Gaughan v. First Community Bank

Filing 19

ORDER, the Clerk shall enter judgment reversing the summary judgment of the Bankruptcy Court (Bankr. Doc. 25; DR at 286289) and remanding with direction to enter summary judgment for the Appellant Trustee and against Appellee First Community Bank; the Clerk shall terminate this appeal. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 8/26/14. (REW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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In re
Larry L. Miller,

No. CV-13-02050-PHX-NVW
BK. 11-10746 EPB
Debtor.

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ADV. No. 13-ap-00436 EBP

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Maureen Gaughan,
ORDER

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Appellant,

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v.

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First Community Bank,

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Appellee.

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This bankruptcy appeal poses the question whether an Arizona judgment against a

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husband on his sole and separate debt may be executed against the Arizona couple’s

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community property in California. The answer is no, even if the original judgment had been

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rendered in California.

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Specifically, the Arizona federal judgment against the husband alone, later registered

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in a California federal court and recorded in California, does not lien their community real

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property in California. This is the rule by Arizona statute, and California choice of law

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principles yield to the Arizona rule concerning Arizona domiciliaries. California has no

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interest in ousting Arizona marital law concerning obligations between husband and wife

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and of persons contracting with one spouse, and the California community property statute
by its terms does not purport to do so.

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In play here is a vital rule of Arizona marital law that community property cannot be
reached to satisfy a guarantee of a debt of another unless both spouses sign.

exception to the general rule that either spouse may obligate community property by acts for
a community purpose without the approval or even knowledge of the other spouse. This
forty-year-old protection of the other spouse from unconsented guarantees is basic
knowledge to all Arizona transaction lawyers.

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Registering the judgment in California does not defeat that protection. Although
applications have sometimes diverged in apparent attempts to do equity, the general
principle is clear: The substantive law of the rendering jurisdiction shapes the judgment;
forum law governs enforcement consistent with the judgment.

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It does not change the question or the answer that this was a federal judgment,
registered in a California federal court. The federal registration statute treats the federal
court judgment the same as state court judgments are treated between sister states. The
federal judgment registration scheme does not transmogrify the Arizona federal judgment
into exactly what the rendering court said it was not.

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This is an

Under California law, which applies Arizona law as to who owes the judgment, the
creditor bank has no judgment lien on the Arizona couple’s community property in
California. The summary judgment for the bank must be reversed with directions to enter
summary judgment for the Trustee.
I.

FACTS
The facts are undisputed. Larry and Kari Miller are married and were domiciled in

Arizona at all relevant times. Larry Miller (“Miller”) personally guaranteed a loan First
Community Bank extended to his businesses. Kari Miller did not sign the guarantee. The
bank sued Miller in this Court when the businesses defaulted and obtained judgment against
Miller alone for approximately $6 million.

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The bank later registered the judgment in the Northern District of California pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 and recorded it in San Francisco County where the Millers own a
condominium as community property. Miller filed for bankruptcy in Arizona. The Chapter
7 Trustee, Maureen Gaughan, has sold the condominium. The bank filed this adversary
proceeding for a declaration that the recordation in California created a judgment lien on the
condominium. That would give the bank priority in the $600,000 net proceeds ahead of the
unsecured creditors. Under California law, unlike Arizona law, a guarantee signed by one
spouse may be enforced against community property. That is not because California law
has a specific rule concerning unilateral guarantees but because it subjects the community
estate to payment of all sole and separate debts incurred by either spouse.

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The Bankruptcy Court held for the bank, stating, “Because the Miller Judgment was
registered in California, California law governs the enforceability of the Miller Judgment
against Debtors’ community property located in California, and under California law,
Debtors’ community property located in California is liable for satisfaction of the Miller
Judgment.”

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The Trustee timely

appealed.
II.

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Designation of Record [hereinafter “DR”] at 289.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) of appeals from

“final judgments, orders, and decrees” of the bankruptcy court.

