Velazquez v. Logan et al

Filing 25

ORDER (Service Packet), Plaintiff's Motion to Seal 5 is granted; the Rule 65(b) Motion 6 must be filed under seal; Plaintiff's Rule 65(b) Motion 24 is denied without prejudice; Plaintiff's Objection to Removal 9 and Notice of S upplemental Authority and Arguments in Support of Objection for Removal 12 are denied; Plaintiff's Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal 10 is denied; Plaintiff's Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading by Maricopa County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply 15 is denied as moot; Plaintiff's Rule 12(f) Motion 17 is denied; Plaintiff's Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time or Suspension of Time Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening 20 is granted; Plaintiff's Fifth Claim for Relief is dismissed without prejudice; Defendants Manos and Wilson are dismissed without prejudice; Defendants Maricopa County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy must answer Plaintiff's First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief; the Clerk must send Plaintiff a service packet including the Amended Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 21-47), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendants McCloskey and Hardy; Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk within 21 days; this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E Aspey for all pretrial proceedings. Signed by Judge Steven P Logan on 10/27/14. (REW)

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1 WO MDR 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Juan Velazquez, 10 11 12 No. CV 14-00941-PHX-SPL (MEA) Plaintiff, vs. ORDER James Logan, et al., 13 14 Defendants. 15 16 On March 20, 2014, Plaintiff Juan Velazquez, who is confined in the Maricopa 17 County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Maricopa County 18 against Defendants James Logan, Michelle McCloskey, Tammy Hardy, Tom Manos, 19 Sandy Wilson, and Maricopa County. On April 1, he filed an Amended Complaint. On 20 May 2, Defendants Maricopa County, Wilson, and Manos (“Removing Defendants”) 21 filed a Notice of Removal. 22 On May 6, 2014, Removing Defendants and Defendant Logan filed a Notice 23 informing the Court that they were waiting for the Court to issue a screening order before 24 filing an answer to the Amended Complaint. On May 9, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Seal 25 (Doc. 5) and lodged under seal a Rule 65(b) Motion (Doc. 6). On May 23, Plaintiff filed 26 a “Response to Defendants[’] Screening Motion.” 27 On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Removal (Doc. 9). On June 4, he 28 filed a “Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal” (Doc. 10). On June TERMPSREF 1 12, Removing Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal. On 2 June 24, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority and Arguments in Support of 3 Objection for Removal (Doc. 12). On June 26, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of 4 Receipt of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Arguments. 5 On July 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading 6 by Maricopa County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply” (Doc. 15). On July 7 9, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of Service (Doc. 16), indicating that they had sent 8 Plaintiff another copy of their Opposition to his Objection to Removal. On July 21, 9 Plaintiff filed a Rule 12(f) Motion (Doc. 17), seeking to strike the Opposition. On July 10 23, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of Receipt of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. On 11 August 1, Plaintiff filed a Reply. 12 On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff also filed a Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time 13 or Suspension of Time Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening” (Doc. 20). On August 14 19, Removing Defendants filed a Response to the Motion). On August 20, Defendant 15 Logan filed a Response to the Rule 4(m) Motion. 16 I. Removal, Objections, and Related Filings 17 In their Notice of Removal, Removing Defendants seek to remove this case 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446. They allege that Plaintiff’s Amended 19 Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that 20 this action is “properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b).” 21 They claim that they and Defendant James Logan have executed waivers of service and 22 mailed them to Plaintiff, that Defendant Logan consents to removal and that, upon 23 information and belief, Defendants McCloskey and Hardy have not been served. 24 A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the 25 state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, 27 violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 28 jurisdiction extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original TERMPSREF -2- This Court’s 1 jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 2 United States”). 