Graham v. Holder

Filing 79

ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70 ) is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43 ) is denied, that Plaintiff's motion requesting to register on PAC ER (Doc. 46 ) is denied, that Plaintiff's motion to vacate the Court's order (Doc 47 ) is denied, and that Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's supplement to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 74 ) is den ied, as all these motions are deemed moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case. (See document for further details). Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 9/27/13. (LAD)

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Linden Winston Graham, 10 No. CV 12-00066-PHX-JAT Plaintiff, 11 ORDER v. 12 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43), 16 Plaintiff’s motion requesting to register on PACER (Doc. 46), Plaintiff’s motion to vacate 17 the Court’s order (Doc. 47), Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 70), and 18 Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplement to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 19 judgment (Doc. 74). The Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20 70) and denies the remaining motions for the following reasons. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 In removal proceedings before an immigration judge, Plaintiff claimed he is a 23 United States citizen by birth in the United States Virgin Islands. The Department of 24 Homeland Security (“DHS”), however, alleged Plaintiff was also known as Winston 25 George Graham and was a citizen of Jamaica. On November 16, 2004, the immigration 26 judge found Plaintiff failed to establish he is a native and citizen of the United States and 27 that DHS met its burden of showing Plaintiff was not born in the United States, but in 28 Jamaica, and the judge ordered him removed. On April 28, 2005, the Board of 1 Immigration Appeals (“Board”) found the immigration judge’s determination was not 2 clearly erroneous, and it therefore dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. Plaintiff subsequently 3 filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 4 but his petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute on September 13, 2006. Following 5 reinstatement of the petition before the Court of Appeals and the appointment of pro bono 6 counsel, Plaintiff, who was removed to Jamaica in 2006, submitted new evidence in 7 support of his contention that he was not Winston George Graham or a citizen of Jamaica. 8 See (Doc. 1 at 3). On January 9, 2012, after briefing and oral argument, the Court of 9 Appeals concluded there was a material issue of fact with regard to Plaintiff’s nationality 10 and transferred his case to this Court for a de novo determination of his nationality 11 pursuant to section 242(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 12 1252(b)(5). See (id. at 1-4). 13 On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff requested that his counsel no longer represent him. 14 (Docs. 18 & 19). Plaintiff then requested that the Court grant Plaintiff new counsel. 15 (Doc. 20). On April 23, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff’s requests and appointed pro 16 bono counsel for Plaintiff. (Doc. 24). On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff again requested that 17 his counsel be removed from the case and he be allowed to proceed pro se. (Doc. 37). 18 That Court granted Plaintiff’s latest request to remove counsel and following discovery, 19 on July 8, 2013, Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment (Doc. 70) 20 before the Court and a statement of facts in support of the motion (Doc. 71). Plaintiff 21 filed a response (Doc. 73) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 77). 22 II. ANALYSIS 23 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals transferred Plaintiff’s citizenship claim to this 24 Court for “a new hearing on the nationality claim as if an action had been brought in the 25 district court under section 2201 of Title 28 [the provision for declaratory judgment].” 26 INA § 242(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). Accordingly, in a de novo hearing on 27 citizenship, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that he is a United States 28 Citizen. Sanchez-Martinez v. INS, 714 F.2d 72, 74 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff therefore -2- 1 has the burden of proving his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence in order to 2 prevail. 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Sanchez-Martinez, 714 F.2d at 74 n.1; Yee Tung Gay v. Rusk, 3 290 F.2d 630, 631 (9th Cir. 1961) (plaintiffs seeking declaration of citizenship had burden 4 of establishing their citizenship by a “fair preponderance of the evidence”); see Mondaca- 5 Vega v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 6 572 F.3d 736, 737 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting, inter alia, “[e]vidence of foreign birth [in 7 removal proceedings] gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage”)). Given the 8 multiple pending motions, the sole issue the Court need determine is whether Plaintiff is 9 able to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s United 10 States citizenship. 11 A. Summary Judgment Standard 12 Defendant argues that there is no issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s claim 13 of United States citizenship by birth because there is no evidence demonstrating Plaintiff 14 was born in the United State Virgin Islands or anywhere else in the United States. (Doc. 15 70 at 3). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 16 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 17 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 18 disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 19 record,” or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 20 genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 21 the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party 22 who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 23 that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex 24 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 25 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 26 motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 27 unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 28 the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do -3- 1 more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 2 “com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). In the summary judgment context, the 5 Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 6 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 7 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 8 defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 9 that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 10 242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of 11 the case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material fact is “genuine” if 12 the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 13 Id. 14 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 15 there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 16 evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 17 249-250. