GoDaddy.com LLC v. RPost Communications Limited et al

Filing 281

ORDER: GoDaddy's Motion to Seal Exhibits 1-3, 5, and 8 to Response Brief 240 is granted; the Clerk shall file under seal the documents lodged at 241 ; RPost's Motion to File under Seal 246 is granted; the Clerk shall file under seal th e documents lodged at 247 ; RPost's Motion to Seal Document 259 is denied as moot; the Clerk shall unseal and file RPost's proposed motion for summary judgment and separate statement of facts that are lodged at 260 and 261 ; GoDaddy&# 039;s Unopposed Motion to Seal Redacted Portions of Exhibits 16-17 and 23 to Declaration of Lewis E. Hudnell, III in Support of RPost's Motion for Summary Judgment of Count I 275 is denied; on 4/1/16, the Clerk shall unseal and file the docume nts that are lodged at 264 ; GoDaddy's Motion to Seal Exhibits to GoDaddy's Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 269 is denied; on 4/1/16, the Clerk shall unseal and file the documents that are lodged at 270 ; Go Daddy's Motion to Seal Exhibits to Motion to Preclude Testimony of Damages Expert Gregory Smith and Request to File Under Seal Redacted Portions of its Motion 262 is denied; by 4/1/16, GoDaddy shall file a Notice of Compliance appended with ve rsions of its Motion to Preclude and accompanying exhibits that are in accordance with this Order; once GoDaddy files its Notice of Compliance, the Clerk shall file under seal the documents lodged at 263 ; RPost's Motion to File Under Seal 277 is denied; on 4/1/16, the Clerk shall unseal and file the documents that are lodged at 278 . Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 3/24/16. (REW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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GoDaddy.com LLC,

No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER

RPost Communications Limited, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Pending before the Court are four motions to seal filed by Plaintiff GoDaddy.com

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LLC (“GoDaddy”) and three motions to seal filed by Defendants.1 (Docs. 240, 246, 259,

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262, 269, 275, 277). The Court now rules on the motions.

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I.

Legal Standard

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It has long been recognized that the public has a general right of access “to inspect

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and copy . . . judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435

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U.S. 589, 597 (1978). This right of access extends to all judicial records except those that

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have “traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons,” namely grand jury

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transcripts and certain warrant materials. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447

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F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, “the common-law right of inspection has

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bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records” do not “serve as . . . sources

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of business information that might harm the litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435

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Defendants are RPost Communications Ltd.; RPost Holdings, Inc.; RPost
International Ltd.; and RMail Ltd. Defendants are collectively referred to as “RPost.”

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U.S. at 598.

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“Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong

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presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178

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(quotation omitted). A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of

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overcoming this presumption by either meeting the “compelling reasons” standard if the

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record is a dispositive pleading, or the “good cause” standard if the record is a non-

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dispositive pleading. Id. at 1180.2

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What constitutes a “compelling reason” is “best left to the sound discretion of the

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trial court.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. The Court must “balance the competing interests of

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the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana,

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In a recent opinion, a panel of the Ninth Circuit shifted from the dispositive/nondispositive analysis to a review of the relationship between the underlying motion and the
merits of the case. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp, LLC, No. 15-55084, 2016
WL 142440, at *6 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) (“Auto Safety”). Specifically, Auto Safety held
that public access to records attached to a motion that is “more than tangentially related
to the merits of a case” will be reviewed under the “compelling interest” standard, while
documents attached to a motion that does not have a “tangential” relationship to the
merits of a case may be sealed if “good cause” is shown. Id. However, because Auto
Safety was only a panel decision and not en banc, prior Ninth Circuit precedent
centralizing the inquiry on whether the record is dispositive or non-dispositive was not
overruled. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Circuit
Judge Sandra S. Ikuta stated as much in her Dissent:
According to the majority, the district court here erred because it “relied on
language in our cases which provides that when a party is attempting to
keep records attached to a ‘non-dispositive’ motion under seal, it need only
show ‘good cause.’” Maj. op. at 5. This comes as a surprise, because the
“language in our cases” constitutes binding precedent. But no matter, the
majority invents a new rule, namely that a party cannot keep records under
seal if they are attached to any motion that is “more than tangentially
related to the merits of a case,” Maj. op. at 17, unless the party can meet the
“stringent standard” of showing that compelling reasons support secrecy,
Maj. op. at 8. Because this decision overrules circuit precedent and vitiates
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I strongly dissent.
Auto Safety, 2016 WL 142440, at *9. Whether Auto Safety will be reheard by the Ninth
Circuit en banc is unknown as of the date of this Order.
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447 F.3d at 1179. If the Court decides to seal certain judicial records after considering