3 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (court has supplemental jurisdiction over “all other 4 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 5 form part of the same case or controversy”). Removal, therefore, was proper pursuant to 6 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law 7 A. 8 In his Objection to Removal, Plaintiff raises three objections to removal. First, he 9 claims that Removing Defendants failed to obtain unanimity, as required by 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1446(b). He contends that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy were served by first-class 11 mail to their last-known mailing addresses, that this constitutes proper service, and that 12 there is no unanimity because Defendants McCloskey and Hardy did not consent to 13 removal or join in the removal. Second, Plaintiff claims that Removing Defendants did 14 not cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 “with any particularity” and, therefore, it is improper for 15 Removing Defendants to rely on § 1443 as an “additional or independent basis for 16 removal.” Third, Plaintiff asserts that if the Court retains jurisdiction over the federal 17 claims in this lawsuit, the Court must stay this case to allow the state court to first 18 proceed with the state law claims. He alleges that the state court has a “primary and 19 strong interest in resolving this suit” because of “the fact-specific content, the parties 20 being sued and the State constitutional questions presented.” Plaintiff’s Objections to Removal 21 In their Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection, Removing Defendants allege that the 22 case was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446, and that 23 Defendants McCloskey’s and Hardy’s consent to removal is not required because those 24 Defendants have not been properly served. 25 In his Notice of Supplemental Authority, Plaintiff alleges that Removing 26 Defendants did not provide a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,” as 27 required by § 1446(a), and that the statutes on which Removing Defendants rely— 28 §§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b)—do not support removal. TERMPSREF -3- 1 In their Notice of Receipt of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Arguments, Removing 2 Defendants allege that they reviewed Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority and 3 “determined that a supplement response is not required” because they “have already 4 provided a full response to Plaintiff’s objection.” 5 As explained in more detail below, Plaintiff’s objections do not justify remanding 6 this action. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Objection and Notice of Supplemental 7 Authority. 8 1. 9 Defendants McCloskey’s and Hardy’s Consent was not Required 10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), when a civil action is removed under 28 11 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in 12 or consent to the removal of action.” In his Objection to Removal, Plaintiff alleges that 13 Defendants did not unanimously consent to removal because Defendants McCloskey and 14 Hardy were properly served and did not consent to removal. 15 document entitled “Acceptance of Service” (Doc. 1-1 at 8-9) that he filed in the Superior 16 Court. In that document, he states that he mailed Defendants McCloskey and Hardy, by 17 first-class mail, “a copy of the Complaint, Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 18 Summers, and a Waiver of Service of Summons for signature and return. Plaintiff is 19 awaiting these responses and will notify the Court and other parties when these waivers 20 are returned or of any other result.” Plaintiff relies on a 21 Rule 4.1(d) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure governs service on an 22 individual. Like Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.1(d) requires 23 service “upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed,” by 24 delivering a copy of the summons and complaint “to that individual personally,” by 25 leaving copies “at that individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some 26 person of suitable age and discretion residing therein,” or by delivering copies “to an 27 agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Plaintiff 28 contends that both individuals were served by first-class mail delivered to their last TERMPSREF -4- 1 known mailing address. This is not an appropriate means of service under either Rule 2 4.1(d) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 3 Procedure. 4 Although both Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(c)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(G) authorize a plaintiff to notify a defendant “by first-class mail 6 or other reliable means” of the commencement of the action and request that the 7 defendant waive service of the summons, a defendant is not required to waive service. If 8 a defendant does not waive service, then a plaintiff must properly serve the summons and 9 complaint. Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 867-868 (8th Cir. 2000) (if a 10 plaintiff seeks waiver of service, but “the defendant does not waive service, service has 11 not been effected”); Dietz v. Quality Loan Serv.e Corp. of Wash., 2014 WL 4546953, *1 12 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“if the defendant does not return the waiver form, the plaintiff must 13 still serve the summons and complaint in a manner prescribed by Rule 4”); Kotzev v. 14 Ryan, 2011 WL 941333, *3 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“A request for waiver does not constitute 15 effective service.”); see also Lacey v. Malandro Commc’n, Inc., 2009 WL 4755399, *3 16 (D. Ariz. 2009) (under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, service was not effective until 17 defendants signed the waiver of service form); Jenkins v. State, 2008 WL 4356274, *1 18 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“a plaintiff is not relieved of the duty to effect service of 19 process merely because the defendant has not signed and returned the plaintiff’s request 20 for waiver of service”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 21 Amendments (“The revised rule is clear that, if the waiver is not returned and filed, . . . 22 the action will not otherwise proceed until formal service of process is effected.”). 23 Defendants McCloskey and Hardy did not waive service and Plaintiff did not properly 24 serve them pursuant to Rule 4.