Puppies 'N Love et al v. Phoenix, City of
Filing
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ORDER granting 11 Motion for TRO; granting 11 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 4/2/2014.(DGC, nvo)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Puppies ‘N Love, a d/b/a of CPI, Inc., et al.,
Plaintiff,
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
v.
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No. CV-14-00073-PHX-DGC
City of Phoenix, et al.,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a
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preliminary injunction. Doc. 11. The motion is fully briefed and the Court held a
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hearing on March 27, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the
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motion and enter a preliminary injunction.
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I.
Background.
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Plaintiffs Puppies ‘N Love and its owners Frank and Vicki Mineo instituted this
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action on January 14, 2014. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
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G-5973 (“the Ordinance”), which the City of Phoenix adopted at a City Council meeting
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on December 18, 2013. The Ordinance went into effect on January 17, 2014. Under the
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Ordinance, Phoenix pet shops can sell only dogs purchased from an animal shelter, a
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nonprofit humane society, or a nonprofit animal rescue organization. The Ordinance
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prohibits pet shops from selling puppies purchased from any breeder. Violation of the
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Ordinance is a criminal offense. The stated purpose of the Ordinance is to “target retail
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outlets that drive the wholesale production of dogs in inhumane ‘puppy mills,’ while also
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combating pet overpopulation and protecting consumers from the emotional and financial
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hardships caused by unwitting purchases of a puppy mill puppy from a pet shop.”
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Doc. 27 at 2. “Puppy mills” are inhumane dog breeding facilities where overcrowding,
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poor sanitation, and inadequate veterinary care are rampant. “The irresponsible breeding
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practices endemic to puppy mills . . . result in a host of hereditary and congenital diseases
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common to puppy mill puppies.” Id.
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Plaintiffs assert that they buy pure and specialty-breed puppies and sell them to
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individual consumers in their stores. They assert that such puppies are not available for
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them to purchase in sufficient numbers from shelters, humane societies, and animal
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rescue organizations, making their business model nonviable under the Ordinance.
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Plaintiffs claim that the Ordinance thus presents them with a Hobson’s choice: either
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continue operating their business and incur criminal liability, or go out of business.
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II.
Legal Standard.
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In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish that they are
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likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
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absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an
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injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
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20 (2008). The Ninth Circuit continues to analyze the four elements using a “sliding
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scale” approach, in which “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced,
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so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.”
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Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Should
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the moving party demonstrate a very high likelihood of injury, the likelihood of success
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on the merits may be relaxed. An injunction may be granted when serious questions
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going to the merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s
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favor. Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.
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III.
Analysis.
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A.
Ripeness.
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Defendant City of Phoenix (“the City”) argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint does not
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present a justiciable issue because the questions presented are not ripe for review.
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Doc. 26 at 2. The City argues that because Plaintiffs have not received any letters, calls,
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or visits from City authorities threatening them with prosecution, Plaintiffs have “jumped
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forward into litigation on the speculation of future prosecution.” Id. at 3-4.
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Ripeness is a question of timing designed to “prevent the courts, through
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avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
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disagreements.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). The role of
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Article III courts is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical
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cases, but to adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent with the powers granted the
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judiciary in Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. III. To determine whether
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the ripeness requirement is satisfied, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs face “a
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realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or
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enforcement,” or whether the alleged injury is too “imaginary” or “speculative” to
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support jurisdiction. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
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(1979).
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The difference between an unripe, abstract question and a “case or controversy” is
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“one of degree . . . and is not discernible by any precise test.” Id. at 297. Neither the
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mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a generalized threat of prosecution satisfies
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the ripeness requirement. See San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121,
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1126-27 (9th Cir. 1996). “When contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, it is
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not necessary[, however,] that [the plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or
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prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of
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his constitutional rights.” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted). “When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct
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arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there
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exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be required to await and
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undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Id.
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The Ninth Circuit looks to three factors in making this determination: (1) whether
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the plaintiffs have articulated a “concrete plan” to violate the law in question, (2) whether
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the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate
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proceedings, or whether there is at least a credible threat of prosecution, and (3) the
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history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute. Reno, 98 F.3d at
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1126-28. Considering these factors, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint presents
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ripe questions for review.
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First, Plaintiffs have a “concrete plan” to violate the Ordinance. Their entire
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business – selling puppies from USDA-licensed Class A breeders and hobby breeders –
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has been made unlawful by the Ordinance. Doc. 34 at 4. The conduct criminalized by
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the Ordinance is not conduct in which Plaintiffs engage only occasionally; it is their core
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business model.
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Second, the City has not made a specific threat to initiate proceedings against
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Plaintiffs, but neither has the City disavowed an intent to prosecute Plaintiffs under the
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Ordinance. Babbitt found a similar refusal by the State of Arizona to “disavow[] any
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intention” to prosecute under a newly passed law adequate to support a finding of
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ripeness. 442 U.S. at 302. Plaintiffs openly admit that they engage in the very conduct
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the Ordinance makes criminal – selling puppies acquired from breeders. As in Babbitt,
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the Court finds that Plaintiffs are “not without some reason in fearing prosecution,”
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making them and the City “sufficiently adverse” to satisfy the ripeness requirement. Id.