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these interests, “it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual

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basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Generally,

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“compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify

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sealing court records exist when such court files might have become a vehicle for

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improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public

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scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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In the business context, a “trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device

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or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an

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opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” In re

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Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Restatement (First) of

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Torts § 757, cmt. B (1939)). As this Court has observed in the past, “because

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confidentiality alone does not transform business information into a trade secret, a party

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alleging trade secret protection as a basis for sealing court records must show that the

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business information is in fact a trade secret.” PCT Int’l Inc. v. Holland Elecs. LLC, 2014

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WL 4722326, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2014) (quotation omitted). In other words,

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“[s]imply mentioning a general category of privilege, without any further elaboration or

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any specific linkage with the documents, does not satisfy the burden.” Kamakana, 447

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F.3d at 1184.

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Similarly, the less-stringent “good cause” standard requires a “particularized

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showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed.

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Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation

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omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Thus, “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated

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by specific examples of articulated reasoning” is not enough to overcome the strong

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presumption in favor of public access. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d

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470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).

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II.

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Analysis
The parties move to seal documents appended to both dispositive and non-

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dispositive motions. Because different standards apply to each type of motion, see

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180, the Court will analyze each motion individually.

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A.

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The parties ask the Court to seal various documents filed in conjunction with

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RPost’s motion to amend its infringement contentions. (Docs. 240, 246). The Court finds

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that the underlying motion was merely a procedural request by RPost for leave to amend

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its infringement contentions on the eve of the discovery deadline. See (Doc. 226). Thus,

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the motion was a non-dispositive motion that was not “more than tangentially related to

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the merits of a case.” Accordingly, the “good cause” standard for sealing treatment

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Non-Dispositive Motion

applies. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180; Auto Safety, 2016 WL 142440, at *6.

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The Court concludes that the need for expedited resolution of these motions

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constitutes “good cause” to seal the documents. Also pending before the Court are cross

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motions for summary judgment and a Daubert motion that all must be briefed and

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decided prior to August 22, 2016, the firm trial date set for this case. For this reason, the

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Court will permit these documents to be filed under seal.3

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B.

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The parties also moved to seal numerous documents appended to dispositive

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motions. See (Docs. 259, 262, 269, 275, 277). The Court will review each motion in turn.

Dispositive Motions

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The Court notes, however, that this ruling has no bearing on whether these same
documents can be sealed for purposes of summary judgment or at trial. Should a party
seek to file and seal these documents in conjunction with a summary judgment brief, the
party must satisfy the “compelling reasons” standard. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178.
Should a party seek to introduce and seal these documents at trial, the party must satisfy
the Ninth Circuit’s multi-pronged test. See Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for
the Dist. of Ariz., 156 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring a party to satisfy three
prongs to seal a document at trial: (1) sealing serves a compelling interest, (2) there is a
substantial probability that without sealing the compelling interest would be harmed, and
(3) reasonable alternatives to sealing cannot adequately protect the compelling interest
(citing Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Or., 920 F.2d 1462, 1464
(9th Cir. 1990))). Thus, the Court’s sealing of these documents is based exclusively on
finding that “good cause” exists.
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1.

GoDaddy’s Motion to Preclude (Doc. 266)

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On March 1, 2016, GoDaddy filed a Motion to Preclude Testimony of Defendants’

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Damages Expert Gregory Smith Redacted (“Motion to Preclude”) pursuant to Daubert v.

