United States of America v. $14,000.00 in US Currency et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 24 Government's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See attached Order for details). Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 3/25/2014.(TLB)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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United States of America,
Plaintiff,
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ORDER
v.
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No. CV-12-01546-PHX-JAT
$14,000 in United States currency, $40,000
in United States currency,
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Defendants.
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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America’s (“the
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Government”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24). The Court now rules on the
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motion.
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I.
Background
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The Government has filed this civil forfeiture action in rem pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
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§ 881(a)(6) to forfeit to its possession a total of $54,000 in United States currency. (Doc.
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1 at 1). Claimant Danny Murray claims an interest in the seized currency. (Doc. 10).
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The facts concerning the seizure are undisputed.1 In February 2012, Danny
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Murray and Jose Lopez traveled from Newark, New Jersey to Phoenix, Arizona with a
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final destination of Burbank, California. The pair traveled on round-trip airline tickets
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that Murray had purchased with his credit card three days earlier, at a cost of
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approximately $1,500. Murray and Lopez were scheduled to return to Newark three days
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later. Neither of them carried checked baggage but both had carry-on bags. Officers with
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Accordingly, the Court will not cite to the statement of facts.
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the Phoenix Police Department approached the pair and questioned them about their
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travel. Both Murray and Lopez consented to searches of their bags. Murray told the
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officers that Lopez was carrying money that belonged to Murray. Murray’s bag contained
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$40,000 in U.S. currency inside a dark-colored sock; Lopez’s bag contained $14,000 in
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U.S. currency in bundles of $5,000, $5,000, and $4,000.2
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When the officers asked Murray how much money he was carrying between the
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money on his person and on Lopez’s person, Murray replied “[a]bout, I don’t know, like
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50.” Murray asked the officers to include his name on the receipt for the money found in
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Lopez’s possession. Murray stated that he did not know how much money he had given
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to Lopez to carry, but later testified at his deposition that during his and Lopez’s car ride
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to the airport, he had taken two stacks of currency from his bag and gave them to Lopez.
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At his deposition, Murray also stated that he arranged on the same day of the trip for
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Lopez to carry the money and had not discussed this arrangement with Lopez during any
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of their earlier conversations about the trip.
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Murray told the officers that he was going to use the money in his possession to
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purchase a video camera. When the officers asked Murray if he was an independent film
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maker, Murray replied that he was “breaking into the business.” Murray used his cell
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phone to show the officers the $38,000 camera package that he wanted to purchase from
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a website called “Red Cinema.” The officers asked Murray how he had earned the
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money, and Murray replied that he had saved it from working in his construction
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business, D. Murray Construction, which he had owned since 2005.
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The officers searched Murray’s cell phone and discovered two photographs, one of
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which appeared to show a bag containing a white powder; the other photo appeared to
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show numerous bags containing white powder. The white powder in both photos had an
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appearance consistent with that of cocaine. Murray identified the photos as having been
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sent to him by a person identified as “J.” Murray denied dealing drugs. The police then
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The $40,000 consisted of 287 $100 bills, 134 $50 bills, and 230 $20 bills; the
$14,000 consisted of 699 $20 bills and four $5 bills.
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used a certified narcotics detector dog to examine the currency; the dog alerted to the
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$14,000 in currency that had been in Lopez’s possession but not to the $40,000 that had
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been in Murray’s possession.
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Murray testified at his deposition that his construction business was a sole
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proprietorship and that he usually earned between $150 and $600 per job. He also
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testified $18,000 of the money had been loaned to him by three different individuals; the
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remaining $36,000 he had saved over five to six years. Murray testified that he had
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previously paid a $3,100 deposit to the camera company and despite the seizure, he
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ultimately purchased the camera in October or November 2012 for $58,000.
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Murray testified that he had filed tax returns reporting $23,355 of income in 2009,
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$18,800 in 2010, and $53,000 or $60,000 in 2011. He also testified that he is the sole
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provider for his five children, his wife, and the mother of one of his children. The
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Government conducted an employment history search in forty-nine states for Murray’s
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social security number and could find no record of employment. Murray’s bank account
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records reflect ATM cash deposits totaling $19,025 during the month of December 2011
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and $21,062 during the month of January 2012. These deposits were generally made in
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amounts between $150 and $1000 and there were often multiple deposits in a single day.
