “[a]ny
change in the distance or time you travel,” Bolt responded “I don’t travel.” (Id.)
Bolt further stated that he was not involved in any activities or hobbies, nor was he
“[a]ctive with family, church, social or other groups.” (Id. at MetBCF000392–93)
Bolt also stated that he did not shop. (Id. at MetBCF000392.)
Dr. Linden’s updated APS was similarly out of sync with the video
surveillance. The APS stated that Bolt had severe cardiomyopathy and an ejection
fraction of 25 percent. (Id. at MetBCF000413.) Dr. Linden opined that Bolt could
only sit for two hours intermittently during the day and could not stand or walk
more than intermittently. (Id. at MetBCF000414.) Dr. Linden also stated that Bolt
was unable to twist, bend, or stoop due to “short[ness] of breath, fatigue, chronic
26
severe pain, lack of stamina.” (Id.) When asked to comment on the video
surveillance report, Dr. Linden did not respond.6
Across the investigative and appeal process, MetLife also had two
nurse consultants as well as one board certified cardiologist, Dr. Rosenberg, review
Bolt’s entire file. Both nurse consultants concluded that Bolt’s functionality was
inconsistent with his most recently reported medical information. (See id. at
MetBCF000134–36; MetBCF000148–54.) Dr. Rosenberg concluded similarly.
He reviewed and outlined Bolt’s medical history, including the most up to date
information provided to MetLife by Bolt and his physician, Dr. Linden. (Id. at
MetBCF000331.) Acknowledging the case was complicated, Dr. Rosenberg found
that “the medical information does not support functional limitations beyond
05/16/08 . . . .” (Id. at MetBCF000332–33.) Dr. Rosenberg explained that his
finding was based on the following facts:
6
Indeed, beginning in 2007 and during the course of the investigation and
appeal process MetLife as well as the independent medical investigators reached
out to Dr. Linden no fewer than four times for comment on his various APS reports
due to the inconsistency between the reports and the video surveillance MetLife
obtained. (See id. at MetBCF000140, MetBCF000331, MetBCF000321–24.) Dr.
Linden did not once respond or in anyway attempt to explain or justify his
opinions.
27
The claimant has demonstrated fluid activity on the surveillance tapes.
His ejection fraction has been stable since his unrecognized anterior
wall myocardial infarction that occurred presumably in the time frame
between 2003 and 2004. His ejection fractions have been stable in the
30% to 40% range throughout that period of time and he has had no
findings of congestive heart failure. Furosemide has been
discontinued. He is not shown to have any objective evidence of
ongoing myocardial ischemia.
(Id. at MetBCF000332–33.) Dr Rosenberg ultimately concluded that Bolt was
capable of engaging in sedentary or light work. Relying on Dr. Rosenberg’s
analysis, the video, the anonymous tip, and the review conducted by the two nurse
consultants, MetLife concluded that Bolt’s cardiac condition did not render him
incapable of engaging in light or sedentary work.
B.
Ophthalmic Condition
MetLife did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bolt’s
opthalmic condition did not qualify him as disabled within the meaning of the Plan.
As outlined above, MetLife received an anonymous tip, obtained
video surveillance of Bolt on a motorcycle day trip, and had two nurse consultants
conclude that Bolt’s ophthalmic condition did not render him incapable of
working. Bolt also had two independent board-certified ophthalmologists as well
as his own ophthalmologist conclude that Bolt was capable of working.
28
Dr. Yanik, the first independent board-certified opthamologist,
expressed concern over the age of the medical records at his disposal, noting that
“all records referred to in the ophthalmologic records in regard to Mr. Bolt are five
years old, and as such, any change in his visual status cannot be inferred . . . .”
(AR at MetBCF000337.) As a result, Dr. Yanik concluded, in part, that “as to Mr.
Bolt’s ongoing present visual status, this cannot be commented upon since the
records I received for review are over five years old.” (Id. at MetBCF000338.)
Dr. Yanik qualified this conclusion by also finding that “[w]hat can be stated from
the medical record present and the surveillance video, is that Mr. Bolt does have
sufficient visual acuity to operate safely a motor vehicle and/or motorcycle. As
such . . . from a visual standpoint . . . he could return to work.”7 (Id. at
MetBCF000340 (emphasis added).)
