Sanchez v. Arizona Department of Corrections et al

Filing 38

ORDER granting in part Defendants' Motion for Clarification Re: Dkt. 34 , or in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Dkt. 34 (Doc. 36 ). FURTHER ORDERED that "Notice to Kelley Morrissey" (Doc. 34) is deemed a response to Defendants' ; Motion for Summary Judgment. FURTHER ORDERED denying the alternative Motion to Strike. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file their reply to Plaintiff's response (Doc. 34) no later than 15 days from the filing of this order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Eileen S Willett on 9/22/2015. (KMG)

1

WO

2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8
9

Hisrael Sanchez,

No. CV-14-01302-PHX-DJH (ESW)
Plaintiff,

10
11

v.

12

ORDER

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

13

Defendants.

14
15

On June 15, 2015, Defendants Cortez and Vargas 1 filed a Motion for Summary

16

Judgment (Doc. 28) and Statement of Facts (Doc. 29). The Court issued its Amended

17

Order (Doc. 33) pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

18

banc). The Court ordered the Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants’ Motion for

19

Summary Judgment together with a separate statement of facts in accordance with Rule

20

56, Fed. R. Civ. P., and LRCiv 56.1(b), no later than July 29, 2015. The Court advised

21

the Plaintiff that failure to file a response which conforms in all substantial respects with

22

the requirements of Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., LRCiv 56.1(b), (e), and LRCiv 7.2 may

23

result in dismissal of the case.

24

On July 27, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a document which is a letter to Kelley J.

25

Morrissey (Doc. 34) with a number of attachments (Doc. 34 at 4-20). In his letter

26

Plaintiff relates that he fell while handcuffed due to standing water, followed policy

27
1

28

By Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) filed on June 26, 2015, the Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissal without prejudice of Defendant Cardenas pursuant to Rule
4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P.

1

regarding a grievance, is taking medication for injuries he sustained, will need future

2

medical care upon his release from prison, and believes he has a strong case. Plaintiff’s

3

letter does not comply in all substantial respects with Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., or LRCiv

4

56.1(b), (e). Defendants subsequently filed their Motion for Clarification Re: Dkt. 34, or

5

in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Dkt. 34 (Doc. 36).

6

Though untitled, based upon the content and timing of Plaintiff’s letter, the Court

7

finds that the document (Doc. 34) was most likely intended to be a response to

8

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court docketed Doc. 34 as a

9

“Notice to Kelley Morrissey.” The Court, however, deems Doc. 34 to be a response to

10

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

11

“A district court has discretion to adopt local rules.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558

12

U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (citing Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987)). See also Rule

13

83, Fed. R. Civ. P.; 28 U.S.C. § 2071. A district court’s local rules are not petty

14

requirements, but have “the force of law.” Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 191 (quoting Weil

15

v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169 (1929). In addition, local rules are binding on the court and

16

the parties. Professional Progame Group v. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th

17

Cir. 1994) (citing Martel v. Los Angeles, 21 F.3d 940, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1994)). A district

18

court cannot depart from its local rules which affect “substantial rights.” Id.

19

In this case, were the Court to depart from the local rules and allow Plaintiff’s

20

response to stand, such departure would not affect substantial rights of the opposing party

21

and require reversal. See Martel, 21 F.3d at 946. Because Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 34)

22

fails to comply with Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., and LRCiv 56.1(a), (b), (e), the Defendants

23

ask the Court to strike Plaintiff’s document (Doc. 34). LRCiv 7.2(m). However, “a

24

motion to strike may be filed only if it is authorized by statute or rule . . . or if it seeks to

25

strike any part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not

26

authorized) by a statute, rule, or court order.” Id. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is not

27

authorized by Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. In fact, the Court should liberally construe a civil

28

motion from a pro se inmate and avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly. See

-2-

1

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010); Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d

2

348, 352 (9th Cir. 1999).

3

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above,

4

IT IS ORDERED granting in part Defendants’ Motion for Clarification Re: Dkt.

5
6
7

34, or in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Dkt. 34 (Doc. 36).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that “Notice to Kelley Morrissey” (Doc. 34) is
deemed a response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the alternative Motion to Strike.

9

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file their reply to Plaintiff’s

10
11

response (Doc. 34) no later than 15 days from the filing of this order.
Dated this 22nd day of September, 2015.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

-3-