Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio et al

Filing 121

ORDER: MCSHCD's motion for summary judgment 72 and the County Defendants' motion for summary judgment 89 are granted. Plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment 91 and 92 are denied. All other pending motions Docs. 96 , 102 , 117 are denied as moot. The Clerk shall terminate this action. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 1/22/2014.(ALS)

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Miriam Mendiola-Martinez, Plaintiff, 10 11 12 No. CV11-02512-PHX-DGC ORDER v. Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., Defendants. 13 14 Plaintiff Miriam Mendiola-Martinez commenced this action against Defendants 15 Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (“Sheriff Arpaio”), Maricopa County (the “County”) (collectively 16 the “County Defendants”), and the Maricopa County Special Health Care District 17 (“MCSHCD”) on December 19, 2011. Doc. 1. She filed an amended complaint on 18 May 14, 2012. Doc. 7. MCSHCD filed a motion for summary judgment on July 25, 19 2013. Doc. 72. The County Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on 20 September 19, 2013. Doc. 89. Plaintiff filed separate motions for partial summary 21 judgment against the County Defendants (Doc. 91), and MCSHCD (Doc. 92), on 22 September 21, 2013. The motions are fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the 23 Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions and grant Defendants’ motions.1 24 I. Background. 25 Plaintiff was arrested by the Scottsdale Police Department on October 23, 2009, 26 for felony identity theft. Doc. 89 at 1. She had been working under another person’s 27 1 28 The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 name because she was an undocumented immigrant. Doc. 91 at 6. At the time of her 2 arrest, Plaintiff was six months pregnant. Id. Plaintiff was booked at the County’s 3 Fourth Avenue Jail (Doc. 91 at 7) and was transferred to the Estrella Jail for housing 4 (Doc. 89 at 1). Plaintiff contends that while housed at Estrella Jail she was “frequently 5 hungry” and “worrie[d] that her baby [would] die inside of her” as a result of the “meager 6 diet and lack of sanitary water.” Id. at 8. The County Defendants note that Plaintiff was 7 “provided a modified diet for pregnant women that consisted of the regular diet 8 supplemented with an additional 32 ounces of milk . . . and a prenatal vitamin.” Doc. 89 9 at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that she was not provided with food or water for “long periods 10 of time” when transported to court. Doc. 91 at 8. 11 Plaintiff first experienced labor pains on December 20, 2009, at which time she 12 was transported to Maricopa Integrated Health Services (“MIHS”). Doc. 89 at 2. During 13 the transport, Plaintiff’s hands were cuffed in front of her body. Id., Doc. 91 at 9. 14 Plaintiff also alleges that she was shackled at the ankles. Doc. 97-1, ¶ 13. Medical staff 15 monitored Plaintiff and determined that she was not in labor. Doc. 89 at 2. Plaintiff was 16 then transported back to the Estrella Jail. Id.; Doc. 91 at 9. The following day, Plaintiff 17 was experiencing additional pain and was again transported to MIHS. Doc. 89 at 2; 18 Doc. 91 at 10. Officer Hertig, the detention officer who accompanied Plaintiff during her 19 transport, testified that Plaintiff was initially handcuffed in the front and that she did not 20 recall whether the handcuffs were removed during transport. Doc. 94-7 at 31; Doc. 91 at 21 9. Plaintiff does not recall being handcuffed during this transport. Doc. 91 at 9. 22 After arriving at the hospital, doctors performed a successful cesarean section to 23 deliver a healthy baby boy. Doc. 89 at 2. Plaintiff was not restrained while in labor at 24 the hospital or during delivery. Id.; Doc. 72 at 2. Officer Hertig remained in the delivery 25 room throughout Plaintiff’s procedure. Doc. 91 at 10. Plaintiff was subsequently moved 26 to a recovery room and a leg restraint was placed on her ankle. Doc. 89 at 2; Doc. 91 at 27 10. The leg restraint consisted of a plastic cuff that went around Plaintiff’s ankle which 28 was attached to a metal chain long enough to provide Plaintiff with “full and -2- 1 unencumbered access to the restroom.” Doc 89 at 3; Doc. 91 at 10; Doc. 72 at 3. 2 Plaintiff’s leg restraint was loosened by a detention officer on one occasion in response to 3 her complaint that the restraint was too tight. Doc. 89 at 3. MCSHCD contends that 4 Plaintiff did not complain about the restraint to the hospital staff. Doc. 72 at 3. 5 Plaintiff complains that she was not provided with regular access to her newborn 6 and that she was neither permitted to breastfeed nor provided with any way to release her 7 breast milk. Doc. 91 at 10-11. She contends that two days after delivering her child, 8 while “still bleeding from her delivery,” she was “bound at her hands and ankles” and 9 “forced to walk through the hospital,” where she was then “chained to other prisoners for 10 transport back to jail.” Id. at 11. She further contends that she was not offered a 11 wheelchair during her discharge. Id. The County Defendants respond that Plaintiff had 12 been cleared for discharge and was first escorted from her room to an inmate waiting area 13 and then back to her room to receive pre-release medication and finally back to the 14 waiting area. Doc. 89 at 3. On December 24, 2009, Plaintiff appeared in court for 15 sentencing, during which time she contends that her breasts were “leaking milk,” and that 16 she was “bleeding into her jail pants.” Doc. 91 at 11. MCSHCD notes that Plaintiff does 17 not claim that either she or her child suffered any injury as a result of her care at MIHS. 18 Doc. 72 at 4. 