Young v. Astrue

Filing 39

AMENDED ORDER granting Plaintiff's 35 Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel is awarded $20,518.25 pursuant to 406(b) fees and is to refund the Plaintiff the previously awarded EAJA fees, in the sum of $7,024.95. Signed by Senior Judge Stephen M McNamee on 2/14/2014. (LFIG)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Carla G. Young,

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Plaintiff,
vs.

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Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of
Social Security,

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Defendant.

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No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM
AMENDED
ORDER

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 35.) Plaintiff’s motion is unopposed by Defendant. The Court will

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grant Plaintiff’s motion.

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Background

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Plaintiff originally filed applications for a period of disability and disability insurance

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benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act before the Commissioner of Social Security.

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Plaintiff's Title II application was denied initially and again on reconsideration. Plaintiff's

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application was then denied by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council

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denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Counsel filed a complaint with this Court on March 23,

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2011. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff and counsel entered into a fee agreement for counsel’s work before

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the Court. (Doc. 35-1.) The agreement provides that counsel will be paid 25% of any past

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due benefits which Plaintiff may be awarded.

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On June 13, 2012, the Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded

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Plaintiff’s claim for further proceedings. (Doc. 27). On November 6, 2012, the Court

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awarded attorney’s fees to Plaintiff in the amount of $7,024.95 under the Equal Access to

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Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 34.) On remand before the Commissioner, Plaintiff was

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awarded $82,073.00 in past due benefits on October 23, 2013. (Doc. 35-1.)

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counsel now moves for fees pursuant to his contingency fee agreement.

Plaintiff’s

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Legal Standard

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Section 406(b) provides that whenever the Court renders a favorable judgment to a

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social security claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney’s fees for representation

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of the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The reasonable fee cannot exceed twenty-five

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percent of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. Id. The fee is payable out of,

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and not in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits. Id. Section 406(b) “does not

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displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for

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successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls

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for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield

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reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The

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Supreme Court stated that “Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are

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unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due

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benefits.” Id. Therefore, the Court must ensure the fee is 1) reasonable, and 2) limited to 25

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percent of past-due benefits.

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This Court must first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.”

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Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations

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omitted). While looking first to this agreement, this Court must still test the resulting award

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for reasonableness. Id. at 1149. In other words, “the district court must first look to the fee

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agreement and then adjust downward if the attorney provided substandard representation or

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delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Id. at 1151. In

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considering reasonableness this Court should consider the following non-exhaustive factors:

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the character of the representation, the results achieved, performance, delay, whether the

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benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case, and, as an aid if necessary, the

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lodestar calculation. Id.

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Discussion

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Plaintiff and her counsel had a contingent-fee agreement in this case typical of fee

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agreements in disability benefit cases. The contingent-fee agreement provides that Plaintiff

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agrees to pay to counsel as his attorney’s fee 25% of any past due benefits which Plaintiff

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or her family receives from Plaintiff’s Social Security Disability Claim. (Doc. 35-1.) Plaintiff

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was awarded $82,073.00 in past due benefits. (Doc. 35.) Twenty-five percent of this award

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is $20,518.25. Plaintiff’s counsel requests that he be paid the contingency fee agreed upon

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between he and his client, $20,518.25. (Doc. 35.)

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Upon review of the case file, the Court finds that counsel’s prosecution of this action

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fell within the broad range of competent representation. The Court finds no reason to reduce

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the award based on the quality of the representation. Neither did counsel engage in

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unreasonable delay. In cases of this type, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc has approved

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effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902 without finding that they are unreasonable.

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See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153. In this case, given the offset from the EAJA recovery for

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which Plaintiff will receive a credit, counsel’s effective hourly rate is $367.66, a 16.44%

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contingency fee. The Court finds that $20,518.25 is a reasonable amount.

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Accordingly, based on the foregoing,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 35.) Counsel is awarded $20,518.25 pursuant to 406(b) fees

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and is to refund the Plaintiff the previously awarded EAJA fees, in the sum of $7,024.95.

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DATED this 14th day of February, 2014.

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