Duryea v. Social Security Administration

Filing 9

ORDER dismissing without prejudice 8 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The Clerk is kindly directed to terminate this case. Signed by Senior Judge Stephen M McNamee on 6/4/12. (LSP)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Clayton Edwin Duryea, II,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Social Security Administration,
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Defendant.
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No. CV-12-748-PHX-LOA
ORDER

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Pro se Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on April 9, 2012. (Doc. 1) On the same

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day, the case was randomly assigned to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson. (Doc.

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3) On April 19, 2012, Judge Anderson issued an order that on or before Friday, May 4,

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2012, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint, setting forth the alleged error made by

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the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) or why the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

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substantial evidence in the record as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 42 U.S.C. §

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405(g). (Doc. 4) Further, on April 19, 2012, Judge Anderson issued a Notice of Assign-

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ment and Order, directing Plaintiff to either voluntarily consent to magistrate-judge

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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) or elect to proceed before a United States

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district judge on or before April 27, 2012. (Doc. 5)

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In cases wherein a plaintiff, as here, is proceeding in forma pauperis, a district

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court is required to screen cases and must dismiss the case at any time if the court

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determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

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malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

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against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 2)

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Screening IFP cases seeking judicial review of Social Security rulings is also required by

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§ 1915(e)(2). Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3rd Cir.

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2008); Wheeler v. Social Sec. Admin., 2010 WL 3784891 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 24, 2010);

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Robinson v. Social Sec. Admin., 2010 WL 2772626 (E.D.Wis. July 13, 2010); .

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Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the federal statute governing judicial review of any

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final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[T]he

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findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

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evidence, shall be conclusive, . . . .”); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988).

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Section 405(g) is the sole jurisdictional basis for judicial review of any claim arising

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under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). “The Commissioner’s denial of

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disability benefits may be set aside only when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error

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or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. If the evidence can support either

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outcome, the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld.” Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d

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1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980

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(9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996).

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The sole function of a district court is to determine whether the decision of the

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Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards

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were applied. Clark v. Apfel, 98 F.Supp.2d 1182 (D.Or. 2000); Bloodsworth v. Heckler,

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703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence means more than a mere

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scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

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401 (1971) (citations omitted); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The

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ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, determining credibility, and resolving

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ambiguities. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). If sufficient

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evidence supports an ALJ’s determination, a district court cannot substitute its own

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determination. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). A district court must

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uphold the Commissioner’s determination that a plaintiff is not disabled if the Commis-

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sioner applied the proper legal standard and there is substantial evidence in the record as a
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whole to support the decision. Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986).
On May 8, 2012, Judge Anderson issued an Order to Show Cause due to Plaintiff’s

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failure to comply with Judge Anderson’s April 19, 2012 orders to either voluntarily

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consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) or elect to

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proceed before a United States district judge and to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 7)

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Plaintiff was ordered to show cause in writing on or before May 16, 2012 why this case

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should not be dismissed without prejudice, or why sanctions should not be imposed for

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his failure to comply with court orders.

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In his May 8, 2012 Order to Show Cause, doc. 7, Judge Anderson forewarned

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Plaintiff that, pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

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1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992), trial courts have the inherent power to control their dockets

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and, in the exercise of that power, may impose sanctions including, where appropriate,

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dismissal of a case with or without prejudice. See also, Flaksa v. Little River Marine

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Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887, 887 (5th Cir. 1968) (cases omitted); Chambers v.

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NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (district court may “fashion appropriate sanction

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for conduct” including “outright dismissal.”). “The threat of sanctions promotes com-

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pliance with a court’s orders even if the sanctions threatened are never imposed.” Green

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v. Lisa Frank, Inc., 221 Ariz. 138, 152, 211 P.3d 16, 30 (Az.Ct.App. 2009) (concluding

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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking plaintiff’s reply, dismissing his cross-

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claim, and entering judgment in favor of defendant) (citing federal and state cases of

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dismissals for a party’s failure to comply with court orders).

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A district court’s inherent authority to sanction parties for failing to comply with

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its orders exists, in part, to prevent “disobedience [of] the orders of the Judiciary, regard-

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less of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial.” Chambers, 501

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U.S. at 44 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787,

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798 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Dismissal of the complaint for failure to

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comply with the rules [is] within the court’s discretion.” Sergio Bautista et al. v. Los

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Angeles County, 216 F.3rd 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v.
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Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 188 (2nd Cir. 1943)); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural

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Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (The public interest “in expeditious

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resolution of litigation,” a court’s need to manage its docket, the risk of prejudice to an

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adverse party for the failure to comply with court orders, the public policy favoring

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disposition on the merits, the availability of lesser sanctions, the bad faith of a non-

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compliant party, and the relationship between improper conduct and the case’s merits

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warrant the consideration of sanctions); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d

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863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).

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The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (“CJRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq.,

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mandates the early and on-going judicial management of the pretrial process. Under the

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CJRA mandate, “[f]ederal trial courts are now required, by statute, to implement tech-

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niques and strategies designed to dispose of cases in an efficient and inexpensive

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manner.” Schwarzkopf Technologies Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 142 F.R.D.

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420, 423 (D. Del. 1992). Additionally, federal judges “are subject to the injunction of

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Rule 1 [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] that [the Rules] ‘be construed to secure the just,

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speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,

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177, (1979) (emphasis in original).

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On May 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, doc. 8, which still fails

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to identify Plaintiff’s claim of the legal error made by the ALJ and the explanation for

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such error, contrary to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief

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must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief; . . . .”). See Hinton v. Social Sec. Admin., 2011 WL 3489663, * 1

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(D.Ariz. August 9, 2011); Pizarro v. Social Sec. Admin., 2008 WL 220320, * 1 (E.D.Cal.

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January 25, 2008). Plaintiff’s allegation that “[t]he reason I’m taking Social Security to

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court is for the large amount of Back Pay that is owed to me” fails to state a claim or give

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the Commissioner fair notice of the alleged error the ALJ committed.

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To date, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s May 19, 2012 Notice of
Assignment and Order, doc. 5, and the Court’s Order to Show Cause, doc. 7, with respect
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to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s Notice of Assignment and Order.

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Plaintiff’s failures to timely comply with Judge Anderson’s April 19 and May 8, 2012

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orders are frustrating the speedy and inexpensive resolution of this case.

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In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply with court orders,

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district courts weigh five factors: (1) the public interest; (2) the court’s need to manage

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the docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant; (4) the public policy favoring

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disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.

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Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61. Plaintiff’s failures to comply with court orders are

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frustrating the Court’s responsibilities mandated by Rule 1, FED.R.CIV.P., and the

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Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. Plaintiff’s pro se status does

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not discharge his obligation to “abide by the rules of the court in which [they] litigate[].”

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Carter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986).

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After considering Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted, the adequacy of lesser sanctions, that Plaintiff has been forewarned

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that sanctions may be imposed, and weighing all five Ferdik factors to determine if

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dismissal is appropriate due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with prior court orders, the

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Court concludes that dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice is

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appropriate and just under the circumstances of this case.

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Pursuant to General Order 11-3 (Dismissal of a Civil Case Assigned to a United

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States Magistrate Judge Absent Voluntary Consent by the Parties Under 28 U.S.C. §

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636(c)(1)),

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s amended complaint, doc. 8, is DISMISSED
without prejudice. The Clerk is kindly directed to terminate this case.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.

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