Mirchandani et al v. BMO Harris Bank NA et al
Filing
17
ORDER that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Doc. 9 is granted and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County. Defendant TradeCor's Motion to Dismiss Doc. 7 is therefore dismissed as moot. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 12/5/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Remand Letter)(KMG)
1
WO
2
3
4
5
6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Haresh Mirchandani; Indra Mirchandani,)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BMO Harris Bank NA; TradeCor Desert)
)
Sky II LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
No. CV-11-2286-PHX-GMS
ORDER
16
17
18
19
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand (Doc. 9). For the reasons
stated below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
20
On November 14, 2011, Plaintiffs Haresh and Indra Mirchandani filed this suit in
21
Superior Court in Maricopa County. (Doc. 1, Ex. B). The dispute arises out of three 2007
22
loans that a predecessor to Defendant BMO Harris Bank (“BMO”) issued to SS Quality
23
Fuels, LLC (“Quality”), an LLC of which Plaintiffs are the sole members. Plaintiffs were the
24
Guarantors on the three loans (collectively “the loans”), and the loans were secured with
25
deeds of trust to a piece of property owned by Quality (“the property”). Defendant TradeCor
26
Desert Sky II, LLC (“TradeCor”), later acquired the bank’s interest in the deeds of trust
27
securing the loans, which are now in default, and scheduled a trustee’s sale for November
28
29, 2011. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant BMO entered the loan terms incorrectly,
1
overcharged loan fees, and sold Plaintiffs an additional “swap” loan that Plaintiffs did not
2
understand. (Id.). They allege that BMO and TradeCor conspired to sell the Deeds of Trust
3
to TradeCor so that TradeCor could foreclose upon the property, which is adjacent to other
4
property owned by TradeCor. (Id.).
5
M & I Marshall Bank (“M & I”), predecessor to BMO, issued a term loan to Quality
6
in the amount of $1,960,000 and a Revolving Line of Credit (“RLOC”) of $150,000 on
7
December 11, 2007. (Doc. 7, Ex. B). The next day, the bank sold Quality a “swap
8
agreement,” whereby it could swap its interest obligations with a counter-party on a similar
9
amount of indebtedness. (Doc. 1, Ex. B(3)). On December 23, 2008, Quality fell behind on
10
its loans, and on September 1, 2009, entered into a forbearance agreement with M &I. (Doc.
11
7, Ex. B). In the agreement, M & I agreed to forbear its right to foreclose on the property, and
12
Quality released “Lender and Lender’s . . . partners, predecessors, successors and assigns,”
13
from “any and all actions and causes of action . . . of any and every character, known or
14
unknown, direct and/or indirect, at law or in equity, of whatsoever kind or nature, whether
15
heretofore or hereafter arising, . . . including but not limited to matters in any way directly
16
or indirectly arising out of or in any way connected to this Agreement, the Notes, the Deeds
17
of Trust, the Loan Agreement, the Guarantee Document and/or any related documents.”
18
(Doc. 7, Ex. B).
19
On April 19, 2010, TradeCor purchased the Lender’s position in the Notes; on April
20
20, their attorney wrote Plaintiffs to notify them that Quality was in default. (Doc. 7, Ex. D).
21
TradeCor then sued Quality and Plaintiffs in Maricopa County Superior Court for breach of
22
contract. Neither Quality, which had filed for bankruptcy protection in August of 2010, nor
23
Plaintiffs responded to TradeCor’s motion for summary judgment, and judgment was entered
24
against them on January 20, 2011. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4). On November 7, 2011, the bankruptcy
25
court denied Quality’s reorganization plan and lifted the automatic stay, allowing TradeCor
26
to exercise its rights in the property. (Doc. 7, Ex. 7). See In re SS Quality Fuels, LLC,
27
2:10-bk-25372-GBN (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010).
28
The trustee’s sale had been scheduled for November 16, 2011, but was moved to
-2-
1
November 29 when Plaintiffs filed for a TRO in state court. The state court set a preliminary
2
injunction hearing for November 22. On November 21, the evening before the scheduled
3
hearing and three days before Thanksgiving, BMO removed the case to federal court,
4
claiming that diversity jurisdiction was proper because TradeCor, the only Arizona
5
defendant, was fraudulently joined, and that federal question jurisdiction was proper because
6
the state-law claims in the complaint “implicate significant federal issues.” (Doc. 1).
