Fuller v. Granville et al

Filing 11

ORDER (Service Packet), Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 is granted; Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 6 is denied without prejudice; Count One is dismissed without pre judice; Defendants Granville, Abbott, and Alger are dismissed without prejudice; Defendant Hansdall must answer the relevant portion of Count Two; the Clerk must send Plaintiff a service packet including the Complaint 1 , this Order, and both summon s and request for waiver forms for Defendant Hansdall; Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk within 21 days; this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge James F Metcalf all pretrial proceedings. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 9/12/14. (REW)

1
2

MDR

WO

3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8
9

Samuel Louis Fuller,

10
11
12

No. CV 14-0020-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

Kari Jill Granville, et al.,

13

Defendants.

14
15
16

Plaintiff Samuel Louis Fuller, who is confined in the Maricopa County Fourth

17

Avenue Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to Bivens v. Six

18

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),1 and an

19

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). He has also filed a Motion for a

20

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 6). The Court will grant

21

the Application to Proceed, will order Defendant Hansdall to answer a portion of Count

22

Two of the Complaint, will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants, and will deny

23

the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.

24

....

25
26
27
28

TERMPSREF

1

Although Plaintiff brought his Complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), he has only sued
individuals who are acting under color of state law. Therefore, the Court will construe
his claims as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775
(9th Cir. 1996) (“Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the
replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” (quoting Van
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991))).

1

I.

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

2

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

3

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

4

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be

5

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to

6

Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C.

7

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government

8

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.

9

II.

Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

10

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

11

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28

12

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff

13

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon

14

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

15

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

16

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

17

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8

18

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-

19

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

20

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

21

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

22

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

23

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

24

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

25

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

26

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible

27

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

28

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s

TERMPSREF

-2-

1

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must

2

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

3

at 681.

4

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed,

5

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

6

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less

7

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.

8

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

9

III.

10

Complaint
In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants:

court-

11

appointed defense attorney Kari Jill Granville, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

12

(MCSO) Sergeant Hansdall, MCSO Field Training Officer Abbott, and MCSO

13

Visitation/Inmate Property Department Officer Alger.

14

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he has received “ineffective advice of

15

counsel”, in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and has

16

been subjected to a “[c]onspiracy to co[]erce incompetency during trial.” Plaintiff asserts

17

that when Defendant Granville initially met with Plaintiff, she told him that his case was

18

going to be “unbelievable” if Plaintiff took the stand and testified and that the testimony

19

of nine police officers would likely be more credible. Plaintiff states that Defendant

20

Granville suggested that Plaintiff make his testimony “beli[e]vable,” which Plaintiff

21

construed to mean that he should either not testify or testify falsely. Plaintiff contends

22

that when Plaintiff stated that he would testify truthfully, Defendant Granville explained

23

to Plaintiff that “[t]his system is nothing more th[a]n a ‘big pimp’ and unfortunately

24

[Plaintiff was] on the ‘whore’ end of the spectrum in this instance.” Plaintiff claims he

25

was injured because Defendant Granville tried to persuade him to either fabricate his

26

testimony or waive his right to testify and “disrespected [him] by calling [him] a Hoe!”

27

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual

28

punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although Plaintiff’s

TERMPSREF

-3-

1

rambling allegations are difficult to follow, it appears he is raising two separate claims.

2

First, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that he was subjected to retaliation by

3

Defendants Alger and Abbott. Plaintiff asserts that after he filed a grievance regarding

4

Defendant Alger and informed Defendant Alger that he had filed two civil rights lawsuits

5

against another officer, Defendant Alger told Plaintiff that he should not attempt to

6

intimidate MCSO staff. Plaintiff states that he then noticed that he had named Defendant

7

Alger as a defendant in another lawsuit and then spoke to Defendant Alger regarding

8

Defendant Alger’s statement that Plaintiff should not attempt to intimidate staff.