MetLife, rather than just accepting Dr. Yanik’s conclusion that Bolt
could return to work, nonetheless provided Bolt another opportunity to appeal its
7
Dr. Yanik also cautioned that “driving, either a car or motorcycle, is
relatively a sedentary activity, many patients who have significant medical
impairment are able to do so without difficulty since very little strenuous work is
required to operate such a vehicle.” (Id. at MetBCF000337.) Dr. Yanik also
explicitly stated, however, that these conditions “would best be reviewed by a
cardiologist or internal medicine specialist more in tune with those diagnoses.”
(Id.) In this case, as discussed, Dr. Rosenberg, a board certified cardiologist,
reviewed the record and concluded that Bolt was capable of working.
29
findings with respect to this conclusion and to submit further documentation.8 (See
id. at MetBCF000301.) Bolt so appealed and MetLife retained another boardcertified ophthalmologist, Dr. Edwards, to conduct another independent medical
review. Dr. Edwards reviewed the updated documentation and contacted Bolt’s
own ophthalmologist, Dr. Gaitan, who opined that Bolt “was able to function in his
original job as far as his ophthalmological status [] was concerned.” (Id. at
MetBCF000271.) Dr. Edwards concluded similarly. (Id. at MetBCF000271–73.)
Relying on the opinions of Dr. Yanik, Dr. Edwards, Dr. Gaitan, the anonymous tip,
and the review conducted by the two nurse consultants, MetLife concluded that
Bolt’s ophthalmic condition did not render him incapable of engaging in light or
sedentary work.
C.
Employment Analysis
Finally, MetLife conducted an employment analysis which identified
several occupations, all sedentary, that Bolt could perform based on his education
and training which would meet the plan’s eighty percent of pre-disability earnings
requirement. (Id. at MetBCF000304–05.) Given that all three board certified
8
Indeed, this is one instance where the record is clear that MetLife’s
structural bias had little impact on MetLife’s ultimate decision. Rather than just
resting on Dr. Yanik’s conclusion that Bolt could work and outright deny the
benefits, MetLife instead provided Bolt another opportunity to appeal its decision
and submit up-to-date ophthalmic documentation in support.
30
M.D.s who reviewed Bolt’s file concluded that Bolt was capable of doing
sedentary work, MetLife concluded that Bolt was not disabled as defined in the
Plan.9
Based on the evidence outlined above, the Court cannot conclude that
MetLife abused its discretion in determining that Bolt no longer qualified as
“disabled” as defined in the Plan and thereafter terminating his benefits.
III.
Bolt’s Arguments
A recurring theme in Plaintiff’s briefing is that MetLife and Dr.
Rosenberg “did not speak with or meet with either Mr. Bolt or his cardiologist, Dr.
Linden,” (Mot. at 7), and that MetLife did not “give [Dr. Linden] a reasonable time
frame to respond.” (Reply at 3.) The Court is not persuaded.
As noted, MetLife and Dr. Rosenberg reached out to Dr. Linden four
times for comment. Dr. Linden never responded. Neither Dr. Rosenberg nor
MetLife can be faulted for Dr. Linden’s failure to respond to their repeated
requests for comment. Indeed, Bolt’s attempts to fault MetLife for failing to obtain
the views of Dr. Linden is disingenuous at best.
9
After the first twenty-four months, disability is defined as the insured’s
ability to perform any gainful occupation for which the insured is reasonably
qualified. (AR at MetBPlan000022.)
31
Bolt also complains that the timing of MetLife’s request for comment
from Dr. Linden was unreasonable because MetLife sent “its reports to [Dr.
Linden] a week before Christmas, with a demand for response by Christmas Eve.”
(Mot. at 11; see also Reply at 3.) While it is true that MetLife sent its final request
for comment on the report provided by Dr. Rosenberg in the midst of the holiday
season, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that this was the fourth request for comment
from Dr. Linden. Given Dr. Linden’s repeated failure to respond to MetLife’s
inquiries into Bolt’s condition, the Court cannot conclude that MetLife acted
unreasonably in providing Dr. Linden the opportunity to comment for the fourth
time during the holiday season.10
Plaintiff attempts to explain away Dr. Linden’s repeated failure to
respond as disgust at MetLife’s “underhanded” tactics in video recording him.