Grants of summary

judgment, which turn on conclusions of law, are reviewed de novo. See In re United Energy
Corp., 102 B.R. 757, 760 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989), aff’d, 944 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1991).
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Duties and powers of the Trustee

The Trustee is empowered “to manage the assets in a manner that will satisfy the
creditors’ claims.” In re Taylor, 599 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 701,
704). This includes a “fiduciary obligation to conserve the assets of the estate and to
maximize distribution to creditors.” In re Rigden, 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986).

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The bankruptcy estate is comprised of “interests of the debtor in property,” including
community property over which the debtor spouse has “sole, equal, or joint management
and control.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); see also In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 359 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1989) (“The filing by a spouse of an individual bankruptcy petition creates an estate which
encompasses community property that is under the spouse’s joint management and control
as of the date of the petition.”). Whether the Millers’ community property is an “interest[]
of the debtor” turns on state law. See In re Summers, 332 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“It is well established that state law determines the nature and extent of a debtor’s interest
in property.”) (quoting Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Svcs., Inc., (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d
1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002)).
In both California and Arizona the law of the matrimonial domicile governs spouses’
property interests. See Sigmund v. Rea, 226 Ariz. 373, 376, 248 P.3d 703, 706 (Ct. App.
2011) (“[T]he property rights of a husband and wife are governed by the law of the couple’s
matrimonial domicile at the time of the acquisition of the property.”) (quoting LorenzAuxier Fin. Group, Inc. v. Bidewell, 160 Ariz. 218, 220, 772 P.2d 41, 43 (Ct. App. 1989));
Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 496, 505, 286 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1991) (“As
a rule, marital interests in money and property acquired during a marriage are governed by
the law of the domicile at the time of their acquisition, even when such money and property
is used to purchase real property in another state.”). Under Arizona law, spouses have
“equal management, control and disposition rights over their community property.” A.R.S.
§ 25-214(B). Therefore, the community property condominium is an interest of the debtor
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) and comes within the bankruptcy estate.
B.

Arizona and California marital property law

Because the law of the matrimonial domicile governs the Millers’ respective rights
and powers concerning their community property, including the power to incur debts
payable from that property, California law applies Arizona law to define those rights and

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powers concerning the California condominium.1 See Grappo, 235 Cal. App. 3d 496, 505,
286 Cal. Rptr. 714. One of those Arizona rights controls here. By statute, one spouse
cannot bind community property by unilaterally guaranteeing a debt:

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C. Either spouse separately may acquire, manage, control or dispose of
community property or bind the community, except that joinder of both
spouses is required in any of the following cases:
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2. Any transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship.

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A.R.S. § 25-214; see also Consol. Roofing & Supply Co. v. Grimm, 140 Ariz. 452, 458, 682

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P.2d 457, 463 (Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he plain meaning of A.R.S. § 25-214(C)(2) requires that

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both spouses must execute a guaranty in order to bind the community.”).

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General principles of Arizona choice of law also defer to the marital policy of other

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states for Arizona-located property of their domiciliaries, with an exception that would not

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aid the bank here.2 See Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Bidewell, 160 Ariz. 218, 220, 772

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P.2d 41, 43 (Ct. App. 1989).

