Parsons et al v. Ryan et al

Filing 1917

ORDER: Defendants' Motion for Relief as a Motion for Reconsiderations 1779 is denied; Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) 1806 is denied as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge David K Duncan on 2/6/17.(REW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Victor Antonio Parsons, et al.,

No. CV-12-0601-PHX-DKD

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

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ORDER

Defendants.

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Defendants moved for Rule 60(b) relief from the Court’s November 10, 2016

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Order (“Outside Provider Order”). (Doc. 1779) Defendants frame their argument in two

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parts: (1) the Court’s order impermissibly modified the Stipulation’s timeframe and

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compliance rates and (2) the Court did not appreciate the ensuing logistical and security

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issues and they should be permitted to present testimony on this matter. (Doc. 1779,

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1821 at 5, 7) Before briefing on this motion was complete, Defendants filed a Notice of

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Appeal. (Doc. 1817) The Court retains jurisdiction of this matter under Federal Rule of

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Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i).

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Procedural Background and Jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the Court notes that,

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without explanation, Defendants have formulated their motion as one for relief under

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Rule 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). (Doc. 1779 at 2) As Plaintiffs’ note, these sections of Rule

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60(b) are mutually exclusive and subject to different standards.

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Defendants do not explain or justify their attempt to use multiple subsections and do not

(Doc. 1806 at 8)

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analyze their claim under any particular standard. (Docs. 1779, 1821) Instead, they

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argue that “Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendants may appropriately challenge the

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Court’s November 10, 2016 order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Therefore, there is not

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jurisdictional basis to not consider Defendants’ Motion.” Doc. 1821 at n.1.

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First, the Court notes that any perceived waiver by Plaintiffs does not eliminate the

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Court’s duty to ensure the procedural jurisdictional propriety of Defendants’ pending

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motion. On first review, it appears that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) may not be

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the most appropriate vehicle for challenging the Court’s order because this matter is not

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post-judgment in the traditional sense of the word because no judge or jury entered

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judgement and the challenged order is not necessarily “final” as contemplated by Rule

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60(b).1 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A ‘final decision’

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generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to

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do but execute the judgment.”).

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Nevertheless, the Court has concluded that the parties are entitled to some

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mechanism for the Court to review its orders interpreting the Stipulation.

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Washington, 761 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the Court will assume

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that Defendants’ motion under Rule 60(b) is proper when, as here, the Court’s Order is an

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exercise of its remedial authority pursuant to Paragraph 36 of the Stipulation.2 (Doc.

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1185 at 14-15)

U.S. v.

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However, Defendants have attempted to bootstrap their argument into multiple

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subsections of Rule 60(b) without any explanation or analysis. (Doc. 1779 at 2:1) This

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will not suffice. Defendants have not explained how the Outside Provider Order is a void

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judgment and so the Court concludes that Defendants are not entitled to relief under Rule

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60(b)(4) which, by its plain language, is limited to “void judgments.” Defendant’s

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Because the underlying Order is already on appeal, this Court invites the Court
of Appeals to consider the paucity of guidance about the particular procedural landscape
of a case where, like here, the Court is overseeing the enforcement of an on-going
settlement.
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Motions for Reconsideration under LRCiv. 7.2(g) may be a more appropriate
vehicle to request the Court’s review of its other orders.
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motion also does not explain which subsection of Rule 60(b)(1)–mistake, inadvertence,

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surprise, or excusable neglect–would apply and so the Court will consider this claim

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waived. (Doc. 1779) Accordingly, the Court will construe Defendants’ motion as one

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for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision.

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Defendants have shown “extraordinary circumstances” such that they are entitled to

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relief. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).

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Application of Order.

Thus, the question is whether

Before evaluating Defendants’ arguments, it is worth

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reiterating the scope of the Outside Provider Order. (Doc. 1754 at 4) The Court is not

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ordering Defendants to use Outside Providers in the first instance. The Court expects

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Defendants can and should use all of their internal resources first and foremost to comply

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with the Stipulation.

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expeditious and effective care to Class Members. Some of these resources are described

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by Defendants’ remediation plans. Other resources, like hiring sufficient staff, are not in

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a remediation plan but remain a viable solution that Defendants can (and probably

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should) implement on their own. It is only when Defendants’ internal resources are

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insufficient that the Court’s Order to use Outside Providers takes effect. In other words,

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if Defendants comply with the Stipulation using on-site resources, then the Court’s Order

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on Outside Providers would not apply. It is only when Defendants cannot provide on-site

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resources to Class Members that the Court’s Order on Outside Providers becomes

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applicable.

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Using internally available resources should provide the most

The Stipulation was not modified.3

Defendants claim that the Court cannot

mandate 100% compliance with the Stipulation because the Stipulation only requires that

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A parallel argument emerged in and out of footnotes. Defendants argue that “a
100% compliance rate is simply not possible” and “that impossibility is why Defendants
could not and did not agree to it.” Doc. 1779 at 7, n.3. Plaintiffs argue that this is
tantamount to an admission of deliberate indifference. Doc. 1806 at 12. Defendants
counter that “the reality [is] that medical staff do not know in real time what percentage
of inmates are seen within the required timeframes” and could not knowingly or
intentionally do so. (Doc. 1821 at 4) These arguments raise the specter of a
constitutional claim against both sets of Defendants or a breach of contract claim by the
State against Corizon. Because neither claim is before the Court, these arguments will
remain footnoted.
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Defendants meet the substantial compliance thresholds, currently set at 80% and soon to

