McCollum v. UPS Ground Freight Incorporated et al

Filing 86

ORDER denying 85 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 9/17/2012.(NVO)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Stephanie McCollum, as Conservator for
the minor wrongful death beneficiaries, on
behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries;
and as Personal Representative of the estate
of Marcela Baca,

No. CV-11-0961-PHX-DGC
ORDER

Plaintiff,

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v.

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UPS Ground Freight Incorporated, et al.,

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Defendants.

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On August 30, 2012, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in

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part Defendants UPS Ground Freight, Inc. (“UPS Freight”), Alfredo Duenas, and Wilmer

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Santos-Maldonado’s revised motion for summary judgment. Doc. 81. Defendants have

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filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of summary judgment on

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Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. Doc. 85. The Court will deny the motion.

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Motions for reconsideration are granted only in rare circumstances. Defenders of

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Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Such a motion will be

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denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority

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that could not have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable

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diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Mere disagreement with an order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Ross v.

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Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 1776502, at *2 (D. Ariz. April 15,

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2008). Nor should a motion for reconsideration ask the Court to rethink its analysis.

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United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). Reconsideration

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is appropriate only if the district court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence,

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(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an

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intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v.

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ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

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The Court denied summary judgment on the punitive damages claim because a

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jury could find that Mr. Duenas’s conduct of driving a tractor in an arguably fatigued

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state through an intersection with a red light, combined with the deficiencies in

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Defendants’ driver’s logs, manifests a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of

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significant harm to others.

See Doc. 81, at 10.

Defendants assert that the Court

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overlooked or misapprehended the fact that none of the evidence relied upon by Plaintiff

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in support of her punitive damages claim is causally related to the subject accident, and

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that this evidence cannot be used to prove her claim for punitive damages. Doc. 85, at 3.

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Specifically, Plaintiff’s arguments related to Mr. Duenas’s financial incentive, errors in

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Mr. Duenas’s log books, and the bald tire should be excluded from the Court’s punitive

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damages analysis because they are not causally related to the accident.

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Defendants argue that the Court is left only with evidence that Mr. Duenas did not get

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enough sleep before running a red light, which is insufficient to meet the “evil mind”

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requirement for punitive damages. Id. at 4-6.

Id. at 4-5.

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Plaintiff’s arguments related to financial incentive and log book errors are relevant

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to whether Mr. Duenas operated the tractor in such a fatigued state as to manifest

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conscious disregard of substantial risk. Plaintiff suggested that being paid by the mile,

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with no electronic monitoring, was an incentive for the inaccurate log books. Doc. 73,

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at 11. Defendants contend that financial incentive is not causally related to the accident

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because at the time of the accident Mr. Duenas had dropped off his cargo and was not

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being paid for the miles to drive home. Doc. 85, at 4. But Duenas may nonetheless have

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made financially motivated choices prior to dropping off his cargo that contributed to his

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fatigue at the time of the accident. See Saucedo ex rel. Sinaloa v. Salvation Army, 24
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P.3d 1274, 1279 (Ariz. App. 2001) (“[T]he conduct giving rise to punitive damages must

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be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted. . . . [P]unitive damages are proper when

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conduct giving rise to punitive damages contributes to, or is a cause of, the injury.”).

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Plaintiff alleges that financial incentives led Mr. Duenas to falsify his log books by

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driving when he should have been out of service and understating the length of time for

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vehicle safety inspections. Doc. 73, at 11. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot rely on

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inaccuracies in Mr. Duenas’s log books to prove her punitive damages claim because the

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Court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim that Mr. Duenas did

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not take 10 consecutive hours off duty before starting his shift. Doc. 85, at 5; see

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Doc. 81, at 7. The Court denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Mr. Duenas

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operated the tractor when he was impaired by fatigue. Doc. 81, at 5. Log books that

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inaccurately report the length of time that Mr. Duenas was in service, if motivated by

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financial interests as Plaintiff alleges, may demonstrate that Mr. Duenas allowed himself

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to become so fatigued that he drove through the intersection on a red light. See Hyatt

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Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 907 P.2d 506, 518 (Ariz. App. 1995).

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The Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent maintenance and

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inspection claim because, as Defendants correctly note, Plaintiff admitted that the bald

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tire was not a proximate cause of the accident. Doc. 85, at 5; Doc. 81, at 7-8. Even

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without relying on evidence of a bald tire, Mr. Duenas’s operation of the tractor while

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fatigued and the inaccuracies in his driver’s logs raise a question of fact as to whether he

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“consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of

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significant harm to others.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration
(Doc. 85) is denied.
Dated this 17th day of September, 2012.

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