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This is a specific application of California’s “governmental interest analysis”
approach to conflicts of laws. “Under this approach, California law will be applied
unless the foreign law conflicts with California law and California and the foreign
jurisdiction have significant interests in having their law applied. . . . Where significant
interests conflict, the court must assess the ‘comparative impairment’ of each state’s
policies. . . . The law applied will be that of the state whose policies would suffer the
most were a different state’s law applied. . . .” S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
California has no interest in applying its marital liability law to property of an
Arizona couple, and by its terms the California statute does not purport to do so. See Cal.
Fam. Code § 760 (defining community property as “property . . . acquired by a married
person during the marriage while domiciled in this state.”). If the California statute did
purport to apply to property acquired while domiciled in another state, application of such
a law here would impair the Arizona legislature’s specific intention to “protect the
substantive rights of the non-signing spouse.” Rackmaster Sys., Inc. v. Maderia, 219
Ariz. 60, 64, 193 P.3d 314, 318 (Ct. App. 2008). California’s general policy favoring
creditors over spouses would carry little weight for a creditor dealing with an out-of-state
husband and not complying with the rights of the wife or even checking into them.
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Where Arizona courts have departed from this principle and applied Arizona law
rather than domicile state law, they were motivated to benefit spousal interests with the
more favorable Arizona rule. In Phoenix Arbor Plaza, Ltd. v. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. 27,
785 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App. 1989), a California husband gave a unilateral guarantee in a
transaction in Arizona. The court denied enforcement of the guarantee against Arizonalocated community property of the California couple, giving the wife the benefit of
Arizona law that “expanded her community property right protection.” Id. at 31, 785
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The rights between spouses and as against creditors dealing with a spouse are
substantive rights. See Rackmaster Sys., Inc. v. Maderia, 219 Ariz. 60, 65, 193 P.3d 314,
315 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting A.R.S. § 25-214(C)(2) “confers substantive rights on each
Arizona spouse”). They effectuate critical substantive policies concerning marriage and
spousal equality in any decision to risk the family’s financial past and future for the benefit
of another. See id. at 63, 193 P.3d at 317 (explaining the purpose of A.R.S. § 25-214(C)(2)
is “to protect one spouse against obligations undertaken by the other spouse without the first
spouse’s knowledge and consent,” and “this purpose would be frustrated if the husband . . .
were able to charge the wife’s interest in the community with the debts he guaranteed”)
(quotation marks omitted).
Those substantive rights cannot be forfeited by one spouse acting alone. See LorenzAuxier, 160 Ariz. at 221, 772 P.2d at 44 (rejecting the power of one spouse to “alter the
rights and liabilities of his marital community, irrespective of the protective policies of the
state of domicile, by simply choosing to contract in another forum and by contractually
consenting to the application of that forum’s laws”); accord G.W. Equip. Leasing, Inc. v.
Mt. McKinley Fence Co., Inc., 97 Wash. App. 191, 198, 982 P.2d 114, 118 (1999) (applying
A.R.S. § 25-214(C)(2) despite the signing spouse’s agreement that Washington law apply).
For this reason, the guarantee’s “Obligations of Married Persons” and “Governing Law”
provisions, purporting to allow recourse against community property and to consent to

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P.2d at 1219; see also id. at 33, 785 P.2d at 1221 (Voss, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
majority’s presumed application of the law of the marital domicile “[i]f the out-of-state
non-signing marital partner’s property rights are ‘restricted, reduced, or jeopardized’ by
the signing party’s acts in Arizona”).
Dauderman may be read as a narrow exception favoring the more equitable
substantive rule where the policy of the domicile state hostile to the spouse is not strong
and the policy of the forum state in favor of spouses is strong. The California
“governmental interest analysis” for choice of law would arguably reach the same result,
though the question could not arise in California because its law is not the one more
favorable to the spouse. The narrow exception of Dauderman, favoring forum law if it
better protects the out-of-state spouse’s community property in the forum state, would be
turned on its head if used to defeat domicile state law that protects the community.

