Moore v Maricopa County Sheriff's Office

Filing 27

ORDER denying 26 Plaintiff's "Motion to Request Case to be Before a Different Bench (Judge)(Request Displacement)". Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 2/8/12.(TLJ)

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WO

MDR

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Larry Lee Moore,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office,

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Defendant.

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No. CV 10-1495-PHX-GMS (JRI)
ORDER

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On February 3, 2012, Plaintiff Larry Lee Moore filed a “Motion to Request Case to

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be Before a Different Bench (Judge) (Request Displacement)” (Doc. 26). Plaintiff contends

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that the undersigned “somehow has taken a personal interest in these matters, and has made

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it his personal duty to ‘dismiss’ any and all of [Plaintiff’s] filed complaints to the Court,

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showing signs of Judicial Misbehavior: Mala In Se/Civil Disob[e]d[i]ence.” Plaintiff states

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that he “wishes to have no concerns with a Judge (Court) who has taken personal interest,

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feelings, the threats and relayed opinions by the presiding Judge over this case./This ‘would-

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not’ be fair for any and all parties involved.” Plaintiff claims that the Court’s most recent

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Order “made the impressions to that of a grudging and discriminative nature. This may-not

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allow [Plaintiff] to present, participate [his] legal recourse under the(se) humiliating

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conditions.” Plaintiff also contends that because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

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remanded this case for the Court “to correct its errors,” having the case assigned to the same

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judge “would be a hurdle/obst[a]cle of considerable size, thoughts and opinions of no chance

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for a favorable or fair outcome.”

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“The substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 is

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the same: ‘[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude

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that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” United States. v. Hernandez,

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109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939

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(9th Cir. 1986)). In order to prevail on a motion for recusal, a plaintiff must show either

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extrajudicial bias or a deep-seated unequivocal antagonism toward the plaintiff. See Liteky

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v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-56 (1994). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never

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constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Id. at 555. “[O]pinions formed by

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the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current

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proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion

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unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

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impossible.” Id.

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A reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts in this case would not conclude

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that the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. A reasonable person with

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knowledge of all the facts would conclude that Plaintiff has sought recusal of the undersigned

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because Plaintiff does not like the Court’s rulings. This is insufficient to support recusal or

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disqualification.1

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Request Case to be Before a Different
Bench (Judge) (Request Displacement)” (Doc. 26) is denied.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2012.

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The Court also notes that the Court of Appeals had the power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106
to assign this case to a different district court judge on remand, see Living Designs, Inc. v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 2005), but did not do so.
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