Donahoe et al v. Arpaio et al
Filing
693
ORDER that Defendant William Montgomery's Motion to Dismiss Wolfswinkel Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. #592 ) is denied. See order for complete details. Signed by Judge Neil V. Wake on 12/07/12. (NKS)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Gary Donahoe and
husband and wife,
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Cherie
Donahoe,
No. CV-10-02756-PHX-NVW
CONSOLIDATED WITH:
Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,
husband and wife; Andrew Thomas and
Anne Thomas, husband and wife; Lisa
Aubuchon and Peter R. Pestalozzi, wife and
husband; Deputy Chief David Hendershott
and Anna Hendershott, husband and wife;
Peter Spaw and Jane Doe Spaw, husband
and wife; Maricopa County, a municipal
entity; Jon Does I-X; Jane Does I-X; Black
Corporations I-V; and White Partnerships IV,
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Defendants.
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Sandra Wilson and Paul Wilson, husband
and wife,
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CV-10-02758-PHX-NVW
Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,
husband and wife; et al.,
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Defendants.
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Conley D. Wolfswinkel, a single man;
Brandon D. Wolswinkel, a single man;
Ashton A. Wolfswinkel, a single man;
Vanderbilt Farms, LLC, an Arizona limited
liability company; ABCDW, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company; Stone
Canyon, LLC, an Arizona limited liability
company; Vistoso Partners, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company; and W
Harquahala, LLC, an Arizona limited
liability company;
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Plaintiffs,
vs.
Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,
husband and wife; et al.,
Defendants.
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Mary Rose Wilcox and Earl Wilcox, wife
and husband,
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vs.
Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,
husband and wife; et al.,
Defendants.
Donald T. Stapley, Jr. and Kathleen
Stapley, husband and wife,
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CV-11-00473-PHX-NVW
Plaintiffs,
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CV-11-00116-PHX-NVW
CV-11-00902-PHX-NVW
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio,
husband and wife; et al.,
Defendants.
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Before the Court is Defendant William Montgomery’s Motion to Dismiss
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Wolfswinkel Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 592), the
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Response, and the Reply. The Motion to Dismiss will be denied.
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I.
BACKGROUND
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Plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint constitutional violations by former
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County Attorney of Maricopa County Andrew Thomas, his deputy, and others. (Doc. 1
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in 11-cv-00116.) Plaintiffs sued William Montgomery solely in his official capacity as
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County Attorney of Maricopa County; he was named in the suit because he currently
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occupies the office held by Defendant Andrew Thomas at the time of Thomas’ alleged
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wrongdoing. (Id.) Montgomery moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the
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grounds that he took office after the alleged wrongdoing underlying the complaint
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occurred. (Doc. 18 in 11-cv-00116.) This Court in its discretion granted the motion to
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dismiss after determining first that including Montgomery as a defendant in his official
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capacity was redundant, given that Maricopa County was also a defendant, and second
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that dismissing Montgomery as a party served the interest of efficiency (Doc. 70).
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Plaintiffs later filed a Motion to Set Aside Order (Doc. 565), seeking to reinstate
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Montgomery in his official capacity as a party-defendant. Noting that Montgomery had
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adopted the position that he was not required to produce documents under his control to
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Maricopa County pursuant to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, the Court concluded that
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dismissing Montgomery as a defendant was not in fact expedient and gave Plaintiffs
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leave to once again name Montgomery as a defendant. (Doc. 572.) Plaintiffs then filed
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an amended complaint naming Montgomery in his official capacity as a defendant (Doc.
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573), which Montgomery now seeks to have dismissed (Doc. 592).
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II.
ANALYSIS
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Montgomery contends that his Motion to Dismiss should be granted because: (1)
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the Amended Complaint states no cognizable legal claim against him and seeks no relief
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from him; (2) given, as alleged in (1), that Montgomery is not a proper party to the suit,
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he cannot be added as a defendant to merely facilitate discovery; and (3) leaving
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Montgomery as a defendant will open the floodgates of litigation. All of these arguments
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fail, however, as William Montgomery, in his official capacity as County Attorney of
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Maricopa County, is a proper party to Plaintiffs’ suit.
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First, Plaintiffs successfully state a claim against Montgomery in his official
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capacity. “Official-capacity suits . . . [represent] another way of pleading an action
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against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
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165 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs allege that
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the defendants in this action committed a series of constitutional violations “pursuant to
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final policy decisions of [Defendant] Arpaio and [Defendant] Thomas and pursuant to the
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customs, policies, and practices of the Sheriff’s Office and County Attorney’s Office as
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established by [Defendant] Arpaio and [Defendant] Thomas.”
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allegations appropriately state a claim under § 1983 against the entity of which
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Montgomery is an agent. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,
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690-91 (1978) (municipalities and local governing bodies can be held liable for
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monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 when constitutional tort is caused
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by action pursuant to municipal policy or custom). As Plaintiffs’ claims, considered
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along with the supporting facts alleged, “permit a reasonable inference that the defendant
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is liable for the conduct alleged,” the claims survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
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12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
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(2009). Further, despite Montgomery’s assertions to the contrary, Plaintiffs do request
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relief from Montgomery in his official capacity. The “Prayer for Relief” explicitly seeks
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actual and consequential damages recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from “Defendants
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(other than Montgomery personally)”—from Defendants, including Montgomery in his
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official capacity.
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Montgomery for his own actions nor seek relief from him personally is immaterial, as
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Plaintiffs have not sued him in his individual capacity.
(Doc. 573 at 14.)
(Doc. 573.)
Such
That Plaintiffs neither raise claims against
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In addition, Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure corroborates the
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position that Montgomery in his official capacity is an appropriate party to the suit, given
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that Plaintiffs did state claims against his predecessor in office, Defendant Andrew
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Thomas. Had Plaintiffs brought this action while Defendant Thomas was still serving as
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County Attorney for Maricopa County, they would have sued him in his individual and
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present official capacities; Montgomery would not have been involved. (Doc. 633 at 2.)
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If Defendant Thomas had stepped down from his position as a public officer during the
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proceedings, his successor, William Montgomery, would have automatically been
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substituted into the suit as an official-capacity defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An
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action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity . . .
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ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically
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substituted as a party.”) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus contemplate having
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public officers such as Montgomery be party to suits in their official capacities, though
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they were not in office during the time period relevant to the suit. The only distinction
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here is that the effective “automatic substitution” occurred prior to suit, rather than while
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the suit was pending.
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Second, Montgomery is neither an improper defendant included solely to facilitate
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discovery nor a defendant duplicative of Defendant Maricopa County. As discussed
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earlier, Plaintiffs properly stated claims against and sought relief from Montgomery in his
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official capacity; Montgomery’s insistence that he has been improperly included in the
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suit to smooth the discovery process fails to persuade. Further, involving Montgomery in
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the suit does not give rise to any redundancy, since he has created a practical need for his
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inclusion. Montgomery’s initial refusal to cooperate with discovery proceedings in this
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suit vitiates any efficiency gains from removing potentially duplicative parties from the
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action. He is a proper defendant, and as dismissing him does not benefit the proceedings,
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he will remain party to the suit.
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Finally, denying Montgomery’s Motion hardly paves the way for a flood of
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litigation. Montgomery would have to give discovery on behalf of Defendant Maricopa
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County even if he were no longer a defendant in this suit.
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Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts and stated claims against William
Montgomery in his official capacity as County Attorney of Maricopa County.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant William Montgomery’s Motion to
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Dismiss Wolfswinkel Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (Doc.
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592) is denied.
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Dated this 7th day of December, 2012.
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