7
Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion in this Court to prevent the sale of the property. This
8
Court held a hearing on November 28. Because Quality, rather than Plaintiffs, was the owner
9
of the property, Plaintiffs could not show that selling the property would personally cause
10
them “irreparable harm,” and the motion for a TRO was denied. (Doc. 13).
11
12
DISCUSSION
1.
Legal Standard
13
“The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving all jurisdictional facts.”
14
Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v. Gen.
15
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). A case may be properly removed from
16
state court if the district court could have exercised original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
17
(2006). Federal jurisdiction is proper in all cases that present a federal question on the face
18
of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). In addition, federal question jurisdiction will lie
19
when claims are filed under state law but nevertheless “turn on substantial questions of
20
federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that
21
a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g
22
& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).The question of federal law must be substantial, however,
23
and “the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
24
confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S 804,
25
813 (1986).
26
In addition, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on cases in which
27
defendants and plaintiffs are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is
28
greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332
-3-
1
to require complete diversity between parties, where “the citizenship of each plaintiff is
2
diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68
3
(1996). However, if a plaintiff “fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant,
4
and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state,” the district court may
5
claim that the party is fraudulently joined, and assert jurisdiction. McCabe v. General Foods
6
Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).
7
Although ordinarily courts determine federal jurisdiction “solely by an examination
8
of the plaintiff’s case, without recourse to the defendant’s pleadings,” when “fraudulent
9
joinder is an issue, we will go somewhat further.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d
10
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). In Ritchey, the Ninth Circuit was asked to find that a defendant
11
was fraudulently joined because claims filed against that defendant had been filed after the
12
appropriate statute of limitations. Because it found that “the fact that the statute of limitations
13
is a kind of procedural bar, and not one which relates to the merits of the case,” it found that
14
the defendant was fraudulently joined and asserted jurisdiction. Id. at 1319. The Court noted,
15
importantly, that fraudulent joinder inquiries do not rely on “whether those defendants could
16
propound defenses to an otherwise valid cause of action,” and cited approvingly a Supreme
17
Court case that “refused to find fraudulent joinder where a misjoinder of parties was claimed
18
by the defendant that was trying to remove the action.” Id. at 1318–19 (citing Alabama Great
19
S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S 206, 218–19 (1906)). It further noted that joinder is not
20
fraudulent when “the assertion made by the removing defendant ‘went to the merits of the
21
action as an entirety, and not to the joinder; that is to say, it indicated that the plaintiff’s case
22
was ill founded as to all the defendants.’” Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Chesapeake &
23
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 153 (1914).
24
In considering whether a defendant is fraudulently joined, “[t]he Court must therefore
25
walk a very fine line: it must consider the merits of a matter without assuming jurisdiction
26
over it.” Davis v. Prentiss Props. Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Courts
27
in the Ninth Circuit have thus concluded “that some room must exist between the standard
28
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), for example, and a finding of fraudulent joinder.” Id. at
-4-
1
1115. Even “where it is doubtful whether the complaint states a cause of action against the
2
resident defendant, the doubt is ordinarily resolved in favor of the retention of the case in
3
state court.” Ballesteros v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072
4
(D. Ariz. 2006) (quoting Albi v. Street & Smith Publ’ns., 140 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1944)).
5
Even a “‘glimmer of hope’ that plaintiff can establish claim is sufficient to preclude
6
application of fraudulent joinder doctrine.” Ballesteros, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (quoting
7
Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating a number of
8
decisions on fraudulent joinder from the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere, the district court in the
9
Central District of California has concluded that “a federal court’s fraudulent-joinder
10
consideration should be akin to an application of Rule 11.” Davis, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
11
This analysis has since been cited approvingly by three other districts within the circuit, and
12
disagreed with by none. See, e.g., Bellecci v. GTE Spring Commc’n Corp., 2003 WL 151538
13
(N.D. Cal Jan. 14, 2003), Lujan v. Girardi & Keese, 2009 WL 5216906 (D. Guam Dec. 29,
14
2009), Jennings-Frye v. NYK Logistics Americas Inc., 2011 WL 642653 (C. D. Cal. Feb. 11,
15
2011). This Court finds the Rule 11 analogy helpful in determining whether a plaintiff’s
16
inability to recover is “obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” McCabe, 811 F.2d
17
at 1339.
18
2.