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the judge 18 may grant summary judgment. Id. 19 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to file a controverting statement of facts and abide 20 by Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 56.1(b). 21 opposing the motion for summary judgment, the non-movant, to file a controverting 22 statement of facts in addition to their response to the motion for summary judgment. 23 LRCiv 56.1(b). In the controverting statement of facts the non-movant must address 24 every one of the material facts that the moving party put forth. Id. Further, the rule 25 requires that any additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact that the 26 non-movant proffers must “be set forth in [ ] separately numbered paragraph[s] and must 27 refer to [ ] specific admissible portion[s] of the record where the fact[s] find[ ] support.” 28 Id. “Failure of the non-moving party to comply with LRCiv 56.1(b) is ground for the -4- This rule requires the party 1 Court to disregard a controverting statement of facts and deem as true the moving party’s 2 separate statement of facts in support of the motion for summary judgment.” Breeser v. 3 Menta Grp., Inc., NFP, CV 10-1592-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 1177651, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4 21, 2013) (citing Szaley v. Pima Cnty., 371 Fed. Appx. 734, 735 (9th Cir. 2010)). 5 Even if the Court were to consider the additional facts Plaintiff has raised in his 6 response, see e.g., (Doc. 73 at 3) (alleging he voted in California); (id.) (alleging he was 7 part of the witness protection program); (id.) (alleging the Government fraudulently 8 redacted any information regarding Plaintiff’s United States citizenship); (id. at 5) 9 (alleging the Government stated Plaintiff’s father died in the United States), he has failed 10 to support these alleged facts by reference to specific admissible portions of the record in 11 compliance with LRCiv 56.1(b). Essentially, Plaintiff has offered no proof of the factual 12 allegations he has made. Further, Plaintiff has failed to set forth controverting and 13 additional facts in numbered paragraphs pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(b). “A district court does 14 not have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual dispute.” Breeser, 2013 15 WL 1177651 at *3 (citing Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The 16 Court’s scrutiny of material statements of facts applies equally to the party seeking 17 summary judgment and the party opposing it. Where a party offers a legal conclusion or 18 statement of fact without proper evidentiary support, the Court will not consider that 19 statement.” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F.Supp.2d 764, 20 771 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). 21 The Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments but the Court will not consider 22 Plaintiff’s factual assertions that are not supported anywhere in the record. See Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). 24 B. Citizenship 25 “There are ‘two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization[.]’” 26 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 27 U.S. 649, 702 (1898)). Plaintiff contends he was born in the United States Virgin Islands 28 in 1959 and that his father was a United States citizen. (Doc. 73 at 3); (Doc. 70-1 at 3); -5- 1 see INA § 101(a)(38), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(38) (the term “United States” generally 2 includes the “Virgin Islands of the United States”); INA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (“a 3 person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” shall be a national 4 and citizen of the United States at birth”). 5 naturalized. Thus, to demonstrate he is a United States citizen, Plaintiff must establish by 6 a preponderance of the evidence that is a citizen by birth. He does not contend that he has been 7 Plaintiff can prove citizenship by birth by showing either that he was born in the 8 United States, Miller, 523 U.S. at 424, or citizenship by acquisition1, see 8 U.S.C. § 9 1401(g). Citizenship by acquisition concerns a person born outside the United States to a 10 citizen of the United States. “The applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child 11 born abroad when one parent is a U.S. citizen is the statute that was in effect at the time of 12 the child’s birth.” Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 13 Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990)). The citizenship law in effect at the 14 time of Plaintiff’s alleged birth in 1959 was the one enacted by § 301 of the INA of 1952, 15 Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, 236, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). That 16 section (“Former § 1401(a)(7)”) conferred U.S. citizenship at birth on any 23 person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. 24 1. 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Cannot Establish Citizenship by Acquisition 1 With regard to citizenship by birth, “the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that every person ‘born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.’ 169 U.S., at 702, 18 S.Ct., at 477. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id., at 703, 18 S.Ct., at 477–478.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 423-24. -6- 1 In this case former section 1401(a)(7) is inapplicable because Plaintiff claims he 2 was born in the United States Virgin Islands and not born abroad. Further, even if this 3 section were applicable, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that his father was ever a 4 United States citizen, let alone that he was a citizen before Plaintiff’s birth who was 5 physically present in the United States for at least ten years, at least five of which were 6 after the age of fourteen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). Consequently, Plaintiff has 7 failed to establish a material issue of fact over whether he is entitled to citizenship by 8 acquisition. 9 Rather, the evidence offered by Defendant shows Plaintiff’s father was born in 10 Belize, and visited the United States on various occasions, but never resided in this 11 country. (Doc. 71 at 4 ¶ 22); (Doc. 77-1 at 1); (Doc. 77-2 at 1-2); (Doc. 77-3 at 1). 