Gregory v. Arizona Department of Child Support Enforcement et al
Filing
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ORDER that Defendants' motions (Docs. 7 , 8 ) are granted. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by 06/10/11. The Clerk shall terminate this action, with no further leave of Court, if no amended complaint is filed on or before 06/10/11. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 05/10/11. (ESL)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Plaintiff,
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No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC
Donald J Gregory,
ORDER
vs.
Arizona Division
Enforcement, et al.,
of
Child
Support
Defendants.
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Defendant Melanie Gregory moves to dismiss on grounds that the complaint does
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not allege facts that would plausibly entitle Plaintiff to relief against her.
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Defendant Gregory also argues that she is misjoined in this suit.
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Veronica Ragland and the Arizona Division of Child Support Enforcement (“AZDCSE”)
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move to dismiss on grounds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the § 1983 statute of
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limitations bar this suit, that the State of Arizona is immune under the Eleventh
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Amendment, that neither of the State Defendants are persons under § 1983 when acting
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in their official capacities, and that the complaint fails to allege facts that would plausibly
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entitle Plaintiff to relief against Defendant Ragland in her individual capacity. Doc. 8.
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Defendants Ragland and AZDCSE will be referred to collectively as “State Defendants.”
Id.
Doc. 7.
Defendants
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Pro se Plaintiff responds that Defendant Gregory was responsible for enforcing
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the child-support judgment against him. Doc. 9 at 2. He further argues that Rooker-
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Feldman does not apply because he alleged a claim independent of a state court
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judgment, and that the § 1983 statute of limitations does not apply because Defendants’
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last action took place on June 21, 2010. Id. at 2, 3. As to sovereign immunity, Plaintiff
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asserts that his due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment trump the Eleventh
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Amendment. Id. at 3. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that both Gregory and Ragland are
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persons contemplated by § 1983. Id. Defendants have not filed replies, and the parties
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do not request oral argument.
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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants, in enforcing a child-support debt,
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have placed levies, liens, and tax offsets against Plaintiff’s property contrary to state law.
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Doc. 1. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants misinformed him about the law, that
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Defendants have failed to follow the processes required by law for state agencies and
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officials, and that this Court has judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706. Doc. 1 at 6. The
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complaint demands a cessation of all debt-enforcement actions by Defendants; a vacatur
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of all liens, levies, and tax offsets; a curing of Plaintiff’s credit profile with three credit
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reporting agencies; $172,000 in compensatory damages; and any other relief the Court
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deems appropriate. Id. at 7.
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The Court begins by noting that 5 U.S.C. § 706 pertains to judicial review of
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federal agencies, not state agencies. Because AZDCSE is a state agency, its actions are
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not reviewable under § 706.
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With regard to the State Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument, the state-court
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judgment was not filed with the motions and therefore the Court cannot conclude that
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Plaintiff is attempting to collaterally-attack the judgment. A court should apply less
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stringent pleading standards to pro se plaintiffs, such that inartful pleadings are still
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considered by the court. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Although the
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complaint states that the state-court judgment denied Plaintiff his constitutional rights, the
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complaint also states Defendants’ actions were taken using a “false court order.” Doc. 1
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at 6. If this statement meant a “wrongfully-decided court order,” then the Court would be
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inclined to agree that Rooker-Feldman bars the suit. The complaint also states, however,
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that Defendants did not obtain a judgment in time and that State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ.
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Sec. v. Hayden, 115 P.3d 116 (Ariz. 2005), precludes collecting arrearages. Doc. 1 at 6.
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Therefore, the complaint may also be interpreted as alleging that Defendants falsified or
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forged a court order in order to obtain the liens, levies, etc. or that the enforcement
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actions were taken without a court order at all – neither of which would be subject to
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Rooker-Feldman. The complaint does not allege sufficient facts from which this Court
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may conclude that Plaintiff meant either of the latter interpretations, or that these
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interpretations are plausible.
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(“[A]llegations must be sufficiently plausible [so] that it is not unfair to require the
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Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011)
opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery.”).
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With regard to the claims against Defendants Gregory and Ragland individually,
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the complaint does not state sufficient facts from which the Court may infer how they
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were involved or that they would be liable under one or more causes of action. Although
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Plaintiff’s response to the motion describes their involvement in general terms, this
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description is not in the complaint. Even if it were, the description is too generic to give
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Defendants fair notice of their alleged wrongdoing. At a minimum, “allegations in a
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complaint or counterclaim must be sufficiently detailed to give fair notice to the opposing
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party of the nature of the claim so that the party may effectively defend against it.” Starr,
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633 F.3d at 1204. Because the Court finds the complaint deficient as to Gregory and
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Ragland in their individual capacities, the Court need not decide the § 1983 statute of
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limitations issue.
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As to Defendants’ immunity argument, state officials are not immune from suits in
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federal court for violations of federal law with regard to claims that merely seek
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prospective relief. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Plaintiff’s complaint
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seeks in part cessation of future enforcement, vacatur of liens, and curing of his credit
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profile. Plaintiff has not shown, however, that the officials named in the suit have the
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power under state law to perform or not perform the acts requested. In other words,
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Plaintiff has not shown that the appropriate state officials have been named in this action.
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Finally, the State Defendants’ “§ 1983 person” argument is persuasive. A state
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and officials of state agencies cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983.
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Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
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For the reasons above, the claims against Defendants are dismissed without
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prejudice. Plaintiff may, by June 10, 2011, amend the complaint to properly plead viable
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claims. If no amendment is filed with the Court within this period, the Clerk shall
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terminate this matter.
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IT IS ORDERED:
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1.
Defendants’ motions (Docs. 7, 8) are granted as stated above.
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Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by June 10, 2011.
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3.
The Clerk shall terminate this action, with no further leave of Court, if no
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amended complaint is filed on or before June 10, 2011.
Dated this 10th day of May, 2011.
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