(AR at MetBCF00067.) This explanation is misguided for multiple reasons. First,
video surveillance is widely accepted as a means of investigating potentially
fraudulent ERISA claims. See, e.g., Lacour v. Life Ins. Co of N. Am., 200 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 626 (W.D. La. 2002); Mote v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 601,
10
Indeed, even if MetLife had not sought comment from Dr. Linden on Dr.
Rosenberg’s report, the Court would be hard pressed to find such conduct
unreasonable given Dr. Linden’s repeated failure to cooperate with the
investigation.
32
609–10 (7th Cir. 2007); Giertz-Richardson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., F.
Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2008). In any event, even assuming Dr. Linden
refused to cooperate with MetLife’s investigation because of the alleged
“underhanded” tactics of video recording Bolt, MetLife was under no obligation to
accept the veracity of Dr. Linden’s report, especially in light of the video
surveillance and the assessments of Dr. Rosenberg, Dr. Yanik, Dr. Edwards, and
Bolt’s own physician, Dr. Gaitan. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord,
528 U.S. 822, 834 (2003) (“[C]ourts have no warrant to require administrators
automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s physician.”).
In short, MetLife did not abuse its discretion by failing to confer with Dr. Linden
before terminating Plaintiff’s benefits.
Bolt also complains that MetLife’s May 15, 2008 initial letter
terminating Bolt’s benefits was based solely on the video and that MetLife abused
its discretion by never explicitly stating “why the reviewer determined that the
video was entitled to greater weight than the statements of Bolt or the reports of his
treating cardiologist.” (Mot. at 7.) Bolt, however, provides no support for the
proposition that a plan administrator must explain why it discredited the evidence
provided by Bolt or Dr. Linden. In fact, relevant case law makes clear that
MetLife has no special duty to so explain. See Black & Decker, 528 U.S. at 834
33
(holding that courts may not “impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of
explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating
physician’s evaluation”). Moreover, the evidence and chronology make clear why
MetLife favored the video evidence over the evidence submitted by Bolt or Dr.
Linden. After obtaining the surveillance video which showed Bolt working on his
motorcycle, going grocery shopping, and taking a seven-and-a-half hour
motorcycle ride, MetLife reached out to Bolt to ask for another APS and PPE.
Bolt, as discussed, grossly misrepresented the impact of his conditions on his every
day life, severely undercutting his credibility. (See AR at MetBCF000389–94.)
Similarly, Dr. Linden’s report flatly stated that Bolt could at most only sit for two
hours intermittently during the day and could not stand or walk more than
intermittently. (Id. at MetBCF000414.) Moreover, Dr. Linden stated that Bolt was
unable to twist, bend or stoop due to “shortness of breath, fatigue, chronic sever
pain, [and] lack of stamina.” (Id.) Plainly Dr. Linden’s report and Bolt’s selfreporting were clearly inaccurate in light of the video surveillance. MetLife was
well within its rights to determine Bolt’s evidence was not probative of Bolt’s
actual condition.
In any event, MetLife did not simply rely upon the video surveillance
in reaching its conclusion. With respect to Bolt’s cardiac condition, MetLife relied
34
primarily on Dr. Rosenberg’s report which, as discussed, cited a variety of reasons
for concluding Bolt was capable of sedentary work. (Id. at MetBCF000332–33.)
With respect to Bolt’s ophthalmic condition, MetLife relied upon the opinions of
Dr. Yanik, Dr. Edwards, and Bolt’s own physician, Dr. Gaitan to determine Bolt
was capable of light or sedentary work. (Id. at MetBCF000271–73;
MetBCF000340.)
Plaintiff complains that MetLife did not “[d]iscuss with Bolt the video
surveillance or termination of benefits.” (Reply at 2.) This assertion, however, is
belied by the record. As discussed, Bolt requested an updated PPE from Bolt after
the video surveillance in which Bolt could have explained his trip.11 Moreover, as
Bolt recognizes in his briefing, during his appeal he submitted an affidavit
explaining “in great detail all of his activities on the video surveillance.” (Mot. at
8.) Instead, it seems Bolt’s real complaint here is not that MetLife did not provide
Bolt the opportunity to explain himself, but that MetLife did not afford Bolt’s
explanation sufficient weight. (See id. at 10.) The Court, however, cannot
conclude MetLife abused its discretion in giving little weight to Bolt’s self-serving
11
MetLife was certainly under no obligation to show Bolt the video first and
then ask for comment.
