United States of America v. Arizona, State of, et al

Filing 162

RESPONSE to Motion re 154 MOTION to Dismiss Counts/Claims filed by Arizona, State of, Janice K Brewer. (Hiller, Evan)

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Thomas C. Horne (#002951)
Attorney General
David R. Cole (#004643 )
Solicitor General
Michael Tryon (#003109)
Senior Litigation Counsel
Evan Hiller (#028214)
Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926
Telephone: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
the State of Arizona
Joseph Sciarrotta, Jr. (#017481)
Office of Governor Janice K. Brewer
1700 W. Washington, 9th Floor
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Telephone: [phone]
[e-mail]
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

John J. Bouma (#001358)
Robert A. Henry (#015104)
Joseph G. Adams (#018210)
Kelly A. Kszywienski (#025578)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
One Arizona Center
400 E. Van Buren
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202
Telephone: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Defendants/
Counterclaimants

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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No. 2:10-cv-01413-SRB
The United States of America,

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Plaintiff,
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v.

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The State of Arizona, et al.,

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Defendants.

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The State of Arizona, et al.,
Counterclaimants,

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v.

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The United States of America, et al.

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Counterdefendants.

COUNTERCLAIMANTS’ RESPONSE
TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNTERCLAIMS AND
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Page

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INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

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LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 2

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ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3

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I.

Arizona Has Standing to Assert the Counterclaims ............................................... 3

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A. Arizona Is Owed Special Solicitude in Standing Analysis as a Quasi-Sovereign 4

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B. Arizona Has Established Injury-in-Fact ............................................................... 4

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C. Arizona’s Injuries Are Fairly Traceable to the Government’s Conduct .............. 6

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D. Arizona’s Injuries Are Redressable ...................................................................... 7

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II.

Arizona’s Claims Are Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel ..................................... 8

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A. Changed Facts and Circumstances Prevent Collateral Estoppel ........................... 9

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B. Arizona’s Constitutional Questions Should Be Resolved on Their Merits ........ 10

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III. The Government’s Arguments for Dismissal of the Individual Counts of the

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Counterclaims Are Unavailing ..................................................................................... 11

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A. Count I Is Reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act ....................... 11

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1.

Review of Count I Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion ... 11

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2.

Agency Action Is Required under § 706(1) and Can Be Ordered by this

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Court ..................................................................................................................... 13

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a.

The Congressional Acts at Issue Require Discrete Actions ..................... 13

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b.

Compliance with the Secure Fence Act and Other Congressional Acts Has

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Been Unlawfully Withheld and/or Unreasonably Delayed .............................. 14

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c.

This Court Can Order DHS to Take Action within Its Discretion ........... 15

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3.

DHS Has Taken Actions That Are Reviewable under § 706(2) .................. 16

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4.

Review is Available for Changes in Agency Policy or Regulations ............ 16

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B. Count II Does Not Raise a Nonjusticiable Political Question............................ 17

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1.

Application of the Political Question Doctrine Would Be Unjust ............... 17

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2.

Earlier Cases Interpreting the Invasion Clause Are Distinguishable ........... 18

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3.

Review of Count II Is Not Barred by Baker v. Carr .................................... 18

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a.

Count II Satisfies the First Baker Formulation ........................................ 19

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b.

Count II Satisfies the Second Baker Formulation .................................... 20

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c.

Count II Satisfies the Third Baker Formulation ....................................... 20

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d.

Count II Satisfies the Fourth Baker Formulation ..................................... 21

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4.

The Government Has Failed to Protect Arizona .......................................... 21

C. Count III Is Reviewable under the APA............................................................. 22

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1.

Review of Count III Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion 23

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2.

Review Is Available for Changes in Agency Policy or Regulations ........... 23

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3.

Review Is Available for Patterns of Non-Enforcement of Clear Statutory

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Language .............................................................................................................. 24

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4.

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Responsibilities..................................................................................................... 24

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D. Count IV Is Reviewable under the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Act .... 25

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1. Review of Count IV Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion .... 25

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2.

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The Government’s Policies Are a Clear Abdication of Statutory

Count IV Seeks Valid Relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act............. 26

E. Count V States a Valid Claim under the Tenth Amendment ............................. 27

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1.

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that Have Deprived Arizona of Any Right to Participate. ................................... 29

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2.

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that Have Singled Out Arizona, Leaving It Politically Isolated and Powerless... 29

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3.

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Carry Out the Executive Branch’s Objectives. .................................................... 30

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CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 32

Arizona Has Alleged Extraordinary Defects in the National Political Process

Arizona Has Alleged Extraordinary Defects in the National Political Process

Arizona Has Alleged Action by the Government that Compels Arizona to

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Defendants/Counterclaimants, the State of Arizona and Governor Janice K.

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Brewer (hereinafter collectively “Arizona”), hereby submit this Response to the

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Counterdefendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaims (hereinafter “Motion”).

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INTRODUCTION

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Arizona passed S.B. 1070 to protect its citizens from the harms associated with

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unchecked illegal immigration.

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immigration battle, 1 the United States sued to enjoin S.B. 1070, arguing that certain of

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its provisions were preempted by federal immigration law and, more particularly, by the

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Executive Branch’s current policies of inaction and non-enforcement, which underlie an

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effort to attain “immigration reform without legislative action.”

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Counterclaims against the United States, Secretary Napolitano, and Attorney General

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Holder (hereinafter collectively the “Government”), which seek injunctive, declaratory,

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and mandamus relief.

Rather than welcome Arizona’s assistance in this

Arizona filed its

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The Counterclaims are necessary to help relieve Arizona from the overwhelming

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burden imposed upon it by its illegal immigration crisis and the Government’s inaction

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and non-enforcement. Through the Counterclaims, Arizona seeks redress for:
• Failure to obtain control of the border and failure to protect Arizona (Counts I

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and II);

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• Refusal by the Government to enforce immigration laws (Counts III and V);

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• Failure by the Government to comply with the State Criminal Alien

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Assistance Program, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006 amendment) (“SCAAP”) and to

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properly reimburse Arizona for the expense of incarcerating criminal aliens

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(Count IV).

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In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “it would be unreasonable to suppose that [the
federal government's] purpose was to deny itself any help that the states may allow.”
Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 1928).
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As more fully explained in the following Memorandum, the Government’s

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motion should be denied because Arizona has standing and asserts justiciable claims that

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are not precluded for which relief should be granted.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal

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of claims for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

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jurisdiction can be “facial” or “factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

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2000). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

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complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a

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factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves,

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would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d

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1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

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12(b)(1) challenge, the Court must presume Arizona’s factual allegations are true and

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draw all reasonable inferences in Arizona’s favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066,

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1073 (9th Cir. 2009).

Challenges to subject matter

Here, because the Government asserts a facial Rule

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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a

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pleading that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” An adequately

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stated legal claim may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

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allegations in the claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A Rule

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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be denied if, taking all factual allegations in the

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complaint as true and making all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the

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complaint states a plausible claim for legal relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

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1949 (2009). If a complaint is dismissed, “leave to amend should be granted unless the

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court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

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pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

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Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

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ARGUMENT
I. Arizona Has Standing to Assert the Counterclaims 2

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The Government’s deliberate failure to secure the Arizona border and comply

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with Congressional mandates to coordinate enforcement efforts with the various states

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has directly increased the flow of illegal aliens into the State. As a result, Arizona has

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been forced to divert significant resources from its domestic concerns to battle what is a

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federal responsibility—illegal immigration. Additionally, Arizona holds all state land in

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trust for certain beneficiaries, primarily the state education system, and the rampant

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illegal immigration across the border has harmed the environment and diminished the

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value of these trust lands. Relief granted by this Court will require the Government to

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increase its efforts to address illegal immigration, thereby reducing the damage to

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Arizona’s trust lands and the costs Arizona incurs to combat illegal immigration.