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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Doc. 266).4 Concurrently,

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GoDaddy filed a motion to seal portions of the Motion to Preclude and accompanying

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Exhibits 1, 2, and 4. (Doc. 262).5 RPost filed a response in opposition to GoDaddy’s

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Motion to Preclude, (Doc. 279), and a motion to seal Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of

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Lewis E. Hudnell III filed in support of RPost’s response (“First Hudnell Declaration”),

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(Doc. 277). Neither party opposes the other party’s motion to seal.

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The parties seek to seal these documents because they contain “sensitive business

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information” regarding (1) the “financial performance of the accused products,”

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(2) “operating margins and sales information” of GoDaddy, (3) “RPost’s damages expert

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royalty calculation by specific percentage,” (4) “confidential RPost licensing negotiations

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with Authentix,” and (5) “product marketing survey results commissioned by GoDaddy.”

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See (Docs. 262 at 1–2; 277 at 1–2). The parties assert that “[w]ith no allowance for the

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sealing of the [documents], GoDaddy and RPost sensitive proprietary information would

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be revealed, without providing any additional benefit to ensuring the public interest’s

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understanding of the judicial process.” (Docs. 262 at 2; 277 at 2). The parties also note

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that the documents have been designated as “Confidential or Highly Confidential under

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the Protective Order.” (Id.)

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Although GoDaddy and RPost contend that a showing of “good cause” permits the

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Court to seal these documents, see (id.), the Ninth Circuit holds that Daubert motions

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closely associated with the merits of a summary judgment motion are subject to the

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“compelling reasons” standard. See In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Prac.

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GoDaddy’s Motion to Preclude remains pending and will be resolved by
subsequent order.
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Although GoDaddy lodged versions of the three exhibits for the Court’s review,
it did not lodge a non-redacted version of the motion itself.
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Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In re Midland”). In this case, GoDaddy

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moves to preclude the entire testimony of RPost’s damages expert, (Doc. 266), while also

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moving for summary judgment on the issue of damages under the theory that RPost’s

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damages expert is the only evidence of RPost’s damages, (Doc. 257 at 31). Thus,

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GoDaddy would not be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of damages if the

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Court denies its Daubert motion. Accordingly, the Court finds that GoDaddy’s Daubert

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motion is closely associated with the merits of its summary judgment motion, and, in

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order to seal the documents, the parties must show “compelling reasons” that overcome

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the “strong presumption in favor of access.” See In re Midland, 686 F.3d at 1120.

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a.

GoDaddy’s Motion to Preclude

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GoDaddy seeks permission to redact multiple portions of its Motion to Preclude.

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(Doc. 266). Although GoDaddy did not file a non-redacted version of this motion, it is

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apparent from the filed Motion to Preclude that GoDaddy seeks to redact three types of

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information: (1) the royalty rate percentage proposed by RPost’s damages expert, Mr.

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Smith, (2) marketing survey results of a survey commissioned by GoDaddy, and

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(3) generic financial information of GoDaddy. See (Doc. 266). According to GoDaddy,

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the royalty rate percentage is “sensitive proprietary information,” while the survey results

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and financial information are “of a very sensitive nature.” (Doc. 262 at 1).

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The Court finds that GoDaddy’s generalized statement that this information is

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“sensitive” does not demonstrate that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the

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material is publicly filed. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. Similarly, GoDaddy does not

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substantiate its “broad allegation of harm” with “specific examples or articulated

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reasoning.” See Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476. Unlike other situations where courts have

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permitted a party to file a royalty rate under seal, see In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x

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at 569 (sealing a document that reflected a royalty rate that was part of a licensing

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agreement between a party and a third entity), the royalty rate in this case is simply Mr.

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Smith’s proposed royalty rate and does not reflect an actual term of an enforceable

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agreement between the parties. In fact, Mr. Smith’s proposed royalty rate is the element

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of his report that GoDaddy predominantly challenges as unreliable under Daubert, see

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(Doc. 266), thereby ensuring public interest in the information, see Kamakana, 447 F.3d

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at 1178–79 (noting that the main public policy favoring disclosure is the “public interest

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in understanding the judicial process”). Moreover, Mr. Smith’s royalty rate cannot be

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considered GoDaddy’s trade secret because it is RPost’s proposed rate to calculate

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damages. Finally, should Mr. Smith’s expert report withstand GoDaddy’s Motion to

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Preclude, GoDaddy is undoubtedly aware that the royalty rate will be brought to the

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jury’s attention at trial—in unsealed format. For these reasons, the proposed royalty rate

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does not overcome the strong presumption of public access, and the Court will not permit

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GoDaddy to redact this information.