Murray’s bank account statement shows two debit card purchases on December
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20, 2011 for “Red Com And Red Digi” in the amounts of $150 and $3,100.
Murray has also admitted to having previously been convicted of possession of
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cocaine with intent to distribute.
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II.
Legal Standard
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A.
Summary Judgment
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Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
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of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
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disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the
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record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or
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declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by
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“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
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dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
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Id. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to
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make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
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case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the
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motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be
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unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to
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the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do
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more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by
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“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the
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evidence is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare
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assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a
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motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. However, in the summary judgment
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context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-
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moving party, Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).
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B.
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21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides that all currency “furnished or intended to be
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furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance” or was “proceeds
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traceable to such an exchange” or was “used or intended to be used to facilitate” a
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violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 to 971 is subject to
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forfeiture to the United States.
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Civil Forfeiture
In an action for civil forfeiture, the government bears the burden of establishing by
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a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. §
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983(c)(1). “[I]f the [g]overnment’s theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to
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commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the
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commission of a criminal offense,” the government must establish a “substantial
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connection” between the property and the offense.” Id. § 983(c)(3); see also United
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States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court looks to
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the totality of the circumstances, including circumstantial facts, in determining whether
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the government has met its burden of proving that property is subject to forfeiture. See
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United States v. Currency, U.S. $42,500.00, 283 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Once the government has met its burden of proving that property is subject to
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forfeiture, a claimant may defeat forfeiture by showing by a preponderance of the
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evidence that “the property was not involved in a violation of the narcotics laws[] or [by]
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otherwise refut[ing] the government’s showing.” United States v. $215,300 U.S.
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Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1989)
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III.
Analysis
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The Government argues that the totality of the circumstances shows that the
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currency in question was substantially connected to drug trafficking. (Doc. 24 at 4).
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These circumstances include Murray’s travel plans, the method and quantity of currency
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transported, the alleged source of the currency, and Murray’s prior criminal history.
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1.
Travel Plans
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The Government contends Murray’s travel plans were inconsistent with his
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professed purpose of his trip because Murray purchased the round-trip tickets just three
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days before departure, Murray asked Lopez on the day of the trip to carry some of the
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currency, and Lopez’s accompaniment was unnecessary if Murray was merely
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purchasing a video camera. (Id.)
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A claimant’s travel schedule and arrangements are probative in determining
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whether currency seized from the claimant while traveling is substantially connected to
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illegal activity. See United States v. Funds in Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred
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Seventy Dollars, 403 F.3d 448, 467 (7th Cir. 2005) (purchasing airplane tickets soon
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before departure is one factor consistent with the travel plans of drug couriers). Murray
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contends, however, that his purchase of the tickets under his own name and using a credit
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card shows that he was not attempting to conceal a crime, and therefore, was not involved
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in any drug trafficking. (Doc. 26 at 4). At least one court has held that traveling in one’s
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own name and purchasing airplane tickets with one’s own credit card instead of cash
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reduces the suspiciousness of travel arrangements. See United States v. $67,220.00 in
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U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 285 (6th Cir. 1992).
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Nonetheless, Murray fails to explain why he paid for Lopez’s ticket or why he
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waited until the car ride to the departure airport to ask Lopez to carry $14,000 in
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currency, and on its face it seems strange that Murray would give Lopez currency to carry
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during the trip only for Lopez to give that currency back to Murray before Murray
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purchased the camera. But the Government has the burden of proving that there exists no
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genuine issue of material fact concerning the currency’s substantial connection to a
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controlled substance, and the Court draws all inferences in the light most favorable to
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claimant. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1075. The undisputed facts show that Murray had
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previously paid a $3,250 deposit for the video camera and in fact eventually purchased
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the camera; these facts corroborate Murray’s story.