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To establish standing, a claimant must demonstrate “that it has suffered a

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concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is

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fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will

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redress the injury.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007). At the pleading

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stage, a claimant may satisfy this burden by alleging general facts that, if proven, would

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establish the court’s jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

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(1992). “At bottom, ‘the gist of the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have

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‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete

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adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely

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depends for illumination.’ ” EPA, 549 U.S. at 517. This question must be answered in

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the affirmative because, as a sovereign state, Arizona is owed particular deference in this

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analysis, and Arizona has adequately alleged all of the elements of standing.

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The Government specifically argues that Arizona lacks standing to raise Counts II, III,
and V of the Counterclaims. It also appears to suggest that Arizona lacks standing to
raise Count I. See Mot. at 18 n.9.
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A. Arizona Is Owed Special Solicitude in Standing Analysis as a Quasi-Sovereign

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The Supreme Court has recognized that “States are not normal litigants for the

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purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction.” EPA, 549 U.S. at 518. As a quasi-sovereign

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in the federal system, Arizona has “an interest independent of and behind the titles of its

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citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.” Id. at 517 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn.

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Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). Arizona also has a quasi-sovereign interest in

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“the health and well-being of its residents.” Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp, 552 F.3d 965,

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971 (9th Cir. 2009).

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sufficiently concrete injury to satisfy Article III, and is especially compelling where, as

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here, it is combined with injury as a landowner. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,

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Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d Cir. 2009). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court

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recognized that the state suffered injury to its quasi-sovereign interest and its direct

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interest as a landowner because the federal government’s refusal to exercise regulatory

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power to incrementally reduce greenhouse gases created a risk of actual and imminent

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harm arising from the effect of climate change on the state’s environment. 549 U.S. at

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521.

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injury to its proprietary and financial interests because the Government refuses to take

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meaningful action to secure the border and check the tide of illegal immigration into the

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state. Arizona is therefore entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis. Id. at

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520.

Injury to Arizona’s quasi-sovereign interest constitutes a

Similarly, Arizona is suffering injury to its quasi-sovereign interest and direct

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B. Arizona Has Established Injury-in-Fact

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The unchecked flood of illegal aliens into Arizona as a result of the

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Government’s policy of non-enforcement has caused Article III injury by forcing the

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diversion of state resources to address this federal responsibility, placing Arizona

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residents at greater risk from criminal aliens, and diminishing the value of Arizona trust

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land.

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continuing policy of inaction has caused more than 40% of all illegal border crossings

The Government’s failure to secure Arizona’s border with Mexico and its

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nationwide to come through Arizona. Countercl. ¶ 2. These illegal entrants are often

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criminals fleeing the law in other countries or expanding criminal operations (such as

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drug smuggling, human smuggling, and murder) into Arizona, exposing residents of the

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state to increased danger and fear. Id. ¶¶ 40, 43. Indeed, the Government placed signs

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only 30 miles south of Phoenix, Arizona (80 miles north of the border with Mexico),

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warning residents to beware of criminal activity by illegal aliens. Id. ¶ 7.

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Arizona has also spent substantial sums of money incarcerating criminal aliens

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who have entered the country illegally. As of December 31, 2010, Arizona was housing

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over 5,700 criminal aliens in its prisons (more than 14% of its prison population), in

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addition to the criminal aliens held by local authorities. Countercl. ¶¶ 121, 122, 125.

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The Government’s refusal to take these criminal aliens into federal custody or fully

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reimburse Arizona for housing the criminal aliens in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i)

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causes further injury and exacerbates the impact of illegal immigration on the state’s

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financial health. Countercl. ¶¶ 139-146. The failure to secure the border and enforce laws

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has drastically redefined Arizona’s political climate driving public discourse, policy decisions,

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and resources toward addressing matters of federal responsibility and away from policy

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concerns important to lawful Arizona citizens. This injury to Arizona’s quasi-sovereign

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interest in securing the health and safety of its residents, together with the diversion of

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state resources to remedy the injury, provide sufficient injury in fact to establish

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Arizona’s standing in this case. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,

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379 (1982) (finding diversion of resources to remedy defendant’s conduct to be injury in

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fact).

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Arizona also establishes injury in fact based on the damage to state trust land

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caused by the wave of illegal immigration flowing across its border. Arizona holds all

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state land in trust for designated beneficiaries. Ariz. Const. art. X, § 1. The State Land

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Department manages and administers state trust lands with the goal of protecting the

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properties and maximizing their value to the trust. A.R.S. §§ 37-102(A), 37-201(A)(3).

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“The Department, through the Commissioner, has the same fiduciary obligations as does

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any private trustee: it must manage state trust lands for the benefit of the trust and its

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beneficiaries.” Koepnick v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 212 P.3d 62, 69 (Ariz. Ct. App.

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2009). As a fiduciary, state law requires the Department to take actions necessary “to

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protect the interest of the state in lands within the state.” A.R.S. § 37-102(C).

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As a result of unchecked illegal immigration, the value of Arizona trust lands has

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diminished. Countercl. ¶ 138. In FY 2008, the Bureau of Land Management collected

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over 468,000 pounds of trash from the Arizona border area. Id. ¶ 132. The passage of

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illegal aliens and criminal aliens threaten native wildlife on the trust lands and citizens

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seeking to engage in outdoor activities such as hiking and camping. Id. ¶ 133. Some of

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Arizona’s state trust lands are located along the border or lie within the Government’s

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“defense in depth” area, and are well within the 80 mile zone where the Government

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posted signs warning citizens to stay off public lands. Id. ¶ 131. Taken together, these

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conditions lower the value of the trust land both for recreational use by residents and for

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commercial development in the best interest of the trust. Thus, Arizona has established

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that it is suffering an actual injury in fact that is concrete and particularized.

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C. Arizona’s Injuries Are Fairly Traceable to the Government’s Conduct

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The Government’s failure to secure the border and its policy of non-enforcement

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have significantly contributed to the wave of illegal immigration that is injuring

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Arizona. The Government argues that this injury results from the “independent action

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of some third party not before the court” and thus does not satisfy the requirements for

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Article III standing. Mot. at 14. The Supreme Court, however, disposed of a similar

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argument when it concluded that the EPA’s failure to enact rules regulating greenhouse

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gas emissions contributed to the state’s injury, even though the EPA didn’t release the

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greenhouse gases and its regulation would be a small step in checking the international

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release of such gases. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523-24 (“EPA does not dispute the existence of

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a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.

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At a minimum, therefore, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions ‘contributes’ to

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Massachusetts’ injuries.”) (emphasis added).

The causation prong of the standing

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analysis, especially at the pleading phase, “is not equivalent to a requirement of tort

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causation.” Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 346; see also Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d

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1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “for purposes of satisfying Article III’s

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causation requirement, we are concerned with something less than the concept of

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proximate cause” and that “even harms that flow indirectly from the action in question

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can be said to be ‘fairly traceable’ to that action for standing purposes”).

