Gutenkauf v. Tempe, City of et al
Filing
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ORDER that because plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court grants defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice 43 , 57 , 79 and 87 . The clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of all defendants and against plalintiff. Signed by Judge Frederick J Martone on 5/3/11.(DMT)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Daniel Arthur Gutenkauf,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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The City of Tempe, et. al.,
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Defendants.
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No. CV-10-02129-PHX-FJM
ORDER
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The court has before it the AAA defendants'1 motion to dismiss (doc. 43), plaintiff's
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response (doc. 54), and the AAA defendants' reply (doc. 55). We also have before us the
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State defendants'2 motion to dismiss (doc. 57), plaintiff's response (doc. 83), and the State
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defendants' reply (doc. 86). In addition we have before us, the Redflex Traffic Systems
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defendants'3 motion to dismiss (doc. 79), plaintiff's response (doc. 88), and the Redflex
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defendants' reply (doc. 93). And finally, we have the City of Tempe defendants'4 motion to
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The AAA defendants are: AAA Photo Safety, Inc., David Pickron, Stephanie
Pickron, and Casey Arnett.
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The State defendants are: Terry and Monica Goddard, Roger and Valerie
Vanderpool, and John and Ruth Halikowski.
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The Redflex defendants are: Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. ("Redflex"), Graham
Davie, Karen and Tim Finely, Bill Harper, Matthew DeGraw, and their respective spouses.
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The City defendants are: the City of Tempe, Tempe City Council, Hugh Hallman,
Susan Hallman, Joel Navarro, Mark W. Mitchell, Debra Mitchell, P. Ben Arrendondo,
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dismiss (doc. 87), plaintiff's response (doc. 95), and the City defendants' reply (doc. 97).
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I. Background
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This action arises out of a speeding ticket issued to plaintiff via a photo radar camera.
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Plaintiff is the registered owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff did not respond to the ticket.
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Thereafter, defendant Casey Arnett served plaintiff with process. Plaintiff requested a
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hearing to contest the ticket. Plaintiff argued that the ticket was issued without verification
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that he was the driver and not his identical twin brother. The Tempe City court found
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plaintiff responsible for the traffic ticket and assessed him $171.00, plus $26 for the service
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of process costs. Plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County
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reversed and dismissed the charges against plaintiff. The City of Tempe refunded plaintiff's
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payment in full. Plaintiff thereafter filed a notice of claim with the City pursuant to A.R.S.
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§ 12-821.01. Plaintiff offered to settle his claim against the City for $699.00. The City
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accepted. However, after the City twice attempted to send plaintiff a check, plaintiff refused
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to sign a release and returned the check.
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Plaintiff's abusive 93 page first amended complaint ("FAC") asserts various § 1983
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causes of action against police officers, judges, the State, the City, and all the companies and
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respective officers involved in photo radar traffic enforcement. Plaintiff claims violations
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of his rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, plaintiff
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asserts conspiracy and RICO violations. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief
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that Redflex is required to obtain a private investigator's license, and that all City defendants
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with "non-conforming loyalty oaths" be denied compensation and their offices deemed
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"vacant." FAC ¶¶ 383-400.
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Ruthann Albrighton-Arredondo, Shana Ellis, and unknown Ellis Richard Antonio, Onnie
Shekerjian, Brian Hart Shekerjian, Corey D. Woods, Jan Hort, Gerald J. Hort, Charlie Meyer,
Deborah W. Meyer, Thomas Ryff, Rose Ann Ryff, Noah Johnson, Jennifer Johnson, Aaron
Colombe, Susan Colombe, Bianca Gallego, Kerby Rapp, Lillian Rapp, Shelly Seyler,
Louraine C. Arkfeld, Mary Jo Barsetti, David E. Nerland, Nancy Rodriguez, David J.
McAllister, Jacquelina McAllister, and Michael Greene.
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II. Pleading, Standing, and Case or Controversy
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Plaintiff's 93 page complaint violates Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., which requires a "short
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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Nevertheless,
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the State defendants argue that we should dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing.
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Plaintiff successfully appealed a finding of responsibility under A.R.S. § 28-701(A), was
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refunded his money, and voluntarily chose to forego the City's acceptance of his offer. He
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has suffered no harm. There no longer is a case or controversy under Article III.