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rise to 85%. (Doc. 1779 at 5) Plaintiffs counter that the Stipulation requires Defendants

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to provide 100% compliance and that the Stipulation’s definition of “substantial

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compliance” only describes the trigger for the Stipulation’s enforcement measures not the

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cap for the Court’s involvement. (Doc. 1806 at 10-13)

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Both parties use the plain language of Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the Stipulation to

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bolster their arguments. (Doc. 1185 at 3-4) After extensive consideration and analysis,

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the Court has concluded that these three paragraphs use the terms “compliance” and

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“substantial compliance” in contradictory ways that cannot be reconciled simply by

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reference to the plain language. Accordingly, the Court must turn to the Stipulation’s

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intent. See, e.g., Williston on Contracts 4th, §§ 32:7, 32:9.

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As the Court has repeatedly explained, the Court understands that the Stipulation

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requires 100% compliance with the performance measures and that the graduated

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compliance rates are the trigger for the imposition of a remediation plan. (Doc. 1767 at

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17-19)

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compliance and, therefore, its Order on Outside Providers requires Defendants to pursue

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100% compliance.

Put another way, the Court understands that the Stipulation requires 100%

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Defendants’ argument that the Stipulation only requires 80% compliance conflates

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the Defendants’ obligation to provide healthcare with the Court’s authority to require

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them to do so. In other words, there is a delta between the Court’s authority and the

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Stipulation’s requirement: the Court cannot impose remedial measures if Defendants fall

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below the Stipulation’s 100% requirement but satisfy the Stipulation’s substantial

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compliance percentages.

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remedial measures because the facilities and performances measures at issue were

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undoubtedly below the requisite threshold.4

Here, the Court has not exceeded its authority to impose

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It is undisputed that the Court has not imposed or threatened sanctions for
compliance rates above the Stipulation’s substantial compliance thresholds. As a result,
it is unclear whether Defendants have suffered any harm sufficient to establish standing
to pursue this claim.
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Defendants again raise the argument that the directive to use Outside Providers

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violates the Stipulation’s limitation on the Court’s ability to order Defendants to “hire a

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specific number or type of staff.” Outside Providers are community healthcare providers

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who are not on Defendants’ payroll.

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categorically different than ordering an increase in staffing.

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departs from the plain understanding of simple words in our language. No person

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obtaining a prescription at a pharmacy or seeing a doctor at an emergency room or urgent

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care is “hire[ing]” that healthcare provider.

(Docs. 1754 at 4, 1767 at 10-11)

This is

Defendants’ argument

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Risk flowing from the Court’s Order. Finally, Defendants argue that the Court’s

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Order creates a heretofore-ignored level of risk and cost which the Court cannot

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appreciate without testimony. (Docs. 1779 at 7-10, 1779-1) Again, the Court notes that

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by timely providing the requisite care, the Defendants have had, and continue to have, the

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ability to avoid the Court-ordered use of Outside Providers. Moreover, the Court issued

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its Order after it had balanced the risk and cost that could arise from its Order against the

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health and well-being of Class Members, individuals to whom Defendants have a

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contractual duty under the Stipulation. The Defendants entered into the Stipulation to

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resolve a lawsuit which alleged extreme indifference to the healthcare needs of the

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Plaintiff Class – allegations which included loss of life and permanent injury. The

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inability of Defendants to meet the healthcare requirements of their own Stipulation, as

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supported by Plaintiffs’ submissions showing continued Class Member harm, shows that

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the Court is addressing a risk to health and safety by means that are necessary and

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balanced notwithstanding Defendants claim of other security risks.

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address those risks in both instances.

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requirements of those within their care or they will need to accomplish that task using the

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only reasonable alternative available to the Court – providing those services via Outside

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Providers. The Court must focus on achieving the requirement of the Stipulation with the

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tools available to it.

Defendants can

They can adequately address the healthcare

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Compliance with PRLA. When drafting the Stipulation, the parties requested

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reference to the language found in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) and the Court affirmed that

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the relief provided therein “is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to

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correct the violation of the Federal right and is the least intrusive means necessary to

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correct the violation of the Federal right.”

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Attachment 1). (“PLRA findings”)

(Docs. 1185 at ¶ 36; Doc. 1458 at 6,

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Plaintiffs, in response to the Court’s first exercise of its authority under Paragraph

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36 of the Stipulation, moved to modify the Court’s Order under Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 60(a) so that the Court could add PLRA findings. Noting that the Ninth

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Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the necessity of any such findings, Plaintiffs moved to

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correct the order in an abundance of caution.

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Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal, thereby limiting this Court’s ability to make any

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such modification. (Doc. 1817) Plaintiffs suggest that the Court should refer to PLRA

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findings in this Order thereby rendering their motion moot. The Court will adopt this

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suggestion.

(Doc. 1806 at 18)

Subsequently,

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Conclusion. As described above, the Court concludes that Defendants have not

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met their burden for demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances” such that they are

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entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The Court further

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concludes that its Order on Outside Providers was narrowly drawn, extended no further

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than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and was the least intrusive

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means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right as required by 18 U.S.C. §

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3626(a)(1)(A).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Relief as a Motion

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for Reconsiderations is denied. (Doc. 1779)

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...

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...

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...

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify the Order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) is denied as moot. (Doc. 1806)
Dated this 6th day of February, 2017.

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