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4 of the 25 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 In addition, Plaintiff’s reliance on Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 5(c)(2)(c) and 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C) is misplaced. Both Rules govern the service 28 of papers other than the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(B) (noting that the rule TERMPSREF -5- 1 applies to “a pleading filed after the original complaint”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (applying 2 the rule to “every pleading subsequent to the original complaint”); Morgan v. Foreman ex 3 rel. County of Maricopa, 973 P.2d 616, 618-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“Rules 4 and 4.1, 4 rather than Rule 5, control the service of a complaint.”); see also Employee Painters’ 5 Trust v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2007) (“an amended 6 complaint can often be served [under Rule 5] if the original complaint is properly served 7 and the defendants appeared in the first instance”) (emphasis added). 8 9 10 11 Because Defendants McCloskey and Hardy were not properly served, Removing Defendants were not required to obtain their consent to remove this action. 2. Citation to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1443 is Not Fatal In his Objection, Plaintiff alleges that Removing Defendants did not cite to 28 12 U.S.C. § 1443 “with any particularity.” 13 Plaintiff alleges that Removing Defendants did not provide a “short and plain statement 14 of the grounds for removal” and that the statutes on which Removing Defendants rely— 15 §§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b)—do not support removal. In his Notice of Supplemental Authority, 16 “While it is the usual practice to cite the section of the United States Code under 17 which an action is removed, failure to cite the proper section in a petition for removal is 18 not a fatal defect where an adequate basis of removal is set forth.” Wormley v. Southern 19 Pac. Transp. Co., 863 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D. Tex. 1994); see also Harlem River 20 Produce Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“Failure 21 to cite the section under which removal is sought is not a fatal defect, and at most is a 22 technical defect where an adequate factual basis for removal is set forth”). 23 Section 1446(a) only requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 24 removal.” The Notice of Removal complies with that requirement because it states that 25 the Amended Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s federal civil rights. 26 previously noted, the Court has jurisdiction over such claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, 27 therefore, removal was appropriate under § 1441(a). Removing Defendants’ citation to 28 TERMPSREF -6- As 1 §§ 1441(c) and 1443, rather than § 1441(a), is, at most, a technical error, not a fatal 2 defect, and does not require remand. 3 3. A Stay is Inappropriate 4 There is no need to stay this case to allow the state court to decide the state law 5 claims. The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claims and will 6 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. This Court can 7 decide both the federal and state claims. 8 B. 9 In his Request for Entry of Judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court remand this Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal 10 case because there was no unanimous consent to removal. 11 rejected this claim, the Court will deny the Request for Entry of Judgment. Because the Court has 12 C. 13 In his Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike, Plaintiff requests that the Court strike 14 Removing Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal and, as a result, 15 find that Removing Defendants have waived their opportunity to oppose remand of this 16 case, and remand the case. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike 17 Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that 18 “[t]he court may order stricken from any pleading an insufficient defense or any 19 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 20 (emphasis added). Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines “pleadings” 21 generally as complaints and answers. Thus, a motion to strike filed pursuant to Rule 22 12(f) only permits the Court to strike pleadings, not motions, responses, or other papers. 23 See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Under the 24 express language of the rule, only pleadings are subject to motions to strike.”). Thus, the 25 Court will deny the Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) 26 D. 27 In his July 8, 2014 “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading by Maricopa 28 County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply,” Plaintiff states that he did not TERMPSREF Notice of Non-Receipt and Request for Copy and Time to Reply -7- 1 receive a copy of Removing Defendants’ Opposition to his Objection to Removal and 2 requests that the Court order Removing Defendants to send him a copy of the Opposition 3 and provide him with an opportunity to reply to it. 4 Defendants filed a Notice indicating that they had sent Plaintiff another copy of their 5 Opposition. In lieu of a reply, Plaintiff filed his July 21, 2014 Rule 12(f) Motion to 6 Strike. Thus, the Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s request in his Notice of Non- 7 Receipt. 