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2.
The Quantity, Packaging, and Concealment of the Currency
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The Government next argues that the quantity of currency and the method by
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which Murray concealed it in his luggage suggests it was substantially connected to illicit
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activities. (Doc. 24 at 5). “[P]ossession of a large amount of cash is ‘strong evidence that
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the money was furnished or intended to be furnished in return for drugs.’” $42,500, 283
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at 981 (quoting United States v. $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572, (9th
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Cir. 1984)). However, possession alone is insufficient to establish a substantial
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connection to illegal drug activity. See id. at 981.
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More significant is the fact that Murray and Lopez hid the currency inside their
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carry-on bags. “A common sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do
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not transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and stuffed into
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packages in a backpack.” United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir.
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2004). In this case, the currency was bundled and stuffed into Murray’s sock, which is
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not a typical location for a legitimate business to store currency for transport. Moreover,
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the denomination of the bills is further evidence that the currency was connected to drug
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trafficking. To the extent that legitimate businesses have an interest in transporting large
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quantities of currency, it is reasonable that they would convert smaller denomination bills
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into larger ones. See id. Drug traffickers cannot avail themselves of this convenience
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because of the currency transaction reports that a bank would generate. Id.
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Here, more than half of the bills comprising the $40,000 were $50 or smaller, and
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the $14,000 was almost entirely comprised of $20 bills. Murray offers no explanation for
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why he divided the currency and gave part to Lopez to carry separately. But Murray
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alleges that he saved the money to purchase a video camera and the Government offers
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no evidence that Murray’s story is not credible as a matter of law. Even if the quantity,
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composition, and concealment of the currency supported a conclusion that the currency
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was substantially connected to illicit activity, illicit activity does not necessarily equate to
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drug trafficking.
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3.
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Murray claims that he earned the bulk of the seized money from working in his
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construction business. The Government argues that this implausible explanation further
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weighs in favor of forfeiture. (Doc. 24 at 6). When a claimant’s legitimate income is
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insufficient to explain the amount of currency found in his possession, it supports a
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showing of forfeiture. See United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658,
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662 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding a total of $31,142 in income over a five-year period
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insufficient to explain $174,206 in currency). “The mere allegation of a highly unlikely
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legitimate source of income without some support to give the allegation credibility cannot
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constitute an issue of material fact defeating summary judgment for forfeiture.” United
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States v. Two Parcels of Real Prop. Located in Russell Cnty., Ala., 92 F.3d 1123, 1129
Alleged Source of the Funds
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(11th Cir. 1996).
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Here, Murray’s total reported income for 2009-2011 was $102,155, assuming the
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higher of Murray’s two estimates for his 2011 income. It is possible that Murray saved
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the seized currency from these earnings despite supporting himself, his five children, his
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wife, and the mother of one of his children. On the other hand, although Murray
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originally told officers that he had saved the money from his business, he testified at his
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deposition that $18,000 of it had been a loan. Inconsistent statements concerning the
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source of the currency are probative of illegal activity. See United States v. $22,474.00 in
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U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (“inconsistent statements about the
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money and [the claimant’s] reasons for being in Phoenix tended to support an inference
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that the money was drug-related”); United States v. $252,300.00 in U.S. Currency, 484
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F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2007). But there are no facts linking any inconsistency in
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Murray’s story to proof that the money was linked to illicit drugs.
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On the other hand, Murray’s bank records show a plethora of small ATM cash
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deposits to his account, which may be indicative of money laundering. See United States
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v. $105,180 in U.S. Currency, 2013 WL 2153326, at *10 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2013). But
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Murray alleges that his construction business earns $150 to $600 per job, which is
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consistent with these deposits. The Court cannot weigh the evidence at the summary
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judgment stage and declare Murray to be not credible; Murray’s explanation creates an
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issue of fact as to whether he saved most of the money from his construction job.
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4.
