Fuller v. Maricopa County Community College District

Filing 96

ORDER granting 79 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 92 Motion to Strike and 94 Motion to Stay. The Clerk shall please enter judgment for defendant on all claims. Signed by Judge John W Sedwick on 4/23/2012. (LFIG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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DIANA J. FULLER,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT,

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Defendant.
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2:10-cv-00288 JWS
ORDER AND OPINION
[Re: Motion at Docket 79]

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I. MOTION PRESENTED
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At docket 79, defendant Maricopa County Community College District (“the
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District” or “defendant”) moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 56. Plaintiff Diana J. Fuller (“Fuller” or “plaintiff”) opposes the motion at
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docket 82. Defendant’s reply is at docket 93. Oral argument was requested, but would
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not assist the court.
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At docket 92, the District moves to strike the affidavits of Raul S. Monreal, Jr.,
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Jean Ann Abel, and Rosemary Kesler. Fuller opposes the motion and moves to defer
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consideration of defendant’s motion for summary judgment at docket 94. The District’s
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reply is at docket 95.
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II. BACKGROUND

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Fuller was hired by the District in 1984 to teach office education and word

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processing.1 Fuller held both a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree. The District

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used a salary schedule to determine compensation for instructors. Placement on the

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schedule was a function of the minimum qualifications for the position–that is, an

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instructor could be placed on the salary schedule by virtue of having a master’s degree,

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or for some positions, a bachelor’s degree and sufficient experience. Horizontal

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movement on the schedule was a function of hours earned towards an advanced

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degree. Vertical movement was based on years of relevant experience.

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When she was hired, plaintiff was placed at Step 6 of the 1984-1985 salary

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schedule, and her salary was $26,596.2 Fuller maintains that she was placed at Step 6

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based on her bachelor’s degree and work experience, which moved her to the

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maximum vertical placement for a new hire. The District argues that her master’s

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degree placed her on the schedule and that her considerable work experience placed

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her at Step 6 which was the maximum for a new hire.

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Minimum requirements for a faculty position varied based on whether the

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courses to be taught were classified as “academic” or “occupational.” Plaintiff maintains

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that she was hired as an occupational instructor; defendant maintains that she was

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hired as a dual discipline instructor. Academic courses required a master’s degree.

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Occupational courses required a bachelor’s degree and a certain level of experience.

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Both parties agree that word processing was occupational. The parties disagree as to

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whether office education was occupational or academic.

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In 2001, Fuller filed a salary appeal, based on her salary placement at the time of
her hire. The appeal was dismissed because the Residential Faculty Policy Manual

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See, e.g., Doc. 78-1 at 22.
Doc. 78-1 at 67, Doc. 78-3 at 13.

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(“RFP”) in place when she was hired did not provide for a salary review process. Fuller

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then submitted a complaint to Phil Randolph (“Randolph”), the District’s Vice-Chancellor

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of Human Resources. Randolph ultimately concluded that Fuller’s master’s degree was

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applied to meet the minimum qualification to teach an academic course as a dual

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discipline instructor. In a June 14, 2004 written complaint to the District, Fuller identified

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several women who received the salary credit for their master’s degrees that Fuller

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sought.3 Fuller filed a charge of discrimination with the Arizona Civil Rights Division in

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2004, which was forwarded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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(“EEOC”). In her written charge, Fuller identified three men and four women who

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received salary adjustments based on their master’s degrees.4
Fuller initially filed suit in Arizona state court, in 2005, alleging that she was

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discriminated against on the basis of sex. Her complaint incorporated by reference

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allegations that both men and women received the salary adjustments that she sought.5

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Ultimately, Fuller voluntarily dismissed that complaint. In 2009, Fuller filed a charge of

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discrimination with the EEOC. Fuller did not identify any women who received salary

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adjustments based on their master’s degree, but the factual premise of her

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discrimination claim was identical. The EEOC declined to investigate beyond a

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preliminary review, and Fuller received a right-to-sue letter.6

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Fuller filed the present lawsuit in February 2010, alleging violations of Title VII,
the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, and the Equal Pay Act.

