Muhammad v. Arizona Department of Corrections et al

Filing 111

ORDER, the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff Muhammad's "Complaint to Recover Unpaid Sum", which is docketed as a Motion 103 ; the Complaint/Motion is denied. Signed by Senior Judge Stephen M McNamee on 5/19/15.(REW)

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Riki Rashaad Muhammad,

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Plaintiff,

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No. CV 11-1890-PHX-SMM (JFM)

vs.

ORDER

Arizona Department of Corrections, et
al.,

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Defendants.

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Before the Court is Plaintiff Riki Rashaad Muhammad’s “Complaint to Recover

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Unpaid Sum,” which seeks a judgment against Defendants in the amount of $375 (Doc.

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103).
The Court will deny the Muhammad’s request for a judgment against Defendants.

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I.

Background
Muhammad brought this pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against multiple Arizona Department of Corrections officials (Doc. 25 at 2, 29). He set
forth four counts for relief, three of which related to his status as a Muslim and asserted
claims under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), and the Equal Protection Clause, and one that alleged a threat-to-safety
claim under the Eighth Amendment (id. at 4, 8-20, 29-30). In July 2014, Muhammad and
Defendants Charles Ryan, Laura Krause, Mike Linderman, and Jeff Lind filed a
Stipulation for Partial Dismissal to dismiss the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and equalprotection claims (Doc. 71). On July 30, 2014, pursuant to the Stipulation, the Court

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dismissed those claims and Defendants with prejudice, leaving the threat-to-safety claim
against Defendant Barbara Ams as the sole remaining claim (Doc. 76).
On December 31, 2014, Muhammad filed his Complaint stating that Defendants

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had not yet paid the sum agreed to in the Settlement Agreement, nor had defense counsel
responded to Muhammad’s inquires about the issue (Doc. 103). Muhammad therefore
requests a judgment be entered against Defendants in the amount they had agreed to pay
him—$375.00 (Doc. 103).
In response, Defendants assert that Muhammad provided a copy of the Settlement

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Agreement in violation of the confidentiality clause therein, that the Court does not have
Article III jurisdiction over the dispute, and that the sum due has been placed into transit
and should be submitted into Muhammad’s account within 7-10 days (Doc. 104).

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Muhammad did not file a reply.
II.

Discussion
Where the parties to an action have executed a stipulation for dismissal with

prejudice, and the district court then dismisses the action with prejudice, the “dismissal
‘terminate[s] the district court’s jurisdiction except for the limited purpose of reopening
and setting aside the judgment of dismissal within the scope allowed by [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 60(b).’”1 Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., CV 09-2129-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL
1119612, at *2 (D. Ariz. March 28, 2011) (quoting Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat’l Bank &

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Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1987)); see DHX, Inc. v. Allianz AGF MAT,

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Ltd., 425 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) (a district court has discretion to consider a

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request for vacatur of a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)). A motion under Rule 60(b) is

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appropriate if one party seeks to enforce or disputes the terms in a stipulation and notice

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of dismissal; it is not appropriate where a party simply wishes to unilaterally vacate an

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order of dismissal. See Jones, 2011 WL 1119612, at *2; see also Hinsdale, 823 F.2d at

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Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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996 (parties may seek enforcement of the settlement agreement “only by means of an
independent action for specific performance or by means of a Rule 60(b) motion to
vacate the prior order of dismissal for the purpose of enforcing the agreement”).
Instead of filing a separate action for specific performance or a Rule 60(b) motion
to set aside the judgment of dismissal, Muhammad asks the Court to specifically enforce
the Settlement Agreement.

The Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the

Settlement Agreement without having first vacated the prior Order of dismissal. See
Hinsdale, 823 F.2d at 996. Even if the Court construed Muhammad’s Complaint as a
Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the prior Order, he fails to present any reasons that support
relief under the Rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
Regardless, Defendants indicate that the money Muhammad seeks is to be placed
into his account (Doc. 104). In failing to file a reply, it appears to the Court that
Muhammad request’s is moot.
IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to
Plaintiff Muhammad’s “Complaint to Recover Unpaid Sum,” which is docketed as a
motion (Doc. 103), and the Complaint/motion is denied.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2015.

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Honorable Stephen M. McNamee
Senior United States District Judge

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