Western Alliance Bank v. Jefferson

Filing 192

ORDER denying 149 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge John W Sedwick on 8/17/15.(JWS)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Western Alliance Bank,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Richard Jefferson,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
)
Richard Jefferson,
)
)
Counter-claimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Western Alliance Bank,
)
)
Counter-defendant.
)
)
)
Richard Jefferson,
)
)
Third-party plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Theodore Kritza & Michelle Lee
)
Kritza,
)
)
Third-party defendants. )
)

2:14-cv-00761 JWS
ORDER AND OPINION
[Re: Motion at Docket 149]

1

I. MOTION PRESENTED

2

At docket 149 defendant, counter-claimant, and third-party plaintiff Richard

3

Jefferson (“Jefferson”) filed a motion in limine to exclude what he refers to as “the

4

12/20/13 letter.” 1 Third-party defendants Theodore Kritza and Michelle Lee Kritza

5

(collectively, “Kritza”) filed an opposition at docket 155; plaintiff and counter-defendant

6

Western Alliance Bank (“Alliance”) filed an opposition at docket 156. Jefferson filed a

7

combined reply at docket 168. Oral argument was requested, but would not assist the

8

court.

9
10

II. BACKGROUND
The court has described the background giving rise to this litigation in detail in

11

the order at docket 183. It need not be repeated here. Suf fice it to say, for purposes of

12

the present motion, that Alliance sued Jefferson to recover an unpaid debt. Alliance’s

13

complaint alleges that attached to its complaint are “individual loan and change in terms

14

agreements comprising the Loan Agreement.”2 The ultimate document is the 12/20/13

15

letter,3 which Alliance alleges is a forbearance agreement between Alliance and

16

Jefferson under which Jefferson would make a $50,000 principal reduction payment in

17

exchange for Alliance’s promise to forbear from exercising its remedies under the loan

18

documents. Jefferson’s alleged breach of the terms of the 12/20/13 letter is the

19

operative default at issue in Alliance’s case against Jefferson.4

20

III. DISCUSSION

21

Jefferson argues that the 12/20/13 letter should be excluded pursuant to

22

Evidence Rule 403. That rule states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if

23

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of,” among other things,

24
25

1

Doc. 149 at 1. For purposes of consistency, the court will do the same.

26

2

27

3

28

4

Doc. 1-3 at 4 ¶ 8.
Doc. 1-4 at 82-85.
Doc. 1-3 at 4 ¶¶ 10-13.

-2-

1

“unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,” or “misleading the jury.”5 “Unfair prejudice is an

2

undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not

3

necessarily, an emotional one. The Rule requires that the probative value of the

4

evidence be compared to the articulated reasons for exclusion and permits exclusion

5

only if one or more of those reasons substantially outweigh the probative value.”6

6

“‘Unless trials are to be conducted as scenarios, or unreal f acts tailored and sanitized

7

for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing. Its major

8

function is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in

9

by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”7

10

Jefferson does not seriously dispute the probative value of the alleged

11

forbearance agreement, nor could he. Instead, Jefferson asserts that the 12/20/13

12

letter “makes reference to amendments that do not exist, and have never existed,” and

13

falsely implies that two loans that were paid off were outstanding.8 Jefferson also

14

claims that he is not bound by the terms of the 12/20/13 letter because of Alliance’s

15

misrepresentations. Jefferson does not elaborate on how the letter might unduly

16

suggest the decision of any issue on an improper basis, or how the jury might be

17

confused or misled by the letter.

18

Jefferson has not shown that the probative value of the 12/20/13 letter is

19

substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or

20

misleading the jury. Although Jefferson contends that his evidence shows that some

21

statements in the letter are false or misleading, he does not explain why the jury might

22

be incapable of weighing that evidence alongside the 12/20/13 letter and making

23
5

24
25
26
27
28

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

6

United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
7

United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.1983)).
8

Doc. 149 at 13-14.

-3-

1

appropriate findings of fact. That is exactly what juries are supposed to do. 9 The

2

existence of evidence that tends to show that the 12/20/13 letter contains misleading

3

statements, without more, does not render that letter inadmissible under Rule 403. 10

4

IV. CONCLUSION

5

Based on the preceding discussion, Jefferson’s motion at docket 149 is DENIED.

6

DATED this 17th day of August 2015.

7
8

/S/
JOHN W. SEDWICK
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
9

25
26
27
28

Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions . . . .”).
10

Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1172 (“Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only
unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant
matter under Rule 403.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

-4-