19 Plaintiff has asserted claims against the County Defendants and MCSHCD for 20 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment 21 (“Count One”), deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Equal 22 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count Two”), cruel and unusual 23 punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments (“Count Three”), 24 “disparate treatment” in violation of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 25 (“Count Four”), and “Monell liability,” (“Count Five”). Doc. 7 at ¶¶ 75-105. 26 II. Legal Standard. 27 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 28 the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] -3- 1 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 2 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 3 evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 4 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 5 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a 6 party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 7 essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 8 trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome 9 of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must 10 be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 11 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 12 III. Analysis. 13 A. Deliberate Indifference Claims. 14 An official violates the Eighth Amendment “when he acts with ‘deliberate 15 indifference’ to the serious medical needs of an inmate.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 16 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). “To 17 establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective 18 standard – that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual 19 punishment – and a subjective standard – deliberate indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 20 985. The objective standard requires that “the denial of a plaintiff’s serious medical need 21 must result in the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Estelle v. 22 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). As to the subjective standard, “deliberate indifference 23 requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” 24 Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). An official must “both be 25 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 26 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The 27 indifference to medical needs, however, “must be substantial; a constitutional violation is 28 not established by negligence or ‘an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical -4- 1 care.’” Anderson v. Cnty of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle, 2 429 U.S. at 105-06); see Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) 3 (“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not 4 violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.”). 5 Plaintiff makes several deliberate indifference arguments. First, she argues that 6 the County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs when 7 they restrained her during her transport to and from the hospital and while she was 8 recovering. Doc. 91 at 8. Next, she argues that MCSHCD was deliberately indifferent to 9 her serious medical needs by “deferring to law enforcement” on the issue of whether or 10 not Plaintiff would be restrained. Doc. 92 at 16. Additionally, she appears to argue that 11 the diet provided by the County Defendants was inadequate and demonstrated deliberate 12 indifference to her serious medical needs. Doc. 91 at 3. Finally, she argues that both 13 MCSHCD and the County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious 14 medical needs by failing to allow her to breastfeed or to provide her with medication or 15 equipment to otherwise release milk or cease lactation. Id. at 4-5; Doc. 92 at 19. The 16 Court will consider each argument in turn. 1. 17 Shackling Claims against the County Defendants. 18 The County Defendants contend that the restraints used on Plaintiff were 19 appropriate and, in any event, that they are protected by qualified immunity. Doc. 89 at 20 6. They argue that the “doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 21 from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 22 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 23 known.” Id. (citing Clouthier v. Cnty of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1240 (9th Cir. 24 2010)). 25 ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional 26 right,’ and ‘whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the 27 defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Contra Costa, 591 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Pearson v. 28 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230 (2009)). Whether a right is clearly established turns on the “In considering a claim of qualified immunity, the court must determine -5- 1 “objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 2 ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 3 (1987); Contra Costa, 591 F.3d at 1241. 