8 II. On July 9, 2014, Removing Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 9 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 10 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 11 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 12 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 13 which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 14 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 15 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 16 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 17 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 18 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 19 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 20 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 21 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 23 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 24 25 26 27 28 TERMPSREF 1 In his “Response to Defendants[’] Screening Motion,” Plaintiff takes issue with the need for a screening order and also requests that he be given leave to amend if the Court identifies defects in his Amended Complaint. Section 1915A(a) applies, notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff originally filed in state court. See Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737-738 (N.D. Ind. 2004). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to screen the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff wants to seek leave to amend his Amended Complaint after receiving this Order, he must follow the procedures in Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1. -8- 1 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 2 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 3 claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 4 on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 5 specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 6 assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. 7 at 681. 8 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 9 courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 10 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 11 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 12 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 13 III. Amended Complaint 14 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Maricopa 15 County, Maricopa County Manager Tom Manos, Maricopa County Deputy Manager 16 Sandy Wilson, Office of Public Defense Services (OPDS) Director James Logan, 17 Michelle McCloskey, and Tammy Hardy. 18 Plaintiff alleges that he hired Defendants McCloskey and Hardy as a mitigation 19 specialist and private investigator, respectively, for the post-conviction portion of his 20 criminal case and provided them with private and confidential information and materials 21 (“materials”)2 and access to those materials. Because Plaintiff was transferred from 22 prison to jail to attend court proceedings and because Plaintiff needed access to his 23 materials that had been stored at the prison, a state court judge granted Plaintiff funds for 24 25 26 27 28 TERMPSREF 2 These materials include legal documents Plaintiff has filed with the courts; his legal notes and strategies; notes he took while meeting with his attorneys and other criminal defense personnel; law books, case law, scientific research materials, and notes he took after reading these items; transcripts, police reports, investigative reports, and medical and institutional records; correspondence between Plaintiff and his attorney and other criminal defense personnel; copies of attorney notes and printed e-mails; logs of correspondence and meetings with defense personnel; DVDs, VHS cassettes, and audio cassettes; draft affidavits; and other documents regarding his criminal defense. -9- 1 a private storage facility. The order for funding for a private storage facility was directed 2 to OPDS. 3 After a private storage facility was reserved, Plaintiff consented to Defendant 4 McCloskey obtaining Plaintiff’s materials from the prison and delivering them to the 5 storage facility. In February 2013, Defendants McCloskey and Hardy transferred the 6 materials to the storage facility. Defendants McCloskey and Hardy and Plaintiff’s then- 7 attorney were given access to the storage unit to get materials from the storage unit for 8 Plaintiff and return them to the storage unit. 9 The state court subsequently determined that there was a conflict of interest 10 between Plaintiff and his attorney and Plaintiff attempted to obtain his files3 from the 11 attorney and Defendants McCloskey and Hardy. Although the attorney gave Plaintiff’s 12 family members files, an access code to the storage facility, and a key to open the lock on 13 the storage unit, the attorney informed them that Defendant McCloskey had retained 14 some of Plaintiff’s materials and had not returned them the attorney and that Defendant 15 McCloskey also had a key to the storage unit. 16 On June 2, 2013, Plaintiff called Defendant McCloskey and left a message about 17 arranging a meeting so Plaintiff’s family members could pick up the materials Defendant 18 McCloskey had retained. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant McCloskey three days later and 19 Defendant McCloskey stated that she was speaking on behalf of herself and Defendant 20 Hardy and that they would not be returning any of the files or materials they had retained. 21 Defendant McCloskey stated that she had spoken to Defendant Logan, whom she referred 22 to as “Boss,” and that they had agreed that Plaintiff would need to obtain a court order to 23 obtain the files and materials. Plaintiff also attempted to obtain the storage unit key from 24 Defendant McCloskey. 