Dixon v. Pinal, County of, et al

Filing 124

ORDER denying 122 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 7/11/12.(TLJ)

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Mark E. Dixon,
Plaintiff,

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No. CV-10-325-PHX-DGC
ORDER

v.
Pinal County, a political subdivision; James
Walsh, Pinal County Attorney, in his
official capacity; and Paul Babeu, Pinal
County Sheriff, in his official capacity,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Mark Dixon has filed a motion for reconsideration. Doc. 122. The

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motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3), and will be

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denied as untimely.

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A motion brought under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) must be brought “no more than a

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year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 60(c)(1). The judgment in this case was entered on July 7, 2011. Doc. 115. Plaintiff’s

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motion was filed on July 9, 2012, more than one year later. Doc. 122. The one-year time

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period of Rule 60(c)(1) is absolute and may not be extended by the Court. See The Tool

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Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 2005); Warren v. Garvin,

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219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 12 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal

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Practice, ¶ 60.65[2][a], at 60-200 (3d ed.1997)). Because Plaintiff’s motion is untimely,

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it will be denied.1
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 122) is
denied.
Dated this 11th day of July, 2012.

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Even if timely, Plaintiff’s motion would be denied. Plaintiff purports to present
newly discovered evidence that concerns the motives and actions of a superior court
judge who was never named as a defendant in this case. The Court would not have
permitted Plaintiff to amend his complaint to assert claims against this individual at the
late date of the summary judgment stage; the evidence would not have been likely to
change the disposition of this case without this individual as a defendant, and therefore
would be insufficient under Rule 60(b)(2), see Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875,
878 (9th Cir. 1990); and the evidence would not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that summary judgment was obtained in this case through fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct as required by Rule 60(b)(3), see id.
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