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The Government’s inaction in Arizona and its failure to obtain control of the

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border as Congress has required (Countercl. ¶¶ 88-91) significantly contribute to the

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exponential increase of illegal immigration into Arizona. Just as the EPA’s reticence to

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regulate greenhouse gases was found to contribute to Massachusetts’ environmental

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injuries, so too does the Government’s reticence to protect the border contribute to

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Arizona’s injuries by allowing the growing flood of illegal immigration to spill into the

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state.

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Arizona’s own efforts to address these harms by bringing legal action to enjoin S.B.

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1070. For these reasons, Arizona’s injuries arising from illegal immigration can fairly

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be traced to the Government’s conduct.

See EPA, 549 U.S. at 524.

Furthermore, the Government has undermined

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D. Arizona’s Injuries Are Redressable

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Arizona’s injuries are capable of being redressed by (1) requiring the

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Government to reimburse Arizona for the expense of incarcerating criminal aliens as

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expressly required by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(i) and (ii), and (2) requiring the Government to

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implement immigration enforcement policies and complete construction of the border

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fence as mandated by Congress.

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A favorable decision in this case would require the Government to undertake

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effective enforcement activity along the border and would inevitably reduce the flow of

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illegal immigration into Arizona. Although the border fence and increased enforcement

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may not completely eliminate illegal immigration, the reduction would provide a

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significant step toward reducing the damage to Arizona trust land, relieve residents from

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danger and fear, and replenish at least some of the resources diverted to compensate for

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the Government’s inaction. This is sufficient to establish the redressability requirement

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of the standing analysis. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526 (noting that “[a] reduction in domestic

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emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens

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elsewhere”); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347 (“A party need only

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demonstrate that it would receive ‘at least some’ relief to establish redressability.”).

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And, just as the Supreme Court attached “considerable significance” to the EPA’s

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agreement with the President to address the issue of climate change, this Court should

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give similar weight to the Congressional goal of drastically reducing illegal immigration

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that is manifested in federal statutes such as the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.

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109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (the “Secure Fence Act”) and SCAAP. Thus, Arizona

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has established standing to assert its Counterclaims.

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II. Arizona’s Claims Are Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel

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The Government argues that Counts II, III, and V of Arizona’s Counterclaims are

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barred by collateral estoppel. However, changes to the legal and factual underpinnings

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of the mid-1990s litigation render collateral estoppel inapplicable. In addition, this case

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involves constitutional claims falling within the Moser exception to the doctrine of

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collateral estoppel.

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In 1994, Arizona filed suit against the Government seeking a judicial resolution

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of what was then a much different and less severe illegal alien crisis. The Government

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successfully resisted that suit on the basis that the issue was not one for the courts to

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decide but one that had to be resolved in the political arena. Arizona v. United States,

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104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997). Since Arizona filed

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its complaint in 1994, however, Congress has enacted various laws designed to address

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these problems, but the Government has failed to enforce them, which has only

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increased the severity of the illegal immigration problems, including significant drug

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and human smuggling activities. See, e.g., Countercl. ¶¶35-43, 110-138. In effect, the

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Government has precluded the possibility of a political resolution through fourteen years

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of inaction, thus opening the constitutional door for Arizona to take action to solve its

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problems.

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Frustrated by the Government’s inaction on resolving the increasingly severe

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illegal alien crisis, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070. In response, the Government initiated

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this litigation, which allowed Arizona to seek the redress set forth in its Counterclaims.

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Despite having hailed Arizona into court over this very same crisis, and without

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abandoning its attack on Arizona’s duly-enacted legislation, the Government now seeks

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to simultaneously hide behind the “political question” doctrine.

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A. Changed Facts and Circumstances Prevent Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel extends only to contexts in which “the controlling facts and

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applicable legal rules remain unchanged.”

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(1948). The Supreme Court has observed that “changes in facts essential to a judgment

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will render collateral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same

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issues.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 158 (1979). The Ninth Circuit has

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recognized a three-inquiry test for applying collateral estoppel: “(1) whether the issues

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presented are in substance the same in the present and prior litigation; (2) whether

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controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the prior judgment;

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and (3) whether ‘other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of

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preclusion.’ ” Richey v. IRS, 9 F.3d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Montana, 440

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U.S. at 155).

Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 600

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Here, controlling facts and legal principles have sufficiently changed since

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Arizona v. United States was decided. Illegal immigration has exponentially increased

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since the mid-1990s, with a corresponding increase in its impact on Arizona. See

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generally Countercl. ¶¶ 110-138. In 2006, the House Committee on Homeland Security

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concluded that immediate action was required to enhance security on the Southwest

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border. Id. ¶¶ 39-43. Congress has passed significant legislation intended to secure the

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Southwestern border and to encourage cooperation between federal immigration

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officials and state law enforcement, including some of the statutes under which

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Arizona’s Counterclaims arise. Id. ¶¶ 50-57, 58-63. Importantly, Counts I and IV of the

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Counterclaim are based on statutes enacted after Arizona v. United States was filed and

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obviously were not a basis for Arizona’s claims in that case. Count I is based on statutes

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enacted in 2006 and 2008.

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obligations under SCAAP’s 2006 amendments.

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collateral estoppel simply is not present here. Montana, 440 U.S. at 158. Accordingly,

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Arizona’s Counterclaims are not “in substance the same” as the legal claims raised in

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Arizona v. United States, and the Government’s motion must be denied.

Count IV seeks a declaration of the Government’s
The “factual stasis” required for

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B. Arizona’s Constitutional Questions Should Be Resolved on Their Merits
In this matter, “other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal

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rules of preclusion.”

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Arizona’s Counterclaims to resolve this matter through “a political determination”

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where, as here, the Government has expressly adopted a policy to achieve amnesty

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through inaction. Countercl. ¶¶ 102, 214.

Montana, 440 U.S. at 155.

The Court should not dismiss

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Another long-standing exception to collateral estoppel is the Moser exception:

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“Where . . . a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a

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subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law

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is otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases.” Moser v. United

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States, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924). The Supreme Court expressed concern with the

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constitutional stasis imposed by preclusion in Montana:

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Of possible relevance is the exception which obtains for ‘unmixed
questions of law’ in successive actions involving substantially unrelated
claims. . . . This exception is of particular importance in constitutional
adjudication. Unreflective invocation of collateral estoppel against parties
with an ongoing interest in constitutional issues could freeze doctrine in
areas of the law where responsiveness to changing patterns of conduct or
social mores is critical.

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440 U.S. at 162-163 (citing Moser, 266 U.S. at 242). Thus, collateral estoppel does not

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preclude the Counterclaims. 3

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III.

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Counterclaims Are Unavailing
The Government’s arguments that each of the Counterclaims’ five Counts must

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The Government’s Arguments for Dismissal of the Individual Counts of the

be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are unpersuasive.

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A. Count I Is Reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act

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The Government asserts that Count I must be dismissed as unreviewable because

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the claims “improperly seek to compel agency action which is either not required or is

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committed to the sole discretion and expertise of the agency.” However, Count I asserts

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that the Government (1) has not taken all necessary and appropriate actions to achieve

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and maintain “operational control,” (2) failed to construct 700 miles of border fencing,

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and (3) failed to comply with explicit timeframes. Countercl. ¶¶ 152, 154. These are

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claims of required agency action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” which

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are reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Count I also raises claims that agency actions

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have been taken which are, inter alia, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

19

otherwise not in accordance with law” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Countercl. ¶¶ 155-

20

156. Both aspects of Count I are reviewable by this Court under the Administrative

21

Procedure Act (the “APA”).

22
23

1. Review of Count I Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion

24
25

The Government asserts that Count I is unreviewable because it challenges a
determination that is committed to agency discretion by law.