Analysis
19
BMO claims that removal is proper because 1) Plaintiffs’s state law claims rely on
20
substantial questions of federal law, 2) Plaintiffs fraudulently joined TradeCor because the
21
forbearance agreement precludes them from suing TradeCor, and 3) Plaintiffs’ fraudulently
22
joined TradeCor because their claims are precluded by the state court judgment in
23
TradeCor’s favor. For the reasons discussed below, all three claims fail.
24
A.
25
Plaintiffs allege that BMO breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In support
26
of this allegation, they claim that BMO breached certain agreements with them, and then
27
failed to file a Suspicious Activity Report as required by 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1989). (Doc. 1,
28
Ex. B. ¶ 68). The regulation in question requires that banks “file a Suspicious Activity Report
Federal Question Jurisdiction
-5-
1
when they detect a known or suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction
2
related to a money laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.” 12 C.F.R. §
3
21.11(a). BMO argues that in order to rule on this claim “the Plaintiffs will have to establish
4
that BMO violated 12 C.F.R. § 21.11, and their claim therefore poses a federal question.”
5
(Doc. 1 at 8). Additionally, BMO claims that because Plaintiffs reference certain federal
6
statutes and rules in their claim for a Temporary Restraining Order, that claim presents a
7
federal question. (Doc 1 at 8). Since the Temporary Restraining Order has already been
8
denied, only BMO’s claim regarding the good faith and fair dealing claim will be considered.
9
A state court claim which relies on a defendant’s violation of a federal rule does not
10
necessarily give rise to federal question jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S at 813.
11
Rather, federal question jurisdiction only lies when “the state action discloses a contested and
12
substantial federal question,” and even then “the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a
13
federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the
14
sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of §
15
1331.” Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313–14. The Ninth Circuit has denied federal jurisdiction
16
when a party seeking removal has failed to show that a claim “necessarily depends upon
17
construction of a substantial question of any federal . . . law.” Ultramar America, Ltd. v.
18
Dwell, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990). It has otherwise only found that purported state
19
claims alleging violation of a federal law are removable when the referenced federal law
20
“unequivocally confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts” Sparta Surgical Corp.
21
v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
22
added); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynergy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 841 (9th Cir.
23
2004).
24
BMO does not claim that “the meaning of the federal statute is in dispute” at all, let
25
alone that interpreting the rule involves resolving a contested and substantial federal
26
question. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 315. It further does not claim that 12 C.F.R. § 21.11
27
unequivocally confers exclusive federal jurisdiction, and it is not clear from the text of the
28
regulation that it does so. Federal question jurisdiction is improper.
-6-
1
B.
Forbearance Agreement
2
Plaintiffs signed the forbearance agreement with M & I Bank on September 1, 2009,
3
and amended it on December 1, 2009, then again in February 2010. BMO acknowledges that
4
the forbearance agreement prohibits only suits complaining of conduct committed before it
5
was signed. (Doc. 1 at 5). It states that although “the complaint contains allegations
6
concerning conduct after February 2010, those allegations are aimed at BMO, not TradeCor.”
7
(Id.). In fact, numerous allegations in the complaint aimed at TradeCor are for conduct it
8
engaged in after the last amendment of the forbearance agreement. (Doc. 1, Ex. B ¶¶ 46–63,
9
¶¶ 106–110).1 The forbearance agreement does not render TradeCor fraudulently joined.
10
C.
Claim Preclusion
11
Finally, BMO argues that the claims against TradeCor should have been raised as
12
compulsory counterclaims in a suit TradeCor filed in Arizona state court for breach of
13
contract, and that they are precluded by the judgment in that case. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiffs
14
allege that the earlier suit does not preclude their claim. They argue that the judgment was
15
in effect a default judgment entered after their attorney failed to appear, the claims at issue
16
were different, and no findings were issued. (Doc. 9).
17
Parties’ motives are only minimally relevant to a fraudulent joinder inquiry because
18
fraudulent joinder is “a term of art,” and does not require a finding of actual fraud. McCabe
19
v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, here some
20
discussion of parties’ actions is instructive. BMO removed this matter on November 21, the
21
evening before a scheduled preliminary injunction hearing in state court, three days before
22
a national holiday, and one week before the scheduled trustee sale. (Doc. 1). The scheduled
23
hearing in state court therefore never took place, and Plaintiffs were left to file a motion for
24
an emergency TRO on Wednesday, November 23, the day before Thanksgiving, in the hopes
25
of receiving a hearing on Monday to prevent the sale of the property on Tuesday. At that
26
1
27
28
BMO identifies a number of “exceptions,” to its statement that all claims against
TradeCor predate the agreement, all of which in fact involve conduct not covered by the
agreement.
