Kotzev v. Ryan et al

Filing 83

ORDER granting 76 defendant's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 68 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying 70 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Frederick J Martone on 4/16/13.(LSP)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Zdravko Kotzev,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Charles L. Ryan, et al.,
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Defendants.
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No. CV-10-0907-PHX-FJM
ORDER

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The court has before it defendant Ryan’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 68),

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plaintiff’s response (doc. 73), defendant’s reply (doc. 77), plaintiff’s motion for summary

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judgment (doc. 70), defendant’s response (doc. 81), and plaintiff’s reply (doc. 82). We also

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have before us defendant’s motion to exceed the page limit for his reply (doc. 76).

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After a jury trial, plaintiff was found guilty of (1) conspiracy, (2) participating in a

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criminal syndicate, (3) use of a wire communication in a drug transaction, (4) possession of

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a narcotic for sale, (5) fraudulent schemes and artifices, and (6) possession of drug

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paraphernalia. On December 9, 2005, plaintiff was sentenced to five years in prison on

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Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, two and one-half years on Count 3, and two years probation plus

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$1,350 in fines on Count 6. The sentences on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were to run

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concurrently, followed by community supervision. Plaintiff rejected probation on Count 6

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and was instead sentenced to one year imprisonment, to run concurrently with the other

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sentences. Plaintiff was released from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC)

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custody on May 8, 2009, and he completed his community supervision on January 7, 2010.

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After his release, plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the

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ADC, through its Director Charles Ryan, subjected him to unauthorized detention by

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requiring him to serve a sentence that exceeded the maximum sentence imposed by the

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sentencing court, improperly modified his sentence by requiring that he serve flat time and

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probation, discriminated against him on the basis of his ethnicity by forcing him to

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participate in the functional literacy program, denying him release credits because of his

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ethnicity and his lack of English proficiency, subjected him to double jeopardy, and

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conspired to violate his constitutional rights by participating in the alleged unconstitutional

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activity. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 41-1604.07 and A.R.S. § 31-

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229, as well as various policies of the ADC. The complaint asserts seven separate counts:

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(1) unauthorized detention and confinement, (2) conspiracy for deprivation of civil rights,

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(3) ethnic discrimination, (4) unauthorized modification of sentence, (5) double jeopardy

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violation, (6) forcible spousal-separation, and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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Plaintiff originally sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory

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and injunctive relief. In a previous order, this court dismissed counts 6 and 7, and dismissed

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all claims against Ryan in his individual capacity (doc. 29), leaving only claims against Ryan

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in his official capacity. Because claims for damages against Ryan in his official capacity are

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prohibited under the Eleventh Amendment, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

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58, 71 & n.10, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 & n.10 (1989), the only claims remaining are plaintiff’s

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claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Ryan in his official capacity. Both parties

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now move for summary judgment on all remaining claims.

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We agree with defendant that plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

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are moot. A case becomes moot when the “issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties

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lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102

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S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 2003). An inmate’s
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request for injunctive relief concerning the prison where he was incarcerated becomes moot

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once he is released from prison. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). The

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same is true for claims seeking declaratory relief. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109

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S. Ct. 202, 203-04 (1988).

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Plaintiff’s release from custody extinguishes his legal interest in injunctive or

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declaratory relief because such relief would offer him no redress. See Bernhardt v. County

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of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002). After his release, plaintiff is no longer

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subject to the prison conditions, policies, and statutes that he challenges. Therefore, we

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conclude that, because plaintiff was released from custody after serving his sentence, his

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remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.
IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s motion to exceed the page limit (doc.

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76).

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IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 68).

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IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 70).

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DATED this 16th day of April, 2012.

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