However, courts

26
3

27
28

The Government relegates to a footnote its argument that Counts II, III and V of the
Counterclaim also are barred by res judicata because the issues could have been raised in
Arizona v. United States. Mot. at 6 n.2. For the reasons previously discussed, the
Government is incorrect in its argument that the distinct claims and issues raised by
Arizona in Counts II, III and V are barred by res judicata.
11

1

frequently review the discretionary acts of agencies for “abuse of discretion,” and that

2

phrase within the APA would be meaningless if discretionary acts were entirely

3

insulated from review. Accordingly, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that this provision

4

applies only where ‘the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful

5

standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.’ ” Spencer Enters.,

6

Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470

7

U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). Rather, “[e]ven where statutory language grants an agency

8

‘unfettered discretion,’ [the agency’s] decision may nonetheless be reviewed if

9

regulations or agency practice provide a ‘meaningful standard’ by which th[e] court may

10

review its exercise of discretion.”

11

Government conflates discretion as to the means of carrying out certain acts with the

12

discretion to not carry out those acts at all.

Id. (citation omitted).

In its argument, the

13

The Government also incorrectly argues that review is precluded because

14

“Congress has allocated a lump sum appropriation for ‘customs and border protection

15

fencing, infrastructure, and technology.’ ” Mot. at 24. The Government relies upon

16

Lincoln v. Vigil, where the Supreme Court held that APA review is unavailable where

17

“Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what

18

can be done with those funds.” 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993). This reliance is misplaced

19

because the funding allocated to “Customs and Border Protection Fencing,

20

Infrastructure, and Technology” is not a lump-sum appropriation of the type described in

21

Lincoln. Lincoln involved a legal challenge to the cancellation of a pilot program for

22

handicapped Indian children where “the appropriations Acts for the relevant period do

23

not so much as mention the Program, and both the Snyder Act and the Improvement Act

24

likewise speak about Indian health only in general terms.” Id. at 193-194. By contrast,

25

the very statutory requirements challenged in Count I were specifically created by the

26

Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, Stat. 2090-91 (Dec. 26, 2007) (the

27

“2008 Appropriations Act”).

28

Act “authorized the appropriation of all sums necessary to carry out this requirement,

Countercl. ¶¶ 50-56.

12

The 2008 Appropriations

1

and provided that such funds were to remain available until expended.” Countercl. ¶

2

56. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L.

3

No. 111-83 (Oct. 28, 2009) (the “2010 Appropriations Act”) provides funding of

4

$800,000,000 specifically for “a program to establish and maintain a security barrier

5

along the borders of the United States, of fencing and vehicle barriers where practicable,

6

and of other forms of tactical infrastructure and technology.” The Act then specifies that

7

the security barrier program must include eleven specific elements regarding reporting,

8

accounting, and planning. Id. Finally, the Act provides withholds specific funding if

9

DHS fails to comply with a requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (where the Secure

10

Fence Act and 2008 Appropriations Act are codified).

11

mismanaged these specific appropriations. For example, DHS received over $800

12

million in specific appropriations for SBInet that the Secretary unilaterally froze after

13

numerous reports of DHS’ mismanagement of the appropriations. Countercl. ¶¶ 85-87.

14

Here, Congress has clearly “circumscribe[d] agency discretion to allocate resources by

15

putting restrictions in the operative statutes,” Lincoln, 505 U.S. at 193, permitting

16

judicial review of Count I.

DHS has received and

17
18

2. Agency Action Is Required under § 706(1) and Can Be Ordered by this Court

19

The Government argues that courts can only review agency inaction if a statute

20

requires discrete acts, relying upon Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542

21

U.S. 55 (2004) (hereafter SUWA). The Government mischaracterizes SUWA’s impact

22

on this case.

23

Appropriations Act of 2010 set forth discrete, required actions for DHS. Countercl. ¶¶

24

50-57. Because these actions have been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,

25

this Court has the authority to grant the relief that Arizona seeks.

The Secure Fence Act, the Appropriations Act of 2008, and the

26
27
28

a. The Congressional Acts at Issue Require Discrete Actions
The 2008 Appropriations Act requires the Secretary to construct at least 700

13

1

miles of reinforced fencing along the Southwest border. Countercl. ¶ 55. The Act

2

further requires the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras,

3

and sensors to gain operational control of the Southwest border.

4

Appropriations Act requires DHS to create a plan “for a program to establish and

5

maintain a security barrier along the borders of the United States, of fencing and vehicle

6

barriers where practicable . . .” again with an eye towards “obtaining operational control

7

of the entire border of the United States.”

8

Government is required to perform under Congressional acts.

Id.

The 2010

These are discrete actions that the

9
10
11

b. Compliance with the Secure Fence Act and Other Congressional Acts Has Been
Unlawfully Withheld and/or Unreasonably Delayed

12

The APA demands that a reviewing court “shall . . . compel action unlawfully

13

withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (emphasis added). The Supreme

14

Court has made it clear that when a statute uses the word “shall,” Congress has imposed

15

a mandatory duty upon the subject of the command. See United States v. Monsanto, 491

16

U.S. 600, 607 (1989).

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

The Tenth Circuit has explained the distinction between actions “unreasonably
delayed” and “unlawfully withheld” under § 706(1):
[W]hen an agency is required to act – either by organic statute or by the APA
– within an expeditious, prompt, or reasonable time, § 706 leaves in the courts
the discretion to decide whether agency delay is unreasonable. However,
when Congress by organic statute sets a specific deadline for agency action,
neither the agency nor any court has discretion. The agency must act by the
deadline. If it withholds such timely action, a reviewing court must compel
the action unlawfully withheld.
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 1998).

24

Here, Congress has given the Government clear deadlines for the construction of

25

fencing and the achievement of operational control. Within eighteen months of the

26

Secure Fence Act’s passage, the Secretary of Homeland Security was required to: (1)

27

take all actions necessary and appropriate to achieve and maintain operational control of

28

the border; and (2) install physical infrastructure enhancements to facilitate access to the

14

1

border by CBP. See Secure Fence Act, § 2(a). These deadlines have passed; action is

2

now “unlawfully withheld” and this Court must order the Government to take action.

3
4

c. This Court Can Order DHS to Take Action within Its Discretion

5

“[W]hen an agency is compelled by law to act within a certain time period, but

6

the manner of its action is left to the agency’s discretion, a court can compel the agency

7

to act, but has no power to specify what the action must be.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65.

8

Arizona seeks, inter alia, that this Court order DHS to take action to achieve operational

9

control over the border and to complete 700 miles of fencing.

10

This remedy – an order to take action, without specific directions on how to act –

11

is in keeping with the history of mandamus, the predecessor to APA review that the

12

Supreme Court acknowledged in SUWA. See id. at 63. The Supreme Court has awarded

13

precisely this sort of relief. See, e.g., ICC v. U.S. ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224

14

U.S. 474, 484-85 (1912) (holding that mandamus “may be issued to direct the

15

performance of a ministerial act, but not to control discretion” and ordering the ICC “to

16

take jurisdiction, [but] not in what manner to exercise it”); U.S. ex rel. Dunlap v. Black,

17

128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (explaining that mandamus may be issued when an executive

18

officer refuses to act, even when those actions involve the exercise of discretion). 4

19

Arizona does not merely seek compliance with “a broad statutory objective.”