25 Plaintiff filed a motion with the court seeking a return of the files and materials 26 retained by Defendants McCloskey and Hardy, but neither Defendant filed a response to 27 3 28 TERMPSREF Plaintiff states that the attorney, Defendant McCloskey, and Defendant Hardy were given files compiled by prior defense personnel and by Plaintiff, and also had documents and information that were being contemporaneously developed. - 10 - 1 the motion. However, Defendant McCloskey spoke to Plaintiff by phone and informed 2 him that she had spoken to Defendant Logan regarding the issue and they had agreed that 3 Defendant Logan would take possession of the storage unit key and the contents of the 4 storage unit. When Plaintiff attempted to dissuade Defendant McCloskey from doing 5 this, she became upset, yelled that she was not going to do what Plaintiff had asked, 6 stated that she was quitting the case, and yelled obscenities. 7 Plaintiff then contacted his sister, who made a three-way call to Defendant Logan. 8 Defendant Logan confirmed that he was taking control of the key and the storage unit and 9 that Plaintiff would need to obtain a court order to regain his materials. Plaintiff told 10 Defendant Logan that it was Defendant Logan who needed court authorization to take 11 Plaintiff’s materials. 12 Plaintiff’s former attorney for not making proper arrangements for Plaintiff’s materials, 13 asserted that he had the authority to determine to whom he would return the materials, 14 and claimed that Plaintiff or anyone else was prohibited from entering the storage unit. 15 However, records from the storage facility show that someone accessed the storage unit 16 after the phone call. As an explanation for his actions, Defendant Logan blamed 17 Plaintiff filed a motion in the state court requesting that Defendant Logan return 18 his materials, Defendant Logan received a copy of the motion but did not respond, and, 19 due to the status of the case, the state court would not rule on the motion. Plaintiff sent 20 an e-mail to Defendants McCloskey and Hardy requesting that they inventory the 21 materials they had retained. Defendant McCloskey responded that she had given some of 22 the materials to Hardy to place in the storage unit, but had retained some other materials. 23 Defendant Hardy stated that she had none of Plaintiff’s materials because she had placed 24 them in the storage unit. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hardy knew Defendant Logan 25 was intent on prohibiting Plaintiff from accessing the storage unit. Plaintiff also contends 26 that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy subsequently “provide[d] contradictory 27 statements and actions . . . and/or gained access to [the] storage unit.” 28 .... TERMPSREF - 11 - 1 Defendant Hardy contacted Plaintiff’s new attorney to provide some of the 2 materials Defendant Hardy retained. 3 Defendants, but only Defendants McCloskey and Hardy replied. Defendants McCloskey 4 and Hardy admitted that they had placed Plaintiff’s materials in the storage unit 5 controlled by Defendant Logan and claimed to have no more of Plaintiff’s materials. 6 Plaintiff contends their responses are misleading, contradict their earlier actions and 7 responses to his requests, and do not identify when they last accessed the storage unit. Plaintiff sent notices of claim to each of the 8 Plaintiff contends that he is the rightful owner of the materials, that Defendants 9 McCloskey and Hardy were granted special access to his materials, and that, at the end of 10 their employment with Plaintiff, abused their access by giving Plaintiff’s materials to the 11 government and knowingly providing assistance to the government in seizing and 12 controlling Plaintiff’s materials. 13 governmental position to seize and control Plaintiff’s materials and that he and 14 Defendants McCloskey and Hardy conspired or otherwise agreed to deprive Plaintiff of 15 his materials. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Manos and Wilson failed to properly 16 supervise Defendant Logan and ratified Defendant Logan’s actions because they refused 17 to take corrective action after they became aware of his actions. Plaintiff claims Defendant Logan abused his 18 In his First Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Logan, without legal 19 authority, interfered with Plaintiff’s private affairs, in violation of the Fourth Amendment 20 and article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, by taking possession of Plaintiff’s 21 materials, deciding what would happen to the materials and who could receive them, and 22 usurping Plaintiff’s decision-making abilities regarding his private affairs. In his Second 23 Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to an unconstitutional seizure in 24 violation of the Fourth Amendment and article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. 25 Plaintiff claims that he cannot access his materials because Defendants seized his 26 materials without a warrant or probable cause, that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy 27 were engaged in joint action with government officials, and that Defendants have to legal 28 right to retain the materials or keep them from Plaintiff. TERMPSREF - 12 - 1 In his Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts that he was denied procedural due 2 process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and article II, section 4 of 3 the Arizona Constitution. 4 written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before depriving him of his materials; there 5 was no basis for postponing the hearing until after the deprivation had occurred; his 6 possessory interests in his property were affected by their actions; and the procedures 7 used by Defendants posed an unnecessary and high risk of erroneous deprivation. 8 9 Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to provide him with In his Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges violations of his substantive due process rights. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Logan used his position to seize 10 Plaintiff’s materials without an implicit, express, or governmental interest; conspired with 11 Defendants McCloskey and Hardy to obtain a key to Plaintiff’s storage unit and assert 12 ownership and control over the storage unit and the materials in it, knowing that the state 13 court would not rule on any motion filed by Plaintiff; took advantage of Plaintiff’s low 14 socioeconomic position; and acted oppressively, tyrannically, arbitrarily, and in a 15 conscience-shocking manner. In his Fifth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff contends that he is 16 entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 17 Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Mano and Wilson ignored their fiduciary 18 responsibilities, chose not to get involved, and, by their indifference, acquiesced to, 19 condoned, and ratified Defendant Logan’s conduct. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant 20 Maricopa County is liable because Defendants Manos and Wilson have the authority to 21 set or terminate municipal plans and events and because Defendant Logan can 22 appropriate County resources and create and enforce policy on behalf of Maricopa 23 County. 24 In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary 25 damages, his costs of suit, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 26 .... 27 .... 28 .... TERMPSREF - 13 - 1 IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 2 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated claims against Defendants Maricopa 3 County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy in his First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for 4 Relief. The Court will require these Defendants to answer those claims. 5 V. Failure to State a Claim 6 A. 7 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 8 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 9 v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 10 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 11 claim that were not initially pled. Id. “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government- 12 official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 13 Constitution.” 14 conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of 15 his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendants Manos and Wilson Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 16 Plaintiff contends that Defendants Manos and Wilson failed to properly supervise 17 Defendant Logan and ratified Defendant Logan’s actions by refusing to take corrective 18 action after they became aware of his actions. Plaintiff does not identify why Defendants 19 Manos and Wilson were responsible for supervising Defendant Logan’s actions, how or 20 when they failed to supervise Defendant Logan, how or when they became aware of his 21 action, or how or when they refused to take corrective action. 22 allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim against Defendants Manos and 23 Wilson, the Court will dismiss them without prejudice. Because Plaintiff’s 24 B. 25 Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief is a request for injunctive relief, not a separate 26 ground for relief. Thus, the Court will dismiss it, without prejudice. If Plaintiff wants to 27 seek a preliminary injunction, he should do so by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 65(a) 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. TERMPSREF Fifth Claim for Relief - 14 - 1 VI. Motion to Seal and Rule 65(b) Motion 2 A. 3 In his Motion to Seal, Plaintiff requests that his Rule 65(b) Motion be filed “under 4 seal/ex-parte” because it contains “confidential matters that are privileged” and that 5 “sealing the motion is appropriate because the motion and attachments contain sensitive 6 information in regards to the case.” The Court has reviewed the Rule 65(b) Motion and 7 the attachments and finds that none of the information contained therein is privileged or 8 sensitive information. Motion to Seal 9 Ordinarily, if a request to file under seal is denied in full, the lodged document 10 will not be filed and “the submitting party may, within five (5) days of the entry of the 11 order denying the request, resubmit the document for filing in the public record.” LRCiv 12 5.6(e). In an effort to move this case forward and because the Rule 65(b) Motion is 13 deficient, the Court, it its discretion, will grant the Motion to Seal rather than require 14 Plaintiff to refile a deficient motion that will ultimately be denied. Moreover, the Court 15 finds no basis for filing this Order under seal because, in denying the Rule 65(b) Motion, 16 the Court makes no reference to the contents of the Rule 65(b) Motion. 17 B. 18 Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary 19 injunction is within the Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 20 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979). A temporary restraining order can be issued without 21 notice Rule 65(b) Motion only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 22 23 24 25 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (emphasis added). See also LRCiv 65.1 (“Ex parte restraining 27 orders shall only issue in accordance with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 28 .... TERMPSREF - 15 - 1 Plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable injury before Defendants can 2 be heard in opposition. Because the Rule 65(b) fails to comply with Rule 65(b)(1), the 3 Court, in its discretion, will deny without prejudice the Rule 65(b) Motion. See LRCiv 4 65.1. See also American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) 5 (district court abused its discretion in granting ex parte temporary restraining order 6 “when there was no valid reason for proceeding ex parte and by disregarding the strict 7 procedural requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) for the issuance of such ex parte 8 orders”); Adobe Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Cal. 9 1999). 