9

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Alger directed other sergeants to target and

10

harass Plaintiff. He claims that the following day, Defendant Alger retaliated against

11

Plaintiff by serving Plaintiff with a disciplinary action report/write-up in which he

12

accused Plaintiff of using “laud” language in an inmate request form. He also asserts that

13

two shift sergeants approached Plaintiff’s cell and harassed Plaintiff by making him stand

14

up and show his face while he was sleeping or by telling him to remove a piece of paper

15

from his wall.

16

Defendant Abbott repeatedly kicked Plaintiff’s cell door and demanded that Plaintiff

17

show his face, although Plaintiff was asleep and his identification was in plain view.

Plaintiff claims that Plaintiff also contends that on one occasion,

18

Second, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force by Defendant

19

Hansdall. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hansdall directed other officers to use chemical

20

devices and fire mace, pepper spray bullets, gas fogger bombs, and a taser at Plaintiff in

21

response to Plaintiff’s refusal to follow a nurse’s instruction that Plaintiff chew in her

22

presence a chewable Tums tablet. He also contends that after the medical department

23

“cleared” Plaintiff, Defendant Hansdall instructed other detention officers to put Plaintiff

24

in a “contaminated” holding cell for three hours.

25

Hansdall knew the cell was contaminated and that the holding cell was not well-

26

ventilated and the toilet was filled with urine and feces and would not flush. Plaintiff

27

also claims Defendant Hansdall was acting vicariously for Defendant Alger and another

28

officer.

TERMPSREF

-4-

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

1

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “interposition by

2

way of [an] injunction order” that requires Plaintiff to be transferred to the custody of the

3

United States Marshal “for the duration and final decision in [his] ongoing criminal

4

prosecution CR-2012-006837-001 DT.”

5

IV.

Failure to State a Claim

6

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

7

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey

8

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a

9

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

10

claim that were not initially pled. Id.

11

A.

12

A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the

13

defendant has acted under the color of state law. A public defender or court-appointed

14

attorney representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law. See Polk

15

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Szijarto v. Legeman, 466 F.2d 864,

16

864 (9th Cir. 1972). However, a public defender engaged in intentional misconduct as a

17

part of a conspiracy with state actors to violate a plaintiff’s rights can be liable under

18

§ 1983 for that misconduct. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984).

Count One

19

To state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must show ‘an agreement or ‘meeting of

20

the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir.

21

2002) (citation omitted). The Court “need not, however, accept as true allegations that

22

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

23

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on other

24

grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). “A mere allegation of conspiracy without

25

factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d

26

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126

27

(9th Cir. 1989) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy did not support a § 1983 claim).

28

TERMPSREF

-5-

1

Plaintiff has used the word “conspiracy,” but has not made any allegations of an

2

agreement or meeting of the minds between Defendant Granville and any other

3

individual. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against Defendant Granville and

4

the Court will dismiss Defendant Granville and Count One.

5

B.

6

First, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s

7

conduct constitutes excessive force, he has failed to state a claim. The Fourteenth

8

Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, protects pretrial detainees

9

from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d

10

1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he Fourth Amendment sets the ‘applicable constitutional

11

limitations’ for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Id.

12

(quoting Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).

Count Two – Defendants Alger and Abbott

13

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v.

14

City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force

15

was excessive depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’

16

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

17

underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum,

18

441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The

19

Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing

20

governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415.

21

Moreover,
[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . .
“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the
Fourth Amendment.

22
23
24
25
26

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s conduct does not rise to the level of excessive

27
28

TERMPSREF

force.

See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (“‘[v]erbal

-6-

1

harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42

2

U.S.C. § 1983’” (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979))). Thus,

3

the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against

4

Defendants Alger and Abbott.

5

Second, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that he was subjected to retaliation by

6

Defendants Alger and Abbott, he has failed to state a claim. A viable claim of First

7

Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor

8

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

9

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment

10

rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not reasonably

11

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

12

Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims

13

requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise

14

of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no legitimate

15

penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise of

16

his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’

17

conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977);

18

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989).

19

Plaintiff does not allege that the exercise of his First Amendment rights was

20

chilled by Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s conduct, that he suffered more than minimal

21

harm from their conduct, or that there was no reasonable correctional goal advanced by

22

their conduct. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s retaliation claim

23

against Defendants Alger and Abbott.