20

Rather, Arizona seeks a declaration that the Secretary must build 700 miles of fencing

21

and take action to achieve “operational control” of the area, which is clearly defined in

22

objective terms by the Secure Fence Act and provides a judicially manageable standard

23

for compliance. Both of these actions have adequate “specificity” to support relief from

24

this Court.

25
26
27
28

4

Further support for the availability of this type of relief is found in the 1947 Attorney
General’s Manual on the APA, which the SUWA Court cites with approval. SUWA, 542
U.S. at 63-64 (noting the Manual as “a document whose reasoning we have often found
persuasive”). The Manual states that “a court may require an agency to take action upon
a matter, without directing how it shall act.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947).
15

1
2
3
4
5
6

3.

DHS Has Taken Actions That Are Reviewable under § 706(2)
Count I further alleges that the Government has taken agency actions in violation

of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which provides as follows:
The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .

7

The Counterclaim enumerates numerous specific actions taken by DHS and by the

8

Secretary of Homeland Security which are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

9

contrary to law, and short of statutory right in violation of § 706(2). See Countercl. ¶

10

155. The Secretary of Homeland Security unilaterally froze funding of the SBInet

11

program. Id. ¶ 86. DHS cancelled the SBInet program. Id. ¶ 87. DHS reduced the 700-

12

mile requirement imposed by the 2008 Appropriations Act to a “target” of 661 miles.

13

Id. ¶ 88.

14

control” as mandated by the Secure Fence Act. Id. ¶ 89. DHS has not followed its own

15

rules with respect to the Southwest border region. Id. ¶ 156. DHS has adopted a policy

16

of “defense in depth” with respect to illegal entries that is not in keeping with

17

Congressional intent of detecting and preventing illegal entries at the point of entry. Id.

18

¶ 131. Count I thus states claims which are reviewable under the APA, and for which

19

relief can be granted under § 706(2).

DHS has chosen to monitor “effective control” rather than “operational

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

4. Review is Available for Changes in Agency Policy or Regulations
The Supreme Court has held that modifications of long-standing agency policy or
regulation are subject to scrutiny under the APA:
A ‘settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment that,
by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by
Congress. There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies will be
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.’ Accordingly, an agency
changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983)

16

1

(citation omitted).

This gives rise to a narrow review of whether the agency has

2

“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action

3

including ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Id. at

4

43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962)).

5

The Government has changed its settled behavior here. In 2007, the Government

6

recognized a Congressional mandate to achieve operational control and the necessity of

7

doing so. Countercl. ¶¶ 81-82. Secretary Napolitano reversed DHS’ commitment to

8

SBInet and cancelled the program. Id. ¶¶ 83-87. DHS abandoned the statutorily-

9

mandated standard of “operational control” as the measure of border security, choosing

10

instead to track a subjective determination of “effective control.” Id. ¶ 89. For each of

11

these changes in course, the Government must provide a reasoned analysis for review by

12

this Court—which it has not done.

13
14

B. Count II Does Not Raise a Nonjusticiable Political Question

15

Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration into this

16

country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime, 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and

17

those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1228.

18

However, despite these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons have

19

succeeded in unlawfully entering and remaining in Arizona. See Countercl. ¶¶ 35, 98,

20

111-17. Arizona enacted S.B. 1070 in an effort to address the burden that illegal aliens

21

impose on the State. By inter alia filing suit to enjoin S.B. 1070, the Government has

22

waived any claim that the issue is nonjusticiable. Even without waiver, Count II of the

23

Counterclaims satisfies the Baker formulations for justiciability. Accordingly, Arizona

24

has stated a valid claim for relief under Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution.

25
26
27
28

1. Application of the Political Question Doctrine Would Be Unjust
Here, the Government desires its affirmative claims against Arizona to be
justiciable but asserts that Arizona’s claims are nonjusticiable.

17

The Government

1

improperly attempts to use the political question issue as both a sword and a shield.

2

These abuses of the political question doctrine, combined with fourteen years of inaction

3

with respect to Arizona’s concerns, constitute a waiver by the Government of any claim

4

it may have had that these are political questions. “Thus, when the circumstances

5

require, estoppel should be permitted even when the government conduct complained of

6

was in the form of inaction or silence.” David K. Thompson, Note, Equitable Estoppel

7

of the Government, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 562 (1979) (citations omitted).

8

In addition, the Government made a conscious decision to leave the executive

9

arena and enter the judicial arena and in doing so waived any separation of powers

10

argument that it may have had. To allow it the benefit of both arenas would be to deny

11

due process and fundamental fairness to Arizona. Equitable estoppel principles also

12

prevent the Government from seeking dismissal of Arizona’s Counterclaims, because

13

the Government affirmatively sought judicial intervention and thereby consented to a

14

judicial resolution of these issues.

15
16

2. Earlier Cases Interpreting the Invasion Clause Are Distinguishable

17

Despite the judicial deference given to the executive and legislative branches in

18

connection with immigration matters, a “unique coalescing of factors” also makes this

19

case sufficiently different from prior immigration cases 5 to warrant a more searching

20

judicial scrutiny of Arizona’s Counterclaims. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977).

21

Although several cases have held claims similar to those in the Counterclaims are

22

nonjusticiable political questions, none of those cases involved a suit by the Government

23

against the state.

24
25

3. Review of Count II Is Not Barred by Baker v. Carr

26

Arizona alleges in Count II of the Counterclaim that the Government has failed to

27
5

28

See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 806 (1997); and California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997).
18

1

protect it from invasion and domestic violence. The Government asserts that Count II

2

must be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question because it runs afoul of the

3

“formulations” recognized by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

4

Mot. at 9-10. However, the political question doctrine does not allow courts to avoid

5

deciding cases merely because they have “political overtones or questions they might

6

categorize as ‘political,’ ” and “[t]he decision that a question is nonjusticiable is not one

7

courts should make lightly.” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d

8

1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, it is with increasing rarity that a case is dismissed

9

on political question grounds. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp.

10

2d 7, 65-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing academic authority regarding the questionable

11

utility of the doctrine and the scant case law applying the doctrine successfully since

12

Baker). The Supreme Court did not even mention the doctrine in its historic decision of

13

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

14

doctrine’s continuing vitality.

15

Justiciable, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1093 (2001); Lawrence Tribe, EROG v. HSUB and

16

its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170,

17

276-87 (2001).

This omission has led some to question the

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not

18

Arizona respectfully submits that a Baker determination is not necessary because

19

the Government has waived any claim or is estopped from asserting that these issues are

20

nonjusticiable political questions because it brought suit against Arizona. However,

21

even under a Baker analysis, Arizona’s Invasion Clause claims are justiciable.

22
23

a. Count II Satisfies the First Baker Formulation

24

The Government first argues that Count II runs afoul of the first Baker

25

formulation: “a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

26

department.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. However, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to

27

conclude that unlawful immigration is wholly committed to the federal government to

28

the exclusion of judicial review. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court declared that:

19

1
2
3
4

[A]lthough the State has no direct interest in controlling entry into this
country, that interest being one reserved by the Constitution to the Federal
Government, unchecked unlawful migration might impair the State's
economy generally, or the State’s ability to provide some important service.
Despite the exclusive federal control of this Nation’s borders, we cannot
conclude that the States are without any power to deter the influx of persons
entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers might have
a discernible impact on traditional state concerns.

5
6

457 U.S. 202, 229 n.23 (1982) (citation omitted). Furthermore, Article IV, § 4 of the

7

Constitution provides only that “the United States . . . shall protect . . . .” Thus, the

8

constitutional requirement to protect the States is not specifically committed to the

9

legislative, executive, or judicial branch. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“Congress

10

shall have the power . . . to establish a uniform rule of naturalization . . .”); U.S. Const.