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Likewise, the Court is not persuaded that the “very sensitive nature” of

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GoDaddy’s marketing survey or generic financial information constitutes a compelling

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reason that justifies redaction. Aside from its blanket statement that the survey and

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financial data constitutes “very sensitive” information which, if revealed publicly, could

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potentially cause harm, GoDaddy has not demonstrated what “specific prejudice or harm

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will result” if the information is not redacted. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. Because the

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Court is precluded from hypothesizing or assuming that a compelling reason exists, see

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179, GoDaddy will not be permitted to redact this information.6

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b.

Exhibit 1 to GoDaddy’s Motion to Preclude

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GoDaddy seeks to seal Exhibit 1 to its Motion to Preclude. (Doc. 262 at 1). After

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review of the exhibit, which is an expert report of David R. Perry explaining why he

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believes that Mr. Smith’s damages report is flawed, the Court is not persuaded that the

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information warrants sealing under the compelling reasons standard. Namely, GoDaddy

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does not provide a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result”

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if the excerpts from Mr. Perry’s report are publicly disclosed, see Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130,

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GoDaddy did not lodge a non-redacted version of its Motion to Preclude. Thus,
the Court will require GoDaddy to file a Notice of Compliance appended with a nonredacted version of the motion.
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nor does the report constitute a trade secret, see In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x at

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569–70. Thus, the Court will not permit this exhibit to be filed under seal.

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c.

Exhibit 2 to GoDaddy’s Motion to Exclude

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GoDaddy also seeks to seal sixty-nine full pages of RPost’s supplemental expert

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report and accompanying appendices. Reflected in the sixty-nine pages is a hodgepodge

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of information that clearly does not warrant sealing under the compelling reasons

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standard. For example, GoDaddy asks the Court to seal multiple pages of Mr. Smith’s

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academic and professional background, in addition to material that GoDaddy publicly

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disclosed in its Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Forms S-1 and 10-Q. As

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to the revenue data for certain products, GoDaddy did not make a “particularized

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showing” that “specific prejudice or harm would result” if such information was publicly

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disclosed. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. Nor is the Court persuaded that such revenue

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information is a sealable trade secret. GoDaddy’s explanations for sealing are generalized

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in nature, do not show that any measures outside of this litigation have been taken to

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secure confidentiality, and lack substantiation with specific examples or articulated

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reasoning. See (Doc. 262 at 1–2). More specificity is required. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at

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1130; Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476. Finally, for the reasons set forth above, Mr. Smith’s

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proposed royalty rate does not warrant sealing treatment.

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The Court will, however, allow the parties to file under seal the documents

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detailing the express terms and conditions of RPost’s prior settlement agreements that are

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currently lodged at Docket No. 263-1 at ¶¶ 56–62, 87, and Supplemental Exhibit 6. The

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Court is satisfied that (1) release of this information would result in an invasion of the

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privacy interests of third parties, (2) RPost would suffer competitive harm if this material

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were made public, and (3) compelling reasons exist to file this information under seal.

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See In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 F. App’x at 569 (finding compelling reasons to seal the

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pricing terms, royalty rates, and guaranteed minimum payment terms found in a licensing

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agreement). More specifically, the Court is satisfied that disclosing the terms of these

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agreements would put RPost at a stark disadvantage in future negotiations for similar

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agreements.7

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d.

Exhibit 4 to GoDaddy’s Motion to Exclude

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This exhibit contains excerpts of Mr. Smith’s deposition regarding the following

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topics: (1) Mr. Smith’s apportionment of damages, (2) the proposed running royalty rate

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by the prior owner of the Feldbau Patent, and (3) the GoDaddy-commissioned market

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survey. Again, GoDaddy has not elaborated or explained why this information should be

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sealed, and the Court is not persuaded that compelling reasons exist to do so. See

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1184 (“Simply mentioning a general category of privilege,

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without any further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, does not

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satisfy the burden.”). Whether Mr. Smith properly apportioned damages is an issue that

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GoDaddy strongly disputes, see (Doc. 266), and thus, the public has a high interest in this

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information to understand the judicial process. In the absence of compelling reasons as to

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why this information merits sealing, the Court will not authorize Exhibit 4 to be sealed.
e.

