Ellington v. Horne et al

Filing 6

ORDER that the complaint 1 is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate this matter. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 2/22/13. (TLJ)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Christopher E. Ellington,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-13-00271-PHX-DGC

Tom Horne, Attorney General for the State
of Arizona, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Christopher M. Ellington is a pro se Plaintiff proceeding in forma papueris

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(“IFP”) in this action against the Attorney General and three judges of the State of

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Arizona. He filed his complaint (Doc. 1) and a motion for a preliminary injunction

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(Doc. 4) on February 7, 2013. He alleges that the actions of the state court judges have

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violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions and other state and federal

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laws.

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In IFP proceedings, a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

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determines that ... the action ... fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted[.]” 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of § 1915 concerns prisoner litigation, § 1915(e)

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applies to all IFP proceedings. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(en banc). “Section 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii) ... allows a district court to dismiss[ ] sua sponte ...

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a complaint that fails to state a claim[.]” Id. at 1130. “It is also clear that section 1915(e)

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not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

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that fails to state a claim.”

Id. at 1127.

A district court dismissing under

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the

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pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

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the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1127–29 (citations omitted).

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All of Plaintiff’s allegations arise from what appear to be ongoing proceedings

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before the Pinal County Superior Court. He variously complains that he was not granted

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a hearing within “5 calendar court days” as he alleges is mandated by Arizona law, that

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JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the real party in interest, made no effort to attend a hearing

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and had discussions with the judge off the record, and that several of the rulings of the

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superior court judges have been wrong. Doc. 1 at 4-8. He claims these actions violate

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his constitutional due process rights and amount to violations of various state and federal

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statutes. He moves for injunctive relief against the judges. Id.

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising

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subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court

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judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Bianchi

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v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003).

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28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants jurisdiction to review a state court judgment in the United

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States Supreme Court. The negative inference of that statute is that lower federal courts

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are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over appeals from state court judgments. The

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IFP complaint at issue in this case is not clearly styled as an appeal from a state court

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judgment, but all of the allegedly wrongful conduct arises from decisions and actions of

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the superior court judges. Accordingly, the Court will construe the complaint as a de

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facto appeal from a state court judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of

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jurisdiction. Because the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by additional amendment,

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the dismissal is with prejudice.

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The doctrine is based on

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IT IS ORDERED that the complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed with prejudice. The
Clerk is directed to terminate this matter.
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2013.

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