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Moreover, plaintiff lacks standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Plaintiff
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seeks a declaration that Redflex is acting as a private investigator and must obtain a private
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investigator's license. Plaintiff also asks for an injunction disqualifying Redflex as a private
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investigator.
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connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and a likelihood that a
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favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
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561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Plaintiff alleges no casual connection between his
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injury, the fees and costs in defending his civil traffic citation, and Redflex's failure to obtain
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a private investigator's license. Moreover, a declaration that Redflex is required to be
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licensed would not redress plaintiff's injury. See Bell v. Redflex Sys. Inc., 374 Fed. Appx.
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518, 520-22 (5th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a similar claim for lack of standing).
Standing requires an actual and particularized injury in fact, a casual
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Plaintiff similarly lacks standing to seek a declaration that the City defendants' loyalty
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oaths do not comply with Arizona law. Plaintiff does not allege any particularized injury
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resulting from the alleged non-conforming oaths, nor could plaintiff's injury be redressed
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through a declaratory judgment.
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Even if plaintiff had standing and even if there was a case or controversy, plaintiff
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fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted.
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III. Section 1983
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To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) the
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defendant was acting under color of state law and (2) the defendant's conduct deprived him
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of a federal constitutional right. Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
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2006). We address each alleged deprivation of a constitutional right in turn.
A. Fourth Amendment
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Plaintiff claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was served
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with a falsely certified traffic ticket. Plaintiff argues that he was seized without probable
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cause because defendants did not compare the image of the driver on the ticket to the picture
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on his driver's license before issuing the ticket, serving process, and haling him into court.
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Defendants argue that the mere issuance or service of a traffic citation is not a seizure under
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the Fourth Amendment.
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Putting aside the issue of whether all defendants were acting under color of state law,
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plaintiff did not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation. A traffic citation is not a seizure
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under the Fourth Amendment. Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.
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2003); see also Williams v. Chai-Hsu Lu, 335 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2003); McNeill v.
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Town of Paradise Valley, 44 Fed. Appx. 871, *1 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a grant of
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summary judgment against the town of Paradise Valley because "sending a traffic citation
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to the registered owner of a vehicle based on the photo radar system is not a seizure").
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Likewise, the issuance of a summons to appear in court is not a seizure. See Burg v.
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Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Although unclear, plaintiff also seems to raise a § 1983 claim for malicious
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prosecution.
A claim for malicious prosecution requires a showing that defendants
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prosecuted plaintiff with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of denying
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plaintiff equal protection or another specific constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of
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Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's claim fails for a number of
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reasons. First, defendants did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and therefore
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could not have maliciously prosecuted him with such an intent. Second, while plaintiff may
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use the word "malice," the FAC merely pleads facts "consistent with [ ] defendant[s]' liability
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[and] . . . stops short of the line between plausibility and possibility" sufficient to entitle
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plaintiff to relief. Iqbal v. Ashcroft, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Plaintiff does
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not plead any facts demonstrating motive, such as personal hatred or ill will. Plaintiff was
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not deprived of any rights under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Sixth Amendment
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Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights because the officer that
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signed his ticket did not appear at his hearing and instead another officer appeared. The City
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defendants argue that plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights were never implicated because he
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was prosecuted for a civil, not a criminal violation.
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The Sixth Amendment only applies in the criminal context. Plaintiff was cited for a
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violation of A.R.S. § 28-701, a civil traffic violation. See State v. Poli, 161 Ariz. 151, 152,
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776 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a violation of A.R.S. § 28-701(A) is
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treated as a civil matter). Plaintiff's assertion that the violation results in a criminal penalty
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is without merit. Arizona law imposes a maximum civil penalty of $250.00 for a civil traffic
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violation. See A.R.S. §§ 28-121(B), 28-701, 28-1598. If the penalty is not paid, the only
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repercussion is the suspension of driving privileges. A.R.S. § 28-1601(A). Section 28-701
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is not so punitive that it has become criminal. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-
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100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 493 (1997). Even if it were criminal, the use of a witness without first
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hand knowledge would result in the exclusion of evidence, not a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff's
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alleged Sixth Amendment violation is not cognizable.