4 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a clearly established 5 constitutional right was violated here. Defendants argue that no law existed at the time of 6 Plaintiff’s incarceration that would have placed them on notice that restraining a pregnant 7 inmate is unconstitutional. Doc. 89 at 8. They further contend that “restraining pregnant 8 inmates during transport remained routine practice in almost every prison and jail in the 9 United States.” Id. Additionally, they argue that at the time of Plaintiff’s incarceration, 10 no state or federal case in Arizona had addressed the issue of restraining pregnant 11 inmates. Id. 12 Plaintiff argues that both the Arizona Department of Corrections and the United 13 States Bureau of Prisons had ended the practice of restraining pregnant inmates years 14 earlier. Doc. 91 at 19. These polices, however, are not legal rules that would have bound 15 the County Defendants. Plaintiff also advances Women Prisoners of D.C. Department of 16 Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp 634, 668-69 (D.D.C. 1994), Villegas v. 17 Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013), and Nelson v. 18 Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009), as support for her position 19 that shackling pregnant women is unconstitutional. But these cases do not create a 20 clearly established constitutional right as they are not binding in the Ninth Circuit and are 21 based on factual circumstances not present here. See Nelson, 583 F.2d at 526 (noting that 22 Nelson’s legs were both shackled to “opposite sides of her hospital bed,” that she was 23 “well into the final stages of labor when [the correctional officer] shackled her,” and that 24 “the shackles prevented her from moving her legs, stretching, or changing positions”); 25 Women Prisoners, 877 F.Supp at 646 (“When Defendants transport pregnant women 26 prisoners on medical visits they customarily place women in leg shackles, handcuffs and 27 a belly chain with a box that connects the handcuffs and belly chain.”); Villegas, 709 F.3d 28 at 566-67 (noting that “Plaintiff was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed -6- 1 together in front of her body and her legs restrained together,” that one of her legs was 2 “restrained to the hospital bed” while she was in active labor, that law enforcement 3 officials did not remove restraints despite the entry of a physician’s order requesting their 4 removal, and that upon the plaintiff’s discharge, the law enforcement agency “did not 5 allow Plaintiff to take the breast pump that the Hospital staff had provided her.”). 6 Plaintiff alleges she was handcuffed in the front and shackled at the ankles during 7 her first transport, handcuffed during her second transport while she was in active labor, 8 and restrained to the bed after she had given birth and had been moved to a recovery 9 room. Plaintiff also notes that the detention officer riding with her during her second 10 transport to the hospital removed her restraints at the request of a paramedic, and there is 11 no evidence that any physician requested the removal of any restraint. Based on the 12 “legal rules” Plaintiff contends were established at the time of the events in this case – a 13 1994 D.C. Circuit case and a then-recently released Eighth Circuit case – the Court 14 cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable to place restraints on Plaintiff during 15 transport and during her recovery. Even assuming the County Defendants were aware of 16 these cases, neither court held that it is per se unconstitutional to restrain a pregnant 17 woman at any point in her pregnancy. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence does not 18 create a genuine issue of material fact here. The Court will grant summary judgment for 19 the County Defendants on these claims. 20 2. Shackling Claims against MCSHCD. 21 Plaintiff argues that MCSHCD and its staff “were far more than negligent in 22 allowing her to be shackled while she was their patient.” Doc. 92 at 16. She also argues 23 that the County Defendants created a risk of harm by handcuffing Plaintiff while she was 24 in active labor and shackling her to her bed while she recovered. Doc. 91 at 18. As 25 support for these arguments, she claims that “[s]ince 1994, federal courts have recognized 26 that the shackling of women prisoners in their third trimesters of pregnancy and 27 immediately after delivery is particularly offensive to contemporary standards of 28 decency.” Doc. 91 at 18; Doc. 92 at 15-16. MCSHCD counters that Plaintiff did not -7- 1 inform any member of its staff that the restraint caused her pain, and that the facts show 2 Plaintiff was properly cared for while at MIHS. Doc. 72 at 7. 3 The evidence shows that Plaintiff was not restrained during her delivery. As noted 4 by MCSHCD, Plaintiff did not inform any doctor, nurse, or other MIHS staff member 5 that any form of restraint used during her time at the hospital was causing her pain or 6 interfering with her treatment. Dr. LaValley, who treated Plaintiff during her stay at 7 MIHS, testified that she requests that shackles or restraints be removed “[i]f they’re 8 interfering with the mother’s ability to walk or to breastfeed.” Doc. 94-5 at 24, 3-4. 9 There is no evidence that any such request to remove restraints was made by Plaintiff or a 10 medical professional. Accordingly, Plaintiff has neither demonstrated that any official 11 employed by MCSHCD was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 12 that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” nor has she presented evidence that any 13 MIHS staff member drew such an inference. