Coleman v. Maricopa Integrated Health System et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 17 Defendants Maricopa Integrated Health System, Susan Myers, Virginia Martinez, Beverly Smith, and Daunn Smith's Motion to Dismiss. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven of 7 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 6/16/11.(LSP)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Maricopa Integrated Health System, et al.,)
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Defendants.
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Herb Coleman,
No. CV-10-02398-PHX-NVW
ORDER
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Before the Court is Defendants Maricopa Integrated Health System, Susan Myers,
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Virginia Martinez, Beverly Smith, and Daunn Smith’s Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17).
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Defendants’ motion was filed on May 23, 2011; accordingly, Plaintiff’s response to the
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motion was due June 9, 2011. LRCiv. 7.2(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). The Court has not
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received a response from Plaintiff. Although failing to respond is grounds to grant the
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motion summarily, see LRCiv. 7.2(i), the Court will also grant Defendants’ motion on the
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merits for the reasons stated below.
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I.
Background
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Plaintiff originally filed his complaint on November 5, 2010, with a motion for leave
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to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 1, 3). The Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis
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status, but screened his complaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (Doc. 6). On January
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3, 2011, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (Doc. 7). Plaintiff’s amended complaint
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contains seven causes of action: “(1) Defendant MIHS’ Violation of Title VII’s Prohibition
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Against Employment Discrimination Gender Discrimination -- Disparate Treatment; (2)
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Defendant MIHS’ Violation of Title VII’s Prohibition Against Employment Discrimination
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Racial Discrimination -- Disparate Impact; (3) Defendant MIHS’ Breach of Contract and/or
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Promissory Estoppel; (4) Defendant Myers, Martinez, B. Smith individually and in their
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capacity as supervisors - Negligence; (5) All Defendants - Intentional Infliction of Emotional
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Distress; (6) Defendant Myers and Defendant D. Smith, individually - Intentional
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Interference with a Contractual Relationship; and (7) All Defendants - Defamation” (Doc.
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7). All of Plaintiff’s complaints relate to alleged wrongs stemming from his employment
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with and dismissal from Defendant Maricopa Integrated Health System.
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Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss on April 14, 2011 (Doc. 10). Although
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Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, the Court denied Defendants’ motion without
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prejudice on May 19, 2011 (Doc. 13). On that same day, the Court received a motion from
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Plaintiff seeking additional time to respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 15),
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which the Court denied as moot (Doc. 16). Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on
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May 23, 2011 (Doc. 17); no response has been received from Plaintiff.
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II.
Legal Standard
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To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
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(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if it
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contains sufficient factual matter to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
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for the conduct alleged. Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
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requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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unlawfully.” Id. All allegations of material fact are assumed to be true and construed in the
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light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th
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Cir. 2009). However, the principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a
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complaint does not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Iqbal, 129
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S. Ct. at 1951. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can therefore be
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based on “the lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged
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under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
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Cir. 1990).
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III.
Analysis
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Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts Three through Seven of Plaintiff’s first
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amended complaint for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. Defendant asserts that
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Plaintiff’s claims are barred because (1) Plaintiff failed to submit notice of his state law
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claims as required by A.R.S. § 12-820.01; (2) Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the
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one-year statute of limitations for actions against public entities and employees; and (3)
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Plaintiff cannot assert his Title VII claims against the individual defendants. The Court
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agrees with the arguments set forth in Defendants’ motion to dismiss and will accordingly
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grant the motion.
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1.
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Counts Three through Seven of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint all allege state law
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causes of action against Maricopa Integrated Health System and/or its employees.1 A.R.S.
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§ 12-821.01(A) states that “[p]ersons who have claims against a public entity or a public
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employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the
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public entity or public employee . . . within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action
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accrues.” This notice of claim must include “(1) facts sufficient to permit the public entity
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to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed, (2) a specific amount for which the
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claim can be settled, and (3) the facts supporting the amount claimed.” Backus v. State, 220
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Ariz. 101, 104, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (Ariz. 2009).
Notice of Claims
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Maricopa Integrated Health System is a group of health care institutions operated by the
Maricopa County Special Health Care District, and is therefore a public entity. See A.R.S.
§ 48-5501.01(D); see also Carey v. Maricopa County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143-44 (D.
Ariz. 2009). The individual defendants were all employees of Maricopa Integrated Health
System during the relevant period, and are as such public employees.
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Because Plaintiff’s employment with Maricopa Integrated Health System ended on
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July 31, 2007, he was required to file his notice of claim by January 27, 2008. See A.R.S.
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§ 12-821.01(A). There is no evidence that Plaintiff ever provided Maricopa Integrated
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Health System or the employee defendants with the required notice of his state law claims
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against them. Plaintiff cannot pursue his claims against Maricopa Integrated Health System
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or its employees unless he has complied with the notice provision in A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).
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See Deer Valley Unified School Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 295, 152 P.3d 490,
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492 (Ariz. 2007) (“Claims that do not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01.A are statutorily
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barred.”). For this reason, Counts Three through Seven — which allege breach of contract
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and/or promissory estoppel, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
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defamation — will all be dismissed.
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2.
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Defendants next state that Counts Three through Seven should be dismissed because
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Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely filed. A.R.S. § 12-821 requires “[a]ll actions against a
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public entity or public employee” to be “brought within one year after the cause of action
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accrues and not afterward.” Plaintiff’s claims relate to his employment with and dismissal
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from Maricopa Integrated Health System, which occurred on July 31, 2007. Accordingly,
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Plaintiff’s claims accrued by July 31, 2007; therefore, he should have filed his complaint by
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July 31, 2008. However, Plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until November 5, 2010.
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Plaintiff has provided no explanation for his failure to comply with the relevant limitations
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period. Because Plaintiff’s state law claims were filed after the statute of limitations on such
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causes of action had expired, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts Three through Seven
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will be granted.
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3.
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Finally, Defendants have argued that, to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint attempts to
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assert claims against the individual employee defendants for violations of Title VII, those
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claims fail because individual employees are not liable under Title VII. See, e.g., Walsh v.
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Nevada Dept. of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006). However, Counts One
Statute of Limitations
Individual Employee Defendant Liability Under Title VII
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and Two of Plaintiff’s complaint, which allege his Title VII causes of action, specifically
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name Maricopa Integrated Health System as the offending and liable party under Title VII.
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Therefore, there is no need to dismiss Counts One and Two against the individual employee
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defendants because those claims do not name them and are directed at Maricopa Integrated
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Health System only.
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‘Defendants’ in plural form” and refers to Maricopa Integrated Health System’s “supervisory
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personnel” in Counts One and Two (Doc. 17 at 6 n.4), dismissal of Counts One and Two is
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against the individual employee defendants is necessary. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s
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complaint could be read as directing Counts One and Two at the individual employee
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defendants, Defendants’ motion will be granted because individual employees are not liable
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under Title VII. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)
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(noting “individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII” and
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dismissing Title VII claims against defendants in their individual capacities).
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IV.
However, Defendants assert that because Plaintiff “refers to
Leave to Amend
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Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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15(a)(2). However, leave to amend “need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject
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to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).
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“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”
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Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s allegations in Counts Three
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through Seven are clearly barred by the relevant statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-821, and
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by Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice of claims provision in A.R.S. § 12-821.01.
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Therefore, no leave to amend will be granted.
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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Maricopa Integrated Health System, Susan Myers,
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Virginia Martinez, Beverly Smith, and Daunn Smith’s Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17)
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is granted.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven of
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2011.
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