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Third, the Ordinance is newly adopted. There is no history of past prosecution or
non-prosecution that could allay Plaintiffs’ fear of criminal liability.
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution under the Ordinance is not
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imaginary or speculative.
Their business model has been made illegal, and their
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challenge to the Ordinance is sufficiently ripe to come before the Court.
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B.
Irreparable Harm.
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If enforcement of the Ordinance is not enjoined, Plaintiffs assert that they will go
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out of business. Doc. 11 at 4. Because the loss of one’s business carries more than
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merely monetary consequences, it constitutes irreparable harm. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns
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v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs’ business consists
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almost entirely of acquiring pure and specialty-breed puppies and selling them to
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individual consumers in the Phoenix area. Doc. 11-1 at 12. Under the Ordinance, the
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only sources of puppies in Plaintiffs’ niche would be animal shelters, nonprofit humane
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societies, and nonprofit animal rescue organizations. Plaintiffs have provided affidavits
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asserting that these sources of puppies would not be adequate to provide Plaintiffs with a
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sufficient number of healthy pure and specialty-breed puppies to sustain their store. Id.
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At oral argument, the City asserted that Plaintiffs would not be irreparably harmed
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because they could switch their business to selling puppies from shelters, nonprofit
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humane societies, or nonprofit animal rescue organizations in conformity with the
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Ordinance. The Humane Society of the United States has made the same assertion. See
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Doc. 27 at 18. Plaintiffs have provided evidence, however, that they could not compete
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on a for-profit basis with subsidized shelters and humane societies that provide the same
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dogs for free or for a minimal price. Doc. 11-1 at 13. Plaintiffs credibly assert that their
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only lawful choice under the Ordinance is to close the doors of Puppies ‘N Love and lay
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off their employees. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of
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irreparable harm if the Ordinance is not enjoined.
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C.
The Balance of Hardships Tips Sharply in Plaintiffs’ Favor.
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If the Court does not enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance against Plaintiffs,
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Plaintiffs will lose their business. If the Court enjoins enforcement of the Ordinance
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against them, Defendants assert that the City will be prevented from exercising its police
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power to “protect consumers from the often unknown, expensive, and heartbreaking side-
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effects associated with” puppy mills. Doc 27 at 18. But this concern is diminished
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considerably by Plaintiffs’ evidence that they do not acquire dogs from puppy mills.
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Defendants also assert that “other entities that supported the Ordinance’s passage will be
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forced to continue devoting resources to monitoring the receipt and sale of animals in
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Phoenix from puppy mills.” Doc. 27 at 18. This concern is diminished considerably by
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the fact that Plaintiffs seek an injunction only with respect to their pet store, not all pet
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stores.
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Weighing the hardship to Plaintiffs if enforcement of the Ordinance against them
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is not preliminarily enjoined (loss of their business) against the diminished concerns of
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Defendants if enforcement against Plaintiffs is enjoined (an inability to prosecute a
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business that is not supporting puppy mills), the Court finds that the balance of hardships
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tips sharply in Plaintiffs’ favor.
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D.
Serious Questions.
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Because the Court has found that the balance of hardships tips sharply in
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Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs need not show that they are likely to succeed on the merits.
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Instead, they can show that their complaint presents “serious questions going to the
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merits.” Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. “For the purposes of injunctive relief, ‘serious
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questions’ refers to questions which cannot be resolved one way or the other at the
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hearing on the injunction and as to which the court perceives a need to preserve the status
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quo lest one side prevent resolution of the questions or execution of any judgment by
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altering the status quo.” Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th
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Cir. 1988) (en banc). “Serious questions need not promise a certainty for success, nor
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even present a probability of success, but must involve a ‘fair chance of success on the
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merits.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coston, 773 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir.
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1985)); see also Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The briefing and oral argument confirm that serious questions are presented in this
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case. Plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause argument, although vigorously disputed, presents an
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issue worthy of factual development and the Court’s careful consideration. Plaintiffs
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assert that the Ordinance discriminates against and imposes burdens on interstate
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commerce that far outweigh local benefits. Plaintiffs have also raised credible equal
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protection and special laws claims. The Court concludes that the status quo should be
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maintained to permit resolution of these issues.
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E.
Public Interest and Balance of the Equities.
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Defendants assert that a preliminary injunction is not in the public interest because
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it would not show proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in
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carrying out their domestic policy. Doc. 26 at 17 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
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315, 318 (1943)). The Court disagrees. Although due regard for the independence of the
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City is surely warranted, countervailing public interests are also at stake. These include
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interests served by the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United State
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Constitution and the Special Laws provision of the Arizona Constitution. Those interests
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can be served in this case only by preserving the status quo while the serious questions
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raised by Plaintiffs’ complaint are resolved. See Sammartano v. First Judicial District
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Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court finds that these public interests
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offset each other and do not weigh against issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The final consideration – balance of the equities – has been addressed above in the
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Court’s consideration of the balance of hardships.
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IV.
Conclusion.
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The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have presented justiciable questions for the
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Court’s consideration and have established the elements under Wild Rockies that entitle
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them to preliminary relief.
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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 11) is
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granted.
Defendants are enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. G-5973 against
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Plaintiffs during the remainder of this litigation.
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Dated this 2nd day of April, 2014.
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