35
affidavit, especially in light of his misrepresentations on the PPE he filled out
immediately after MetLife obtained the video surveillance.
In sum, Bolt’s arguments are without merit.
IV.
ERISA Factors
As noted, a “court must consider numerous case-specific factors,
including the administrator’s conflict of interest, and reach a decision as to whether
discretion has been abused by weighing and balancing those factors together.”
Montour, 588 F.3d at 630 (citing Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 116–19). Factors that
frequently arise in the ERISA context include whether the fiduciary failed to
investigate a claim adequately or ask the plaintiff for necessary evidence, whether
the fiduciary failed to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, and whether the
fiduciary’s decision is against the weight of evidence in the record. Abatie, 458
F.3d at 972. Other factors courts have found relevant include whether the
administrator acknowledged or distinguished a contrary disability determination by
the SSA, Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118, whether the administrator presented outside
medical reviewers with all the relevant evidence, id., and whether the administrator
conducted an in-person medical evaluation or relied instead on a paper review,
Montour, 588 F.3d at 630.
36
The Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of concluding that
MetLife did not abuse its discretion. The Court has already addressed the first two
factors. With respect to the first, the impact of the structural conflict of interest,
the Court concludes for the reasons discussed supra that it should be afforded little
weight. With respect to the second factor, whether MetLife sufficiently
investigated the claim, the Court concludes that, as outlined above, MetLife’s
investigation was sufficient.
The third factor, whether MetLife asked the plaintiff for necessary
evidence, also weighs in favor of finding MetLife did not abuse its discretion.
During Bolt’s first appeal, Dr. Yanik explained that the ophthalmological record
was incomplete because it included information that was five years old. Dr. Yanik
nonetheless concluded Bolt was capable of working. MetLife, rather than just
terminating the benefits, provided Bolt with another opportunity to appeal and
invited Bolt to submit as much up-to-date evidence as he saw fit. MetLife then
reviewed that evidence before reaffirming its earlier decision.
The Court finds the next factor, whether MetLife failed to give due
consideration to credible evidence, also weighs in favor of finding MetLife did not
abuse its discretion. Bolt did not provide MetLife with any evidence it had to find
37
credible. As outlined, Dr. Linden’s APS reports were dramatically out of step with
the video surveillance as well as the other doctors’ assessments. Moreover,
MetLife permissively found that Bolt had little credibility in light of the
misrepresentations on his PPE which he provided immediately after the video
surveillance. In sum, Bolt provided little credible evidence to which MetLife
should have given weight
The next factor, whether the administrator acknowledged or
distinguished a contrary disability determination by the SSA, does not weigh in
favor of finding an abuse of discretion. While it is true that Bolt has qualified for
benefits under the SSA, as MetLife points out in its briefing, the SSA made this
determination before MetLife undertook its investigation into Bolt. Accordingly,
the SSA may very well have based its decision on Dr. Linden’s APS reports as
well as Bolt’s PPEs without the benefit of the video surveillance and subsequent
investigation.
Whether the administrator presented outside medical reviewers with
all the relevant evidence also weighs in favor of finding that MetLife did not abuse
its discretion. MetLife provided the entire file to each of its board-certified
38
doctors. When one, Dr. Yanik, protested that some of the information was
outdated, MetLife reached out to Bolt to provide up-to-date information. This
factor weighs in favor of finding that MetLife did not abuse its discretion.
The final factor, whether MetLife conducted a paper only review, is
the only factor which can be said to weigh in Bolt’s favor. The Court, however,
cannot conclude, looking at all the evidence before it and weighing all the
appropriate factors, that MetLife abused its discretion based on this factor alone.
V.
Attorney’s Fees
In his Motion, Bolt also requested an award of attorney’s fees. (Mot.
at 13–14.) The Court finds that this request was premature as the Court had not yet
reached a decision on Bolt’s Motion for Summary Judgment when it was filed.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Bolt’s request for an
award of attorney’s fees. Bolt is invited to refile his request, if he so chooses, in
light of the Court’s decision to deny his Motion for Summary Judgment.
39
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Timothy
Bolt’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 41). The Court also DENIES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Request for an Award of Attorney Fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 9, 2011.
_____________________________
DAVID ALAN EZRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Bolt v. Honeywell International, Inc., et al., CV. NO. 10-00071 DAE-RLP;
ORDER: (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY BOLT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY BOLT’S REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES
40
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