11

art I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . engage in War, unless

12

actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”). Unlike these

13

other immigration- and invasion-related constitutional provisions, Article IV, § 4 does

14

not specify commitment to a particular branch of the federal government.

15
16

b. Count II Satisfies the Second Baker Formulation

17

The Government also argues that Count II runs afoul of the second Baker

18

formulation: “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving

19

it.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Arizona has addressed this factor by reference to specific

20

quantifiable, discoverable, and manageable standards. See, e.g., Countercl. ¶¶ 45-52,

21

153, 157. “Operational control” is the definition of adequate protection adopted by

22

Congress in Section 2(a) of the Secure Fence Act. “Effective control” is the definition of

23

adequate protection tracked by the Executive Branch. Either definition provides “a

24

discoverable and manageable standard.”

25
26

c. Count II Satisfies the Third Baker Formulation

27

The Government argues that Count II runs afoul of the third Baker formulation:

28

“the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for

20

1

nonjudicial discretion.”

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

Count II requires no such

2

determination.

3

Government has an obligation to protect Arizona and whether the Government has met

4

that requirement by obtaining and maintaining control. Congress has provided any

5

necessary initial policy determination of the Government’s obligations through various

6

findings, reports, and legislation. Countercl. ¶ 164. Even DHS concedes that it has only

7

40% of the Tucson sector of the Southwestern border under “effective control.”

8

Countercl. ¶ 91.

Rather, the determinations requested of the Court are whether the

9
10

d. Count II Satisfies the Fourth Baker Formulation

11

Finally, the Government argues that Count II runs afoul of the fourth Baker

12

formulation: “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without

13

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government.” Baker, 369

14

U.S. at 217. The constitutional obligation to protect Arizona is not solely entrusted to

15

any particular branch of the federal government, see supra at 19. There is no lack of

16

respect in the judiciary interpreting whether the Executive Branch has complied with

17

constitutional and statutory mandates.

18

Government to use its expertise and make ultimate decisions on how to discharge its

19

obligations under Article IV, § 4. Thus, this requested relief gives the “respect due” to

20

the Executive Branch.

In addition, the requested relief permits the

21
22

4. The Government Has Failed to Protect Arizona

23

In California, 104 F.3d at 1091, the Ninth Circuit held that it could not determine

24

that the U.S. had been invaded when the political branches had not made such a

25

determination. Congress has, in effect, recognized that the Government has failed in its

26

duties to protect Arizona, through findings, reports, and legislation, and recognized the

27

credible threat that exists at the Arizona border. Countercl. ¶¶ 39-42, 164. Former

28

Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano declared a state of emergency. Id. ¶ 8.

21

1

Moreover, a proper reading of the Invasion Clause does not require an “actual

2

invasion,” a phrase that appears in Article I, § 10 of the Constitution but not in Article

3

IV, § 4. Nor does the actual language of the Article IV, § 4 require that the federal

4

government shall protect the states only “after” an invasion and domestic violence have

5

occurred. Rather, the Government’s duty operates prospectively to safeguard the states

6

against the credible and looming threats of invasion and domestic violence—threats

7

currently posed by armed cartels, border bandits, and terrorists.

8

Government’s duty to protect the States in this fashion embraces the modern equivalent

9

to a military invasion from a foreign political entity – direct armed conflict with criminal

10

terrorist organizations. The situation on the Arizona border presents this modern threat

11

of “invasion and domestic violence.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. Paramilitary bands,

12

organized criminal enterprises, and individuals with ties to terrorist organizations

13

threaten Arizona. Countercl. ¶ 170. Armed cartels and illegal aliens are present in

14

Arizona, where they threaten law enforcement officers and have killed border patrol

15

agents. Id. ¶ 129. These groups have been found by Congress to require “immediate

16

action” to stem the possibility of “terrorist infiltration” and “represent[] a real threat to

17

America’s national security.” Id. ¶ 39-41.

Defining the

18
19

C. Count III Is Reviewable under the APA

20

The Government asserts that Arizona’s claims fail because immigration

21

enforcement is wholly committed to the discretion of the Executive Branch and non-

22

enforcement decisions cannot be reviewed.

23

Arizona cannot show the Government has abdicated its enforcement responsibilities.

24

Both of these contentions are unpersuasive. Rather, Count III raises colorable claims for

25

relief from injuries caused by the Government’s adoption of a consistent policy not to

26

enforce immigration laws.

27
28

22

The Government further asserts that

1

1. Review of Count III Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion

2

Courts review the discretionary acts of agencies for an “abuse of discretion.” As

3

set forth in Part III.A.1, supra at 11, discretionary acts are insulated from review “only

4

where the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against

5

which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.” Spencer Enters., 345 F.3d at 688

6

(citation omitted).

7

The Government’s argument that enforcement has been fully committed to

8

agency discretion is particularly unpersuasive as to the deliberate non-enforcement of

9

the federal immigration laws. The Government has repeatedly asserted that current

10

Executive Branch policies, practices, and priorities operate to preempt S.B. 1070. Yet

11

the Government also asserts that the same policies, practices, and priorities are

12

discretionary actions insulated from any inquiry by the judiciary. The same Executive

13

Branch decision cannot serve as both sword and shield.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

2. Review Is Available for Changes in Agency Policy or Regulations
The Supreme Court has held that modifications of long-standing agency policy or
regulation are subject to scrutiny under the APA:
A ‘settled course of behavior embodies the agency's informed judgment that,
by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by
Congress. There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies will be
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.’ Accordingly, an agency
changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance.

22

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 41-42 (citation omitted). This gives rise to a

23

narrow review of whether the agency has “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d]

24

a satisfactory explanation for its action including ‘a rational connection between the

25

facts found and the choice made.’ ” Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington, 371 U.S. at 168).

26

This is precisely the case here. The Government has taken the position that

27

Arizona’s inquiries pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 will not be honored,

28

Countercl. ¶ 98, which is both inconsistent with the statutory mandate and DHS’

23

1

previously settled course of behavior. Moreover, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

2

Services (“USCIS”) seeks to implement a radical shift in immigration policy by

3

enabling aliens to remain in the United States despite non-compliance with the

4

Immigration and Naturalization Act. Countercl. ¶ 103. These and other, similar shifts

5

in agency policy with respect to immigration priorities – shifts associated with the

6

Executive Branch’s efforts to achieve “meaningful immigration reform absent

7

legislative action” (Countercl. ¶ 102) – are subject to judicial review.

8
9
10

3. Review Is Available for Patterns of Non-Enforcement of Clear Statutory
Language

11

Agency non-action can be reviewed where “an agency engages in a pattern of

12

nonenforcement of clear statutory language.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839

13

(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). “A consistent failure to [take action] is a dereliction of

14

duty reviewable in the courts.” Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir.

15

1973). 8 U.S.C. § 1227 provides for the deportation of certain aliens unlawfully present

16

in the United States. This statute does not limit deportation to those aliens who have

17

committed aggravated or violent criminal offenses. However, the Government has

18

adopted a policy of amnesty for aliens who have not committed aggravated or violent

19

offenses within the United States, and has otherwise refused to enforce the INA.

20

Countercl. ¶¶ 34-35, 97. This constitutes “a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory

21

language,” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 839, for which judicial review of agency non-action is

22

available.