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First Hudnell Declaration

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RPost seeks to seal an exhibit to the First Hudnell Declaration, which contains

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excerpts of Mr. Perry’s expert report analyzing Mr. Smith’s proposed royalty rate. For the

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reasons stated above, the Court will not permit this exhibit to be filed under seal.
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RPost’s Motion for Summary Judgment

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GoDaddy argues that the redacted portions of Exhibits 16, 17, and 23 to Mr.

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Hudnell’s Declaration in support of RPost’s motion for summary judgment (“Second

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Hudnell Declaration”) should be sealed because the exhibits contain “information

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regarding non-public, confidential internal GoDaddy business practices, the parties’

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commercial relationship with a third party, revenue and sales performance information

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about the accused email marketing products, and certain of the parties’ pre-suit

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communications regarding the amount of settlement offers that are in effect GoDaddy’s

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Because this document was not lodged in redacted format, the Court will require
GoDaddy to file this document redacted in accordance with this Order.
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275

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(Doc. 274 at 2), and GoDaddy subsequently moved to
seal the other three exhibits, see (Doc. 275). The Court
will therefore determine whether to seal Exhibits 16, 17,
and 23 based on GoDaddy’s motion.
DENIED. The redacted portions of this document
include a proposed settlement offer from RPost and
generic information about GoDaddy’s commercial
relationship with a third party. The Court finds that
neither piece of information constitutes a sealable “trade
secret,” see, e.g., Allagas v. BP Solar Int’l, Inc., 2016
WL 324040, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (“There is
no apparent privilege or trade secret matter at stake if . .
. documents [describing settlement offers] are
disclosed.”); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., 2012 WL
6019754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (denying a
motion to seal a document consisting of settlement
negotiations because the party “fail[ed] to articulate how
the disclosure of [the] document could ‘become a
vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of
records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal,
circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets”
(citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179)), and is not
persuaded that GoDaddy’s lone allegation of specified
harm—competitor exploitation—is applicable to this
material.
DENIED. The fact that this testimony (1) references
Exhibit 17 to
Second Hudnell innocuous communications between RPost and
GoDaddy, (2) provides an estimated number of patent
Declaration
notice letters GoDaddy received, (3) discloses RPost’s
(Doc. 264-2;
initial settlement offer, and (4) alludes to pre-suit
264-3)
discussions between GoDaddy and a third party does
not warrant sealing the information from public
purview. Again, the Court is not persuaded that this
business information is a trade secret or that GoDaddy’s
competitors could exploit this material as leverage in
future business dealings with GoDaddy.
DENIED. This document also references RPost’s initial
Exhibit 23 to
Second Hudnell settlement offer and GoDaddy’s contention that a third
party is involved in the alleged infringement. Such
Declaration
material does not constitute sealable trade secrets, and
(Doc. 264-5)
the Court is not persuaded that GoDaddy’s lone
contention of prejudice applies to the remainder of the
redacted material. Namely, it is seemingly unlikely that
to Second
Hudnell
Declaration
(Doc. 264)
Exhibit 16 to
Second Hudnell
Declaration
(Doc. 264-1)