10 VII. Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time or Suspension of Time 11 In his Rule 4(m) Motion, Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to serve the un- 12 served Defendants until after the Court completes its statutory screening of the Amended 13 Complaint. The Court will grant the Rule 4(m) Motion. This Order will direct the 14 United States Marshal to serve Defendants McCloskey and Hardy and will provide 15 Plaintiff with information regarding the service procedure. 16 VIII. Warnings 17 A. 18 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 19 Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 20 for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 21 dismissal of this action. Address Changes 22 B. 23 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 24 copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 25 certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 26 Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 27 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 28 Plaintiff. TERMPSREF Copies - 16 - 1 C. 2 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 3 these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 4 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 5 for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 6 IT IS ORDERED: 7 8 (1) Possible Dismissal Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 5) is granted. The Rule 65(b) Motion (Doc. 6) must be filed under seal. 9 (2) Plaintiff’s Rule 65(b) Motion is denied without prejudice. 10 (3) Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal (Doc. 9) and Notice of Supplemental 11 12 13 14 15 Authority and Arguments in Support of Objection for Removal (Doc. 12) are denied. (4) Plaintiff’s “Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal” (Doc. 10) is denied. (5) Plaintiff’s “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading by Maricopa County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply” (Doc. 15) is denied as moot. 16 (6) Plaintiff’s Rule 12(f) Motion (Doc. 17) is denied. 17 (7) Plaintiff’s Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time or Suspension of Time 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening” (Doc. 20) is granted. 19 (8) Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief is dismissed without prejudice. 20 (9) Defendants Manos and Wilson are dismissed without prejudice. 21 (10) Defendants Maricopa County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy must answer 22 23 Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief. (11) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 24 Amended Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 21-47), this Order, and both summons and request for 25 waiver forms for Defendants McCloskey and Hardy.4 26 27 28 TERMPSREF 4 Although an attorney has filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendant Hardy, it is not clear whether Defendant Hardy has been served or has waived service. - 17 - 1 (12) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 2 within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 3 provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 4 (13) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 5 complete service of the Summons and Amended Complaint on Defendants McCloskey 6 and Hardy within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing 7 of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not 8 served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 9 10 11 (14) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. (15) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants McCloskey and Hardy 12 of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons 13 pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants 14 must include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers 15 of service of the summons. 16 undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the 17 request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 18 (a) If a waiver of service of summons is returned as personally serve copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint, and 19 this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure; and 21 (b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 22 service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 23 service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 24 upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 25 form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 26 photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint, or this 27 Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 28 required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant TERMPSREF - 18 - 1 pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 2 ordered by the Court. 3 (16) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 4 Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 5 Marshal, not the Plaintiff. 6 (17) Defendants Maricopa County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy must answer 7 the Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time 8 provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure. 10 (18) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 11 whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 12 paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 13 (19) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to 14 Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 15 authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 16 Dated this 27th day of October, 2014. 17 18 Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TERMPSREF - 19 -

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