Holden v. Astrue

Filing 29

ORDER granting 24 Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiff is awarded $3,399.00 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 6/6/13. (LAD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Garland Scott Holden,

No. CV-11-01726-PHX-DGC

Plaintiff,

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ORDER

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v.

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Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff has filed a timely motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access

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to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Docs. 24-25. A response and reply have

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been filed. Docs. 27-28. The Court will grant the motion.

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I.

Background.

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An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for social

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security benefits, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

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Security Act. Doc. 22 at 1. That decision became Defendant’s final decision when the

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Appeals Council denied review. Id. Plaintiff then brought an action for judicial review

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff and remanded the

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case to Defendant for further proceedings. Doc. 22 at 13.

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II.

Analysis.

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“The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.”

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Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party

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because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act,

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Doc. 22 at 13; Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th

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Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for purposes

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of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether

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disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”); Flores, 49 F.3d at 567 (“If the district court

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enters judgment reversing and remanding under sentence four, then the claimant must

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apply for fees within 30 days of the date the judgment becomes final.”). The Court

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should award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA unless Defendant

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shows that its position in the case was “substantially justified or that special

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circumstances make an award unjust.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez,

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274 F.3d at 1258.

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A.

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Defendant argues that an award of attorney’s fees should be denied because her

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position was substantially justified. Doc. 27 at 1. The Court disagrees. Under the EAJA,

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“substantial justification” means that “‘the government’s position must have a reasonable

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basis in law and fact.’” Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

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Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Where, as here, the ALJ’s

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decision was reversed on the basis of procedural errors, the question is not whether

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[Defendant’s] position as to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] disability claim was substantially

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justified. Rather, the relevant question is whether [Defendant’s] decision to defend on

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appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Id.

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(emphasis in original).

Was Defendant’s Position Substantially Justified?

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Defending “basic and fundamental errors” is not substantially justified. Shafer,

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518 F.3d at 1071-72 (holding that it was legal error to discredit Claimant’s testimony

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without giving clear and convincing reasons, and that the Commissioner was not

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substantially justified in defending it). A reviewing court should not have to speculate as

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to the reasons the ALJ rejected the claimant’s allegations. Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d at

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1052 (holding Commissioner was not substantially justified in defending an ALJ’s

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decision in which he rejected Claimant’s subjective testimony without specific findings).
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Defense of the ALJ’s decision in this matter was not substantially justified. The

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ALJ committed the same error as those in Shafer and Corbin. The ALJ dismissed

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Plaintiff’s testimony, reasoning only that: “Claimant’s statements concerning the

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intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the

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extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.”

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Doc. 22 at 12. The ALJ committed legal error because he “did not identify the evidence

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on which he was relying, did not give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for his

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determination, and made no specific findings.” Id. Just as the Commissioner was not

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substantially justified in defending the errors in Shafer and Corbin, Defendant was not

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substantially justified in defending this case.

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B.

Is the Amount if the Requested Fee Award Reasonable?

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Plaintiff’s counsel has filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to

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the EAJA. Counsel submitted an itemized statement that shows he worked 17.5 hours on

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the case, plus one hour for a reply in support of the motion. Having reviewed counsel’s

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statement and having considered the fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

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U.S. 424, 429-30 (1983) the Court finds that the total of 18.5 hours is not excessive. The

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Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and award $3,399.00 in attorney’s fees.

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IT IS ORDERED:

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Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees (Doc. 24) is granted.

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2.

Plaintiff is awarded $3,399.00 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to

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Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Dated this 6th day of June, 2013.

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