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C. Due Process
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Plaintiff claims that nearly all of the defendants violated his due process rights by
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participating in some way in the civil traffic matter. Defendants move to dismiss because
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plaintiff was provided with a meaningful post deprivation remedy.
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Due Process requires that an individual be given notice and an opportunity to be heard
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at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92
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S.Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972). "[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
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employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss
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is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984). Plaintiff
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received a notice in the mail, had a hearing to contest the ticket, and successfully appealed
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to the Superior Court which reversed. Additionally, plaintiff filed a notice of claim against
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the City and its employees. The City agreed to settle for the requested amount, but plaintiff
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failed to accept it. Plaintiff received all the process he was due. His alleged deprivations do
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not in any way support a § 1983 cause of action. See e.g., Vasquez v. City of Hamtramck,
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757 F.2d 771, 772 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Plaintiff asserts violations of substantive due process. Plaintiff claims that the City
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and the State defendants acted pursuant to a custom of "deliberate indifference" in issuing
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traffic tickets based only on a gender match. The defendants argue that none of plaintiff's
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substantive due process rights were implicated.
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"Substantive due process forbids the government from depriving a person of life,
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liberty, or property in such a way that shocks the conscience or interferes with the rights
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implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir.
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2009). Plaintiff has no substantive due process right to be free from prosecution without
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probable cause. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1069 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, plaintiff
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has no constitutional right to be free from erroneously issued traffic tickets. Moreover,
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defendants' actions were not capricious nor do they "shock the conscience" of the court.
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These claims are frivolous.
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Finally, plaintiff asserts that the Redflex defendants and Officer Colombe violated
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A.R.S. § 28-1561(A) and thereby violated the due process clause. "State law can create a
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right that the Due Process clause will protect only if the state law contains (1) substantive
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predicates governing official decision-making, and (2) explicitly mandatory language
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specifying the outcome that must be reached if the substantive predicates have been met."
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James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2010). A.R.S. § 28-1561 merely requires
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that a certification of "reasonable grounds" be included with a civil traffic complaint. It does
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not create any substantive predicates or mandate any outcomes. Section 28-1561 does not
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create a due process right entitling plaintiff to relief.
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Having found no violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights, plaintiff fails to state
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a cause of action under § 1983.5 Absent any underlying deprivations of constitutional rights,
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plaintiff's § 1983 conspiracy claim also fails.
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IV. Immunity
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Even if we found that plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, we would still
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dismiss his FAC against many of the defendants on the basis of immunity. Judge Barsetti,
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Judge Arkfeld, defendant Gallego, and defendant Rodriquez are entitled to judicial immunity.
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See Stemp v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 361, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107 (1978); Acevedo v.
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Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep't., 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1967); Moore v.
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Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (court administrators entitled to judicial
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immunity); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500 (1985) (witnesses
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entitled to judicial immunity).
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Shekerjian, Ellis, and Mitchell are entitled to legislative immunity since all alleged actions
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were taken during official council meetings. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 118
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S.Ct. 966, 970 (1998).
Defendants Hallman, Arredondo, Woods, Navarro,
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As for the rest of the City and the State defendants, qualified immunity would shield
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them from liability because their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
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457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
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V. RICO
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Plaintiff's second cause of action arises under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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Organizations Act ("RICO"). Plaintiff alleges that defendants committed mail fraud, wire
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fraud, and extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In addition, plaintiff claims that
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nearly all the defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy. Defendants move to dismiss on the
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We note that many of plaintiff's claims against individual defendants, such as
Pickron, Goddard, and Vanderpool, rely on theories of improper training and supervision.
Even if we assume that these defendants have supervisory roles, a fact which would not bare
out under analysis, they could not be liable. Absent any underlying constitutional violations,
the claims for supervisory liability fail as well.
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basis that plaintiff cannot articulate two or more predicate acts. Absent an underlying RICO
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violation, plaintiff's conspiracy claim also fails.
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To state a claim under § 1962(c), plaintiff must allege (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise
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(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Sanford v. Memberworks, Inc., 625 F.3d
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550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010). Racketeering activity includes the predicate acts of mail fraud, wire
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fraud, and extortion.