23
24

4. The Government’s Policies Are a Clear Abdication of Statutory Responsibilities

25

The Government does not deny that review of non-enforcement decisions is

26

available under the Ninth Circuit’s exception for cases where an agency has adopted a

27

general policy so extreme as to abdicate its statutory responsibilities. However, the

28

Government asserts that this exception “is plainly inapplicable here.” Mot. at 17. The

24

1

Government further asserts that Arizona’s Counterclaim does not specifically identify

2

any policy of abdication. Mot. at 18. These assertions are incorrect.

3

Arizona’s Counterclaims contain numerous examples of agency policies so

4

extreme that they would qualify as the abdication of statutory responsibility by the

5

Government, and these examples are presented exactly as such. The Counterclaims

6

assert that the Government has “adopted policies with respect to enforcement of the

7

federal immigration laws that are so extreme that they amount to an abdication of DHS’

8

and the DOJ’s statutory responsibilities.” Countercl. ¶¶ 180. The Counterclaims then

9

list seven specific allegations of the Government’s actions constituting such abdication,

10

including that the Government has abdicated its responsibility to deport illegal aliens

11

who have not committed aggravated offenses; that the Government has abdicated its

12

responsibility to provide information under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644; and that it has

13

abdicated its responsibility to address sanctuary policies in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373

14

and 1644. Id. ¶ 181. Taking all seven of these allegations as true (as required by Fed.

15

R. Civ. P. 12(b)), Arizona has stated a claim for which relief can be granted.

16
17

D. Count IV Is Reviewable under the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Act

18

The Government asserts that Count IV is unreviewable because the distribution

19

of funds under SCAAP is entrusted to the Government’s discretion and there are no

20

judicially manageable standards to review the allocation.

21

Furthermore, the Government misconstrues Count IV as being exclusively directed at

22

review of agency actions under the APA. This also is not correct; Arizona has requested

23

declaratory relief establishing the rights, duties, and obligations of Arizona and the

24

Government under SCAAP, and the Court has the power to grant such relief.

This is not correct.

25
26

1. Review of Count IV Is Not Barred by Commitment to Agency Discretion

27

The Government asserts that no portion of Count IV is reviewable because it

28

challenges a determination that is committed to agency discretion by law. As set forth

25

1

in Part III.A.1, supra at 11, “[e]ven where statutory language grants an agency

2

‘unfettered discretion,’ [the agency’s] decision may nonetheless be reviewed if

3

regulations or agency practice provide a ‘meaningful standard’ by which th[e] court may

4

review its exercise of discretion.” Spencer Enters., 345 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted).

5

The Department of Justice itself provides such standards in documents such as the 2010

6

and 2011 SCAAP Guidelines.

7
8

2. Count IV Seeks Valid Relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act

9

Even if the Attorney General’s distribution of funds under SCAAP were entirely

10

insulated from judicial review, as the Government asserts, Arizona still has stated a

11

claim. The Counterclaims do not merely seek injunctive relief for agency actions, they

12

also seek declaratory judgment on the correct statutory interpretation of SCAAP.

13

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) provides:

“In a case of actual controversy within its

14

jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate

15

pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking

16

such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Arizona seeks

17

various declarations and determinations of rights by this Court with respect to 8 U.S.C. §

18

1231. Arizona seeks a determination as to meaning of the “enter into a contractual

19

arrangement” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i). Countercl. ¶ 192(a). Arizona seeks a

20

declaration as to its right to reject SCAAP allocations. Id. ¶ 192(b). Arizona seeks

21

clarification of the statutory duties of the Attorney General under 8 U.S.C.

22

§1231(i)(4)(A), such as whether the Attorney General must pay the actual cost of

23

incarceration, take aggravated felons into federal incarceration, or initiate expedited

24

deportation proceedings.

25

declaration of “rights or other legal relations” envisioned by 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

26

Because this is inarguably a “case of actual controversy” within the jurisdiction of the

27

Court, Arizona has stated a claim for which relief can be granted in Count IV, and the

28

Government’s Motion must be denied.

Id. ¶ 192(f).

26

These examples are precisely the kind of

1

E.

Count V States a Valid Claim under the Tenth Amendment

2

In Count V, Arizona asks this Court to declare that the Tenth Amendment

3

prohibits the Government from using unenforced federal immigration laws and

4

regulations to prohibit Arizona from taking actions that are consistent with these federal

5

laws and regulations to protect the State, its millions of acres of State Trust Lands, and

6

its citizens from the harms associated with illegal immigration. The Tenth Amendment

7

requires this Court to police the outer boundaries of federal power in order to maintain

8

the Constitution’s careful balance between the Government and Arizona. Arizona has

9

raised a colorable Tenth Amendment claim under a historically accurate interpretation of

10

the Tenth Amendment. The Government is simply incorrect that Arizona’s injuries do

11

not raise Tenth Amendment concerns.

12

The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States

13

by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

14

respectively, or to the people.” The Tenth Amendment imposes “limits on Congress’

15

authority to regulate state activities.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512

16

(1988). The general rule is that “the limits are structural, not substantive,” and that

17

“States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national

18

political process,” not the courts. Id.

19

The Tenth Amendment reflects the importance of state sovereignty and

20

maintaining the balance of power between federal and state governments. See, e.g.,

21

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (holding that the “constitutionally

22

mandated division of authority [between state and federal governments] was adopted by

23

the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties”). Judicial enforcement of

24

this balance is critical to maintaining it.

25

Constitution, the balance of power in the relationship between the federal government

26

and the states should remain static with the proper deference given to state sovereignty.

27

See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (“[O]ur Constitution preserves the

28

sovereign status of the States”). In upholding a state mandatory retirement age for

27

Given the framework set forth in the

1

judges which was inconsistent with federal law, the Supreme Court recognized the

2

importance of this balance of power: “Just as the separation and independence of the

3

coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of

4

excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and

5

the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”

6

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-458 (2000). 6

7

The Supreme Court has recognized two circumstances in which a state can

8

challenge federal action under the Tenth Amendment. First, a state can challenge

9

federal action if there are “extraordinary defects in the national political process” that

10

have either: (1) deprived the state “of any right to participate in the national political

11

process” or (2) singled out a state “in a way that left it politically isolated and

12

powerless.” Id. at 512-13. Second, even if a state had an opportunity to participate in

13

the national political process, federal action violates the Tenth Amendment if it compels

14

a state or its officers to enforce or carry out federal objectives. See New York v. United

15

States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (“Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to

16

cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state

17

governments as its agents.”).

18

provisions in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that

19

“offer[ed] state governments a ‘choice’ of either accepting ownership of waste or

20

regulating according to the instructions of Congress” because the Court found that “[n]o

21

matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.” Id. at

22

176.

In New York, for example, the Court struck down

23
24
25
6

26
27
28

See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (striking down a federal
effort to criminalize and regulate gender-motivated violence and emphasizing the
importance of its role in maintaining the balance of power between the branches of
government); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution .
. . divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient
solution to the crisis of the day.”) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
28

1
2

1. Arizona Has Alleged Extraordinary Defects in the National Political Process
that Have Deprived Arizona of Any Right to Participate.

3

Under the established national political process, Congress has the power to set

4

national policy and the Executive Branch has the responsibility for implementing that

5

policy. Arizona participates in the national political process through its Congressional

6

delegates. The federal government has recognized the security and economic threats

7

that illegal immigration poses to the nation as a whole and to the individual states.

8

Countercl. ¶¶ 41, 81-82, 196. To address these concerns, Congress has enacted detailed

9

immigration requirements and imposed severe civil and criminal sanctions for violators.