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 14 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that because the defendant doctor did not believe that a 15 prescribed medication “presented a serious risk of harm to [the plaintiff], her conduct 16 cannot constitute deliberate indifference”). 17 Plaintiff (Doc. 94-4) is not instructive as to the deliberate indifference standard. Further, the expert opinion offered by 18 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the risk of the restraints applied to her in 19 this case was “well-established” by either Nelson or Women Prisoners, she is mistaken. 20 As noted above, the pregnant inmates in these cases were restrained to a greater extent 21 than Plaintiff, and these cases do not establish that any restraints – such as the tether 22 restraint used in this case – pose a substantial risk of harm. The Court will grant 23 summary judgment for MCSHCD on this count. 24 3. Diet Claims. 25 Plaintiff alleges that the diet she received while incarcerated was inadequate 26 (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 24-27), and that she was worried her child would die due to improper 27 nutrition (Doc. 91 at 8). She also claims that she “had to go extended periods of time 28 without food or water,” when she was transported to court and that on one occasion, a -8- 1 fellow inmate asked a guard to give Plaintiff food because she was hungry and the guard 2 said he had no food and proceeded to “walk[] by with his own sack lunch and [shake] it 3 at the inmates, teasing [them].” Doc. 93-2 at 2. Plaintiff’s statements, without more, do 4 not show a constitutional violation. There is no indication as to what Plaintiff means by 5 “long periods of time,” and it is therefore impossible for the Court to determine whether 6 the County Defendants were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 7 that a substantial risk of serious harm” existed or whether the County Defendants drew 8 such an inference. As to the alleged incident with the guard, Plaintiff does not contend 9 that she was not fed at all on the date in question. Rather, she alleges that a fellow inmate 10 asked a guard for food and the guard said he did not have any. Plaintiff cites no authority 11 for the proposition that refusing to provide food to a pregnant inmate outside of a 12 regularly scheduled meal constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court 13 declines to so hold on these facts. 14 There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff was provided with a regular diet, 15 supplemented with additional milk and a prenatal vitamin. Doc. 89 at 2. Plaintiff does 16 not contend that she was denied food altogether. That she was hungry while in jail does 17 not establish deliberate indifference on the part of the County Defendants. Further, in 18 spite of Plaintiff’s frequent citations to Graves v. Arpaio, the judgment and findings in 19 that case do not create an issue of material fact here. Accordingly, the Court will grant 20 summary judgment for the County Defendants on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference 21 claims related to her prison diet. 22 4. Breastfeeding and Lactation Claims. 23 Plaintiff argues that the County Defendants’ policy of “prohibiting post-partum 24 mothers from using a (sic) medically recommended and related supplies, and denying a 25 post-partum mother her prescribed pain medication,” demonstrates deliberate 26 indifference to her serious medical needs. Doc 7, ¶ 85. She also appears to include 27 MCSHCD in these claims. Doc. 92 at 19; Doc. 98 at 13-14. The County Defendants 28 argue that Plaintiff has not provided evidence that she was denied medication, and that -9- 1 she was not prescribed a breast pump while at the hospital and did not request one once 2 she returned to jail. Doc. 89 at 12. 3 Plaintiff once again has failed to support her deliberate indifference claim. Not 4 only has she failed to support her factual allegations with evidence, but she has failed to 5 present any legal authority supporting her assertion that her non-receipt of a breast pump 6 violated her constitutional rights. 7 reversed a grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that “[a]bsent proof that 8 the breast pump was prescribed, as is necessary under a diagnosed medical-needs theory, 9 Plaintiff must show that it was so obvious that even a layperson would recognize the need 10 to provide Plaintiff with a breast pump.” Villegas, 703 F.3d at 579. There is no evidence 11 that Plaintiff was prescribed a breast pump, and Plaintiff has not shown that her need for 12 a breast pump would be obvious to a layperson. 13 14 In the Villegas case cited by Plaintiff, the court For the reasons outlined above, the Court will grant summary judgment for all Defendants on Counts One and Two. 15 B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims. 16 Plaintiff sets forth the legal standard for her cruel and unusual punishment claim 17 by stating that “[d]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes 18 the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth 19 Amendment.” Doc. 92 at 13. The Court has already determined that Plaintiff has failed 20 to present evidence demonstrating deliberate indifference to a serious medical need on 21 the part of any Defendant. To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a separate cruel and 22 unusual punishment claim, she has provided no arguments or evidence supporting such a 23 claim. See id. at 20. The Court will grant summary judgment for the Defendants on 24 Count Three. 