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DENIED. The Court is completely unaware why this excerpt of Dr. Terrance
Tomkow’s deposition warrants sealing. The information describes (1) prior
cases widely available to the public and (2) the educational background of Dr.
Tomkow.
DENIED. RPost claims that this document is “highly confidential” because it
discusses non-public positions and business information of RPost. Again,
however, the Court is presented with no indication as to why this information
is so confidential such that sealing is necessary. On its face, this document
provides generic business information about RPost, such as Mr. Tomkow’s
estimation of how many employees worked at RPost on a particular date.
Absent a showing of particularized prejudice or harm, the Court will not allow
the parties to seal this document.
DENIED. Exhibit 27 is a twenty-seven page excerpt from RPost’s
infringement contentions. GoDaddy claims the document refers to
“GoDaddy’s technical information relating to the accused products that is
commercially sensitive and non-public.” The document is structured with the
following three sections: (1) claim language, (2) a generalized description of
the accused infringing products (many of which are screen captures from
GoDaddy’s website with website addresses), and (3) a “discussion” of the
alleged infringement. The claim language is certainly not sealable information,
nor are screen captures that display publicly available website addresses. As to
the remaining information, absent a detailed explanation of why the material
harms or prejudices GoDaddy, the Court will not hypothesize or manufacture
such an explanation. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.
DENIED. For the same reasons as Exhibit 27, GoDaddy’s request to seal
Exhibit 28 is denied. The Court is not persuaded that the strong presumption of
public access has been overcome by GoDaddy’s broad allegation of
generalized harm.
DENIED. Exhibit 30 is a sixteen page excerpt of Mr. Haslup’s deposition. As
before, the Court is not persuaded that GoDaddy’s broad allegation of harm
has overcome the strong presumption of public access to judicial records.
GoDaddy states that Exhibit 30 contains “secret information” but does not
explain why this information is secret or whether additional measures have
been implemented to maintain the information’s “secrecy.”
DENIED. This document includes excerpts from Mr. Smith’s supplemental
expert report. GoDaddy publicly disclosed much of this information in its
Form S-1, while the other information concerns Mr. Smith’s proposed royalty
rate, which as discussed above, is not entitled to sealing treatment.
DENIED. Exhibit 36 contains excerpts from the deposition of Marc Heiligers,
who apparently has knowledge about GoDaddy’s Mad Mimi product. Once
again, the Court is not persuaded by GoDaddy’s broad allegation of harm that
the company would suffer a loss of competitive standing if this non-trade
secret information was filed publicly.
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DENIED. This document contains excerpts from the deposition of Eric
Weiherer. The parties do not clarify the identity of Mr. Weiherer or what
position he holds in this litigation. In any event, the Court is not persuaded that
the strong presumption of public access to judicial records has been overcome
simply because GoDaddy believes this information is “secret.” Without a
detailed explanation setting forth a reason why this deposition testimony
prejudices or harms GoDaddy, the Court can only speculate as to why this
information requires sealing. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.

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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Motion to Seal Exhibits 1-3, 5, and 8 to

Response Brief (Doc. 240) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file under seal the
documents lodged at Docket No. 241.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to File under Seal (Doc. 246)
is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall file under seal the documents lodged at Docket
No. 247.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to Seal Document (Doc. 259)
is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court shall unseal and file RPost’s proposed motion
for summary judgment and separate statement of facts that are lodged at Docket Nos. 260
and 261.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Unopposed Motion to Seal
Redacted Portions of Exhibits 16-17 and 23 to Declaration of Lewis E. Hudnell, III in
Support of RPost’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Count I (Fraudulent
Misrepresentation of Patent Ownership) (Doc. 275) is DENIED. On April 1, 2016, the
Clerk of Court shall unseal and file the documents that are lodged at Docket No. 264.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Motion to Seal Exhibits to
GoDaddy’s Statement of Fact[s] in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 269)
is DENIED. On April 1, 2016, the Clerk of Court shall unseal and file the documents that
are lodged at Docket No. 270.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that GoDaddy’s Motion to Seal Exhibits to
Motion to Preclude Testimony of Damages Expert Gregory Smith and Request to File
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1

Under Seal Redacted Portions of its Motion (Doc. 262) is DENIED. By April 1, 2016,

2

GoDaddy shall file a Notice of Compliance appended with versions of its Motion to

3

Preclude and accompanying exhibits that are in accordance with this Order. Once

4

GoDaddy files its Notice of Compliance, the Clerk of Court shall file under seal the

5

documents lodged at Docket No. 263.

6

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that RPost’s Motion to File Under Seal (Doc. 277)

7

is DENIED. On April 1, 2016, the Clerk of Court shall unseal and file the documents that

8

are lodged at Docket No. 278.

9

Dated this 24th day of March, 2016.

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