10

Congress has also taken numerous steps to ensure that its immigration laws are enforced

11

through such acts as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

12

(“IIRIRA”), Countercl. ¶¶ 46-48, and the Secure Fence Act, id. ¶¶ 50-54.

13

The Government, however, has circumvented Congress’ efforts by failing to

14

enforce the laws Congress has enacted and seeking to achieve “meaningful immigration

15

reform absent legislative action.” Countercl. ¶¶ 100-03. The Government’s refusal to

16

enforce the laws Congress has enacted and to follow Congress’ directives regarding the

17

enforcement of the federal immigration laws constitute extraordinary defects in the

18

national political process by “creat[ing] a vacuum in which the objectives and mandates

19

of the federal immigration laws are not being or cannot be achieved.” Id. ¶ 211, 214.

20

These extraordinary defects in the national political process have resulted in an

21

immigration policy in which the states, including Arizona, have been deprived of any

22

opportunity to participate.

23
24

2. Arizona Has Alleged Extraordinary Defects in the National Political Process

25

that Have Singled Out Arizona, Leaving It Politically Isolated and Powerless.

26

In addition to the extraordinary defects identified above, the Government has

27

welcomed efforts from other states to increase their communications with the federal

28

government regarding potential immigration violations. When Arizona sought to

29

1

increase such communications, however, the Government declared Arizona’s efforts to

2

be a “burden” and immediately acted to prevent Arizona from pursuing its objectives.

3

Countercl. ¶ 99, 200. The Government has also openly criticized Arizona and its

4

policies both nationally and internationally based, in large part, on misrepresentations

5

regarding the effect and purpose of S.B. 1070. These criticisms have created foreign

6

policy concerns that bolstered the Government’s preemption arguments and have

7

inflicted substantial economic harm on Arizona.

8

In addition, Arizona has a unique burden as a border state with over 40% of the

9

illegal aliens nationwide entering its border that is compounded by the mandate of the

10

Enabling Act (as a condition for becoming a state) to hold in trust millions of acres of

11

land. Arizona was treated differently than the other states because it was the one of the

12

last states and the previous allocations of public trust land had been squandered. See

13

Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 351, 181 P.2d 336, 344 (1947) (explaining that "[t]he sad

14

experience of Congress with the handling by [the twenty-three previous states that had

15

been] granted lands, the sale thereof, and the investment of monies derived from a

16

disposition of the granted lands, brought about a new policy which found expression in

17

the Enabling Act for New Mexico and Arizona”). This obligation to preserve and

18

maximize the value of state lands on and near the most heavily trafficked illegal alien

19

corridor in the United States for the express purpose of public education – including

20

education of illegal aliens as required by the Fourteenth Amendment – distinguishes

21

Arizona from the other states.

22

The Government’s actions and Arizona’s unique burdens have “single[d] Arizona

23

out in a way that leaves it politically isolated and powerless to protect itself and its

24

citizens from the harm associated with rampant illegal immigration.” Countercl. ¶ 213.

25
26
27
28

3. Arizona Has Alleged Action by the Government that Compels Arizona to Carry
Out the Executive Branch’s Objectives.
The Constitution contemplates that Arizona has a right and obligation to

30

1

“represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.

2

898, 920 (1997). “It is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they

3

remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.” Id. at 928.

4

To preserve state sovereignty and the balance of power between state and federal

5

governments, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from

6

“compel[ling] States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory

7

programs.” Id. at 925 (emphasis added).

8

In Printz, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Ninth Circuit and found

9

that a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107

10

Stat. 1536 (the “Brady Act”), which required “state and local law enforcement officers

11

to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers,” was invalid under

12

the Tenth Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the federal government

13

could require “state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks,” finding no distinction

14

between control of a state and control of the state’s agents. Id. at 930-31. One of the

15

primary bases for the Court’s conclusion was that “[b]y forcing state governments to

16

absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of

17

Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents

18

to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.” Id. at 930.

19

The judicial balance of power between the states and the Government under the

20

Tenth Amendment can also be seen in recent cases concerning Section III of the

21

Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which excludes same-sex marriages in its federal

22

definition of marriage and, therefore, imposes on the states’ ability to regulate marriage.

23

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sebelius, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235, 249 (D. Mass. 2010)

24

(holding that DOMA was an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment

25

because it plainly intrudes on a core area of state sovereignty – the ability to define the

26

marital status of its citizens). 7

27
7

28

Although the Tenth Amendment was not invoked in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision upholding Arizona’s right to mandate the use of E-Verify to confirm
immigration status and to sanction employers who hire illegal aliens, see Chamber of
31

1

Here, the Government is forcing Arizona to absorb the financial burden of the

2

federal government’s policies and interfering with Arizona’s state sovereignty by

3

“effectively prohibit[ing] Arizona from exercising its police and other traditional state

4

powers to address issues of importance to the State and its citizens.” Countercl. ¶ 199.

5

This case is not like the claims in California, 104 F.3d at 1093, which were

6

premised upon inaction by the federal government. Here, it is the Government’s action

7

in preventing Arizona from taking steps to discourage illegal immigration within its

8

borders, coupled with its inaction in enforcing the federal immigration laws, which

9

compels Arizona to act. Those actions, “in combination with Arizona’s preexisting

10

constitutional duties under the Fourteenth Amendment, compel Arizona to

11

accommodate and provide education, medical care, and other benefits to illegal aliens

12

within its borders.” Countercl. ¶ 202.

13
14

CONCLUSION

15

If amnesty for illegal aliens is the desired outcome, there are proper procedures to

16

change the law to reflect that desire. The Government, however, cannot ignore the

17

mandates of federal law and adopt an unspoken policy of amnesty by inaction for some

18

subset of undocumented immigrants who are present in the United States illegally.

19

Furthermore, the Government has affirmatively sued Arizona for taking action to try to

20

resolve the economic problems and injury caused by the Government’s actions and

21

deliberate inactions. These issues not only require a judicial solution, the Government

22

has invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to decide them.

23

The

Government’s

arguments

do

not

justify dismissal

of

Arizona’s

24

Counterclaims at this early stage. Arizona’s allegations, if ultimately proven, state

25

cognizable claims for relief. This Court should deny the Government’s motion.

26
27
28

Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __ (2011), the decision further reflects the importance of
state sovereignty and the judicial balance of power between the states and the
Government. See also City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, __ S. Ct. __, 2011 W.L. 2175213
(2011) (remanded to the Third Circuit for consideration in light of the Whiting decision).
32

1

DATED this 13th day of June, 2011.

2

By s/Michael Tryon
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General
David R. Cole, Solicitor General
Michael Tryon, Senior Litigation Counsel
Christopher Munns, Assistant Attorney General
Evan Hiller, Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926
Attorneys for the Defendant/Counterclaimant
the State of Arizona

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4
5
6
7

10

By s/Joseph Sciarrotta, Jr. with permission
Joseph Sciarrotta, Jr.
Office of Governor Janice K. Brewer
1700 W. Washington, 9th Floor
Phoenix, AZ 85007

11

and

12

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

13

By s/John J. Bouma with permission
John J. Bouma
Robert A. Henry
Joseph G. Adams
Kelly A. Kszywienski
One Arizona Center
400 E. Van Buren
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants

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9

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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2

I hereby certify that on June 13, 2011, I electronically transmitted the foregoing

3

document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a

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Notice of Electronic Filing to the CM/ECF registrants on record in this matter.

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6

s/Michael Tryon

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Doc. #1993371v5

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