Positive Canine Alert
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The Government argues that the narcotics detection dog’s positive alert to
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Murray’s currency in Lopez’s possession further supports a substantial connection
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between the currency and illegal drugs. (Doc. 24 at 9). A “positive canine alert for the
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presence of narcotics on the seized currency” is strong evidence that the currency was
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“exchanged for or intended to be exchanged for drugs.” $215,300, 882 F.2d at 419.
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However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that virtually all currency is contaminated to a
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degree with drug residue and that a positive dog alert supports a conclusion of substantial
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connection to drug trafficking only when the alert is combined “with other credible
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evidence clearly connecting the money to drugs.” United States v. U.S. Currency,
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$30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994). Significantly, the narcotics detection dog
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alerted only to the $14,000 of currency in Lopez’s possession and not to the $40,000 in
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Murray’s possession; this undermines the Government’s argument that there is
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substantial connection to drug trafficking.
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5.
Prior Drug Conviction
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Murray argues that his prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to
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distribute is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 404(b), which
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prohibits using evidence of a crime to prove character and show that on a particular
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occasion a person acted in conformity with his character. But FRE 404 permits evidence
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of a criminal conviction to be used for other purposes, such as “proving motive,
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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
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accident.” Murray’s prior conviction is admissible not to show that Murray acted as a
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possessor of cocaine with intent to distribute, but to show that the currency was
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substantially connected to drug trafficking.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly found prior drug convictions to
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be admissible for the purpose of determining if seized property was substantially
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connected with illegal drug activity. See $22,474, 246 F.3d at 1217; United States v. U.S.
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Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988). The Government’s burden
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remains, however, to prove that Murray has not established a genuine issue of fact as to
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whether the money was substantially connected to drug trafficking. Murray’s prior
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conviction is evidence that will have to be weighed, along with the other evidence, in
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making this factual determination.
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6.
Drug Photos
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Investigators found photos of cocaine on Murray’s cell phone, and the
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Government has attached to its statement of facts photos of Murray’s cell phone
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displaying these photos on its screen. Murray contests the admissibility of the
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Government’s photos. (Doc. 26 at 8). The Government replies that it need not establish
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the admissibility of evidence it offers in support of its motion for summary judgment.
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(Doc. 27 at 8). The Government is incorrect. Although evidence offered in opposition to
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a motion for summary judgment need not be in an admissible form, evidence offered in
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support of a motion must be admissible. See Canada v. Blain’s Helicopters, Inc., 831
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F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is well settled that unauthenticated documents cannot
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be considered on a motion for summary judgment.”).
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The photos in the Government’s Exhibit 15 are inadmissible because the
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Government has not authenticated them. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (“To satisfy the
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requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must
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produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
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claims it is.”); see also People of Territory of Guam v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir.
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1985).
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However, because Murray admitted in his answer to the Government’s complaint
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that investigators examined the contents of Murray’s phone and located “a photo which
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investigators, based on their training and experience, identified as a photograph of a
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kilogram of cocaine,” (Doc. 13 at 9; Doc. 1 at 11), the Court considers this fact to have
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been proven. See Am. Title Ins. Corp. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.
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1988) (“Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings which have the effect
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of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the
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fact.” (citation omitted)).
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The existence of a photograph showing a kilogram of cocaine on Murray’s cell
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phone at the time the currency was seized is probative evidence that weighs in favor of
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the money having a substantial connection to drug trafficking; however, in light of a
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genuine issue of fact as to the source of the currency, the Court cannot grant summary
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judgment in favor of the Government.
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IV.
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Conclusion
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there exists a substantial
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connection between the seized currency and drug trafficking. Murray alleges that he
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saved the money through his earnings at his self-employed construction business, and the
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Government offers no evidence that Murray’s testimony is inaccurate. Instead, the
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Government attempts to draw inferences from the undisputed facts that Murray was
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involved in drug trafficking. Because at the summary judgment stage, all facts and
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inferences are to be viewed in the light most favorable to Murray, the Government is not
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entitled to summary judgment.
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For the foregoing reasons,
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IT IS ORDERED denying the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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(Doc. 24).
Dated this 25th day of March, 2014.
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