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Id. at 5, 6.

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Doc. 28-1 at 10.
Doc. 28-1 at 3, 10.
Doc. 78-3 at 17.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”7 The materiality

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requirement ensures that “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the

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suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”8

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Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a reasonable

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jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”9 In resolving a motion for summary

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judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party.10 The reviewing court may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of

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witnesses.11 The burden of persuasion is on the moving party.12
IV. DISCUSSION

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A. Fuller’s Title VII Claim
Under the McDonnel-Douglas13 framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima

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facie case of sex discrimination. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that 1) she is a

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member of a protected class, 2) that she was qualified for the position she held, 3) she

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was subject to an adverse employment action, and 4) similarly situated individuals

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outside her protected class were treated more favorably.14 If the plaintiff is successful,

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then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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Id.

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
McDonnel-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See, e.g., Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000).

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discriminatory reason for the disparate treatment.15 The burden then shifts back to the

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plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.

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The first two elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case are not in dispute. Fuller is

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female, and the District does not argue that she was unfit for any position she held from

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1984 until 2003. The District’s primary argument is that Fuller is unable to satisfy the

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fourth prong. The District maintains that Fuller admitted that both men and women were

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treated more favorably than she was. The District also argues that the two men who

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plaintiff identifies as having received more favorable treatment were not similarly

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situated. Although Fuller maintains that the District “has not disputed the first three

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elements”16 of Fuller’s prima facie case, if the District’s version of the facts is correct,

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then the third element–an adverse employment action–would not be met.

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1. Adverse Employment Action

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The first question is whether Fuller has established that she was subjected to an

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adverse employment action. This depends on whether she was hired to teach

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academic and occupational courses or only occupational courses. The District

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maintains that office education was an academic course. Fuller maintains in her

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response that office education was occupational. If the course was academic, then

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plaintiff’s master’s degree was a minimum qualification and should not have been taken

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into account for purposes of salary advancement. If it was occupational, then plaintiff’s

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master’s degree would have rendered her eligible for salary increases that she did not

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receive.

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The District cites, among other things, the 1984-1986 RFP and the April 1981

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Hiring Qualifications for Faculty.17 Fuller maintains that the 1981 Hiring Qualifications

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would not have been in place in 1984 when she was hired and cites documents that

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Id. at 1123–24.
Doc. 82 at 7.
Doc. 78-1 at 42, 73.

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were seemingly created in 2003 and 2004 to support her position that office education

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was an occupational course at the time of her hire.18 The District also cites Fuller’s

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deposition, in which she stated that one course that she was hired to teach was

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academic.19 Even viewing the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to Fuller,

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Fuller’s admission that she was hired to teach an academic course in addition to an

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occupational course is fatal to her Title VII claim. Because Fuller has recognized that

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she was hired to teach an academic course in addition to an occupational course,

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summary judgment in defendant’s favor is appropriate as a matter of law based on a

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failure to satisfy the third element of a prima facie case under McDonnel-Douglas–Fuller

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was not subjected to an adverse employment action because instructors hired to teach

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academic courses were required to have a master’s degree.

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2. Similarly Situated Employees

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Even if the court were to ignore Fuller’s concession that she was hired as a dual

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discipline instructor, Fuller has also conceded that both women and men received the

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salary adjustment she sought. Fuller argues formally that two male faculty members,

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Charles Esparza (“Esparza”) and David Cost (“Cost”) received horizontal salary

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advancements for having master’s degrees. The District argues, however, that plaintiff

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has admitted (many times under oath) that both men and women received more

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favorable treatment in the form of salary adjustment based on their master’s degrees.

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The District also argues that neither Esparza nor Cost were similarly situated to Fuller.