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application of California law “without regard to its conflicts of law provisions,” are
ineffective as against the rights of the non-consenting spouse. DR at 41–42.
Miller’s personal guarantee of the bank loan could not obligate the marital
community property. This Court so stated that when it entered the original judgment
against him alone. See DR at 183 (“[T]he complaint seeks no adjudication of liability of the
marital community, and any such liability appears to be precluded by A.R.S. § 25214(C)(2).”).3
In stark contrast to Arizona, California law does not provide such protection to
spouses and the community estate. See Cal. Fam. Code § 910(a); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 695.020. In California “the liability of community property is not limited to debts
incurred for the benefit of the community, but extends to debts incurred by one spouse alone
exclusively for his or her own personal benefit.” Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin., 14 Cal. 4th 56,
64, 925 P.2d 1002 (1996); see also 5 Miller and Starr, Cal. Real Est. § 12:63 (3d ed.) (“The
community property is liable for any debt incurred by either spouse before or during
marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether one or both spouses are
parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt.”); id. (“The liability of the community
property is not limited to debts incurred for the benefit of the community.”). Because either
California spouse can obligate the community property for separate debts, a judgment
against a unilaterally guaranteeing spouse may be satisfied from community property
governed by California law like any other sole and separate liability. See Phoenix Arbor
Plaza, Ltd. v. Dauderman, 163 Ariz. 27, 28, 785 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that under California law a guarantee signed by only one spouse exposes community
property to liability).

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Even if the underlying debt were a community obligation, a judgment does not
run against community property unless both spouses are parties to the judgment. See
A.R.S. § 25-215(D) (“In an action on [a debt or obligation contracted for the benefit of
the community] the spouses shall be sued jointly . . . .”). This Court consciously dropped
Kari Miller from the judgment, doubly preventing it from reaching community property.
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On the bank’s view, domesticating the Arizona judgment in California supplanted
Arizona’s community property law with California’s and exposed the condominium to
satisfaction of the husband’s sole and separate debt. But this interpretation is at odds with
choice of law principles, full faith and credit, and California law for enforcing foreign
judgments.
C. State registration and enforcement
Like the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, California’s Sister State
Money Judgments Act simplified the process of bringing a local action on a foreign
judgment. See Kahn v. Berman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1499, 1507, 244 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(1988) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1710 et seq.); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1710.25
editors’ notes (“Section 1710.25 is similar to Section 2 of the revised Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 which requires the clerk to file a sister state judgment
and treat it in the same manner as a judgment of his state.”). Statutory compliance creates a
California judgment, and “the new judgment has the same effect as an original California
money judgment and ‘may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.’” Kahn, 198 Cal. App.
3d at 1507, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1710.35).
But the statute applies forum law for enforcement purposes only. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 1710.35 editors’ notes (“Section 1710.35 provides that a judgment entered pursuant
to this chapter is to be treated as a judgment of the superior court for purposes of
enforcement.”); see also Weir v. Corbett, 229 Cal. App. 2d 290, 293, 40 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163
(1964) (“In giving judgment the California court made available to plaintiff the various
California procedures for the enforcement of such a duty. The method of enforcement of a
foreign judgment is governed by the law of the forum.”) (quotation marks omitted). This
reflects the common law principle that execution can only be under the local court’s
processes. See Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (citing
McElmoyle, for Use of Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 324 (1839), for the proposition that
“[e]nforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects

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do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law”); see also Fink v.
O’Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 284 (1882). 4
Domestication does not—and under principles of full faith and credit it cannot—alter
the substance of the foreign judgment or create a liability where none existed. Cf. Weir, 229
Cal. App. 2d at 294, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (“[T]he foreign judgment defines the duty which is
to be enforced.”) (citing Gilmer v. Spitalny, 84 Cal. App. 2d 39, 189 P.2d 744 (1948)).
Although “the new judgment will have greater efficacy as a remedy” because an Arizona
court could not issue a writ of execution against California property, a California-registered
judgment “will not have any greater effect, as an adjudication of the rights and duties of the
parties, than it had in the state where rendered.”

Id. at 295, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 164.

Domestication cannot make the marital community a new de facto judgment debtor.
The bank objects that “California law expressly provides that a judgment against
only one spouse can be enforced against both spouses’ California community property.”

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Arizona’s registration statute is to the same effect:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of
Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of
any superior court of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in
the same manner as a judgment of the superior court of this state. A
judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment
of a superior court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like
manner.

