Howard v. RJF Financial LLC

Filing 43

ORDER that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 42 ) is denied. The lawsuit shall remain closed. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 2/6/2012.(KMG)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Leslie Howard,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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RJF Financial, LLC,
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Defendant.
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No. CV-11-1213-PHX-GMS
ORDER

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 42). For the
reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND

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On October 12, 2006, the Agua Fria Justice Court in Maricopa County resolved a

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claim brought by Defendant RJF Financial (“RJF”) against Plaintiff Leslie Howard in favor

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of RJF and entered a judgment of $12,487.98. (Doc. 27, Ex. 5, No. CC2006-069913).

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Howard filed a lawsuit in the District of Arizona on June 21, 2011, claiming among other

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things that RJF had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by bringing

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the original claim. (Doc. 1). The Court ruled that the suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine, which holds that decisions by state courts are res judicata to challenges in the

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federal court. See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ederal district

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courts have no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial

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proceedings”) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff now files a motion for reconsideration,

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stating, among other things, that he “has not made any claim against the judgment. The

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Plaintiff’s claims were made against the Defendant’s claim.” (Doc. 42, emphasis omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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1.

Legal Standard

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Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration may be granted only on one of four

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grounds, “1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the

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judgment is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable

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evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice or 4) there is an intervening

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change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063

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(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). Motions for reconsideration are

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disfavored and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original

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briefs and arguments. See Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d

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918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor should such motions ask the Court to “rethink what the

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court has already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.

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Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing,

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Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).

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2.

Analysis

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Plaintiff cites Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, (9th Cir. 2004) for the

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proposition that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when “wrongful acts of the defendants were

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responsible for the court’s erroneous judgment.” (Doc. 42 at 7). As the Court noted in its

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previous order, Kougasian acknowledges an exception to Rooker-Feldman when a Plaintiff

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alleges that a state court decision is based on “extrinsic fraud.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140.

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The fraud in Kougasian involved a false declaration submitted to a state court, and upon

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which the state court relied. Id. Plaintiff here alleges no fraud at the state court level; indeed,

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as noted in the previous order, “Plaintiff continued to pursue the case in the trial court after

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the default judgment,” bringing many of the same arguments he raises here, which the trial

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court rejected. (Doc. 40). Plaintiff alleges that the previous action was improper because it
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was a violation of the FDCPA and because it was untimely under Arizona law because credit

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card accounts are “open accounts” under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-543(2).

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These arguments were available to him at the state court proceeding.

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Plaintiff alleges that he is bringing the case against RJF for collecting the debt, not

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against the state court for ruling in RJF’s favor, and that the action is therefore not a

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“forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). The decision

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by the state court in RJF’s favor resolved the issues in the claim in RJF’s favor. Challenging

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those underlying issues is challenging the state court’s decision. A federal suit brought by

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a state-court defendant containing allegations that were or could have been raised in the

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original state court suit is a de facto appeal, and precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits.

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See Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Co., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-

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Feldman prohibits suits by those “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

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rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review

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and rejection of those judgments”).

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Rooker-Feldman bars this suit. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration asks the Court

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to “rethink what the court has already thought through.” Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.

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The motion is denied.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.

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42) is denied. The lawsuit shall remain closed.

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DATED this 6th day of February, 2012.

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