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Plaintiff stated at her deposition that she believed three women received salary

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adjustments as a result of their master’s degrees.20 Although Fuller maintains that

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those women were not employed at the same campus, that distinction is immaterial.

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The women that Fuller identified as having received salary adjustments based on their

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Doc. 83-2 at 2, 5, 23.
Doc. 93-1 at 3–4.
See, e.g., doc. 78-1 at 30–34.

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master’s degrees were employees of the District whose salaries were determined

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according to the same criteria.21 Finally, the District has presented evidence that only

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one other person–a woman named Mary Long (“Long”)–was hired as a dual discipline

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instructor in 1984.22 Long had a slightly higher starting salary than Fuller, even though

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Fuller was at a higher vertical position on the pay chart, due to horizontal placement.

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The District included an unsupported footnote in its motion explaining that Long

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received horizontal credit on the salary chart based on a second master’s degree.23 If

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that is correct, then it lends further support to the conclusion that Fuller’s salary was

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properly determined and that her master’s degree was used as the minimum

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qualification to teach an academic course as a dual discipline instructor, and therefore

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that Fuller suffered no adverse employment action. If that is not correct, and Long

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received horizontal credit for having a master’s degree, then Long’s salary adjustment is

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fatal to Fuller’s Title VII claim because she is a similarly situated women who would

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have received the very treatment Fuller sought.

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Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and summary

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judgment in defendant’s favor is appropriate with respect to plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

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B. Fuller’s Other Claims

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Fuller argues that the District violated the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. However,

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as the District points out, the Act functioned to define when an unlawful employment

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practice occurs with respect to discriminatory compensation.24 The Ledbetter Act did

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not create a new federal cause of action.

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See Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Svc., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[E]mployees need not be identical; they must simply be similar in all material respects.”)
(internal quotations omitted).

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Doc. 78-1 at 92.
Doc. 79 at 5 n.6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).

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Fuller also alleges that the District violated the Equal Pay Act.25 “In an Equal Pay

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Act case, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination

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by showing that employees of the opposite sex were paid different wages for equal

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work.”26 Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the work in question was “substantially

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equal.”27 Here, however, Fuller has not shown that any pay disparity could be

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categorized by sex. For instance, Long, the only other dual discipline instructor hired in

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1984, was given a starting salary of approximately $2000 more than Fuller. That is

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almost exactly the same difference between Fuller’s annual salary at the end of her

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employment and the salaries of Ray Esparza and David Cost.28 Fuller therefore has not

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made out a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Pay Act.

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C. Motions at Dockets 92 & 94

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Although Fuller’s argument that the District’s motion to strike violates Local

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Rule 7.2 appears to have merit, the affidavits of Raul S. Monreal, Jr., Jean Ann Abel,

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and Rosemary Kesler do not bear on the conclusions reached above.29 Although the

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affidavits support Fuller’s contention that her initial salary placement was based on her

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bachelor’s degree and relevant work experience, as opposed to her master’s degree,

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the content of those affidavits does not alter the fact that Fuller has acknowledged that

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several women received horizontal salary credit for their master’s degrees. At most

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then, the affidavits suggest that Fuller’s initial salary placement may have been error.

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Erroneous calculations are not contemplated by Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.

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Consequently, the District’s motion to strike and Fuller’s motion to delay consideration

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of the District’s motion for summary judgment are moot.

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See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

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Stanley v. Univ. of So. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1073–1074 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Id. at 1074.
Compare doc. 78-1 at 92 with doc. 82 at 13–14.
See LRCiv. 7.2(m)(2).

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V. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons above, defendant’s motion at docket 79 for summary judgment

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pursuant to Federal Rule 56 is GRANTED. The Clerk shall please enter judgment for

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defendant on all claims.

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The motions at dockets 92 and 94 are DENIED as moot.

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DATED this 23rd day of April 2012.

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/s/
JOHN W. SEDWICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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