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A.R.S. § 12-1702.

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Tracking the Uniform Act, Arizona’s foreign judgment–registration statute applies
Arizona enforcement procedures. See Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A. v. Phifer, 181 Ariz. 5,
6, 887 P.2d 5, 6 (Ct. App. 1994) (“[F]iling a judgment under the Uniform Act
domesticates it for purposes of enforcement.”). But registration cannot limit or alter the
judgment itself:

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The purpose of the Uniform Act is to provide the enacting state with a
speedy and economical method of enforcing foreign judgments so as to
prevent the cost and harassment that would result if further litigation were
required. The Uniform Act does not create substantive rights. It is an act
creating procedures for enforcing rights conferred by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Doc. 12 at 13. But “California community property” means, subject to exception, “all
property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the
marriage while domiciled in this state . . . .” Cal. Fam. Code § 760 (emphasis added).
California has elected to expose its own domiciliaries’ community property to the other
spouse’s sole and separate debts, which include unilateral guarantees. It has not so elected
for Arizona couples, who marry and live under different expectations set by their own
legislature. Under California law respecting foreign judgments, forum rules do not create
duties contrary to the judgment itself or transmute Arizona community property into
California community property for purposes of applying the California liability rules.
The bank’s analysis parallels one rejected long ago in Gilmer v. Spitalny, 84 Cal.
App. 2d 39, 189 P.2d 744 (1948). There, creditors sought to enforce an Arizona-rendered
judgment on a community debt against a wife’s separate property in California despite
conceding the separate property could not be reached under Arizona law. The court in
Gilmer rejected the creditors’ argument because it would expand the judgment. The case is
summarized in Weir:

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Gilmer . . . was an action upon an Arizona judgment which, by its terms, was
payable only out of the community property of the defendants. The appellate
court held it was error to enter a California judgment against the defendant
wife which would be payable out of her separate property. The duty adjudged
by the Arizona court was not the wife’s duty except insofar as it affected her
share of property under the legal control of her husband. Thus the Arizona
judgment did not provide evidentiary support for a personal judgment against
the wife.

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Weir, 229 Cal. App. 2d at 294, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The bank pursues a similar expansion

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here, and it fails for the same reason the expansion failed in Gilmer.

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The bank principally relies on two cases for execution on property that would have a

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different marital law character in the judgment-rendering state.

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distinguishable. In National Bank of Arizona v. Moore, 138 N.M. 496, 122 P.3d 1265 (Ct.

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App. 2005), the court upheld garnishment under New Mexico community property

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principles of the husband’s divisible one-half interest in a community property bank

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Both cases are

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account. Under Arizona community property law neither spouse has a divisible interest in
community property, and none of it can be reached for a sole and separate debt incurred
while married. But in reaching that result the court expressly declined to decide whether
“the law applicable to the enforcement of the judgment . . . depends on whether the bank
account is Arizona community property as opposed to New Mexico community property,”
holding the issue waived. Id. at 499, 122 P.3d at 1268. The issue is not waived in this case.
The judgment creditor in American Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Speros, 494
N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1993), successfully garnished property created in the forum state
(husband’s wages and rent from local property), which was not the proceeds of property
originating in the marital domicile.

These circumstances marginalize both cases as

precedent for the broad proposition the bank asserts. If they stand for a broader proposition
beyond their circumstances, they are unpersuasive.
California law does not allow an Arizona judgment against an Arizona spouse that
cannot be satisfied from community property in Arizona nevertheless to be executed against
their community property located in California.
D.