25 C. Disparate Treatment. 26 Plaintiff argues that the Arizona Bailable Offenses Act (“ABOA”), under which 27 she was held without bond, “creates a disparity between women who are born in the 28 United States and those of other national origins” because it “requires that persons whom - 10 - 1 the State believes are in the country illegally to be held without bond, if they are charged 2 with a felony.” Doc. 7, ¶¶ 92-93. As a result, she contends, pregnant women who are 3 unable to prove that they are legally in the United States and are charged with a felony 4 “are more likely to be subject to shackling than similarly-situated United States citizens.” 5 Id., ¶ 95. She argues that a United States citizen in the same circumstances – no criminal 6 history and charged with a non-violent crime – would have been released and not 7 detained. Doc. 91 at 21. The ABOA states, in relevant part, that “[a] person who is in 8 custody shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or the presumption great that 9 the person is guilty of . . . [a] serious felony offense if there is probable cause to believe 10 that the person has entered or remained in the United States illegally.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 11 § 13-3961(A)(5). 12 A neutral law that “has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority” 13 is unconstitutional “only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” 14 Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also Vill. of 15 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Plaintiff 16 asserts that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), is the “model for disparate 17 impact analysis” and claims that, although it concerns employment discrimination under 18 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “the Ninth Circuit has applied this framework 19 to other kinds of civil rights cases.” Doc. 91 at 16. Plaintiff does not, however, cite any 20 Ninth Circuit cases supporting this assertion. The Court finds Plaintiff’s cited authority 21 entirely inapposite. 22 Plaintiff also devotes significant portions of her briefing to recounting Sheriff 23 Arpaio’s anti-immigrant views. See id. at 21. Of course, the Sheriff did not enact 24 ABOA, and to the extent Plaintiff intended to offer this evidence to prove some type of 25 discriminatory enforcement, she has failed to provide the Court with authority or 26 arguments supporting such a claim. This evidence is not relevant to the issue of whether 27 the alleged “disparate impact” of A.R.S. § 13-3961 on non-citizens “can be traced to a 28 discriminatory purpose.” See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. Plaintiff has, in fact, presented no - 11 - 1 evidence relevant to that issue. Further, even if Plaintiff had presented evidence of a 2 discriminatory purpose behind A.R.S. § 13-3961, it is unclear she would be able to raise 3 such a claim against these County-level Defendants. 4 Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment states that “[t]he right of citizens of the United 5 States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1. None 6 of the evidence presented in this case appears to have any relation to the denial of voting 7 rights to a United States citizen or any other individual. Accordingly, the Court will 8 grant summary judgment for the Defendants on Count Four. D. 9 Monell Liability. 10 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978), held that 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983 “imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official 12 policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.” The execution of 13 a government policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional 14 violation. Id. at 694. 15 Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that an employee of any Defendant 16 violated her constitutional rights, her claim under Monell cannot survive. The Court will 17 grant summary judgment for Defendants on Count Five. 18 IV. Motions to Strike. 19 The County Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s motion for partial 20 summary judgment. Doc. 96. MCSHCD filed a similar motion. Doc. 102. In response, 21 Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Errata” pertaining to her motion for partial summary judgment 22 against the County Defendants (Doc. 97), and similar document pertaining to her motion 23 for partial summary judgment against MCSHCD (Doc. 100). Plaintiff also filed a motion 24 to strike the County Defendants’ response to her Notice of Errata. Doc. 117. The Court 25 will deny these motions as moot. 26 IT IS ORDERED: 27 1. 28 MCSHCD’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72) and the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 89) are granted. - 12 - 1 2. Plaintiff’s motions for partial summary judgment (Docs. 91 and 92) are denied. 2 3 3. All other pending motions (Docs. 96, 102, 117) are denied as moot. 4 4. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 5 Dated this 22nd day of January, 2014. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 13 -

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