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We first note that plaintiff's RICO claims against the City, the State, and their
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employees acting in their official capacity fail because governmental entities are incapable
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of forming a malicious intent. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp., 940 F.2d
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397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991). We therefore only consider the claims against the employees in
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their individual capacities and the Redflex defendants.
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Plaintiff claims that the Redflex defendants and Officer Colombe engaged in mail
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fraud by mailing him a traffic citation that lacked identification information and contained
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a false certification. Plaintiff also claims that defendants Gallego and Barsetti are guilty of
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aiding and abetting. Defendants argue that the traffic citation does not contain false
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information and even if it did, the claim must be dismissed for lack of specificity.
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Plaintiff contends that Officer Colombe's certification is false.6 Officer Colombe
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stated that he was "reasonably certain" that plaintiff was the driver. Plaintiff never denied
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that he was the driver and even if a positive identification had been made, Officer Colombe
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would have been reasonably certain that plaintiff was driving because he and his brother are
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identical twins. Plaintiff makes no showing that the traffic ticket contained false information.
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Plaintiff's claim for wire fraud also fails. Plaintiff alleges wire fraud on the basis of
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the Redflex defendants' having posted a facial image of someone driving plaintiff's van on
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the website photonotice.com. The image is not a false representation and does not contain
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any statement representing that the driver was positively identified. Furthermore, plaintiff's
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We may consider the contents of the traffic citation (ex. M) and a print out of
photonotice.com (ex. V) because they are attached as exhibits to the FAC. See Knievel v.
ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
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pleading that the "predicate act of Wire Fraud, committed some time around October 22,
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2009 by an unknown REDFLEX employee", FAC ¶ 284, is insufficient under Rule 9(b)'s
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particularity requirement. See Sanford, 625 F.3d at 558.
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Even if plaintiff did establish the predicate act of mail fraud or wire fraud, he cannot
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satisfy RICO's proximate cause requirement. See Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York,
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__ U.S. __, 13 S.Ct. 983, 989 (2010). Even if the Redflex defendants had checked plaintiff's
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license photo before mailing the ticket and posting the image, that check would not have
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prevented plaintiff from receiving the citation because he and his identical twin brother look
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alike. Moreover, the forms served on plaintiff included a section allowing him to identify
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the actual driver to avoid liability. Had plaintiff simply identified his brother at that point,
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he would have avoided any purported RICO injury.
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Finally, plaintiff alleges that the State and the City defendants conspired to commit
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extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) and A.R.S. § 13-1804, and that the Redflex
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defendants aided and abetted them. The predicate act of extortion cannot be based on the
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"efforts of Government employees to get property for the exclusive benefit of the
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Government." Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 563-64, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2605-06 (2007).
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That is exactly what defendants were doing. The State and the City defendants simply were
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enforcing traffic laws to obtain remuneration for the exclusive benefit of the government.
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Those defendants cannot be guilty of extortion. Nor can the Redflex defendants be guilty of
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aiding and abetting them.
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Without a substantive RICO claim, the conspiracy claim fails as well. See Howard
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v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2000). We dismiss the RICO cause of action
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in its entirety.
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VI. Conclusion
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A little bit of knowledge can sometimes be worse than none at all. Plaintiff's pro se
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filings demonstrate some exposure to the legal process. But they also demonstrate a
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fundamental failure to appreciate that the administration of justice promotes fairness, not
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abuse. This is not plaintiff's first § 1983 action against scores of public officials. See
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Gutenkauf v. Maricopa Cnty., No. 99-15425, 1999 WL 1080146 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Plaintiff received his full measure of justice when he obtained the reversal he sought
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and the City agreed to pay him the sum he demanded. Not content with this, he made a
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mountain out of a mole hill and caused great harm to the public by filing frivolous litigation
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and forcing public entities and officials to spend scare resources on legal fees.
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Because plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured by amendment, it is ORDERED
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GRANTING all defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice (docs. 43, 57, 79, and 87).
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The clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff.
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We urge plaintiff to seek the advice of a lawyer before any new filings. If he does not
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have one, he may wish to contact the Lawyer Referral Service of the Maricopa County Bar
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Association at 602-257-4434.
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DATED this 3rd day of May, 2011.
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