Federal rules for registration and enforcement

The bank argued, and the Bankruptcy Court agreed, that registration of the Arizona
federal judgment in the California federal court ousted Arizona law that the judgment runs
only against Miller’s sole and separate property. Instead, they say, California marital law
makes the Millers’ community property located in California executable for Miller’s sole
and separate judgment. Registering a federal judgment works no such alchemy, turning
base metal into gold by crossing a state line. What starts out base or gold stays base or gold,
wherever it moves in the federal courts. The effect of registering a federal judgment in a
new district is the same as domesticating a sister state judgment directly in the state court.
Federal procedure adopts state procedures for execution of a money judgment:
A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court directs
otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary
to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of

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the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent
it applies.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 governs procedures on
execution of a judgment and, for the most part, directs the district court to look to state
rules.” Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2010).
Before Congress authorized registration of federal judgments, “a successful litigant
in federal court who wanted to execute on a judgment in another district had to bring a
separate action on the judgment.” Hershel Shanks & Steven A. Standiford, Schizophrenia
in Federal Judgment Enforcement: Registration of Foreign Judgments Under 28 U.S.C.
S 1963, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 851, 857 (1984). “To provide a simple, inexpensive and
expeditious means to enforce federal money judgments,” id., Congress enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963, under which a party may register and enforce a federal judgment in another district:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any
court of appeals, district court, bankruptcy court, or in the Court of
International Trade may be registered by filing a certified copy of the
judgment in any other district or, with respect to the Court of International
Trade, in any judicial district, when the judgment has become final by appeal
or expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered
the judgment for good cause shown. Such a judgment entered in favor of the
United States may be so registered any time after judgment is entered. A
judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district
court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.
A certified copy of the satisfaction of any judgment in whole or in part may
be registered in like manner in any district in which the judgment is a lien.
The procedure prescribed under this section is in addition to other procedures
provided by law for the enforcement of judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 1963 (emphasis added). Rule 69 and § 1963 have the same effect, “providing
that the procedure on execution is to be in accordance with the procedure of the state in
which the district court is located at the time the remedy is sought.” Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 536 F.3d 980, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2008).
This system of enforcing out-of-state federal judgments parallels the California and
Arizona systems for enforcing sister state judgments, with the same procedural

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consequences and no substantive consequences. Like them, the federal scheme applies the
state law of the registration district to determine how the judgment may be executed and
which assets of the judgment debtor can be reached, but not who is liable for the judgment.
The underlying judgment determines that.

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The bank’s generic case authorities do not support any different interpretation of the
federal judgment scheme. Some cases stand only for the proposition that the registration

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forum’s enforcement procedures and remedies govern execution.5 Cases about expiration

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of successive registrations have no relevance here.6 It starts but does not end the analysis to

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say, “Registering a judgment under § 1963 is the functional equivalent of obtaining a new
judgment of the registration court,” In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 536 F.3d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 2008), or, “Once a judgment has been registered, state
law determines which assets may be reached.” Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929
F.2d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir. 1991). In none of these cases did federal registration amend the
substance of the judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The sole and separate judgment against the Arizona husband cannot be executed

against the community property condominium in California.

The underlying Arizona

judgment foreclosed community liability. A California court would apply the same Arizona
community property law and enforce the judgment according to its Arizona meaning. It
would do so under its general principles of choice of law and because the different
California community property statute by its terms applies only to property acquired while
domiciled in California. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1963 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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See Condaire, Inc. v. Allied Piping, Inc., 286 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2002); Johns v.
Rozet, 826 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1993); United States v. Miller, 229 F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir.
1956).
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See Del Prado v. B.N. Dev. Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2010) (allowing a
federal judgment rendered in Hawaii to be registered in Texas even though it had expired in
Hawaii because it was still live in Illinois, where it had been registered first); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 536 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2008); Stanford v. Utley,
341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.).
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69(a) changes that. The bank did not acquire a judgment lien on the Millers’ community
property condominium in California.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment reversing the
summary judgment of the Bankruptcy Court (Bankr. Doc. 25; DR at 286–289) and
remanding with direction to enter summary judgment for the Appellant Trustee and against
Appellee First Community Bank. The Clerk shall terminate this appeal.
Dated this 26th day of August, 2014.

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