12 Plaintiff has offered no evidence to create an issue of fact showing his father was born in 13 the United States Virgin Islands. Nor has Plaintiff offered any evidence showing his 14 father was ever present in the United States prior to Plaintiff’s birth, let alone physically 15 present for the duration of time required to transmit citizenship. Finally, Plaintiff has not 16 alleged that his mother was ever a United States citizen, nor would the facts support such 17 a claim. See (Doc. 71 at 3 ¶¶ 12, 13, 17) (Plaintiff’s mother was born in Belize, she was a 18 citizen of British Honduras, and she never travelled outside Belize). 19 Accordingly, Plaintiff has made no legal or factual argument that he is a United 20 States citizen by birth under former section 1401(a)(7) or any other subsection of former 21 section 1401. 22 23 2. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Citizenship by Birth in the United States 24 The only other way for Plaintiff to show citizenship by birth is to show he was born 25 in the United States. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 423-24. Plaintiff alleges he was born in the 26 United States Virgin Islands. (Doc. 73 at 3); (Doc. 70-1 at 3). However, Plaintiff has 27 offered no evidence of any kind that he has ever been to the United States Virgin Islands 28 or that he was born there. In spite of discovery requests by Defendant, Plaintiff has not -7- 1 produced any birth certificate, medical records, or school records establishing his birth or 2 presence in the United States Virgin Islands at any time. 3 requests, Plaintiff declared he did not possess, nor could he obtain, any documents: (1) 4 relating to his legalized birth certificate; (2) relating to his parents’ birth, residence, or 5 death; (3) showing he was the child of his parents; or (4) relating to his medical records 6 during his first year of life. (Doc. 70-1 at 7-8, 10). Indeed, Plaintiff admitted he “did not 7 request[ ] a birth certificate or ma[k]e an effort to obtain a birth certificate.” (Id. at 12). 8 He also did not produce any documents in response to Defendant’s request for documents 9 relating to his parents’ entry into and/or presence in the United States between 1955 and 10 1965. (Id. at 7, 10). Significantly, although he claims he applied for a social security 11 number in 1986, and that he applied for a United States passport in 1986, (id. at 4-5, 12), 12 Plaintiff failed to produce any documentation supporting these claims. 13 producing evidence of his birthplace, Plaintiff made vague, unsubstantiated assertions 14 claiming to have been born on a plantation in West Christiansted, St. Croix, United States 15 Virgin Islands. (Id. at 3). As he can have no personal recollection of the circumstances of 16 his own birth, Plaintiff’s assertion is based solely on his claim that he was told of the date 17 and place of his birth by his father. (Id. at 3, 5). However, Plaintiff failed to substantiate 18 his claim with any evidence. He proffered no statement from his father to that effect, nor 19 any evidence concerning his father. Further, Defendant has presented evidence showing 20 the United States Virgin Islands’ Bureau of Vital Statistics, at its separate locations in 21 both St. Croix and St. John, has no records relating to Plaintiff. (Doc. 71 at 11 ¶ 83). In 22 sum, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence—documentary, testimonial, or 23 otherwise—supporting his claim of birth in the United States Virgin Islands, and he has 24 therefore failed to establish his claim of United States citizenship by a preponderance of 25 the evidence. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see Rassano v. INS, 377 F.2d 971, 973 (7th 26 Cir. 1967) (noting lack of documentary evidence to support allegations of citizenship in 27 finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding claim of citizenship). 28 Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. -8- In response to discovery Instead of 1 While Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support his claim, Defendant has 2 presented substantial evidence showing Plaintiff was in fact born in Belize. Plaintiff has 3 acknowledged that he was born on August 31, 1959, and that his mother was named 4 Phyllis McCoy. (Doc. 71 at 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 6). Defendant has presented Plaintiff’s birth 5 certificate under the name “Linsden Winston Graham,” and indicating a date of birth of 6 August 31, 1959, obtained from the Belizean Bureau of Vital Statistics. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 84). 7 Defendant has presented a criminal record for Plaintiff in Belize, which included 8 Plaintiff’s matching fingerprints and indicated he was born in Belize. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 9 30). Defendant has offered evidence establishing that Plaintiff’s father is Ernest McCoy, 10 and that Plaintiff’s parents, Ernest McCoy and Phyllis Graham were married on 11 September 15, 1962, three years after Plaintiff was born. (Doc. 70 at 10). Evidence 12 shows both of Plaintiff’s parents were natives and citizens of British Honduras, which 13 later became the independent nation of Belize. (Id. at 11). 14 Ernest and Phyllis McCoy had three children in addition to Plaintiff and that Phyllis 15 Graham has at least three living siblings. (Id.). Further, evidence shows Plaintiff has used 16 numerous names during his life and that his aunt, Geraldine Graham (“Geraldine”), 17 referred to Plaintiff as both “Linden” and “Linsden.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s younger sister 18 Brenda Leslie, two of his maternal aunts, Geraldine and Rachel Jones, and his maternal 19 uncle Phillip Graham, all identified photographs of Plaintiff as being their relative, 20 Linsden Graham, and stated he was born in Belize. (Id. at 12-13). Evidence also shows that 21 Accordingly, Defendant has offered substantial evidence showing Plaintiff’s given 22 name is Linsden Winston Graham, that he was born in Belize on August 31, 1959, and 23 that neither of his parents were United States Citizens. Plaintiff has failed to meet his 24 burden to show that there is a genuine dispute regarding these facts. Therefore, Defendant 25 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 26 III. Based on the foregoing, 27 28 CONCLUSION // -9- 1 2 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70) is granted. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 4 (Doc. 43) is denied, that Plaintiff’s motion requesting to register on PACER (Doc. 46) is 5 denied, that Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Court’s order (Doc. 47) is denied, and that 6 Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplement to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 7 judgment (Doc. 74) is denied, as all these motions are deemed moot. 8 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. 10 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 11 Dated this 27th day of September, 2013. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 10 -

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