-7-
1
hearing, TradeCor’s attorney stated that the sudden removal “caught me a little bit off
2
guard,” but at the time he had been guarded enough to consent to the removal and to file a
3
motion to dismiss in federal court the day after the removal was filed. (Doc. 16 at 35; Doc.
4
7). TradeCor has filed no briefings asserting that it was fraudulently joined, and declined the
5
opportunity to be heard on the jurisdictional issue at the TRO hearing. (Doc. 16 at 9).
6
Although fraudulent joinder is usually employed against Plaintiffs who have joined an
7
improper party solely to keep a federal case in state court, here Defendants, rather than
8
Plaintiffs, appear to have used procedural tactics to obtain a substantive advantage.
9
In Arizona, “[t]he defense of claim preclusion has three elements: (1) an identity of
10
claims in the suit in which judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final
11
judgment on the merits in the previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties
12
in the two suits.” In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
13
System and Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 69–70, 127 P.3d 882, 887–88 (2006). Compulsory
14
counterclaims are those that arise from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
15
matter of the opposing party’s claim. Ariz.R.Civ.P. 13(a). Compulsory counterclaims are
16
subject to the principles of res judicata. Levin v. Hindhaugh, 167 Ariz. 110, 111, 804 P.2d
17
839, 840 (App.1990). Lansford v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 419, 850 P.2d 126, 132 (App.
18
1992).
19
Plaintiffs argue that their claim is not precluded by TradeCor’s breach of contract suit
20
because it involved different claims, no findings were issued, and the case was not litigated
21
on the merits. (Doc. 9). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that TradeCor conspired with BMO to
22
transfer the deeds of trust while aware that they had been recorded with numerous
23
discrepancies that had not been properly reconciled, and despite a mandatory restriction in
24
the swap that both parties must consent to its transfer. (Doc. 1, Ex. B ¶¶ 42–63). TradeCor
25
asserted in its claim that Plaintiffs had failed to make payments on the loans. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1).
26
It is not necessary for this court to determine whether the alleged conspiracy to transfer the
27
loans fraudulently and the failure to pay those loans back “arises out of the [same] transaction
28
or occurrence” under Arizona state law. Levin v. Hindhaugh, 167 Ariz. 110, 111, 804 P.2d
-8-
1
839, 840 (App. 1990). For the purposes of determining whether TradeCor was properly
2
joined, it is enough to find that Plaintiffs have “a glimmer of hope” that a state court may so
3
find, and the Court finds that they do. Ballesteros, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. Relying by
4
analogy on the standards of sanctioning a party under Rule 11, Plaintiffs’ filings against
5
TradeCor are clearly not “both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent
6
inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). It
7
is the province of the state courts of Arizona to determine whether BMO and TradeCor’s
8
defenses are adequate to defeat Plaintiffs’ claims, and in a case where the parties are not
9
completely diverse, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to rule in their stead. See Murakami v.
10
E.L. DuPont De Nemours and Co. 191 F.3d 460 (table) 1999 WL 701902 (9th Cir. 1999)
11
(rejecting fraudulent joinder when question of whether a Stipulation agreement applies
12
“should have been decided by the courts of Hawaii”).
13
14
15
The parties in this case are not completely diverse, and the case is therefore remanded
to state court.
CONCLUSION
16
The fact that Plaintiffs reference federal rules in their claim for violation of good faith
17
and fair dealing does not pose a “contested and substantial federal question.” Grable & Sons,
18
545 U.S. at 313. The forbearance agreement did not bar suits against TradeCor for actions
19
TradeCor took after the agreement’s final amendment. Plaintiffs have at least “a glimmer of
20
hope” to succeed against TradeCor’s claim preclusion defense, and therefore TradeCor is not
21
fraudulently joined. Ballesteros, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. Diversity is not complete and this
22
Court is therefore without subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the substance of the claim.
23
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 9) is
24
granted and this matter is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County.
25
Defendant TradeCor’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is therefore dismissed as moot.
26
DATED this 5th day of December, 2011.
27
28
-9-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?