24

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant Hansdall was acting

25

vicariously for Defendant Alger, this does not state a claim against Defendant Alger

26

because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

27

V.

28

TERMPSREF

Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required – Defendant Hansdall
Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force

-7-

1

claim against Defendant Hansdall in Count Two. The Court will require Defendant

2

Hansdall to answer Count Two.

3

VI.

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

4

In his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,

5

Plaintiff seeks to be transferred to the custody of the United States Marshal “until the

6

conclusion of his state criminal proceeding in . . . . CR 2012-006837-001 DT”;2 to

7

prevent Defendants Hansdall, Abbott, and Alger from engaging in any written, verbal, or

8

physical interaction regarding “any of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings and or institutional

9

functions”; and to prevent “any representation or hand[]ling of discover[y] of the

10

Plaintiff’s criminal case.”

11

Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary

12

injunction is within the Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d

13

1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979).

14

1.

15

A temporary restraining order can be issued without notice

16

only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified
complaint show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney
certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Temporary Restraining Order

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (emphasis added). See also LRCiv 65.1 (“Ex parte restraining
orders shall only issue in accordance with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking a temporary restraining order, he is seeking a
temporary restraining order without notice, yet has not certified the “efforts made to give
notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B).
Because the request for a temporary restraining order fails to comply with Rule

26
27
2

28

TERMPSREF

On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to Attempted Aggravated Assault on
a Law Enforcement Officer in CR 2012-006837-001-DT. See http://www.courtminutes.
maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/042014/m6273559.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
-8-

1

65(b)(1)(B), the Court, in its discretion, will deny that request. See LRCiv 65.1. See also

2

American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court

3

abused its discretion in granting ex parte temporary restraining order “when there was no

4

valid reason for proceeding ex parte and by disregarding the strict procedural

5

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) for the issuance of such ex parte orders”); Adobe

6

Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Cal. 1999).

7

2.

Preliminary Injunction

8

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely

9

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

10

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

11

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

12

(2008).

13

Environmental Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal.

14

2000).

The moving party has the burden of proof on each element of the test.

15

To the extent Plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction, he has failed to meet his

16

burden and has failed to address many of the elements of the test. Thus, the Court will

17

deny Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.

18

VII.

Warnings

19

A.

20

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his

21

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he

22

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to

23

comply may result in dismissal of this action.

Release

24

B.

25

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with

26

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion

27

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in

28

dismissal of this action.

TERMPSREF

Address Changes

-9-

1

C.

2

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a

3

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a

4

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also,

5

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv

6

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to

7

Plaintiff.

8

D.

9

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including

10

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v.

11

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action

12

for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

13

IT IS ORDERED:

Copies

Possible Dismissal

14

(1)

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.

15

(2)

As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government

16

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial

17

filing fee.

18

(3)

19

Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 6) is denied without prejudice.

20

(4)

Count One is dismissed without prejudice.

21

(5)

Defendants Granville, Abbott, and Alger are dismissed without prejudice.

22

(6)

Defendant Hansdall must answer the relevant portion of Count Two.

23

(7)

The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

24

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

25

Defendant Hansdall.

26

(8)

Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

27

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not

28

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

TERMPSREF

- 10 -

1

(9)

If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

2

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the

3

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later,

4

the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

5
6

(10)

The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

7

(11)

The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of

8

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the

9

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this

10

Order.

11

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not

12

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was

13

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the

14

(a)

personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order

15

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

16

and

17

(b)

within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of

18

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of

19

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service

20

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service

21

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for

22

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for

23

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of

24

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule

25

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the

26

Court.

27
28

TERMPSREF

- 11 -

1

(12)

If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint,

2

he must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the

3

Plaintiff.

4

(13)

Defendant must answer the relevant portion of Count Two of the Complaint

5

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable

6

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

7

(14)

This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf pursuant to

8

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as

9

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

10

Dated this 12th day of September, 2014.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

TERMPSREF

- 12 -