Jolley v. Astrue

Filing 42

ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Attorney's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 40 ) is GRANTED in the amount of $31,096.50. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel must refund the lesser of the EAJA fee award and the § 406(b) fee award to Plaintiff. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 7/5/2016. (KAL)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Tamra Jolley,

No. CV-12-02447-PHX-JAT
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER

Carolyn W Colvin,

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Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Tamra Jolley (“Plaintiff”)’s motion for

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attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 40). The Court now rules on the

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motion.

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I.

Background

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On October 6, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s

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request for social security benefits. (Docs. 1 at 2; 9 at 2). The Social Security Appeals

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Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on September 24, 2012. (Docs. 1 at 2; 9 at

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2). After exhausting her administrative appeals, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking

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judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (Docs. 1 at 2; 9 at 2). On appeal, Defendant

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conceded error and asked this Court to remand to the agency for further proceedings.

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(Docs. 17, 18). Plaintiff opposed the motion, instead seeking a remand for an immediate

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award of benefits. (Doc. 21). After ordering additional briefing, the Court granted

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Defendant’s motion to remand the claim for further proceedings. (Doc. 32 at 11). After

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additional proceedings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is disabled. (Doc. 40-1 at 2–6).

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On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal

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Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 34). On August 27, 2015, the Court awarded

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Plaintiff her requested attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA. (Doc. 39). On

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October 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for attorneys’ fees under § 406(b).

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(Doc. 40).

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II.

Analysis

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Section 406(b) provides that whenever the Court renders a favorable judgment to a

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social security claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorneys’ fees for representation

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of the claimant. § 406(b)(1)(A). The reasonable fee cannot exceed twenty-five percent of

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the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. Id. The fee is payable out of, and not

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in addition to, the amount of the past-due benefits. Id. Section 406(b) “does not displace

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contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully

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representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court

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review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield

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reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).

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To that end, “Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to

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the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.” Id.

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Therefore, the Court must ensure the fee is 1) reasonable, and 2) limited to 25 percent of

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past-due benefits. Id.

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Moreover, the Court must be sure to “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client

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fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)

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(internal quotations omitted). While reviewing this agreement, the Court must still test

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the resulting award for reasonableness. Id. at 1149. In other words, “the district court

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must first look to the fee agreement and then adjust downward if the attorney provided

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substandard representation or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a

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windfall.” Id. at 1151. When determining reasonableness, the Court should consider the

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following non-exhaustive factors: the character of the representation, the results achieved,

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performance, delay, whether the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case,

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and, as an aid if necessary, the lodestar calculation. Id.

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Plaintiff and her counsel had a contingent-fee agreement in this case typical of fee

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agreements in disability benefit cases. Specifically, the contingent-fee agreement

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provides that “attorney fees for Federal Court work will be equal to the greater of 1) 25%

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of all past due benefits including benefits payable to spouse, children, and others, without

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regard to the maximum statutory allowance . . . or 2) fees awarded pursuant to the

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[EAJA] . . . .” (Doc. 40-1 at 9). Plaintiff was awarded $124,386.00 in past due benefits.

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(Id. at 1–4). Twenty-five percent of this award is $31,096.50. (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel

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requested the full twenty-five percent amount, (Doc. 40 at 14), which the Government

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does not oppose, (Doc. 41)

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Given the factors outlined in Crawford, the Court finds the contingent-fee

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agreement in this case to be reasonable, and thus, will award Plaintiff’s counsel

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attorneys’ fees in the amount of $31,096.50 pursuant to § 406(b). See 586 F.3d at 1151.

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Because Plaintiff was also awarded EAJA fees, (Doc. 39), Plaintiff’s counsel must refund

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the lesser of these two fee awards to Plaintiff, see Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

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III.

Conclusion

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Based on the foregoing,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for an Award of Attorney

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Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 40) is GRANTED in the amount of $31,096.50.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel must refund the lesser of
the EAJA fee award and the § 406(b) fee award to Plaintiff.
Dated this 5th day of July, 2016.

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