Brandon et al v. Liddy et al

Filing 229

ORDER granting 211 motion for attorney's fees and costs and awarding fees to plaintiff in the amount of $302,175.28. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick J Martone on 9/10/2014.(LMR)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Maria Brandon,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Tom Liddy, et al.,
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Defendants.
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No. CV-12-0788-PHX-FJM
ORDER

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Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and non-taxable expenses
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(doc. 211), defendants’ response (doc. 219), and plaintiff’s reply (doc. 220). Following a
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seven-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Brandon on two of the four claims
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presented to the jury. The jury found in favor of Brandon and against Maricopa County on
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Brandon’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Brandon’s First Amendment rights
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and awarded nominal damages of $1.00. The jury also found in favor of Brandon and against
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Defendants Rocky Armfield and Sandra Wilson on Brandon’s state law claim of tortious
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interference with employment contract and awarded Brandon $638,147.94. The jury found
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against Brandon on her 14th Amendment and wrongful termination claims based on a
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protected property interest in her employment.
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I.
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Brandon now seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) as the prevailing

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party on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Brandon requests $289,387.50 in attorney’s fees and

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$12,787.78 in non-taxable costs for a total award of $302,175.28. Defendants challenge

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plaintiff’s fee request, arguing that the nominal damages on the First Amendment claim

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renders the victory on the federal claim “meaningless” and Brandon ineligible for fees.

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Response at 2. We disagree.

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A plaintiff who wins only nominal damages on a § 1983 claim is still a prevailing

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party under § 1988. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573 (1992). A party

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“prevails” under § 1988 “when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the

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legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that

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directly benefits the plaintiff.” Id. at 111-12, 113 S. Ct. at 573. Indeed, a “judgment for

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damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant’s

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behavior for the plaintiff’s benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he

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otherwise would not pay.” Id. at 113, 113 S. Ct. at 574. Therefore, “the degree of the

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plaintiff’s success does not affect eligibility for a fee award.” Id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574

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(quoting Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 790, 109

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S. Ct. 1486, 1492 (1989)).

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However, “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success” is relevant “to the

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reasonableness of a fee award under Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933,

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(1983).” Id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574. “[T]he most critical factor in determining the

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reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]hen

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a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element

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of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115,

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113 S. Ct. at 575 (citation omitted)

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In the absence of a meaningful monetary award, Farrer considered other measures of

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“success,” such as “the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have

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prevailed,” and whether the success “accomplished some public goal.” Id. at 121, 113 S. Ct.

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at 578 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir.
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2010); Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “other tangible

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results—such as sparking a change in policy . . . will, in combination with an enforceable

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judgment for a nominal sum, support an award of fees”).

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But Farrer and the other cases cited by the parties are distinguishable from the instant

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case because Brandon did not fail to prove an essential element of her claim for monetary

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relief. On the contrary, she was awarded $638,000 in compensatory damages on her state

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law claim. Therefore, Brandon’s “degree of success obtained” is substantial by any measure.

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When viewing the jury’s verdicts on the First Amendment and tortious interference

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claims together, it is apparent that the jury concluded that Wilson and Armfield interfered

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with Brandon’s employment contract because of the statement she made to the press. The

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jury also concluded that the County (acting through Mark Faull), terminated Brandon’s

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employment because of her protected speech. By assessing the entire damages award against

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Wilson and Armfield, the jury may have reasonably concluded that Wilson and Armfield, the

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parties who instigated the chain of events, should shoulder responsibility for the damages.

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Where, as here, a plaintiff’s successful state law claim and her fee-eligible federal

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claim are based on a common core of facts and related legal theories, the overall success in

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the action, as evidenced by a $638,000 damages award, supports a § 1988 fee award. See

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Jama v. Esmore Correctional Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that

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plaintiff’s substantial award on her pendent state claim distinguishes her case from Farrer).

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Moreover, in addition to the damages award, the jury’s verdict that Brandon was retaliated

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against because she exercised her First Amendment rights “offers clear and important

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guidance” to Risk Management, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, and the County that

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public employees retain the right to speak out on issues of public concern. See Guy v. City

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of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that jury’s verdict offered

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important guidance to the police department regarding the use of excessive force).

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Therefore, the judgment in this case will not only compensate Brandon for her injuries, but

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will also serve to encourage speech on matters of public concern, and will help to prevent

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terminations in violation of the First Amendment.
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II.

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Defendants also challenge the amount of the fee requested, arguing that Brandon’s

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partial success in this litigation entitles her to only a partial reimbursement of fees. Again,

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we disagree.

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In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court found that if successful and unsuccessful

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claims “involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories,” work done

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on unsuccessful claims may be included in a fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct.

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at 1940. A case will not be viewed as a series of discrete claims when counsel’s time is

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“devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours

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expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. “Instead the district court should focus on the

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significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably

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expended on the litigation.” Id. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his

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attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. “The result is what matters.” Id.

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The claims in this case arose from the same core set of facts–plaintiff’s work was

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eliminated and her job ultimately terminated because she angered individuals in County

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government when she made a statement to the press. Brandon’s theory of her case was that

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she was wrongfully terminated in violation of her First Amendment rights, and alternatively

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in violation of a protected property interest in her employment. Although the jury rejected

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the alternate theory, plaintiff nevertheless prevailed with respect to all the relief sought.

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Therefore, we will not differentiate between successful and unsuccessful claims, but instead

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will look to the “significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the

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hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id.

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Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s fee request is inadequate because the invoice

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lacks sufficient detail of the services provided to differentiate between distinct claims.

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Having already determined that the successful and unsuccessful claims are related by a

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common core of facts, we are not required to differentiate between the claims. In any event,

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however, counsel’s billing records describe the work performed in sufficient detail to

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establish that the work was reasonably related to the litigation. Lawyers need only “keep
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records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of the time

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expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fees to allow.” Id. at 441,

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103 S. Ct. at. 1943. Plaintiff’s counsel’s time records are sufficiently detailed for our

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determination of reasonableness.

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Plaintiff’s counsel expended almost 700 hours at a rate of $400.00 on this litigation.

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In this complicated case, spanning over 2 years and concluding in a seven-day jury trial, we

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conclude that the hourly rate and hours claimed are reasonable.

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III.
IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs (doc.
211) and awarding fees to plaintiff in the amount of $302,175.28.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2014.

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